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Abstract 
This thesis measures the tax effort and taxable capacity in Libya and 
examines an important research question: " Has the tax burden reached the 
level of full tax capacity in Libya?". The main motivation of the study is 
the need to diversify the sources of  the Libyan economy. To this end the 
thesis presents a conceptual framework for tax burden, excess of tax 
burden, theory of optimal taxation, concept of taxable capacity, concept of 
tax effort.The framework is used to reviews the developments of the 
Libyan economy and the impact on tax effort. The thesis has explored 
several aspect of  tax performance in Libya. First, it analyses the trends of 
public revenues, public revenues, public spending in final stances of the 
government. Second, it studies the tax structure and the relative importance 
of tax sources through the analysis of marginal propensity to tax and the 
income elasticity of taxes. Third, it examines the evolution of Libya's tax 
system particularly the income tax system. Finally, various econometrics 
models such OLS regression, Ordinary ridge regression, and Unbiased  
ridge regression  are used to measure the tax performance such as tax 
burden, tax effort and tax capacity using time series data covering 1970 to 
2000, and panel data covering 2001 to 2007. A fixed and random effect 
model are used to compare if the  determinants of Libya’s tax efforts differs 
from that of  a range of selected oil producing countries. These countries 
are: Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, 
Cameroon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, 
Equatorial Guinea, Ecuador, Egypt, Emirates, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Kuwait, Lesotho, Libya, Mauritania, 
Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Saudi, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Venezuela, 
Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
This research consists of seven chapters: Chapter One provides a 
background; Chapter Two provides the literature review; Chapter Three 
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gives a brief overview of the development of the Libyan economy, while in 
Chapter Four there is a description of the public finances in Libya; this is 
followed in Chapter Five by a review of the tax system in Libya; Chapter 
Six presents the study’s analyses and findings; Chapter Seven provides the 
conclusions and recommendations. 
The main findings of this research are: First, in Libya, tax burden per capita 
is high; Second, the tax bases in Libya were narrow reflecting the 
government's heavy reliance on oil revenue; Third, the level of taxable 
capacity in Libya is also low compared to the selected oil producing 
countries for a variety of reasons, including:  narrow tax bases, failure to 
diversify the tax sources, and the public sector being subject to tax. The 
argument is presented that the Libyan economy has reached the full 
utilization of its taxable capacity. 
In addition, the study found that the following factors have a major positive 
impact on Libya's taxable capacity and tax effort: the national product of 
the service sector, money supply, level of business freedom, level of 
economic freedom, currency in circulation and tax penalties. In contrast, 
two factors are found to be negatively affecting the taxable capacity and tax 
effort in Libya: non-oil exports, oil revenues. 
The contributions of this study to the literature are twofold: first, this is the 
first of its kind to provide comprehensive analyses of Libya’s tax 
performance; Second, it has added some new variables such as oil 
revenues, non-oil exports, currency in circulation, money supply(M1), and 
tax penalties in testing the determinants of tax effort into the model built by 
previous researchers. Finally, the research results shed lights on how Libya 
government may  diversify the Libyan economy and encourage growth in 
the non-oil private sector through proper taxation mechanisms.  
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Chapter One  
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the background to the study, the research problem, the 
research questions, the study objectives, and the importance of the study.  
1.1 Background  
An increase in interest in the topic of taxes has accompanied the development of 
countries all around the world, not only because of the resources they represent, 
but for the use they can be put to as a tool for social and economic policy, to 
achieve the objectives of countries. Taxes affect all areas of economic and 
social life; the importance of these effects has increased with the widening role 
of the state and its increased intervention in economic affairs, and the evolution 
of the concept of public finances. Therefore, countries are trying to reform their 
taxation through the design of more efficient systems, which include taxes that 
are more politically and socially acceptable and applicable, and are able to 
achieve sufficient income, provided there are no economic distortions as a result 
of these taxes. 
 However, the fiscal policy in Libya has not hitherto depended in general 
on the use of taxes as a financing tool, for several reasons, such as the 
abundance of oil resources, which meant that increases in the size of public 
spending were financed through monetary issuance. In the meantime, because 
the Libyan general budget mainly depended on one resource, which was oil 
revenue, this led to instability in the Libyan economy, and poor distribution of 
income and wealth among the members of the society. With this in mind, the 
Libyan government's effort to diversify its revenue sources since the mid-1980s 
had as its aim the development of taxes. 
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 Due to the instability of oil revenues (and customs revenues), whereby 
Government funding was particularly affected when the oil price fell to $13.5 a 
barrel in the mid-1980s, Libya has been trying to alleviate its dependence on oil 
revenues and move towards a transition to a free-market economy. Thus, it 
became necessary to use tax as an important tool to finance the expenses of the 
state, and the development of a tax system to suit the requirements of a free 
market and economic globalisation.  Therefore, the optimal control of the tax 
system is necessary, which is an essential tool that the industrialised countries 
depend on to achieve and guide their development programmes.  When tax is 
considered a successful tool, the state can use it for many purposes, such as 
controlling some of the economic phenomena of a state, encouraging certain 
economic activities, or limiting some other undesired economic activities.  So 
Libya is considering how best to utilise its tax system in the search for 
alternative (non-oil) resources, which it can use to cover expenses and to 
achieve more sustainable economic development. Moreover, the Libyan 
government is fuelling the development of economic activity outside the oil 
sector by encouraging foreign and local investment in the non-oil sector in order 
to achieve tax revenues. 
 As a result, measuring the tax burden is of great importance, as it gives a 
clear picture of the nature of the prevailing tax system and its weaknesses. The 
measurement of the taxable capacity of a state also provides information on the 
financial capacity of the national economy and demonstrates the maximum tax 
that can be paid by the society in order to finance public services without 
harming economic development. 
Problem of the research1.2  
The Libyan economy has several salient features, such as its status as a mono-
economy dependent predominantly on one resource, the difficulties its faces in 
its transition to a free economy, and the decline in foreign investment it is 
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facing for a variety of reasons both within and beyond its control. This research 
attempts to examine the factors most influential on tax effort and taxable 
capacity, which prevent the realisation  of  the optimal level of tax burden in the 
 Libyan Economy. 
The main reason for this study to be conducted is the occurrence of certain 
economic developments that require a re-examination of the tax effort index. 
Among these developments are the need for economic diversification, the 
shifting of the Libyan economy to a free market, and low levels of foreign 
investment. These problems are clarified as follows: 
1. The need to diversify sources of national income: 
In the 1970s, the oil wealth of Libya led to some improvement in living 
standards, attracting investment and infrastructure development. However, it is 
also true that the economy has been so far been characterised by the features of 
an oil economy, which can be summarised in three elements: 
First: Mono-economy (or rentier economy, see glossary), characterised as an 
economy in which the oil business is the main factor contributing to economic 
growth. As a result, fluctuations in world oil prices often lead to fluctuations in 
economic growth.   
Second: Due to the mono-economic structure, oil revenues are the main drivers 
stimulating the Libyan economy. The abundance of oil leads to an increase in 
income, whether through direct shifts or by increasing the levels of wages and 
the expansion of jobs, all of which leads to increased purchasing power in 
society: this means transferring surplus oil revenues abroad. This in turn leads 
to a deficit in the balance of payments, because the wealth of the economy leaks 
abroad in the form of increasing imports. Tax policy has the potential to modify 
the balance of payments. 
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Third: There is unbalanced development at the district level linked 
geographically to the natural distribution of oil wealth, a pattern that is not easy 
to change or modify in terms of its social and economic effects. Tax policy at 
the district level can help a lot to change this pattern.  
Although the non-oil sector in Libya has seen remarkable growth over previous 
years, the Libyan economy has not been completely free from the problem of  a 
high dependence on oil; and since the beginning of the 1970s, until 2005, there 
was a notable instability of growth rates of GDP, so the economy was exposed 
to relative decline in the rates of economic growth in some years. 
The national economy is still mainly dependent on the oil sector, resulting in the 
following: 
- Dependency of the national economy on world oil market price 
fluctuations. 
- Intensity of global competition and entry of new and strong competitors. 
- High population growth. 
- Focus of foreign investment in the oil business in Libya. 
- Libya's obligations in terms of bilateral economic agreements. 
- Increased staffing requirements (job creation) and the inability of the 
public sector to provide a sufficient number of jobs. 
 
The Libyan economy depends primarily on oil, but oil prices are unstable, and 
oil revenues witnessed a marked deterioration in the mid-1980s. As a direct 
result of the low oil price, falling from $26.5 per barrel in 1985 to $13.5 in 
1986, this situation led to the need to increase non-oil revenues to cover the 
shortfall in oil revenues.   
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2. Transition to a free market economy (privatisation): 
Libya, as a developing country, seeks to raise the rate of economic growth 
through a transition from a socialist system to a free market economy. Some 
steps have been taken to achieve this change, such as economic reforms in 
accordance with international standards, maintenance of economic resources 
and wealth, and creation of new sources of finance (i.e. resources that are not 
derived from oil).   
3. Decline in foreign investments: 
A favourable tax policy can significantly contribute to attracting foreign capital 
by providing an attractive climate for investment. This is because the stability of 
the tax system stimulates the inflow of foreign direct investment, and also 
stimulates the investment of domestic capital locally, and prevents its leakage 
abroad. Therefore, the Libyan government needs to design an appropriate tax 
system to attract foreign capital. 
4. Inadequacy of the tax system: 
The tax system prevailing in Libya during the study period was a system that 
was wholly inappropriate for all these political, economic and new social 
developments. It has not been revised since 2004. 
 
1.3 Research Questions:  
1- What was the tax revenue performance during the period of the study? 
2- What were the key determinant factors affecting the tax effort in Libya? 
What social and economic factors and proxies affect the tax effort and show a 
positive and significant relation to the tax ratio; for example: tax penalties, 
money supply, non-oil exports, and oil revenues? 
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3- Has the Libyan tax effort not reached its optimal level because of:  
            a) Low tax burden, 
            b) Low taxable capacity, 
or for some other reason? 
4- What policies might be suggested to improve taxable capacity in Libya? 
The variables mentioned in question two are expected to be important factors 
because the payment of tax is a monetary phenomenon and these factors have a 
strong influence on the tax structure and the Libyan economy. 
 
1.4 The aims of the Study 
The main purpose of this research is to estimate the optimal standard of the 
taxable capacity in the Libyan economy and make recommendations for 
improving Libyan tax effort. This study aims to: 
( 1 ) Examine current tax revenue performance, and investigate the possibility 
of improvement.           
( 2 ) Investigate the key determinants affecting tax effort. 
( 3 ) Identify the nature and characteristics of the tax basis, establishing the tax 
basis field and range, and assessing the economic advantage or usefulness of the 
expansion and diversity of  the tax base.  
( 4 ) Explore whether the tax burden has reached its optimal level . 
( 5 ) Provide recommendations for policy makers to improve tax effort. 
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( 6 ) Measure the Libyan tax effort compared with other selected oil producing 
countries . 
1.5 Methodology of the research 
In order to measure the tax effort inside Libya during 1970 - 2000, this study 
used three regression models: ordinary least squares (OLS), ordinary ridge 
regression (ORR), and unbiased ridge regression (URR) .  
The OLS method examines the relationship between the dependent variable and 
the independent variables. Under the Gauss-Markov assumptions, the OLS 
estimator is the best, linear, unbiased estimator of the true parameters βi, 
conditional on the sample values of the explanatory variables. The goal of OLS 
is to closely ‘fit’ a function with the data. It does so by minimizing the sum of 
squared errors from the data. 
ORR is obtained from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) by adding a small 
constant to the diagonal elements of the matrix X'X , which improves the 
estimation to get a smaller mean squared error than ordinary least squares. 
The URR method is based on realistic empirical prior information that can be 
measured by taking the average of the regression coefficients of OLS. URR 
regression achieves a smaller mean squared error than ORR and is more stable 
than the OLS.  Meanwhile, the URR method leads to smaller mean square error 
(MSE) than the ORR procedure, and substantially smaller than OLS. 
The dependent variable is the contribution of tax revenue to gross domestic 
product (Ty); this is the variable representing the process the study is trying to 
predict and understand. After estimation   ෠ܶ௬ became as indicator of the taxable 
capacity. The four explanatory variables are: non-oil exports (nox); tax penalties 
(vp); oil revenues (oilR); and money supply (Msp): these are the variables used 
to model or to predict the dependent variable values, where Ty  is a function of 
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nox, vp, oilR, and Msp.The number of observations is 31 for the period of 1970-
2000 . 
The regression coefficients (β) are computed by the regression models. They are 
values, one for each explanatory variable, that represent the strength and type of 
relationship the explanatory variable has to the dependent variable. 
For the period 2001-2007, cross-sectional analysis and panel data analysis were 
used for measuring the comparative tax effort, by measuring the indices of tax 
effort for Libya and comparing them with some other oil producing countries. 
Using cross-sectional analysis, the sample is 34 countries and independent 
variables are: Service, value added as share of GDP; Index of fiscal freedom; 
Index of business freedom; Currency in circulation % of GDP; Index of trade 
freedom; Agriculture, value added as share of GDP. Meanwhile, the sample in 
the panel data analysis is 38 countries , and the independent variables are: 
Agriculture, value added as share of GDP; International trade as share of GDP; 
Annual rates of inflation % growth; Index of economic freedom; Corruption 
perception index; Shadow economy index. 
The index of tax effort is constructed as the ratio of actual tax share to the 
predicted tax share. 
1.6 Importance of the study, and its contribution  
This study attempts to examine the tax policy performance of the Libyan 
economy, during the period 1970-2000, then to make a comparison with 
selected oil producing countries during the period 2001-2007, identifying if and 
how objectives of the tax policy were realised. Therefore it is necessary to make 
a regular estimate of the most important factors which affected the taxable 
capacity, and to make an appraisal of potential effects of the different 
components of tax structure. This will assist in determining the tax capacity of 
Libyan society, as well as helping to ensure the expansion possibility of the tax 
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base, and the forecasting of taxable capacity's limits, which can be used in the 
planning and projection of fiscal policy. The theoretical contribution of this 
study is represented in studying the impact of some new variables on tax effort, 
and these variables are: oil revenues; non-oil exports; tax penalties; currency in 
circulation, money supply ( M1). 
As for its empirical contribution, this research has examined the tax system in 
Libya during a 31 year period from 1970 to 2000. It has also made a comparison 
of the tax effort between Libya and some selected oil-producing countries. This 
study has also applied the two methods of ORR and URR in measuring the tax 
effort.  
This research consists of seven chapters. Chapter one contains the research 
problem, the research questions, the study objectives, the research method and 
data sources, and describes the study’s importance and its contribution.  
Chapter two deals with the literature review of the research, including an 
introduction, the notion of tax burden, the excess of tax burden, the theory of 
optimal taxation, the concept of taxable capacity, the concept of tax effort and 
the previous studies on tax effort 
Chapter three explains the developments of the Libyan economy during the 
study period through analysis of the GDP structure and its components, 
analyzing the product of non-oil sector and the oil sector. This chapter points 
out that the development plans aimed at reducing dependence on oil due to its 
price fluctuations in world markets. In this chapter, the most important 
characteristics of the Libyan economy are also reviewed. Chapter Three also 
touches on the economic developments in Libya and their impact on tax effort 
and tax burden during different periods with different conditions.  
Chapter four sheds light on the public finance in Libya; it shows trends of 
public revenues, public spending and the position of the public budget (deficit / 
25 
 
surplus) during the study period. Chapter four also explains that indirect taxes 
are mainly dependent on the customs taxes, especially import tax and 
production tax. 
Chapter five sheds light on the tax system, tax base and rates in accordance with 
the Libyan tax legislation, and shows the most important developments and 
trends in tax revenues, and then analyses the tax structure and the relative 
importance of the tax types to determine the marginal propensity to tax and the 
income elasticity of taxes in the Libyan economy. This chapter explains that the 
tax system in Libya applies two methods of tax deduction, which are the direct 
method (direct taxes) and the indirect method (indirect taxes). The chapter 
finally evaluates the Libyan income tax system. 
Chapter six deals with measuring the tax burden and the tax effort for the 
national economy in Libya, including: measuring the individual tax burden in 
Libya during 1970-2000, and measuring the Libyan tax effort over the same 
period, using OLS, ORR and URR. This chapter also measures the Libyan tax 
effort during 2001-2007 compared with selected oil producing countries, 
applying cross–sectional analysis and panel data analysis.  
Chapter seven gives a summary of conclusions, based on the empirical results 
of the study, together with the implications and recommendations of the study, 
its contribution, limitations and a proposal for future studies. 
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Chapter Two  
 Literature Review 
  
2.1. Introduction 
To fulfill the objectives of the current study to examine the Libyan tax system 
and tax performance, some importance concepts such as tax burden, taxable 
capacity, tax effort, and their measurement needed to be clarified. In addition, 
the previous research in this area will be discussed so that key issues relating to 
tax performance in developing countries can be identified, in order to lay the 
foundation for the current study.  
Tax burden represents the wider indicator of the role of taxation in a country's 
economy, which mirrors the entire tax burden born by households and firms, 
(De Santis et al., 2001, p. 9).  
Taxable capacity is considered together with tax effort as the most essential 
tools in the area of tax policy. Both concepts put stability between positive and 
negative influences as a priority.  However tax, which is an important source of 
revenue, may also be compared against other economic elements. Although 
fiscal policy’s influence is not restricted to demand, to supply, consumption and 
employment elements, it expands to have an effect on money supply through 
the way that is selected to fund expenditure (Mankiw, 2003). Some studies 
indicate, in this case, that financing budget deficit from external borrowing, 
especially in developing countries, may result in money market instability 
(Aaron & Pechman, 1981; Bird & Oldham, 1990). 
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The level of prices will, therefore, be increased by aggregate demand. 
Developing countries are counseled to organise and manage their public 
expenditure and improve their internal receipts to avoid such negative effects. 
Although taxation acts as a lead source of internal incomes, there are many 
restrictions upon using it. Government cannot always go on raising the tax 
burden due to its confliction with other economic elements such as economic 
development, wages and well-being. In most cases, increases in tax rates can 
impact not only on receipts, but also other tax bases and eventually their tax 
receipts. 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the meaning of taxable capacity and tax 
effort in addition to their methods and determinants. 
 
2.1.1. Meaning of tax and its classification  
The distinction between oil revenues and tax revenues is important in the 
economies of oil-producing countries, and for this purpose tax can be defined as 
chargeable money imposed on persons, income or property by public 
government (Allan, 1971; Black, 1997; James & Nobes, 1996; Lymer & 
Hancock, 2002). To differentiate between tax revenues and revenues from 
natural resources such as oil and gas, such a definition is very helpful. 
Although oil and gas revenues are categorised by the financial and budget 
systems with different method to tax revenues, in a rentier state such as Libya, 
and other petroleum based economics, it is practical to assume that the oil 
industry could allow for a broad tax basis while oil rents are obtainable, which 
may suggest a lack of necessity for other types of taxation.   
Having faced a deficit in its budget since the 1980s, the Libyan government is 
trying to obtain extra financial revenue sources to fill the gap between revenue 
28 
 
and expenditure. This study will differentiate between oil revenues, such as 
income obtained from natural resources, and tax revenues. Governments resort 
to taxation for many purposes, such as funding their expenditure, redistributing 
income, improving economic growth, and protecting particular industries. 
Moreover, it can be used to encourage or discourage consumption of particular 
goods (Allan, 1971, Farhoud, 1998). 
Tax is classified into direct and indirect tax according to the administrative 
arrangements for collection. Direct tax can be defined as money directly paid by 
individuals to a tax authority; while indirect tax is defined as tax borne by 
someone different from the one paying it, such as value added tax (VAT) which 
acts as a form of consumption tax. 
It is also split in accordance with the relationship of tax amount to tax basis size 
(Allan, 1971; James & Nobes, 1996). Lymer and Hancock (2002) mentioned 
that exact or unit tax takes into account the weight or size of the basis, while “ad 
valorem” tax relies on the value of the tax basis. Tax rate is likely to be split 
into three kinds: progressive, proportional, and regressive, according to rate 
diversity. Progressive rate refers to a tax that occupies an increasing share of the 
tax basis as the tax base rises. Proportional indicates a tax that occupies an 
unchangeable share of tax basis regardless of increases or decreases. The final 
rate, regressive, indicates that the tax rate declines as the tax basis increases.  
 
2.2. Tax burden and its measurement. 
Interest in the concept of the tax burden in tax studies has increased since the 
middle of the last century. Overall, most studies have agreed that tax burden is 
the actual amount of tax suffered by individuals and organisations, which can be 
measured by finding (counting) the ratio of Government tax revenues to Gross 
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Domestic Product (Baer and Galvao, 2005, p.5), or to Gross National Product 
(Malik, 2001, p.10 ).   
Musgrave (1959) saw the tax burden as representing the changes in the 
distribution of national income resulting from the tax deduction. Musgrave 
differentiated between the specific tax burden and what he called the differential 
tax burden (cited in Howard, 2001). Assuming stability of expenditure, the 
specific tax burden means the change in pattern of income distribution because 
of taxation. On the other hand, the differential tax burden means the change in 
the distribution of income resulting from the replacement of another tax system, 
under the assumption that the real tax revenue in both systems is equal, and the 
real public expenditure has not been affected by this replacement. 
Hicks (1959), an English economist, made a distinction between the traditional 
burden of tax and the tax effects.  Hicks viewed the traditional tax burden as the 
statistical expression of the distribution method of the actual tax burden among 
the citizens during a certain period, while the effects of tax represent the 
changes in the behavior of taxpayers as a result of the imposition of tax.  Other 
economists such as Daxon and  Enevoldsen (1998) have pointed out that the tax 
burden is part of the resources that are absorbed by the public sector in a certain 
period of time, which can be considered as an indicator of the degree of state 
intervention.  
 Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize winner for economics, believes that "tax burden is the 
difference between the individual's real income before and after the tax has been 
imposed, taking full account of how wages and prices may have adjusted”, 
(1999, p. 483) 
Entin (2004) considered the tax burden as the economic impacts caused by 
taxation, which reflect the reactions of taxpayers because of this tax deduction.  
In other words, tax becomes a burden because it reduces people's income.    
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Most scholars who have conducted research on this subject agree that the tax 
burden can be measured quantitatively as a share of GDP, (Baer and Galvao, 
2005, p.5 ).  
Daxon and Enevoldsen (1998) suggested a measure of the tax burden per capita, 
which can be measured in two ways: 
First, per capita taxes expressed in money terms. However, this indicator may 
lead to misleading results for not taking into account the differences in income 
levels, especially when the comparison is between several asymmetrical 
communities.   
Second, it is possible to calculate the taxpayer's share of taxes divided by his 
share of national income. 
2.2. 1.  Tax burden and equity. 
 The measures of tax burden are indicators of how well tax policy meets one of 
its primary goals; that of equitably raising the revenues needed to run 
government. There has been ongoing debate on how to find the optimal tax 
system, both socially and economically, in such a way that both efficiency 
and fairness are generated, because taxpayers should have an ability to bear the 
tax burden (Maroun, 2010, p. 32). 
 Equity has two aspects. The first, vertical equity, concerns the way taxes are 
distributed among taxpayers with different abilities to pay. The second, 
horizontal equity, concerns the way taxes are distributed among taxpayers 
with the same ability to pay. Tax burden thus measures broad economic and 
social questions about the effect of tax policy on the distribution of income and 
wealth (Atrostic & Nunns, 1991). To examine the fairness of tax equity, several 
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indices have been constructed. These include the Suits Index, the Gini Index, 
the Hoover Index and the Theil Index. 
The Gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality: the Gini coefficient can 
be calculated as the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and the absolute 
equality line, divided over the total area under the 45o line. Its value ranges from 
0 to 1, with 0 being the value of perfect equality and 1 of maximum inequality 
(Charles-coll, 2011).  
The Hoover index is equal to that portion of the total income that would have to 
be redistributed for there to be perfect equality (Harney, 2007). The idea behind 
this measure is quite simple; it is the proportion of income that would need to be 
redistributed from the upper half in the income distribution to the lower one, in 
order to achieve maximum distributional equality. As in the Theil index, the 
value of the index ranges from 0 to 1, being 0 the value of perfect equality - 
where no redistribution is necessary- and 1 of maximum income inequality - 
where all income would be redistributed (Charles-Coll, 2011). 
The Theil index provides a measure of discrepancies between the distribution of 
income and the distribution of population between groups (Rohde, 2007), and 
like the Theil index goes from 0 to 1. However, in this case a value of 1 reflects 
total equality and a value of 0 represents maximum inequality (Charles-Coll, 
2011). 
Musgrave (1959) had recourse to use the Lorenz Curve when measuring per 
capita tax burden, which represents the pattern of income distribution in 
society. As illustrated by figure 2.1 (see the figures appendix), the Lorenz 
curve can be used to compare distributions of pre-tax or post-tax income over 
different years; different countries, for other purposes; or of pre-tax income 
with post-tax income (James & Nobes, 2004). 
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A Lorenz curve is the cumulative portion of the total income held below a 
certain income percentile, and the straight line of slope +1 ( MacDonald, 2007, 
p. 60). 
From figure 2.1, the axis AB measures the percentage of income earned, AD 
axis is cumulative percentage of population, AEC is 45 degree line (line of 
perfect equality) which reflects the optimum distribution of income, and the 
curve AGC represents the pattern of income distribution prior to the imposition 
of a new tax, and curve AFC refers to the pattern of income distribution after 
the imposition of a new tax (the new distribution of income). Mathematically, 
tax equity can be explained by the ‘Gini Index’ which is the difference between 
the 45 degree line and the Lorenz curve. The index varies between 0 and 1, with 
1 being the maximum inequality. Also using the Lorenz curve, the Suits Index 
can be constructed. In figure 2.1, if the rate of change between the area AFCB 
and area AGCB is greater than one, this means that the tax burden  is  
progressive and that income (after tax) is distributed in a more equitable way. 
Vice versa, if the rate of change between the two areas mentioned is less than 
one, this means that the tax burden is regressive. Therefore, the distribution of 
income after taxation is less equitable than before. In other words, if the AFC 
curve is closer to the line AEC compared to the AGC curve, this means that the 
tax burden is more equitable in this case. The Suits Index is positive for a 
progressive tax whilst it is negative if there is a regressive tax. 
There are many other indices of income redistribution through tax burden. The 
most commonly used are the Hoover and Theil indices. The Hoover index is the 
easiest to calculate from all measures of inequality, namely: the proportion of 
all income which would have to be redistributed to achieve a state of perfect 
equality (taken from the richer half of the population and offered to the poorest 
half). Hoover index varies between 0 and 1 (0% and 100%), where 0 (zero) 
indicates perfect equality and 1 (100%) indicates maximum inequality 
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(Constantin et al., 2010).  Theil's measure is part of a special class of inequality 
measures known as Generalised Entropy, or GE measures, (Rohde, 2007, p. 2). 
Entropy can be understood as a property of a group of income earners who are 
unable to be distinguished from each other by their resources. In other words, 
higher entropy means higher equality in income distribution. The Theil index 
goes from 0 to 1. A value of 1 reflects total equality (maximum entropy) and a 
value of 0 represents maximum inequality (Charles-Coll, 2011, p. 23).   
 From this we understand that if a Hoover index is close to zero this means that 
the tax burden is low, and if a Theil index is close to zero this means that the tax 
burden is high. 
There have been some criticisms about the aforementioned measurement for tax 
burden.  For example, when the percentage of actual deducted tax to national 
income is used to measure the tax burden, there may be a difficulty in defining 
the scope, substance and items of national income. In addition, there is also a 
difficulty in using the measurement to compare the tax burden across different 
countries, because this measure does not take into account the differences 
between these countries in terms of their tax structure; level of economic 
growth; structure of the economy, population structure and also the methods of 
determining prices. 
Despite all the shortcomings of this measure of the tax burden, it has been used 
widely by many modern tax studies when they have distinguished between 
different tax burdens, and this was because of the ease of its use and the lack of 
other alternative standards that are more accurate.  
 In terms of using the ratio of actual deducted tax to total public revenues as the 
measurement of tax burden, this method also faces some difficulties in 
measuring some non-tax revenues. 
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Based on all the above definitions, during the period between 1970 and 1972, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) conducted a study to measure the tax 
burden for 72 countries using the following three criteria:  
(1) the tax burden = total tax revenues ÷ gross national product  
(2) the tax burden = total tax revenues ÷ per capita income  
(3) the tax burden = total tax revenues ÷ size of the foreign trade. 
( Marar and El-hindi , 1980, p.90 ) :   
2.2.2. Excess of tax burden  
To be familiar with the cost of introducing and/or changing taxes is one of the 
major orientations of taxation. Tax collected by the state on the basis of the 
exact amount which is used to estimate the taxation cost may surpass the 
revenue raised.  The following study will discuss the impact of excess tax on the 
welfare and the production. 
2.2.2.1. What does excess tax burden mean? 
Tax burden is defined by Black, (1997) as the burden to which an entire society 
is subjected in terms of tax cost, while Auerbach (1985) defines excess burden 
as allocative inefficiency, styling it the sum of all losses in productivity caused 
by excessive taxation in a society. As all conceptual definitions broaden the 
excess burden further than revenues a government collects, graphical and 
mathematical representation will be relied upon in its analysis. 
A formula can be developed that assumes that an indirect tax is offered to allow 
the government to obtain “R” revenue, then:  
ܴ ൌ ܴ ሺ ሖܲ , ܧ ൫ ሖܲ  , ሖܷ ൯ ሻ ……………………………………………..…… (1) 
This function indicates that revenue will be expressed as a price function “P” 
and required expenditure amount “E” encountering utility “U” at price “P”. 
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Therefore revenue will be the following function in the case that tax rate “ti” is 
imposed on good “X” and period “i” 
ܴ ൌ ሺ ሖܲ  , ܧ ሺ ሖܲ , ሖܷ ௜  ሻሻ ൌ  ∑ሺ ́ݐ ݇/1 ൅  ́ݐ݇ ሻ ሖܲ ݇ ܺ݇ ሺ ሖܲ , ܧ ሺ ሖܲ , ܷ ሻሖ ………….(2) 
 
Marshallian demand function is represented in the last equation section, Xk (p',  
E (P',U'). 
The excess burden based on  equivalent (extortionary) variation “EBe” or the 
excess burden based on compensating variation “EBc” is the act of debating 
about conceptual definition of excess burden; based on equivalent variation 
“EV” this means consumers change their behaviour in order to reduce the 
amount of tax they must pay. Meanwhile, having the government repay the 
amount of additional money to the individual to reach the initial utility (before 
the tax collection) is the definition of excess burden based on compensated 
variation “ CV ”. Therefore (according to Auerbach,1985; Creedy, 2000 & 
2004):  
EBe = EV  -  R( P1 , E( P1 , U1 ))…………….………………………..( 3 ) 
and: 
EBc = CV  -  R( P1 , E( P1 , U0 ))………………………………..….…( 4) 
Where: 
EV = E ( P1 , U1 ) -  E ( P0 , U1 )…………………………..…….…….( 5 ) 
E (p1, U1) reflects the sum of expenditure after a modification in price due to 
taxes. 
P0 and U0 reflect initial price and utility respectively 
p1 and  U1 refer to new price and utility levels after a modification in tax. 
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ܥܸ ൌ   ܧ ሺܲଵ , ܷ଴ሻ െ  ܧ ሺ ܲ଴, ܷ଴ ሻ……………………..…………… ( 6 ) 
E (p0, U0) stands for total expenditure before a change price. 
The following section uses graphical analysis to clarify excess burden in order 
to discuss the welfare cost of taxation and tax incidence, and to specify from 
whom taxation is collected. 
2.2.2.2. Private sector and excess tax burden 
The majority of situations vary in the impact they have; and a similar situation 
applies to people in evaluating different values. That means that people assess 
their benefits differently (Alwaily, 2006). Thus, people may withhold paying an 
imposed tax; however, they will face a burden of tax which limits the 
consumer's choice either by discouraging them from a bargain, or by imposing 
cheaper goods on them. To analyse excess burden (dead-weight) of taxation, 
indifference curves and budget line technique will be useful.  Black (1997) and 
Pindyck and Rubinfeld, (1997) provide a definition for the Indifference curve as 
a graph showing different bundles of goods between which a consumer is 
indifferent: the consumer has no preference. The budget line refers to all 
probable choices or goods a consumer can afford, restricted by earnings level 
and goods prices. 
Tax imposed before and after consumer behavior is represented in figure 2.2. 
All probable combinations of the consumer designate consumption between 
goods “X” and “Y” are included. In the case of devoting his whole earnings to 
one of the quantities “OA” of “Y”, or “OB” of “X”, the consumer can consume 
them. Although the comparative price of “X” and “Y” Px/Py is referred to by 
the gradient of the budget line, a reasonable consumer will select the 
combination of these two goods that enable him to maximise his utility. 
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When the budget line “AB” touches (tangent) the highest indifference curve, “I1 
”, it acts as the perfect combination. The indifference tangent curve slop 
referring to marginal substitution rate “MUx / MUy” between “X” and “Y” is as 
equal as the gradient of the budget line and reflects the comparative price 
“Px/Py”.   This finding gratifies utility maximisation. 
As a rule, (Mu1/P1=Mu2/P2= .....=Mun/Pn) must be equaled to maximise 
consumer utility, which means that the same marginal utility is provided by all 
money spent on goods "1, 2,……., n".  In the case that the government imposes 
a tax on commodity “X”, the budget line will adapt to “AC”, which gives the 
consumer, in particular, the chance to buy “OC” units of commodity “X” after 
the imposed tax, while the commodity quantity “Y” does not change. 
The comparative price, the incline of the budget line, obviously changes to 
"Px(1+t)/Py". The consumer will broaden, one more time, his utility at “Q2” 
where the highest possible indifference curve “ I2” is touched by budget line 
“AC”. “Q2” achieves a state of balance for the consumer. 
"Mux/Muy=Px(1+t)/Py", which will help in demonstrating the consumer's worst 
condition due to the initiation of such a duty of excise special tax. To get the 
same receipts (as equal as duty of excise special tax), the government is able to 
use other kinds of taxes and leave the consumer more satisfied than a duty of 
excise special tax. Forcing a lump-sum tax, for instance, on both commodities 
“X” and “Y” at an equal rate by a consumption tax, will move the budget 
constraint backward to “A'B' ”, analogous with “AB”  and joint point  “Q2” (to 
get as equal receipt as a selective tax). 
Thus the consumer can purchase equal amounts, as with the selective tax 
approach. A higher indifference curve “ I3”, however, can be achieved under  
utility maximisation conditions. The falsification of price structure is the major 
difference between these scenarios. 
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The selective tax that may lead to having an effect on fruitful price elements has 
obviously modified the comparative price, the incline of the budget line, Px/Py, 
so there will be an effective loss. The comparative price has not been affected in 
the second scenario (the slope of “A' B' ” is as equal as “AB”) 
Musgrave and Musgrave, (1989) indicate that income tax only has an income 
effect when leading to purchase decreases from both commodities “X” and “Y”, 
 while duty of excise special tax has an additional alternative effect leading to 
“X” by “Y” substitution. There is a significant result indicating that constricted 
tax basis is likely to impose a more significant excess burden than a wide tax 
basis (Cullis & Jones, 1992; James & Nobes, 1996; Musgrave & Musgrave, 
1989). Imposing wide based taxes without any exceptions is not easy to collect 
and less complies with costs.  A low rate of tax will encourage the public to 
accept the tax and decrease the motivation to avoid it. This in turn leads to 
contradict the demand to present complicated non–avoidable plans (Eland, 
1995). But a question of low income groups and geographic distribution may 
arise from Eland’s viewpoint (Alwaily, 2006). 
Some elements that may have an effect on excess burden size is also important, 
as indicated by (Alwaily, 2006 ):  
1. How efficiently pertinent parts of the economy are working. 
2. The value of elasticity of demand and supply timetables (see following 
section). 
3. Elasticity of production elements and how they could be assembled. 
4. Great tax basis (as mentioned before. a wide tax basis is likely to produce 
less excess burden in comparison with a narrow tax base). 
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2.2.2.3.  Estimating excess tax burden. 
Considering income compensated and uncompensated demand curves (the latter 
also known as the Marshallian demand curve), excess burden can be evaluated 
through measuring well-being costs. 
Figure 2.3 is extracted from figure 2.2 where the curve “Dm” acts for the  
Marshallian demand  curve  and  “Dc” shows the income compensated demand 
curve, which involves income impacts and is less elastic, for normal 
commodities, than the Marshallian curve (Black, 1997). The excess burden 
(Welfare cost “W”) is determined by Triangle 123 .The triangle area 
Mathematically calculates as 1/2( Base * Height ) . The basis equals "q2-ql” or 
“ ∂ Q”  and the high equals the variation between “P1” and “P2” which also 
points out for tax per unit “T” ( T equivalent to tP) concerning figure 2.3. “P2” 
reflects the price level after tax, where: 
P2=P1 (1+t)   ………………………………………………………….…..( 7 ) 
Where ( t ) is tax rate representing the variation between P1 and P2. 
Evaluation of the excess burden needed to calculate triangle (123) area, thus:  
W = 1/2 (q2 – q1) (P2 – P1) ……………………………………….……..( 8 ) 
Or  
W = 1/2 ( q2 – q1 ) ( P1 ( 1+t ) – P1 )……………..….………….…….…( 9) 
ܹ ൌ 1 2⁄   ߲  ܳ. ܶ  ………………………...……………………..………(10) 
The modification on “Q” relies on price elasticity of demand (ed) which can be 
calculated as the following equation: 
݁݀ ൌ ቀడொ
డ௉
ቁ . ሺ   ௉
ொ
 ሻ   …………………………………………….……….. (11) 
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Leads to : 
߲ܳ ൌ ሺ   ௘ௗ.డ௉ொ 
௉
  ሻ …………………………………………………….…..( 12) 
Alternative equation (12) into (10) gives  
ܹ ൌ   
భ
మ
ሺ ௘ௗ  .  డ ௉ொ் ሻ
௉
………………………………………………….…….(13)  
 
As stated previously “∂ P” is equal to “T” so: 
 
ܹ ൌ
భ
మ
ሺ ௘ௗ ்మ.ொ ሻ
௉
…………………………………………………….…… (14) 
 
“T ” is equal to “tP” so (14) can be rewritten as: 
 
ܹ ൌ ଵ
ଶ
ሺ ݁݀ ሺ ݐ. ܲ ሻଶ ܳ ሻ/ܲ…………….………………….……………. (15) 
Finally ,  
ܹ ൌ  ଵ
ଶ
  ݁݀  ݐଶ ܲܳ …………………………………...……………..…. (16) 
 
All variables required to evaluate welfare cost (dead- weight) based on the last 
equation created by tax are price demand elasticity “ed”, tax rate  “ t ”, pre-tax 
price  " P1 " , and quantity “q1” . Nevertheless, this equation does not consider 
price supply elasticity. Cullis and Jones (1992) consider this point to avoid such 
a deficiency and introduce the following equation: 
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ܹ ൌ ଵ
ଶ
ݐଶሺ ଴ܲݍ଴ሻ ሺ ݁ݏ – ݁݀ ሻ/ሺ ݁ݏ െ ݁݀ ሻ…………………………. ( 17) 
where “es” and “ed” refer to elastic price of supply and demand respectively. 
2.2.2.4. Distribution of tax burden  
The taxation cost is likely to exceed tax revenue. Therefore, it is necessary to 
know who will bear these costs or how the tax burden will be divided. 
The person who is legally responsible for paying the tax (statutory taxpayer) 
may not be the one who actually bears the burden of the tax (economic 
taxpayer), because of shifting the tax burden, also known as tax incidence 
(Economic Report of the President, 2004).This means that the persons who do 
pay tax to the government are likely to be different from those who actually 
cover the tax burden, according to the concept of tax incidence. Black (1997), 
Lymer and Hancock (2002), and Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) indicate that 
there is a discrimination between economic incidence and lawful incidence, 
which refers to the person or corporation responsible for paying tax: economic 
incidence refers to those who actually bear the burden of tax. Elasticity of 
demand and supply, market feature, and time period permitted for adaptation to 
happen have an effect on the dispensation of tax burden (Musgrave & 
Musgrave, 1989).  Figure 2.4 indicates that imposing tax such as excise tax lead 
to transferring supply curve “S” to “S1” and the price rises from “P0” to “P1”. 
The burden really covered by the consumer is represented in the area between 
the initial price and the new one “POECP1”. While the area limited between the 
initial prices and “H” “HFEPO” describe the untransformed burden and has to 
be covered by the manufacturer. The essential conclusions are that the greater 
the price elasticity of demand, the smaller the burden transferred to the 
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consumer. Nevertheless, the greater the price elasticity of supply, the greater the 
burden transferred to the consumer. Figure 2.5 clearly indicates these findings. 
Cullis and Jones (1992) adjust the following equation to calculate burden 
distribution in order to reveal the significance of price elasticity of demand and 
supply. This equation will be so helpful to answer inquires about who will pay 
the tax, or alternatively how the tax burden is divided between consumer and 
producer. 
߲ܲ݀ ߲ݐ ൌ   ݁ݏ ݁ݏ െ ݁݀⁄⁄  ………………………….………………..…… (18) 
Similarly, 
߲ܲݏ ߲ݐ ൌ   ݁݀ ݁ݏ െ ݁݀⁄⁄ ………………………………..……………..… (19) 
 
Where " t " considers the tax per unit which reflects to the variation between     
" Pd" and "Ps". 
2.2.2.5. What is the relationship between excess tax burden, tax rate and 
tax revenues? 
A positive relation is found between tax rate and tax revenue; however, the 
issue is more complex than that and requires careful attention rather than a 
quick response. The following analysis will demonstrate that an efficiency cost 
(dead-weight) will grow since the tax rate rises. Nevertheless, tax revenue is not 
likely to be conducted in the same way as excess burden. A number of tax rates 
are assumed in order to test such cases. 
The impacts of several tax rates on tax revenue and excess burden, (both 
demand and supply curves are elastic) are illustrated by figure 2.6. Position “A” 
mirrors pre-tax equilibrium where "P0" and "Q0" are the equilibrium price and 
quantity of good “X”. Consumer surplus equals “PODA”.  Presenting a unit tax 
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“POP1” has an effect on the supply curve to move to “S1".  A new balance 
position is generated where yield is decreased to “0Q1”, price increases to 
“OP1” and consumer surplus decreases to “P1DB”. Moreover, new variables 
are generated due to presenting a tax such as excess burden that is represented 
by triangle "ABF", and the government will collect earnings equal to rectangle 
“POFBP1”. Imposing a new higher rate “POP2” moves supply schedule to 
“S2”, as a result price increases to “0P2”, yield reduces to “0Q2”, excess burden 
expands to “AGC” and tax revenue grows to “POGCP2”. It is worth noting that 
if tax increases to “POP3”, as a result of this, tax revenue will reduce to 
“POHEP3” while excess burden will spread to" AHE".  Figure 2.7 demonstrates 
the development direction of tax revenue collected by government and excess 
burden undergone by the economy, by using the same concept of total revenue 
(TR) analysis as that used in private firms. Tax revenue can be noted to 
continuously grow as a result of the raised tax rate until it reaches its highest 
level. Any increase of tax rate will, afterwards, decrease the sum of amount of 
tax revenue. Excess burden (EB) will be greater, however, provided that the tax 
rate rises. 
Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) concluded that if the definition of taxation 
quality is the tax revenues ratio to excess burden, any further growth of tax rate, 
after tax revenue reaches its maximum point, will decrease the quality of 
taxation. This review is connected to optimal tax theory, and will be traced in 
the following section. 
 
2.3. Theory of optimal taxation: 
Section 2.2.2.2 illustrates that poll tax or lump sum tax is less of a falsification 
or redundant burden than excise tax. The main object of optimal tax theory is to 
search for decreasing excess burden and increasing tax revenue. However, the 
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majority of important commodities such as food have less price elastic demand. 
Therefore, imposing a higher tax rate on such commodities will make poor 
people suffer disproportionately as a high ratio of their income is used up on 
these commodities. There is obviously conflict between equity and efficiency. 
The following section will discuss the matter of how optimal tax theory could 
adapt between them. 
2.3.1. The optimal tax on commodity: 
Ramsey’s derivation of optimal commodity formula, or what is called Ramsey’s 
rule, is the basis optimal commodity tax analysis relies on. It specifies: “small 
uniform intensification of the optimal taxes (that increase all taxes by the same 
proportion) will produce equal proportionate reductions in demand for all goods 
if the consumer is compensated to stay on the same indifference curve” (cited in 
Alwaily, 2006, p.145). If two independent goods “X” and “Y” are assumed to 
have variant price elasticity, optimal tax will provide proportional decrease in 
demand. Taxation on lower price elasticity goods must be higher than higher 
price elasticity goods to attain such a decline. Ramsey’s theory can be achieved 
when tax rate is reciprocally proportionate to the price elasticity of demand.  
Moreover, the same finding can be illustrated by using a mathematical method. 
The welfare cost “W” or excess burden “EB” can be measured by the formula 
(Cullis,1992 ): 
EBx = 1/2 (ex.Px . Qx . t2x ) ……………………..………………( 20) 
Where, ex= price elasticity of demand for good X ; Px = price of good X ; Qx = 
quantity of the good X consumed ; tx = the rate of tax on good X .            
Similarly, 
EBy = 1/2 ( ey . Py . Qy . t2y ) ……………………….…………..( 21) 
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Where, ey= price elasticity of demand for good Y ; Py = price of good Y ; Qy = 
quantity of the good Y consumed ; ty = the rate of tax on good Y . 
Total tax revenues “R” obtained from “X” and “Y” equal: 
R = tx.Px.Qx + ty.Py.Qy ……………………………………….( 22) 
Lagrange (L) formula must be used to decrease excess burden affected by 
revenue restriction: 
ܮ ൌ 1 2 ሺ ݁ݔ. ܲݔ. ܳݔ. ݐଶݔ ሻ ൅ 1 2 ሺ ݁ݕ. ܲݕ. ܳݕ. ݐଶݕ⁄⁄ ሻ ൅ ߣ ሺܴ െ ݐݔܲݔܳݔ െ
ݐݕܲݕܳݕሻ...................................................................................... ( 23) 
Taking the first differentiation for both" tx" and " ty " yields: 
߲ܮ ߲ݐݔ ൌ ݁ݔ ܲݔ ܳݔ ݐݔ –  ߣ ܲݔ ܳݔ⁄  ……….…………………….(24) 
߲ܮ ߲ݐݕ ൌ ݁ݕ ܲݕ ܳݕ ݐݕ െ  ߣ ܲݕ ܳݕ⁄ ………………….…….…..( 25) 
Setting both equations equal to zero and rearranging the variables yields, 
݁ݔ ܲݔ ܳݔ ݐݔ ൌ  ߣ ܲݔ ܳݔ   ฺ        ݁ݔ. ݐݔ ൌ  ߣ  ……….………( 26) 
݁ݕ ܲݕ ܳݕ ݐݕ ൌ  ߣ ܲݕ ܳݕ   ฺ        ݁ݕ. ݐݕ ൌ  ߣ ………….……..(27) 
 
By substituting equation (27) into equation (26): 
݁ݔ. ݐݔ ൌ ݁ݕ. ݐݕ ……………………………………..……..…..( 28 ) 
  Finally,     
ݐݔ ݐݕ⁄   ൌ   ݁ݕ ݁ݔ⁄    ……………………………….……….….( 29 ) 
An inverse elasticity rule is the name of the last equation and it complies with 
Ramsey’s rule. However, this analysis considers contradictory equity principals 
as low price elasticity goods are more likely to be necessity goods, which use up 
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a high ratio of the income of lower income groups. Taxation on good “Y” will 
be 8% while taxation on good “X” will be only 2%, and “ey” is equal “2” and 
“0.5” respectively according to the last equation. 
Yet, some economists criticise optimal tax theory in many of its attributes, 
which include a major one that can concisely be discussed. First, a complex 
group of taxes and rates is needed to apply optimal tax theory, although the 
result will be second best particularly when leisure is considered in the tax base 
(Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989; Cullis and Jones, 1992), supposing that there 
are different selections between goods “X” and “Y” on the one hand and 
between income “I” and leisure “L” on the other, in order to elucidate this 
matter. However, if both goods “X” andY” are taxed equally, such falsification 
can be decreased.  This case does not generate falsification between “X” and 
"y". 
 “L” will be selected rather than “X” and “Y”. However, the question remains of 
what will happen, as an alternative, in the case that the taxation on “X” is 
greater than “Y”? To intensify the falsification between “X” and “Y”, “X” and 
“L”, such a state is expected, while it will decrease falsification between “Y” 
and " L ". 
Second, administrative obstacles connected to the intricacies mentioned above 
exist. Intricacy may generate some losses and increases costs. Computing the 
optimal tax rate is very difficult because great effort is required to get the 
essential information, such as the awareness of utility levels and revenue 
distribution (Cullis and Jones, 1992; Tait, 1989). In addition, the omission of 
administrative cost is an essential defect of optimal tax theory (Abu Hammour, 
1997; Heady, 1993). James and Nobes (2004) indicate that the administrative 
cost of operating a tax system should comprise the full assets cost to the public 
sector of each functional tax; in addition, the services obtained not paid for from 
47 
 
other divisions. Estimating the direct cost is possible, while doing so for indirect 
cost is very difficult, if not impossible. It is reasonable that this deficiency of 
estimating administrative costs, particularly indirect ones, is not only limited to 
optimal tax theory. 
Third, optimal tax theory pays little attention to consumer behaviour. The value 
of commodities arises from realising that commodities are not easily consumed 
by other consumers at the same time. In Hirch’s (1977) opinion, consumer 
behavior has been omitted in the analysis of optimal tax theory. Furthermore, an 
optimal tax method is most likely to disregard variances in favouring between 
households that possibly arise from variances in demography, and other 
properties (Alwaily, 2006). 
Abu Hammour (1997),  Hausman (1988),  Rosen (1976), and Sandmo (1976) 
explain that although all taxes have an effect on consumer conduct to some 
extent, either by decreasing available income or by raising the price of goods 
and services or both, taxation can also impact saving, and risk affecting labour 
supply, education selections and housing resolutions. 
Both Tollision (1987) and Cullis and Jones (1992) illustrate the fourth aspect 
connecting to rent-seeking cost where manufactures and small groups of 
companies make an effort to force government and pay out some assets to 
undermine tax. Such costs of rent conservation compromise a real assets loss 
(Alwaily, 2006). Optimal tax theory requires that such extra costs does not 
maximise efficiency loss, (Tollision, 1987). He observed that the traditional or 
optimal taxation is under threat; optimal taxation has a pillar that the excess 
burden is reduced to a specific amount of increased income when such taxes are 
set on goods with relatively inelastic demand curve.  
This optimal taxation rule, unluckily, is not able to resist the above analysis.  
According to Tollision, 1987, the area of “P23Ps” in figure 2.8 (appendix 2)  is 
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calculated as a portion of duty of excise special tax cost, taxing an industry with 
a more elastic demand curve, but no organised rent, or rent protecting 
opposition to the tax, is socially preferable: (see figure 2.8 in appendix 2). 
2. 4. The concept of taxable capacity for the national economy, and its 
measurement  
Taxable capacity and tax effort have gained due attention, particularly in 
developing countries, to study and examine the aim of increasing tax proportion 
in a country to fund government programmes and decrease constant deficit.  
However, very often socio-economic elements restrict the government’s 
capability and desire to take up such policies. A discussion of these aspects is 
given in the following: 
2. 4.1. The concept of taxable capacity: 
Taxable capacity represents a very early approach in the field of public finance. 
Dalton (1961) indicates that taxable capacity could be split into two types; 
absolute taxable capacity and relative taxable capacity. Both types will be dealt 
with in the following section. In practice, this study adopts measuring the 
relative taxable capacity because it is more accurate than the absolute taxable 
capacity. 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, a considerable amount of research was 
devoted to studying tax related issues in developing countries. Much of the 
research was led by economists in the IMF in an effort to assist aid donors and 
international lending agencies in their evaluation of the fiscal performance of 
governments. Much of this analysis was conducted by economists such as Lotz 
and Morss (1967), Chelliah (1971) and Howard (2001). 
Mirrlees (2010) stressed that tax capacity is a slippery, elusive concept. On 
examination, taxable capacity always turns out to be very difficult to define and 
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to be a matter on which opinions will differ rather widely. Despite this opinion, 
there have been various attempts to define taxable capacity. 
Taxable capacity (also known as tax capacity) is one of the major components 
in the studies of taxation. Some scholars refer to the term “taxable capacity" as 
the maximum capacity of a community to bear taxes without much hardship. It 
indicates the degree of taxation beyond which the productive effort and 
efficiency of the society begin to fall. Thus, taxable capacity is the maximum 
limit up to which people can normally pay taxes, (Deepashree, 2006, p. 28): in 
other words, it is the optimal size of tax revenues. According to Howard (2001, 
p. 162) “taxable capacity can be interpreted as the amount of tax which could be 
justly or fairly imposed on a country ". 
The taxable capacity can be measured by finding the expected rate of tax to 
GDP and, through a regression equation of the actual tax burden on a variety of 
factors, influencing it. Musgrave (1987) identifies several factors that determine 
a country’s taxable capacity: its stage of development, often measured by per 
capita income; the existence and extent of ‘tax handles’; and the efficacy of its 
tax administration . 
The literature of public finance is replete with attempts to define the concept of 
taxable capacity for the national economy.  
Below are some examples of the alternative definitions of taxable capacity:  
Firstly, tax capacity is defined as “the ability of a government to raise  tax 
revenues based on structural factors including the level of economic 
development,  the number of  ‘tax handles’ available, and the ability of the 
population  to pay taxes” (Hoek & Peter, 2008, p. 28).  This definition 
emphasises that the taxable capacity is the national income's ability to bear the 
tax. 
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Secondly, the taxable capacity is the optimum size of tax revenues that must be 
collected when every country applies its own tax system efficiently (Hope, 
1996). According to Hope (1996) taxable capacity can be seen as the total tax 
amount that would be collected if each country applied an identical set of 
effective rates to the selected tax bases - that is, as the yield of a representative 
tax system. Similarly, Govinda et al. (2005) defined the taxable capacity of a 
country/state as the revenue it can generate if it levied an average effective rate 
of tax on its base. 
Thirdly, taxable capacity is the ability of the taxed person to bear the burden of 
the tax in relation to his/her source of income without experiencing a reduction 
in standard of living, or margin of profit and investment in the case of firms 
(Rajagopalachar, 1993, p. 260). 
Fourthly, the taxable capacity is the potential ability of tax, in other words, it is 
the maximum possible tax revenues that can be deducted from the national 
income, without the economic or social pressures associated with the inability to 
pay them. This mean that taxable capacity is the extent to which households and 
firms can pay a tax and a fiscal authority can collect it (Rutherford, 2002). In 
essence, the taxable capacity reflects the limit between the national income's 
ability to bear the maximum possible tax revenues and the negative impact on 
the tax bases as a result of exceeding that limit.  
Finally, the ability to tax is determined largely by a country's taxable capacity 
and it is possible to consider an almost infinite list of variables that could 
conceivably affect taxable capacity (Williams, 2001). 
It can be noted that although the definitions of taxable capacity differ in 
wording, there is a consensus that taxable capacity of the economy represents 
the optimum tax burden, which accommodates between the government's need 
for tax revenues and the ability of the gross national product to meet that need. 
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On the other hand, governments must also consider the ability of individuals to 
bear the tax burden by taking into account social and economic considerations, 
and distributing the tax burden among members of the society fairly (Gravelle 
& Shvedov, 2004). 
In short, taxable capacity depends on the ability of the people to pay and the 
ability of the government to collect (Malik, 2010, p. 10). 
Gupta (2007) has indicated that there are two concepts of taxable capacity:  
(i) Absolute taxable capacity: which means the surplus of production over the 
minimum maintains that volume of production per head of the population, 
keeping the essential standard of living unchanged over a number of years. (ii) 
Relative taxable capacity, which means the extent of tax burden that should be 
imposed on different persons to finance a common expenditure. The relative 
taxable capacity is a percentage of absolute taxable capacity to net state 
domestic product (Gupta, 2001, p. 184). 
2.4.1.1. Laffer curve and the absolute taxable capacity  
Optimal tax theory may be an inappropriate means to satisfy inquires raised by 
this study due to previous criticisms, which makes it necessary to examine the 
chance of utilising taxable capacity. According to Dalton (1961), absolute 
taxable capacity can be gathered and obtained as a tax income with no 
economic harm for a country, such as a decline of welfare level, contraction of 
the labour supply, or investment deterioration etc. 
There is a wide-ranging belief that high taxes lead to reduction of economic 
growth in terms of weakness in the development of firms, the demotivation of 
labour, and increases in the cost of investment. Yet, the kinds of expenditure 
funded by tax revenues powerfully reflect the impacts of tax. On one hand, 
taxes negatively affect an economy when their revenues are used to fund 
unproductive schemes such as transfer payments. They, on the other hand, they 
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affect positively when their revenues are devoted to fund productive schemes 
such as education and public foundations. 
It is possible, therefore to assume that comparatively high tax areas may be 
preferred to low ones . According to Dalton (1961) governmental interference in 
the economy in the shape of taxes should be chosen and planned in order to 
accomplish their aims with no loss to the economy.  Exceeding taxable capacity 
and/or suitable practice of the tax system results in such loss or negative effects. 
In most of countries, economists firstly argue that government should consider 
the economic cycle when it has some surplus in the budget during economic 
prosperity, in order that the government during an economic depreciation may 
operate through a loss without significant tax rises. Secondly, in case a state 
owns natural resources, does that mean this country should not impose tax 
revenue? Taxes are not only restricted to achieving financial aims; in many 
places they have also been utilised to attain a number of objectives such as 
economic, social and political goals. 
Absolute taxable capacity illustrates the highest tax rate which could be 
deducted from the economy with no adverse impacts or economic loss, and this 
is difficult to be identified and estimated. The relationship between tax rate and 
tax revenue is demonstrated by the Laffer Curve, which can be employed to 
measure an absolute taxable capacity and to determine the concept of ‘economic 
damage’. Adam Smith (1776) identified the relationship between tax rate and 
tax revenue, stating : “high taxes, sometimes by diminishing the consumption of 
the tax commodities, and sometimes by encouraging smuggling, frequently 
afford smaller revenue to government than what might be drawn from more 
moderate tax” (cited in Haughwout et al., 2004, p.570). Later, this idea was 
developed by Dupuit (1844) when he clearly drew the nature of the relationship 
between tax rate and its revenue, later known as the ‘Laffer Curve’.  Dupuit 
pointed out that: 
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if a tax is gradually increased from zero up to a point where it becomes 
prohibitive, its yield is at first nil, and then increases by small stages until it 
reaches a maximum, after which it gradually declines until it becomes zero 
again. It follows that when the state requires raising a given sum by means of 
taxation, there are always two rates of tax, which would fulfil the requirement, 
one above, and one below that which would yield the maximum. There may be 
a very great difference between the amounts of utility lost through these taxes 
which yield the same revenue (cited in Auerbach, 1985,p.62). This prompted 
Auerbach (1985, p. 61) to write that “even the  Laffer  curve...might  more 
appropriately be called the Dupuit curve.” 
Professor Arthur Laffer (1974, cited in Wahid, 2002) suggested, as shown by 
the curve illustrated in figure 2.9 (see appendix 2) that tax revenue will increase 
equally with tax rate along the upward share, where the normal range is 
represented by a bell-shaped relation between tax revenue. An opposite relation 
between tax rate and tax revenue will take place as soon as the peak of the curve 
is reached. According to Griffiths and Wall (2001) raising tax rate will occur at 
the same time as a reduction in tax revenue because a high tax rate that 
decreases the tax base has a discouraging impact in this downward sloping 
portion, the prohibitive range. However, raising tax rate more than the revenue 
maximising tax rate (RMTR), a peak on the Laffer curve, is likely to make tax 
revenue greater in the short term due to the new tax rate. Buchman and Lee 
(1982) distinguish between the short run and long run in the Laffer curve, where 
the latter has a more significant curve than the former. 
Tax revenue (TR) will be valued to zero at two rates: (r) -zero and 100% as 
illustrated by figure 2.9 (appendix 2). In a simple manner, TR = r (GDP), 
therefore, zero tax rate produces zero tax revenue in spite of GDP level. 
Although a 100% rate is presumed to produce zero tax revenue due to its 
discouragement to all yields, Kinsley (1978) indicates that revenue valued to be 
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zero at 100% tax rate is illogical as other motives have an effect on work effort 
in addition to a money motive alone.   
The sum of tax revenue amount “TR” can be obtained by two different tax rates. 
“r1” located in the normal extent is not as high as the maximum rate, while “r2” 
located in the prohibitive segment is not as low as the maximum tax rate. 
Therefore, it is more likely to provide an opposite impact and reduce tax 
revenue be decreasing the tax basis (Alwaily, 2006). 
The Laffer curve, from the supply side in particular, has been given due 
consideration by focusing on the stimulating impact of the tax rate modification 
(reducing/increasing) by economists. Others studies concentrate on deciding the 
greater tax rate revenue. The Laffer curve, therefore, has been utilised to 
evaluate complete taxable capacity (maximum tax rate) and indirectly to show 
the stimulating impact of tax rate modification. 
For example, Clarke suggests that no type of tax rate should exceed 25% to 
eliminate loss pressure (Griffiths and Wall, 2001). 
Although the majority of developed countries tend to increase tax rate to more 
than 40%, they have great positive growth rate of real income. Musgrave and 
Musgrave (1989) indicated that the ratio of tax rate to GNP varied from 8% to 
18% in less developed countries, while it conversely varied between 30% and 
40% in developed countries. Tax revenue in Sweden is estimated by Sturat 
(1981) to be maximised at a 70% of tax rate.  He also indicated that Sweden's 
tax system in the 1970s was situated in the prohibitive extent of the Laffer 
curve, because the real tax rate was 80%. 
Hsing (1996) in his study into the American tax system, discovered that the 
revenue increased to the highest amount when tax rates were between 32.67% 
and 35.21%.  Ravestein and Vijibrief (1988) indicated that tax revenue would 
be increased to the highest amount at a tax rate of about 70% while the actual 
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tax rate was 67% in 1985 in the Netherlands. Griffiths and Wall (2001) 
concluded that summit of the Laffer curve would be accomplished at a tax rate 
of about 60%. The maximum tax rate on dividend income the in the United 
Kingdom was reduced from 83% to 60% according to their study.  
Kiefer (1978) argued that there is a lack of tax rate for the entire economy 
which can be measured by using the horizontal axis. The elasticity of supply 
was taken into account to settle different views in the relation between tax rate 
and its revenue. He mentioned "those who find an inverse relationship between 
tax rate and revenues must believe that the relevant elasticity is high, that the 
relevant tax rate is high, or both. Those who find a normal range must believe 
that one or both of these parameters is low. Finally, those who deny the 
existence of an inverse relationship at any tax rate might really just believe that 
the uncompensated supply elasticity is zero or negative (or that demand is 
inelastic)” (cited in Fullerton, 1982, p. 4).  
It can be concluded that each country has its own Laffer curve which varies 
from one period to another with varied tax rates. 
The Laffer curve, as previously stated, has not been directly used to assign the 
motivated/unmotivated influence of altering tax rate on labour supply. A 
taxation system can have a great influence on people to accomplish economic 
activities, as economists affirm about the supply side. This debate assumes that 
a tax cut would stimulate individuals to work hard, which would result in 
extending tax basis and increasing tax revenue. Tax effect on individuals' 
selection between work and leisure can be identified by measuring the role 
diverse taxes (especially income tax) play on work effort. Two important 
impacts affect such selection: income impact and alternative impact, which 
mostly work in diverse directions. James and Nobes (2004) indicated that the 
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two, in theory, can be examined by utilising a variant curve that can clarify tax 
differences and their varied influence on work motivation. 
Many attempts have been made to test the impact of imposing tax on labour 
supply.  In the UK 70% of a sample indicated that the impact of income is equal 
to an alternative impact on motivating work, which means a neutral response to 
work with higher tax (Brown & Dawson, 1969). Only between 5% and 15% had 
an unmotivated impact on work (income impact is less than alternative impact). 
A motivated impact on higher tax (income impact is greater than alternative 
impact) was eventually indicated by a smaller percentage. Weak evidence was 
reported by Flemming and Oppenheimer (1996) for the impact of tax cuts at the 
upper end group of the income bracket, on the labour effort. 
However, Griffiths and Wall (2001) point out that a high implied marginal tax 
rate can perform as an essential discouragement to low income earners. As 
Barlow et al. (1966 ) point out, only one eighth of their sample of 957 persons, 
decreased their work hours due to progressive income tax (cited in Alwaily, 
2006). He concluded: “There are many more powerful motives affecting the 
working behaviour of high income people than the marginal income tax rate. 
People are aware of taxes and do not enjoy paying them, but other 
considerations are far more important to them in deciding how long to work" 
(Alwaily, 2006, p. 153). 
Many elements such as gender, work nature (professional or non-professional), 
the family size and the age of children, as well as taxes are seen to have an 
effect on work effort. Mankiw (2003) showed the strong positive impact of tax 
reduction during the Kennedy presidency in the USA, which finally led to a 
reduction in the unemployment rate from 5.7% in 1963 to 5.2% in 1964 and 
then to 4.5% in 1965. Moreover, growth rate of actual GDP was 5.3% in 1964 
and 6.0% in 1965. He concluded "tax cuts stimulate aggregate supply by 
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improving workers' incentive and expand aggregate demand by raising 
household disposable income" (p.154). 
Nevertheless, tax cuts are likely to have an opposite impact where the reduction 
in tax rate ' t '  grows the associated price of leisure " PL "  and individuals will 
be in favour of working rather than leisure. This impact is known as alternative 
effect. Leisure price "PL" as a function of wage rate "W" and rate of tax “t “ can 
be written as  
௅ܲ  ൌ   ܹ െ ݐ ሺ ܹ ሻ …………………………………….………….( 30) 
Decreasing tax rate will, on the contrary, raise available income "Yd". 
Individuals, therefore, are required to work less to obtain the same level of pre-
tax cuts income. The following function where "h" stands for working hour is 
likely to express this relation. 
ܻ݀ ൌ   ݄ ሾ  ܹ െ ݐሺ ܹ ሻሿ  ……………………………………………(31) 
Fields and Stanbury (1970) indicated that the reverse is true according to this 
hypothesis. However, this means that a researcher may be unable to identify the 
complete impact of tax modifications on the labour market.  
Several groups of workers in different countries and times have been covered by 
 studies examined the influence of taxation on work, which mostly they did not 
indicate any fundamental impact from taxation. These studies, moreover, show 
that both incentives and disincentives have minor impacts. James and Nobes 
(2004) discussed such inconsistent influences by indicating they tend to offset 
each other, so that the net of taxation on the supply of labour is likely to be 
small. 
Lindsey (1987), and Griffiths and Wall (2001) have another significant 
viewpoint in this regard that decreasing tax rate may increase the cost of tax 
avoidance  (as part of the black economy) regardless of the neutral impact of tax 
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cuts on discouragement to work. Tax base, as a result of that, will extend 
leading to an increase in tax revenue. In this context, the black economy in the 
UK has been evaluated at between 6% and 8% of GDP, while Griffiths and 
Wall (2001) suggest that some evaluations of the black economy are as high as 
10% to12% of GDP in the UK.  It is a sum almost equivalent to the amount the 
Treasury obtains from income tax every year.  
2.4.1.2. Tax effort and the relative taxable capacity: 
Relative taxable capacity and tax effort methods will be taken into account in 
this part, trying to clarify questions offered by this study.  However, evaluating 
relative taxable capacity has gained significant attention because it is an elusive 
concept (Prest, 1978). Toye (1978) indicated that taxable capacity has been 
given various meanings at different times and in different contexts. Bahl (1971) 
defined relative taxable capacity according to the representative tax system 
(RTS) method as the tax ratio that can be achieved when a country applies to its 
variant tax bases a group of mean effective rates calculated as net regression 
coefficient for the sample of countries involved in the study. It can be also be 
defined as the sum of taxation that can be deducted from GNP or GDP when a 
similar country forces many tax rates on its different tax bases, taking into 
account the ability and readiness of the persons to pay taxes, in addition to the 
government's readiness to impose taxes, and its ability to collect them. 
Majority of taxable studies have attempted to apply a similar methodology 
between many developed and/or developing countries. Tait, Gratz and 
Eichngreen (1979), as a result, enhanced the use of the concept ‘International 
Tax Comparison’ (ITC) to refer to relative taxable capacity. Their comparison 
between many countries results in three possible cases: 
1. The countries involved in the study completely utilised their relative taxable 
capacity  with no potential of increasing tax revenue. 
59 
 
2. The country/countries used part of its/their taxable capacity. In other words, 
there were some adjustments to increase tax revenue either by raising the 
current tax rate or  offering new taxes. 
3. The country/countries progress further its/their tax capacity, which result in 
decreasing tax rates. 
Thus, it is acceptable to inquire if there is any variance between the capability 
and desire to pay tax. There is logically substantial variance between such 
concepts not only in taxation but also in their usage. According to Abu 
Hammour (1997) the capability to pay or collect taxes is of minor importance 
while the desire to pay or collect taxes is available. The capability to pay, in 
other words, relies on the tax payers’ monetary status (income and wealth). A 
country's tax system sometimes places onerous responsibilities on tax payers. 
Meanwhile, Chelliah (1971) indicates that a government’s capability to collect 
taxes may be related to its goals, constitutional elements, efficient 
administration and the nature of political leadership. 
Yet, the comprehension of taxpayers and the extent to which they are persuaded 
of the necessity for paying taxes are the limitations relating to the desire to pay 
them. If government dissipates or waste public revenues with no strong auditing 
and examination, tax payers will surely avoid tax and resist it. That means that 
taxpayers’ resistance plays an important part in restricting the amount of 
collected tax; thus, the way tax revenues are used enhances or curtails the 
willingness to pay. There is an essential and interesting fact to be taken into 
consideration here that may be briefly summarized; Individuals may have the 
capability to pay without the willingness, which could also apply to the 
willingness of the government to collect tax.  This is proven in many developing 
countries, such as Libya for instance, where the industrialised sector receives a 
very generous exemption and tax holiday although it has the ability to pay taxes. 
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2.4.1.3. The measurement of taxable capacity:  
From the above definitions, the taxable capacity can be seen as the possibility of 
imposing taxes using an efficient and effective method. This means taking into 
account the size and nature of tax bases in order to obtain maximum benefits 
with the minimum possible economic and social costs, and without incurring 
any loss of benefits to society and the national economy as a result of imposing 
the tax. However, absolute taxable capacity is difficult to conceptualise and 
impossible to measure in any objective sense. The relative taxable capacity is 
important to this study because it helps to compare the tax effort between the 
selected countries, and also to overcome the problem of currency unit’s 
difference between the countries. 
Although the concept of taxable capacity has been dealt with theoretically by 
some writers such as Musgrave  (1959), Paul Baran (1957)  and  Kaldor (1963),  
the first attempts to measure taxable capacity statistically were by Martin and 
Lewis (1956).    
 Musgrave (1959) emphasises the relevance and importance of relative taxable 
capacity; this can be estimated by comparing different countries or sub-national 
units in a federation. Thus, two countries or sub-national units in a country 
which are similar in economic circumstances should be able to generate equal 
amounts of revenue and the differences could then be attributed to the 
differences in their preference patterns.  Thus taxable capacity of different units 
in a federation can be estimated by estimating the ‘average’ behaviour of the 
States in raising revenues after allowing for economic factors that can cause 
differences in taxable capacity (Govinda et al., 2005). 
 Most specialised studies agree that measuring taxable capacity must be 
achieved through finding the expected or potential ratio of tax to gross national 
product and through the use of a regression equation of the actual tax burden on 
61 
 
the variety of factors influencing it. In other words, taxable capacity is the 
predicted tax- GDP ratio estimated from a regression, taking into account the 
country’s specific characteristics (Le Minh et al., 2008). To measure  
international taxable capacity, some other research has used the cross-section 
analyses to estimate the function of the tax burden of a group of countries, with 
the assumption that these countries are similar in terms of growth rates, degree 
of development, economic structure , tax structure, degree of efficiency and 
effectiveness of the tax system , and that tax rates are imposed on various tax 
bases (Chelliah, Bass & Kelly, 1975; Truong & Gash, 1979; Le Blanca & 
Rojchaichaninthorn, 2008) .  The relative taxable capacity using the regression 
approach is estimated by regressing the variables representing the tax bases and 
their proxies on the tax- GDP ratio of the states in cross-section regression. 
Apart from tax bases, “it also requires the identification of other factors that 
facilitate revenue collections, particularly those representing organization of the 
economy"( Govinda et al., 2005, p. 259).  
However, this method is beset with many defects, in particular by several 
complex problems which are caused by a lack of uniformity in the factors which 
affect  taxable capacity in the countries concerned. 
Other studies (e.g. Adanu & Sun, 2002) used time series analysis to measure 
taxable capacity in each country separately. 
It is possible to define the tax effort (which is sometimes called Tax Burden 
Index) as a portion of the society's taxable capacity which is borne by the 
society itself in the form of taxes, or the amount of taxable capacity which is 
used by the state. The tax effort can be measured by dividing the actual tax 
burden by the potential (estimated) taxable capacity.  
If the Tax Effort Index is greater than one, this means that the tax burden 
exceeds the taxable capacity.  In addition, the taxpayer suffers from tax stress or 
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fatigue resulting from the tax deduction exceeding his/her ability to pay. In 
other words, a high tax effort ratio, above one, indicates that the country is 
collecting more taxes than predicted by the structural characteristics of its 
economy (  African Economic Outlook , 2011). 
However, if the Tax Effort Index is less than one, it indicates that the tax burden 
is less than the potential taxable capacity, and the country is collecting less tax 
than predicted (African Economic Outlook , 2011), and that it is possible to 
increase the tax deduction. In this case, the tax burden could be increased by 
using any combination of four methods: increasing the existing tax rates; 
imposing new taxes; improving methods of tax collection; or preventing the 
phenomenon of tax evasion and reducing tax avoidance. 
If the Tax Effort Index is equal or close to one, this means that the tax burden is 
equal to the taxable capacity and the taxable capacity is fully exploited. It also 
means that, in this case, tax collection is as expected from structural 
characteristics (African Economic Outlook, 2011), so that the imposition of any 
additional taxes or raising of tax rates is not feasible.  
In the light of measuring the tax burden and taxable capacity results, there are 
four probabilities for tax policy classification in any country (Toye, 1978), as 
follow:   
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High taxable capacity & high tax burden. High taxable capacity & low tax burden. 
Lo
w
 
Low taxable capacity & high tax burden. Low taxable capacity & low tax burden. 
 
Although the limits of taxable capacity cannot easily be expressed by a fixed 
ratio, without taking into account several interrelated economic and social 
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factors which differ from one society to another, the change in these factors 
leads to change in the limits of the taxable capacity.  Therefore, any tax system 
must take such factors  into account, because " the desirable features of a tax 
system include minimal loss of efficiency, low administrative costs and that the  
system  should  take  account  of  issues of  both horizontal and vertical equity " 
(Connolly & Munro, 1999, p. 183). Therefore the most traditional explanatory 
variables in the conventional tax effort literature are those controlling a 
country's economic structure. These variables reflect the idea that the 
availability of "tax handles" (Bird et al., 2007).  
This has prompted some researchers to take some of these factors into account 
when making econometric models, in order to estimate the taxable capacity of 
an economy.  Some of them use the multivariate regression model, (e.g. Morss 
& Lotz 1967, 1970; Bahl 1972; Chelliah & Keely, 1975; and Musgrave, 1980).  
a)   Regression Analysis Approach:  
This approach is an improvement over the traditional tax effort measure, namely 
tax-income ratio, where income is used as a measure of taxable capacity. The 
regression approach (also called a stochastic approach) establishes that in 
addition to aggregate incomes, the denominator in the tax ratio, other factors 
affect a  country's taxable capacity.   
According to this approach, tax effort is the ratio of actual state-local tax 
collection to the estimated yield from the model tax system (Burkhead &Miner, 
2007, p. 207). Therefore, the regression approach takes into account the effect 
of several capacity indicators on tax capacity and tax effort. For this purpose, 
the average degree of relationship between the tax ratio and what are identified 
as the taxable capacity factors may be derived through multiple regression 
analysis. Since in this regression equation only the tax capacity factors would be 
included as independent variables, it is not intended to, and will not explain the 
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total variations in the tax ratio.  The difference between the actual tax-ratio in a 
country and that estimated for it on the basis of the tax capacity may be 
attributed to tax effort. Tax effort then could be measured in one of two ways:  
i) some expression of the residual variance can be taken as the measure of tax-
effort and the countries could be ranked according to the values of this 
expression,   ii) alternatively, the estimated tax-ratio can be taken to represent 
the relative taxable capacity which a country would have had if it had used its 
capacity estimation of tax function.  There are various models being developed 
for this purpose. The notable models are:   
a . i ) Stochastic Model :  
In this model cross section data are used to estimate tax yield. Several 
determinants exclusively determining capacity are chosen and tax-ratio or per 
capita tax is regressed upon these determinants. While the estimated yield 
measures capacity, the residual, i.e. the difference between the actual and 
estimated yield gives a measure of tax effort (Goode, 1984, p. 85). However, 
this method fails to distinguish residual variations due to factors affecting tax 
effort from those due to random disturbances arising out of sampling 
fluctuation.   
 
a. ii) Panel data:  
The intention of this model is to overcome the shortcomings of the stochastic 
approach. This method helps not only the identification of common traits in the 
tax behaviour of the countries/states but also to segregate the effects of country 
specific factors from those of pure random disturbance factors.  
Panel data model has certain advantages over the conventional model. The basic 
logic of the two models is similar as both require identification of the 
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determinants at the first step, followed by tax function specification, and form 
of regression to be used, including the use of dummy variables and so on.  
Briefly, the Regression Analysis Approach (the tax base availability approach) 
to assessing tax effort was employed by Lotz and Morss in the first international 
tax effort model (1967). Instead of using specific tax bases and tax rates derived 
from summing tax collections and the value of tax bases for all countries 
examined, Lotz and Morss used general indicators of the availability of tax 
bases, and coefficients of these indicators derived from a regression equation, to 
generate the marginal relationship between the indicators and the tax share. The 
reasons for using an alternative model to assess tax effort across countries were 
both theoretical and practical.  The use of indicators to measure availability of 
tax bases was probably prompted by empirical considerations.  Lotz and Morss 
simply did not have an adequate data base to measure specific tax bases and 
rates for developing countries LDCs. Consequently, the representative tax 
system approach used by U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations (ACIR) could not be utilized. However, the use of a regression 
equation rather than a deterministic formula such as that used by ACIR was 
certainly prompted by methodological considerations.  As noted above, the 
regression approach utilises more information from the data and allows a more 
appealing calculation of the marginal effects of changes in tax bases on taxable 
capacity. However, if the regression approach were used with specific tax bases 
as the independent variables in a tax capacity equation, the substitution problem 
would still remain. The Lotz and Morss tax base availability approach, while 
losing the direct linkage between a specific tax and its tax base that exists in 
ACIR approach, did allow for cross-country variations in tax base use to 
achieve a given taxable capacity. That is, by using general indicators of tax base 
availability such as the “level of development" and "openness", Lotz and Morss 
allowed  for some unknown alternative use of tax bases from country  to 
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country in order to obtain the same taxable capacity.  Another feature of the 
Lotz and Morss approach derives from the use of cross section data to imply tax 
structure change over time. The expected positive relation between the tax share 
and the level of development indicator is presumed to result not only from a 
widening of existing tax bases as a country grows, but the creation of new tax 
bases as a country develops over time. That is, the cross section regressions are 
assumed to reflect a common pattern of tax structure development for each LDC 
over time. Thus, as the level of development of an LDC increases, new forms of 
taxation are assumed to gradually replace old ones. 
b)  Representative Tax System Approach: 
The second approach analysing tax yield is popularly known as the 
Representative Tax System Approach (RTS). This method is applicable at 
individual tax levels; major proponents of this measure include the Advisory 
Commission on Inter-Governmental Relations.  Subsequently, various 
improvements have been suggested by scholars such as Akin (1973), Bahl 
(1972), Manvel (1971), and others. This method essentially involves identifying 
actual tax bases or their suitable proxies for individual taxes and then 
calculating an effective rate for each tax as a ratio of actual tax revenue to the 
actual or proxy base.  A normative tax rate is then derived from these effective 
tax rates over the observations. This gives the measure of taxable capacity. 
Individual tax potential can then be summed across countries to arrive at the 
aggregate tax potential. As in the case of the regression method, in the RTS 
method, by measuring actual aggregate collections against aggregate capacities, 
so an index of aggregate tax effort is derived. Since RTS uses standardised rates 
applied to standardised bases, the resulting tax effort measures give 
comparability among countries or states that simple comparison of statutory 
rates does not.   
67 
 
The Representative Tax System method has five basic elements:   i) the revenue 
coverage ; ii) the classification of revenue into separate sources; iii) definition 
of a standard tax base for each revenue source;  iv) the definition of a standard 
tax for each revenue source and; v) the estimation of  RTS revenue for each  
country/state.  
Both the Aggregate Regression Method and RTS method are commonly used to 
measure capacity and effort, and both have their own relative merits and 
demerits. The applicability of RTS method depends upon the availability of 
adequate and reliable data on the tax bases and actual tax rates. In the absence 
of such information, the Aggregate Regression Approach is considered as 
suitable. This approach does not require highly disaggregated data and also 
takes account of the inter dependence of the tax bases. As the Ninth Finance 
Commission (1989) rightly observed,  sometimes the effective rates themselves 
can vary with the size of the tax base (the effective tax rate may be higher in a 
more developed country than in a less developed country), which is captured in 
the  regression approach. In the regression approach the estimates are not 
derived by relating tax revenue to the actual or proxy tax bases, but only to 
macro-capacity indicators. A major weakness of the regression method is that 
the residual error is taken to represent tax effort. However, the residual error 
may also contain random factors.  The RTS method relates the tax revenue to 
individual tax bases or their proxies and therefore, the logic of the method is 
more transparent. Notwithstanding these advantages, this method is riddled with 
the complex problem of non-availability of comparable, reliable and adequate 
data on tax base and rates, and also item-wise tax yield across the countries.  In 
the absence of such information any attempt to estimate tax-wise yield results in 
a disaggregated level regression approach only. 
In summary, the representative tax system approach can be used to obtain the 
taxable capacity for each state. First the average national tax rate for a given tax 
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base is defined as the rate implied by taking the total revenue actually collected 
on this tax base  in all states and dividing this number by the total value of  the 
taxable base in all states. Then each average national tax rate for a given base is 
multiplied by the actual tax base in a state to yield the taxable capacity of a 
given base for a particular state. Finally, the taxable capacity for each of the 
bases is summed for a particular state to yield the taxable capacity of that state. 
Thus, this method assumes that there are nationwide average tax rates that can 
be applied to each of the tax bases in a given state, and that when these products 
are summed, the estimated tax capacity of that state can be determined. If actual 
total tax revenues exceed estimated taxable capacity, a state is assumed to be 
making a higher ‘tax effort’ than the average of states. If actual tax revenues are 
less than estimated taxable capacity, a state is assumed to be making a lower 
‘tax effort’ than the average of states. The implications of this exercise are that 
those states that are making a high tax effort are more deserving of central 
government grants than states making a low tax effort, since the low tax effort 
states could tax their residents more if they chose to. Those states making a low 
tax effort are assumed to be substituting national grants for state and local tax 
revenues. 
2.5. The concept of tax effort:  
Leuthold (2002) indicates that tax effort is defined as the exertion a country puts 
into collecting its tax revenue, given the tax handles available to the country. 
This means that the tax effort is the extent to which a country utilises its taxable 
capacity (Gillis, 1989). Hoek and Peter (2008) defined the tax effort as a 
measure of how well a country is using its taxable capacity; that is tax effort is 
the ratio of actual tax revenues to taxable capacity (Hoek & Peter, 2008; 
McGee, 2008, p. 15). Thereupon the tax effort can be considered as a spent 
(exploited) part of the optimal (potential) taxable capacity.  In any country, tax 
effort can be calculated by dividing its actual tax share by an estimate of how 
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much tax the country should be able to collect given the structural 
characteristics of its economy (African Economic Outlook, 2011). In other 
words , the tax effort  can be measured by dividing the tax burden by the taxable 
capacity "index of tax effort" (Le Minh et al., 2008).Thimmaiah (1976)  
believed that " the proportion of the actual yield from all taxes to the aggregate 
potential revenue is interpreted as the total tax effort"(p.1514 ).  
2.5.1. The importance of measuring the tax effort:  
Firstly, measuring the tax effort helps to make a comparison between the actual 
distribution of the individual tax burden and the objectives of the tax legislation 
on the one hand, and the taxpayer's ability to pay tax on the other hand. In order 
to ensure that this distribution comes close to tax justice, societies must attempt 
to find an optimal tax rate which takes into account the different economic, 
social and financial circumstances of the country. Indices of tax effort provide a 
tool for measuring differences between countries in how effectively they are 
using their potential tax bases (Hoek and Peter, 2008).  
Secondly, to determine the ability of both the individual, and the national 
economy to bear the tax burden at different periods of time, thereby helping to 
make decisions regarding the imposition of new taxes or the changing of tax 
rates, through creating new ways to avoid the negative effects of taxes, where 
the tax effort is the degree to which taxable capacity is used (Malik, 2010. p. 
10). 
Thirdly, to search for a tax burden which ensures the achievement of the 
greatest social welfare possible, without using random estimation which is 
based on determining an inaccurate tax rate in advance. In an ideal world the 
optimal tax rate should be related to changes in several social and economic 
factors affecting the tax burden on the national economy, because the tax 
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burdens need to be proportionate to the abilities of the taxpayers to endure them 
(Maroun, 2010, p. 35)   
Fourthly, the tax effort reflects the limits of the state's role in economic and 
social life, and shows tax rates  should  be  controlled  as a  tool of  tax policy, 
especially because  "the tax system can reflect ideological positions" (Connolly 
& Munro, 1999, p.159 ).   
Fifthly, to compare the actual tax burden with taxable capacity in the society, 
leading to an evaluation of existing tax policy, and putting forward suggestions 
to amend that policy, especially that the tax effort has been considered as 
representing the degree of intensity of  the government's willingness to tap 
available resources (Amin, 2008, p. 309).  The study of   tax effort and taxable 
capacity helps the researcher to evaluate the tax structure's performance .Tax 
effort is an index measure of how well a country is doing in terms of tax 
collection, relative to what could be reasonably expected given its economic 
potential. It is a ratio that, by construction, is always positive (African 
Economic Outlook , 2011 ). 
Sixthly, measurement of the actual tax burden for each economic sector or each 
administrative region helps to compare the tax burden, and to calculate the 
importance of the sector or the region, and its role in the economic development 
of the country. However, the study of tax effort and tax burden in this case 
contributes to finding solutions to problems of local finance, by identifying the 
share of each administrative region in central revenues. Indices of tax effort 
may indicate the appropriate policy for dealing with budget deficits. For 
example, countries with a high tax effort index may need to look at reducing 
expenditure rather than raising taxes (McGee, 2008, p. 15).  
Finally, comparing the real tax burden and the contribution of tax revenues to 
total public revenue among different countries distinguishes between these 
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countries in terms of tax effort, and taxable capacity. This comparison also 
contributes to finding solutions to the problems of the financing of international 
organisations by determining their respective share in financing the expenses of 
these organisations. This system also helps international banks asses the 
suitability of granting international loans. In this respect, Leuthold (2002, p. 2) 
believed that "international lending agencies also use measures of tax effort as a 
basis for allocating international grants favoring high tax effort over low tax 
effort countries in order to deter low tax effort countries from substituting 
external funds for locally raised funds". 
2. 5.2.  Factors affecting tax effort and taxable capacity: 
Tax has an important role in the modern economy, but it cannot be imposed 
without limits in order to avoid negative side effects on society and the national 
economy. Tax can have many harmful effects, such as reducing the incentive to 
work and produce, and spreading tax evasion and avoidance, which leads to 
declining tax revenues in the end, because estimate of the tax effort as a ratio of 
the tax revenue to the taxable capacity will have to take into account the GDP or 
the GNI without ignoring various capacity factors such as size of population; 
administrative capability; degree of monetisation; availability of tax handles; 
etc. (Ramanujam, 2006, p. 1). Taking into consideration that the ability of the 
national income to bear the tax burden changes according to changes in 
political, social and economic conditions, any research into tax effort and 
potential taxable capacity in any economy should be seen to take into account  
several considerations (Zaki, 1992, p. 209), including: 
1-The structure of the national economy and the degree of its development or 
underdevelopment. For example, an economy characterised by an established 
manufacturing sector has more easily identifiable and accessible taxpayers than 
an economy that is largely agrarian or principally comprised of small traders 
(Mertens, 2003). In this respect, the larger the agricultural share in an economy, 
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the lower the tax share is likely to be due to the difficulty of taxing agriculture 
directly and the relatively low level of monetisation in the agricultural sector 
(African Economic Outlook, 2011 ). 
2- The pattern of national income distribution between the classes and segments 
of a society (Barth et al., 2000, p. 80).     
3- Tax rates and the existing tax structure and support system. 
4 - Considerations of social justice, which take the government's current policies 
into account. 
5 – The economic and social problems which face the national economy.  
6 - The potential impact of increasing taxes on production, savings, investment, 
distribution and prices. 
Rajagopalachar (1993) finds that there are three major determinants of taxable 
capacity and they are: (i) Ratio of total tax revenue to national income of the 
nation; (ii) The benefits of public expenditure out of tax revenue; and (iii) The 
efficiency of tax administration (Rajagopalachar, 1993, p. 261). 
Barth and Hemphil (2000) identify the following major factors to the taxable 
capacity: (i) The degree of openness of an economy; (ii) The level of 
development and income; (iii) The composition and distribution of income 
(Barth and Hemphil, 2000, p. 80).  
 Berglof and Vaitilingam (2000) have indicated that the literature also identifies 
several economic variables as bearing on a country's taxable capacity, such as: 
per capita GDP; share of value added produced in agriculture; openness to 
foreign trade; production of natural resources; monetisation of the economy 
(Berglof & Vaitilingam, 2000, p. 18).  
The general level of economic development of a country, its openness to trade 
and the relative importance of agriculture in domestic production are the key 
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characteristics bearing on a developing country’s ability to collect taxes, and 
thus its tax share. Empirically, these characteristics are captured respectively by 
per capita income, the ratio of trade to GDP, and the share of agriculture to 
GDP (African Economic Outlook, 2011). 
In this study, the preceding discussion will be enhanced to deal with the factors 
and their proxy variables specifying taxable capacity as used with the 
econometric models. Previous studies that deal with measuring taxable capacity 
confirm that it should be considered as a function of: 
a) The size of foreign trade.   
b) Structure of the national economy.   
c) The income level and level of economic development. 
The proxy measurement of the above elements in the second phase of this 
process will be considered on the basis of economic theory and logic correlation 
between ’taxable  capacity/tax ratio’ and these proxy variables. It is necessary to 
choose such a variable to reflect some ranges of biased decision. However, there 
are a number of impalpable elements greatly affecting tax ratio, for example, 
form of state, and sociological and geographic areas which may or may not be 
involved in the models by using indicator variables. The following discussion 
gives due attention to the proxy variables represented and the factors affecting 
taxable capacity: 
a) The size of foreign trade: 
The degree of economic openness has a direct and extensive effect on taxable 
capacity in developing countries. Thus, it is significant to specify the proxy 
variables of this factor. Three possibilities can be considered:   
i. The import ratio to GNP (M/Y). 
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ii. The export ratio to GNP (X/Y). 
iii. The total foreign trade ratio to GNP [(X+M)/Y]. 
The most suitable variable is considered to measure the degree of economic 
openness by earlier studies. According to Hinrichs (1965) the first variable is 
(M/Y), while Lotz and Morss (1967) pointed, in their first paper, to the third 
variable [(M+X)/Y]. However, Wakatsuki suggested the second variable (X/Y) 
to be superior to the two other variables (M/Y) and [(M+X)/Y] (cited in Lotz 
and Morss, 1970). Lotz  and Morss (1970) themselves, in their second paper, 
promoted Wakatsuki's findings when confirming that the export ratio (X/P) was 
the most independent variable ( Alwaily, 2006 ). These authors' argument for 
using these variables was because they considered them to be indicators of the 
size of foreign trade which dominates the national economy in the developing 
countries. 
Export ratio was recommended by Chelliah (1971) because of its closer 
association with the tax ratio than the import and total foreign trade ratios. Bahl 
(1971) illustrated how important export ratio is; he pointed out that the export 
ratio only will be more suitable in the case that the foreign trade variable 
reflects the size of the basis that is amenable to joint income or export taxation. 
It is theorised that taxable capacity has a direct and positive relation to the 
degree of economic openness variables. A number of reasons strengthen this 
hypothesis: 
1. Imposing and collecting taxes easily from the foreign trade sector, especially 
in developing countries, makes it a significant source of tax revenue. Both 
exports and imports are handled through definitive ports that can be built and 
supervised by government (Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989). 
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2. Rapidly increased rate of the foreign trade sector indicates a significant 
degree of monetisation and industrial development, which in turn, supports and 
extends the tax base (Bahl, 1971). That means taxes are directly obtained from 
exports and/or imports and indirectly from the income resulting from them. 
3. Customs duties, in developing countries, are significant ways in which to 
provide due protection to national industries and to reduce trade imbalances. 
4. Although there are regression results, it is not easy, especially in this era 
where every country exerts great efforts to extend its export market, to accept a 
hypothesis that considers exports as a direct target for taxes, because such taxes 
will increase the price of exports and openly alter competitive scope. Moreover, 
passing export taxes to the foreign consumer obviously relies on the price 
elasticity of demand for export  goods. 
Askari, Cummings and Glover (1982) provided a new independent variable to 
the regression model namely, export index of the tax burden (EI), which is 
computed by the following formula: 
 
 
Where  EI= price elasticity of demand for commodity i . 
Xij= the total value of country j's exports of commodity i. 
Xit= the total value of world exports of commodity i. 
Yj= GNP of country. 
M= total number of commodities. 
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The sign of this variable (EI) coefficient is varied among the samples as used by 
this study. Other studies exemplify the degree of openness by the export ratio, 
which exclude mineral exports. That is because the mineral variable, as will be 
discussed, is included as an independent variable in the models as a typical 
measure of the sectoral structure of the economy factor. The section on the 
review of earlier studies will discuss closely related studies and their 
methodology and approaches. 
b) Structure of the national economy: 
A country’s economic structure is the essential factor that specifies taxable 
capacity. According to Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) the availability of tax 
bases is connected with the economic sector. Bahl (1971) indicates that the 
surplus available to government for taxation can be said to vary considerably 
among these sectors. In other words, these sectors’ importance to tax revenues 
is specified by their share of total tax revenues. Three proxy variables have been 
used to represent the economic structure: 1. Product of the manufacturing 
sector; 2. Product of the local trade sector; 3. Product of the Mining sector. 
These proxies are discussed in more detail below:  
First,  Product of the manufacturing sector:  
Developing countries have given due attention to this sector, which has obtained 
appreciable protection. It is reasonable to theorise some types of relation 
between this sector and taxable capacity, and this may be a two-way relation. 
Firstly, there may be a positive relation between the product of this sector and 
taxable capacity. Secondly, there is a reverse relation in developing countries 
between these two due to the abundant enhancement and tax exemptions that 
governments offer. Generous tax holidays are, moreover, often available for 
long periods; this is particularly one of the most common approaches among the 
developing countries. Yet, Tanzi and Zee (2001) indicted a number of 
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deficiencies of such a policy. Firstly, tax holidays provide taxed corporations 
sensible bases for avoiding tax. Secondly, the tax holiday period is subject to 
misapplication and extension. Thirdly, such a motivation affects investment 
quality and tends to falsify investment options. It attracts short term projects, 
which are of restricted economic profit potential compared with long term 
investments. 
Second, Product of the local trade sector:  
Malki (1978) and Abu Hammor (1997) utilised this variable as an independent 
variable in the taxable capacity regression method. Both pointed out a negative 
relation between this variable and taxable capacity. The explanation provided to 
demonstrate the negative relation refers to the wholesale and retail sales 
corporations which represent temporary and small establishments. Abu 
Hammor (1997) indicated that some account-auditing problems are connected 
with such small enterprises that widely permit for tax avoidance. Such a 
justification may be logically accepted in the case that it is restricted to direct 
taxes such as a profit tax, since the profit margin is relatively low in small 
corporations. Moreover, Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) illustrated that the 
administration of income tax is not much easier where employment is in mostly 
in small corporations.  It is seemingly unsatisfactory in the case of considering 
indirect taxes, particularly value added tax (VAT) that relies on the efficiency of 
the tax system efficiency. 
Third ,  Product of the mining sector:   
A positive and important relation between the product of this sector and taxable 
capacity has been illustrated by previous studies. Chelliah (1971), for example, 
noted that the mining sector is a very essential determinant of taxable capacity 
in developing countries with extractive industries. Similarly, Tait, Gratz and 
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Eichengreen (1979) examined the economic composition factor represented by 
mining and agricultural variables as indicators of taxable capacity. 
There is an important and positive relation between the product of mining sector 
as an independent variable and taxable capacity, this relation is explained by:  
1) As the extractive companies are usually foreign owned, tax avoidance levels 
will be lower compared with domestic companies. Governments tend to do this 
for political reasons i.e. to avoid provoking the local corporations. 
2) High stable investments demonstrate that investment in extractive industries 
is focused on a few large firms connected with high profitability that strengthen 
both the availability of tax base and administration simplicity (Chelliah, 1971; 
Bahl, 1971). 
c) The income level and economic development: 
There is a hypothetically and logically positive relation between the degree of 
development of an economy and its taxable capacity: the more development 
degree increases, the more taxable capacity increases. The variables represented 
in the development degree should be taken into account. Three variables are 
considered as the most significant indicators frequently used to give an 
approximate evaluation of the development level and its influence on taxable 
capacity. However, economic development has profound and broad ranges and 
affects most if not the whole sector. Hence, to estimate it precisely either by a 
single variable or by a simple combination of variables is very difficult. The 
variables are: 
1) The level of individual income (Yp).   2) The agriculture portion in GNP 
(Ay)   .; 3) The monetisation degree (M2). 
First, the level of individual income:  The income per person level has a direct 
effect on the capability to pay taxes. It is used as a proxy variable of the 
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economic development level in the regression method. There is a positive 
relation between per capita income (Yp) as an independent variable and tax 
ratio (T/Y) as a dependent variable due to economic reasoning. There are many 
reasons for that: 
a) The higher the level of income per person or GNP is, the greater taxable 
surplus is, and consequently there is a larger tax base. That means an increase of 
per capita income demonstrates a higher development level. The latter could 
refer to higher tax payment capability and a greater extent to the collection of 
taxes (Chelliah, 1971). If there are, for instance,  two countries "A" and "B" 
have the same total revenue and the same price indicators but variant per capita 
income, say, $500 for A and $1250 for "B", Country "B" is apparently in a 
better status to yield income tax than country "A". This hypothesis is consistent 
with the consumption theory, especially that part of marginal propensity to 
consume (MPC). It indicates that MPC for wealthy people is smaller than that 
of  poor or middle-income  people. 
b) The potential of transferring resources from individual to public use may be 
very restricted in low per capita income countries, where the majority of this 
income is required to cover survival needs (Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989). 
c) A regular increase in per capita income potentially leads to an enlarged 
demand for public commodities and services. Hence, this raises the 
government's requirements for extra financial sources to confront the demand 
growth for its services. It is reasonable to indicate that a government’s 
capability to collect taxes and its need to comply with its obligations is fairly 
specified by its objectives. As mentioned previously, the greater taxable surplus 
is, the more tax revenue government obtains as new tax sources are provided. 
Mixed findings regarding the significance of per capita income as an 
independent variable in the taxable capacity regression methods have been 
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illustrated by earlier studies. However, most findings were consistent with real 
facts. Direct taxes are more significant than indirect taxes for developed 
countries, as is widely known. Therefore, most taxable capacity studies, which 
are limited in developed countries, have only confirmed that per capita income 
(Yp) was statistically significant. Nonetheless, (Yp) is statistically insignificant 
when taxable measurement studies are restricted to developing countries. Such a 
result is consistent with the fact that indirect taxes have a significant role in 
these countries. A review will be conducted on these studies, and most related 
ones, later in the section on earlier studies. 
One or more of the following conclusions, however, may lead to differences in 
the  result: 
i) Variation of periods: Each study concentrated on a different period and that 
involved variant data. The period and data used in the study were logically 
reflected by the regressions results.  
ii) Different countries: The sample of each study is varied in quality and 
quantity. For instance some studies did not differentiate between developing 
and developed countries, while others dealt only with developing countries. 
iii) Different variables: Studies have a significant difference in using 
independent variables. Shin (1969), for example, suggested the rate of change in 
the consumer prices index (∆P/P) and the rate of growth in population (∆N/N) 
in addition to other independent variables. Lotz and Morss (1970) added the 
degree of monetisation as well as other variables: however, they disregarded the 
variables of (∆P/P) and (∆N/N) that Shin used. 
iv)  Since the adopted methodology groups the sample into low, middle and 
high-income countries according to their geographic region, different results 
may arise. 
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Second: The Agriculture Portion of GNP: The income proportion yielded in the 
agricultural sector is one significant indicator of a country’s development phase. 
A significant and reverse relation between the agricultural sector ratio to GNP 
and tax ratio are statistically indicated by all earlier studies. There is a negative 
influence on tax ratio that may be clarified by the following: 
a) In general, the higher a proportion of the economy agricultural sector 
represents, the lower per capita income becomes (Chelliah, 1971), because in 
this sector wages are relatively low. 
b) According to Musgrave and Musgrave (1989), it is very difficult to tax the 
agricultural sector because a large section of this sector’s yields are consumed 
domestically and it is largely a non-monetised sector.  
C) Agricultural yield in developing countries is usually produced by small 
farmers. In other words, the profit that they make may be very low and cannot 
be subjected to tax unless and provided that it gains a minimal standard. 
d) The agricultural sector is mostly considered as a subsistance sector because 
of its relevance to a lower commercialisation and industrialisation level. That 
means a lower potential for taxable capacity (Bahl, 1971). 
e) Government has a very limited potential to bring in and collect taxes from the 
agricultural sector because of the preceding reasons, and political pressure. 
f) Some countries promote the agricultural sector and offer a wide range of 
advantages to accomplish subsistance needs for national security reasons. 
Third, The degree of monetisation: According to Black (1997), money has three 
essential functions. It is a valuable store, a unit of account, and a medium of 
exchange. The third function indicates the idea of using money to facilitate the 
process of exchanging one's product for those of the rest of community. This 
function leads to a barter economy quickly becoming less common.  As taxes 
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nowadays gain a monetary kind, the degree of monetisation and the use of 
money as a medium of exchange represent great importance. As previously 
mentioned, a large portion of agricultural products are nonmonetised because 
products are domestically consumed, or such a sector is very difficult to be 
taxed in a barter economy. 
The level of monetisation means that simplifying, imposing and collecting taxes 
is difficult. Therefore, a positive relationship between taxable capacity and the 
monetisation level is reasonably anticipated. Moreover, a positive relation 
between inflation and tax ratio is indicated to test the variable of the rate of 
change in the consumer prices level (∆P/P) (Shin, 1969).  
Now, unless the increase in the money supply "M" is not related to a similar 
increase in the production (of the closed economy) and imports (in the open 
economy), prices, generally, will not remain unchanged. In addition, tax 
revenues may increase in infinite terms. On the other hand, if a government 
decides to raise the money supply by printing new money to fund its spending, 
and such a phenomenon is not attached by an increase in production and/or 
imports, or it is attached by low levels of these, this will lead prices to rise and 
as a result the consumer price index will increase. 
Finally, it is necessary to choose a definition of money as a variable of 
monetisation?  There are many measures of the quantity of money as stated 
below: 
a) Currency "C" refers to the sum of superior paper money and coins.   
b) M1 comprises currency plus demand deposits.   
c) M2 involves M1 plus savings deposits.   
d) M3 comprises M2 plus long-term deposits. 
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"M1" is normally decided as an independent variable to reflect the level of 
monetisation in the tax ratio regression models. 
 
2. 6.  The previous studies on tax effort: 
The basic aim of this section is to take into account the methodologies that have 
previously been used to measure relative taxable capacity and to evaluate which 
methodologies are most suitable for measuring relative taxable capacity in 
Libya. 
There is a body of literature in public finance regarding  the tax effort and 
taxable capacity at the international level; included in this body are works by 
researchers such as: Oshima (1957); Son ( 1961); Plasschaert (1962 ); Martin & 
Lewis (1956) ; Perst (1978); Datta (1977), as well as a study by Tait et al. 
(1979) ; Tanzi (1987); Tanzi ( 1992); Stotsky and  Wolde Mariam (1997); 
Mertens (2003) and Bird (2007). These studies attempted to measure the tax 
effort and taxable capacity, according to the different social and economic 
factors in the countries under investigation. Some influential studies in this area 
are outlined as follows: -  
Williamson (cited in Sookram &Saridakis, 2009) conducted one of the oldest 
studies to measure a methodical relation between the development growth and 
government revenue in 1961. He utilised two independent variables in his 
sample of thirty three developed and developing countries. His outcome 
illustrated a positive and significant relation between tax ratio and per capita 
income, which functioned as a proxy variable for the degree of development. 
Such a result is consistent with the view that the higher development level is, 
the higher tax surplus is achieved, in addition to its consistency with economic 
theory. Nevertheless, Williamson's outcome is opposite to that of many other 
studies which were conducted only with developing countries, and that 
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indicated unimportant relations between per capita income and tax ratio. This 
could be explained by the reality that both developed and developing countries 
were involved in Williamson's sample, and it is generally perceived that income 
taxes represent a large portion in the total revenue of developed countries. 
Plasschaert's endeavour in 1962 followed this study. His sample was limited to 
twenty less-developed countries and his focus was on per capita income and 
import ratio as the independent variables. He referred to a result contradictory 
with Williamson's outcome. That means Plasschaert emphasised that import 
ratio arose as an important and positive determinant of tax ratio. On the other 
hand, per capita income lacked of statistical significance (Chelliah, 1971) and 
(Hope, 1996). 
Study by Hinrichs(1965), which measured the tax effort and taxable capacity in 
60 countries including 40 developing countries during the period of 1957-60, 
which tried to find the relationship between the ratio of public revenues to GDP, 
and two independent variables: imports and per capita income. 
The study found that in the developing countries the degree of economic 
openness (measured by imports) was a determining factor for the ratio of public 
revenues to GDP, not per capita income (Williams, 2001, p .62).  More 
precisely, Hinrichs has found a relationship between a country's openness—that 
is, the trade-GNP ratio—and the ratio of government revenue to GNP. For the 
poorer developing countries, openness appeared to be a better indicator of the 
government revenue share than per capita income (Corden, 1997). 
In fact, trade taxes represented a remarkably even share in the total revenue in 
developing countries. Hinrich (1965) evenly sustained Plasscharet's result on 
examining the relation between government revenue and the development level, 
and the degree of openness, for a sample of sixty countries. Further tests were 
conducted for several sub samples. The sixty countries were divided by Hinrich 
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into several groups in accordance with per capita income  level "Y/N" such as 
countries of "Y/N" under $150 (fifteen countries), countries of  "Y/N" between 
$150-299 (fifteen countries), countries of  "Y/N" between $300-749 (fifteen 
countries) , and countries of "Y/N" over $750 (fifteen countries ). He took into 
account the same variable as other studies and applied a simple regression for 
each independent variable exclusively and a multiple regression for both. His 
conclusion, on the one hand, highlighted a strong positive relation between tax 
ratio and per capita income for the whole sample (sixty countries).  On the other 
hand, he emphsised the invaluable importance of per capita income and tax ratio 
when developing countries (forty-five of the sixty) only were considered. In 
addition, import ratio is a fundamental determinant of the size of tax revenue for 
developing countries in general, and for countries with per capita income less 
than $300 in particular. The coefficient of R2 emphasised the result that the 
simple regression (containing M/Y as independent variable) may somewhat 
clarify more variation than the multiple regression (involving both Y/N and 
M/Y). 
Thom's study of fifty-two countries (twenty developed and the rest developing 
countries) produced results consistent with both Plasschaert and Hinrich's 
findings. However, when Thom studied developing countries exclusively the 
result was not compatible with the studies of Plasschaert and Hinrich. He did 
not address any meaningful relation between the degree of economic openness 
(measured by import ratio to GNP) and tax revenue (Alwaily, 2006). 
In a study by Lotz and Morss (1967) entitled "Measuring tax effort in 
developing countries" and covering the period of 1962-65, an attempt was made 
to measure the tax effort for about 72 countries (main sample) including 52 
developing countries (LDCs) and 20 Middle Developed Countries (MDCs). 
They examined such relations for the entire sample (72 countries) and for each 
group separately.  Lotz and Morss’ findings have been arranged to emphasise 
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the percentage difference between actual collection and projected taxable 
capacity (Radian, 1980, p. 30). They made an important contribution to 
identifying the determinants of the tax ratio (T/Y) by including the “openness” 
of a country as a better estimator of taxable capacity in poor countries (Howard, 
2001), so that by measuring the relationship between the share of taxes in the 
Gross National Product  (T/Y) and independent variables of the average per 
capita income (Yp) and the ratio of foreign trade (as degree of openness) to 
Gross National Product (F/Y), they showed that the export ratio was more 
closely associated with the tax ratio than either the import or the foreign trade 
ratio (Snider, 1996)     
This study concluded that the income per capita and the degree of economic 
openness (expressed as a ratio of imports and exports to GDP) were both 
important explanatory factors and determinants of the tax share (Gupta, 2007), 
where they have a positive relationship with the ratio of taxes to national 
income, also they are able to explain a high proportion of the variance. As can 
be seen from table 2.1, significant coefficients were obtained for the whole 
sample (72 countries) and for the 52 LDCs taken separately, but not for the 20 
MDCs taken separately (significant at the 1% level). They found  a positive and 
significant relationship between Yp and F/Y and T/Y,  which showed that for 
every percentage point increase in the importance of foreign trade (F/Y), the tax 
ratio increased by 0.079 percentage points for the main sample (Lotz & Morss, 
1967).The result for the LDCs  showed that the explanatory variables remained 
significant despite a decline of the t-value of independent variables from 10.89 
and 2.74 to 2.963 and 2.573 for the main sample and the LDCs respectively 
(Alwaily, 2006). Table 2.1 (see statistical appendix) shows the result of 
estimating this model.  
Lotz and Morss attempt to account for those factors measuring a country's 
taxable capacity in order to determine a country's tax effort. In general, the 
87 
 
taxable capacity of a country is the ability of a country to raise tax revenue.  
Traditionally this has been viewed from the revenue-raising side only as 
aggregate income above subsistence, and has been assumed to automatically 
constitute a "surplus" amenable to taxation. Increases in this surplus are 
increases in taxable capacity. Lotz and Morss define taxable capacity in this 
manner and define tax effort as the extent to which a government actually 
utilizes taxable capacity. 
Therefore, in a tax effort model it is necessary to explain only those variations 
in the tax share due to taxable capacity factors in a multiple regression equation. 
 Tax effort is given by the residual. This produces a linear model of the form: 
T/Yi = XB +Ui  where (X) is a matrix  of  (k) taxable capacity factors for ( N ) 
observations, (B) is a vector of (k) coefficients and (Ui ) is a vector of (N) 
disturbance terms. A regression over the sample of n countries will yield the 
estimating equation,   ቀ ೅෡ೊ೔ቁ ൌ ܺܤ
෠௜  . This is the expected tax capacity—the tax 
capacity that would result when a particular country's values for the regressors 
are plugged into the estimating equation. Given the actual tax collections of this 
country, T/Yi   we can then construct TE = ( ೅ೊ೔) / (
೅෡
ೊ೔
) and compare this ratio with 
that of other  countries in a tax effort ranking. 
In their 1967 study, Lotz and Morss argue that in addition to aggregate national 
product specified in the denominator of the tax share, other factors heretofore 
unaccounted for also affect taxable capacity. These include the level of 
economic development, the size of the foreign trade sector, “openness " , the 
size distribution of income, the  industrial origin of output, and the composition 
of government expenditures. They used the ratio of the sum of imports and 
exports to GNP, rather than the import ratio or the export ratio, as the index of 
openness (Hope, 1996). Lotz and Morss made an important contribution to this 
analysis by including the “openness” of a country as a better estimator of 
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taxable capacity in poor countries than the per capita income measure of 
development (Howard, 2001).  
Data limitations force Lotz and Morss to consider only Yi, Yi/P, and F/Y i . The 
rationale for including the relative size of the foreign trade sector had been 
given earlier by Hinrichs (1965): that it is administratively easier to tax trade 
flows than domestic transactions and that the degree of “openness" reflects the 
degree of monetisation, urbanisation, and commercialisation of the economy. 
Using a two or three  year (mid 1960s) average for each of 72 Middle 
developing countries (MDCs) and Less developing countries (LDCs), Lotz  and 
Morss ran several OLS regressions. Significant coefficients were obtained for 
the whole sample and for the 52 LDCs (those with less than $800 Yi/P), but not 
for the 20 MDCs taken separately. Thus Lotz and Morss dropped the MDCs 
from the rest of their study, arguing that the public share of a high income 
country “. . . is more an index of political preference for the appropriate size of 
a government's role than an index of taxable capacity" (Lotz and Morss, 1967, 
pp. 488-  489).  
An important impetus for the original international tax effort model presented 
by Lotz and Morss (1967) was the work done by the U.S. Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR). 
Weiss (1969) collected data from sixty-six developing countries for his study, 
which tested the elements influencing government revenue. He used 
quantitative and qualitative (dummy) variables. He added to the "installed” 
variables several dummy variables reflecting social, political, regional and 
cultural variances. Cultural homogeneity (CH) and representative political 
system (REPR) variables contributed meaningfully to the statistical clarification 
of the varied revenue proportion when they reverted in the sub-sample of forty-
seven countries. Moreover, Weiss signalled four socio-economic variables that 
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were likely to be used as good representatives, instead of income per person, as 
a general indicator of a country’s development level: the "economically active 
population";  percentage in agricultural positions; literacy rate of population 
aged fifteen years and over; urban drift;  and an index of the degree of mass 
communication. He found that both per capita income and openness were 
statistical significance. The regional group analysis indicated that there were 
variant elements in different parts of the world operating on the revenue. This 
was due to the close social and political distance between countries of the same 
geographical area ( Alwaily, 2006, p.169). 
Shin (1969) contributed considerably when he took into account, for the first 
time, several independent variables and reverted them on tax ratio so that the 
study is extended to the tax effort and taxable capacity. Shin added three 
independent variables: agricultural income ratio to GNP "MY"; the rate of 
prices change "∆P/P" ;  and the rate of growth of population "∆N/N", while 
most earlier studies restricted  themselves to per capita income and foreign trade 
ratio. He explained that agricultural income ratio evaluated the level of 
industrialisation, commercialisation, and urbanisation of an economy. It was 
anticipated that agricultural income ratio variable adversely affected taxable 
capacity, and that the rapid growth of population would reduce taxable capacity. 
That was likely to be accepted under the assumption that the population growth 
rate is in excess of the growth rate of GNP. 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
developed a tax effort model (1970) which differed from the Lotz and Morss 
models in that it pooled cross section and time series data. Thirty-six LDCs 
were included in the study, and time series of from two to fifteen years were 
used depending on the country's data availability. The total pooled observations 
totaled 346. 
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In the pooled equations of this study, all of the variables were significant at the 
5 percent level, while in the cross sectional equations F/Y2 was not significant.  
While the regression coefficients for Ag/Y2 did not vary much between the 
pooled and the cross section regressions, the coefficients for F/Y2 varied greatly 
between the regressions run on the two types of samples. In terms of ranking the 
36 LDCs by tax effort using actual T/Y2 tax effort derived from pooled data, 
and tax effort derived from time averaged cross sectional data, there was no 
significant difference in the rankings. 
The rate of inflation regressor, ∆Cp/Cp, was used in the preliminary equation 
run by UNCTAD and had also been used by Shin. The rationale for employing 
this regressor was that under a progressive tax structure a higher rate of  
inflation may lead to a higher tax ratio or, alternately,  that a higher tax ratio 
may cause a higher inflation rate (Shin, 1969, pp. 215-217). UNCTAD suggests 
that the highly significant and positive relation of ∆Cp/Cp to T/Y2 derives from 
the high correlation between T/Yi and Ec/Yi found for most countries and that 
the higher is Ec/Yi the greater the likelihood of inflation (UNCTAD, 1970, p. 
28). UNCTAD argues that this rationale does not bear on taxable capacity and 
so excluded ∆Cp/Cp from the regression equation for the purpose of 
comparison of pooled and cross section country rankings.  
While the pooling technique increases the sample size it necessitates another 
assumption relative to the use of averaged cross section data. In pooling the 
data, UNCTAD implicitly assumed that factors which determine taxable 
capacity cross-sectionally also determine taxable capacity over time. That is, 
one would have to assume that long run or permanent secular (cross section) 
determinants of the tax share are the same as short run or temporary cyclical 
timeseries)  determinants of the tax share. 
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Lotz and Morss (1970) essential contribution in their second paper was the use 
of a monetisation variable, which measured per capita "M1" (coins and notes), 
with meaningful results. It is interesting to notice that this monetisation variable 
had high significance when regressed with per capita income; however, it led to 
a point of no significance of the later variable. They eventually concluded that a 
limited definition of money "M1" as independent variable is more suitable to 
other definitions. Tax effort was analysed by the study of "UNCTAD" (United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development) for thirty-six developing 
countries for the period 1950-1966. The study added two independent variables- 
the share of agriculture in GDP and inflation rate. It also traced a meaningful 
relation between all independent and dependent variables. Nevertheless, the 
high intercorrelation between agricultural proportion and per capita income 
included inflation and led to descend the two later variables from the regression. 
The study’s conclusion was that countries having a low agricultural proportion 
in income and a high degree of open economics are expected to have the highest 
tax ratio and vice versa. 
A study entitled "A Regression Approach to Tax Effort and Tax Ratio Analysis” 
was produced in 1971 by Bahl , who measured the impact of two independent 
variables on the ratio of taxes to gross national product (T/Y), the share of the 
mining sector (oil and minerals) in the GNP, on the grounds that this sector 
reflects the degree of openness of the economy to the outside world (NY) and 
the share of the agricultural sector in the gross national product (AY). Using a 
cross-sectional data for a sample of 47 developing countries during the period of 
1969-1971, he found a significant, positive relationship between the mining 
share and the tax ratio using data for the 1960's (Bahl &Tumennasan, 2002). 
The study's details result in the table 2.1. Bahl made a clear distinction between 
the tax effort and the tax ratio models. After decomposing the inter-country tax 
ratio variances, he introduced two approaches to identifying the determinants of 
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these variances. First, to explain the variations in tax ratio, (defined as tax/GDP 
ratio), he proposed a stochastic model with tax ratio as its dependent and Xi as a 
set of independent variables that were used as proxy measures for the 
determinants of differentials in taxable capacity and tax effort. This may be 
termed the tax ratio approach. Second, he proposed that if a researcher wanted 
to identify inter-country differences in tax effort, then Xi is defined as a set of 
variables that will reflect only the variances in taxable capacity. According to 
Bahl, the basic difference between the tax ratio and tax effort views of the 
problem turns on the restrictive definition of the independent variables in the 
latter approach (Tosun & Abizadeh, 2005). 
The Bahl study (1971) summarised many of the previous tax ratio and tax effort 
models, examined their differences, and presented a tax effort model that dealt 
with some of the methodological and theoretical problems associated with the 
tax effort approach. Bahl stressed that  if the regression equation is to explain 
only taxable  capacity, care must be exercised in selecting the independent  
variables and the regressor proxies for these variables  so that they reflect only 
factors related to a government's  ability to tax, not a government's willingness 
to tax (Bahl, 1971, pp. 571-572). Bahl noted that tax effort, TE , can  have many 
determinants, but he concentrated on three: the  relative productivity of public 
as compared to private  investments, a desire on the part of government to 
intervene  in the resource allocation process for distributional reasons, and 
historical institutional arrangements for certain activities between public and 
private sectors. All of these determinants affect a government's willingness to 
tax (Bahl, 1971, pp. 582-583). 
In developing his version of the tax effort model, Bahl pointed out that data 
limitations precluded the inclusion of taxable capacity variables such as 
personal income, income distribution, and the level of subsistence sector income 
in the tax share regression equation (Bahl, 1971, p. 554). Bahl included three 
93 
 
variables measuring taxable capacity in his model: the size of the foreign trade 
sector, proxied by XY; the stage of development, proxied by AY; and a measure 
of the sectoral composition of value added, proxied by NY (Bahl, 1971, p. 585). 
Taxable  capacity is assumed to be related to the size of the foreign trade sector 
first because a greater level of exports relative to income suggests both a greater 
degree of  monetisation and an industrial structure that is administratively  
amenable to taxation and, second, because the  subsequent larger imports may 
be taxed with a minimum of administrative difficulty. The foreign trade sector 
was proxied by the export share rather than the theoretically more satisfactory 
exports plus imports to aggregate national product (since this measure reflects 
the total available trade tax base) because of a high degree of collinearity 
between the import share and export share (Bahl, 1971,  p.  586). Bahl used AY 
as the proxy for the stage of development because of certain theoretical and 
empirical problems associated with the use of YP as the proxy. 
Bahl noted that empirically YP satisfactorily explained tax ratio variations 
between MDCs and LDCs but did not satisfactorily explain variance among 
only LDCs in previous studies. He offered two reasons for this failure:  first, YP 
hides important structural differences that affect taxable capacity, specifically 
the relative size of the monetised sector; second, conversion of local currencies 
into U.S. dollars makes for a large error factor in intercountry comparisons 
because of disequilibrium exchange rates and their incomplete measurement of 
the relative purchasing power of a currency in any case. The use of Ag/ Yi 
mitigated these problems. Also, Bahl felt that causation between YP and T/Yi 
runs both ways; consequently, the specification of YP as an independent 
regressor in an OLS single equation regression leads to biased and inconsistent 
parameter  estimates (Bahl, 1971, p. 581).(  
A higher level of activity in the agricultural sector was assumed to be associated 
with a larger subsistence sector, less commercialisation and industrialisation, 
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and a lower per capita aggregate income. Furthermore, value added in the 
agricultural sector may imply a lower taxable surplus because the incomes of 
agricultural wage earners may be relatively low, profit margins may be 
relatively low when agricultural output is produced largely by many small 
farmers, and small agricultural enterprises are not as administratively amenable 
to taxation as enterprises in other sectors (Bahl, 1971, p. 590). Bahl used a third 
independent regressor—the mining share. It was hypothesised that sectoral 
income distribution affects taxable capacity independently of the overall level of 
development and size of the foreign trade sector. The mining share, NY, was 
used because it was asserted that the mining sector produces a larger surplus 
than any other sector and is therefore a positive determinant of taxable capacity. 
Mining operations are confined to a few large firms that are relatively easy to 
tax via income, or exports (Bahl, 1971, p. 590). 
Bahl specified the tax ratio as a simple linear function of the above three 
regressors in a single equation OLS regression using late 1960s averages for the 
variables over 49 LDCs. He found that AY and NY were significant 
explanatory variables and had the expected signs, while XY was insignificant, 
apparently because of the high degree of collinearity between it and NY (Bahl, 
1971, p. 593). That is, the regression coefficient of NY to a large extent 
included the influence of XY as well. Bahl also undertook a comparison of tax 
effort using the Bahl equation and the 1967 Lotz and Morss equation (using 
Bahl’s data) and found that they did not result in significantly different tax 
effort rankings. 
Similarly to Lotz and Morss (1967 and 1970), Bahl found regional effects to be 
a significant determinant of inter-country tax share variations (Bahl, 1971, pp. 
600-604). That is, when Bahl specified his model with an additional five 
dummy regressors to represent different levels of taxable capacity among 
regions, the തܴଶ of the estimating equation increased by a statistically significant 
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amount (from 0.411 to 0.522). As in the Lotz and Morss model, interaction 
effects do not add significantly to the statistical explanation in terms of ഥܴ ଶ.  
Also, in a further study by Bahl , which was entitled "A Representative Tax 
system : Approach to Measuring Tax Effort in Developing countries". The 
article tested the tax effort for 49 developing countries for the period of 1966-
1968 by using his previous model. The paper was published in 1972. This study 
found that T/Y related inversely to AY and positively to NY. It indicated that an 
increase in the share of the agricultural sector in the GDP meant a decrease in 
taxable benefits due to the relatively low level of agricultural sector income, as 
shown in table 2.1. (Abu-Hammour, 1997). 
In a study by Chelliah (1971) entitled "Trends of tax system in the developing 
countries" a sample of 27 developing countries during two periods was used, the 
first 1953-1955, and second 1966-1968. He related the tax share to explanatory 
variables such as mining share, non mineral export ratio and agriculture share 
(Gupta, 2007). The study indicated that the tax ratio in developing countries was 
affected by economic attributes (characteristics) and changed during the stages 
of development. This means that the proportion of the tax deduction rises with 
an increase in incomes and wealth, and expenditure which occurred because of 
the development and expansion the current tax bases and created new tax bases. 
The findings of this study indicated that the proportion of tax to GDP rose from 
11.3% to 13.8% between the two periods.                           
Then the same study increased the sample size to 50 countries, including 24 
developing countries for the period of 1966-6 only, and this study indicated that 
the average proportion of income taxes to GDP was 5.1% in the developed 
countries while it was 2.2% in the developing countries. The average ratio of 
total taxes to GDP was 15.5% in the developed countries and 12.3% in the 
developing countries. Also this study found that the capacity to collect and pay 
taxes increases with the level of development (Gupta, 2007).    
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Chelliah, Bass and Kelly (1975) were experts of the IMF who studied the 
relationship between taxes and GDP on a sample of 47 countries during the 
period of 1969-71. This study is one of the most important studies which have 
calculated the tax burden and taxable capacity and the tax effort; it used at the 
outset the relations between taxes and GDP, which were called "Lotz-Morss 
Equations". Then the study built a taxable capacity model, and assumed that the 
tax effort was influenced by the following factors:                    
A- per capita Gross National product (Yp)  
B- per capita export income (Xp)  
C-ratio of mining sector product to the GDP (NY)  
D-ratio of exports to GDP (XY)  
E-ratio of exports, excluding mineral exports, to GDP (X`Y )  
F- per capita GNP, excluding income from exports (Yp - Xp)  
G- ratio of the agricultural sector product to GDP (AY)  
L-ratio of the foreign trade to GDP (F/Y).  
They obtained the best fit using the agricultural share, the mining share, and the 
export ratio in GDP as explanatory variables. They found that mining was 
positively related to the tax share while agriculture was negatively related and 
the export ratio is insignificant (Eltony, 2002).  
The study provided evidence that countries with larger per capita non-export 
income, more open to trade, and with larger mining but smaller agricultural 
sectors have, on average, a higher “taxable capacity” or ease of collection 
(Aisen & Veiga, 2005). The results of this study as illustrated in table 2.1 
(equations of  F-K). 
Two alternative methods were suggested by Tait and Eichengreen (1978) to the 
international comparison of imposing tax. The first one was the standard tax 
rate (STR) method and the other was the standard tax elasticity (STE) method, 
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to which the arithmetic approach was adopted for both of them. They did not 
consider the elements specifying taxable capacity and their proxy variables. A 
common element between these methods and the representative tax system 
(RTS) existed where all of them needed to find the loss of total tax earnings. 
Four essential components were taken into account by the previous methods: 
1. Taxes on capital earnings, individual incomes, and business profits.   
2. local taxes.   
3. Taxes on foreign trade (exports and imports).  
4. Other taxes. 
Calculated actual tax yields (ATY), which are required by the standard tax rate 
(STR) method, can be acquired by dividing each kind of tax over its basis. The 
mean of (ATY) is named a standard tax yield (STY). The standard tax rate 
(STR) is acquired by dividing (ATY) by the (STY). 
If the (STR) is less than one, this shows that a country, on one hand, has not 
utilised its taxable capacity yet, and vice versa. On the other hand, if the (STR) 
is equal to one; this indicates that a country has completely utilised its taxable 
capacity. This method supplies a sign showing how far a country has utilised its 
tax bases and the decisions that are likely to be taken as to which taxes are more 
reasonable for a raise or a reduction. 
The actual tax yield (ATY) is calculated for two periods individually in the 
standard tax elasticity (STE). The (STE) increase rate of (ATY) is divided by 
the increase rate of the (STY) to get it. If the (STE) is higher than one, Taxes 
are flexible and vice versa. This model highlights the increase rate of actual tax 
yield and also indicates some tax earnings growth as a result of the 
modifications in base rate. 
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Altough Tait and Eichengreen (1978) mostly criticisied earlier studies 
connected to this subject, particularly those adopted the econometrics models, 
on the grounds that independent coefficient has a lower degree; moreover, these 
studies faced some regression problems. The same methodology was taken up 
in their research (1979) about international comparisons of imposing tax for 
sixty-three chosen developing countries for the period 1972-1976. The sample 
was divided into two subgroups. The first one was countries with GNP more 
than $10 billion and the other was for those with GNP less than $10 billion. The 
conclusion proposed that the equation was reasonable only for the countries 
with small economies. The countries were classified in accordance with their 
population size into two sub samples.  The first, group "A", involved countries 
having a population below or equal to 10 million, and the second was group “B" 
involved countries having a population of more than 10 million. In addition, the 
sample was categorised into three geographical subgroups, Africa, Asia and 
Latin America. The Lotz & Morss equation and the CBK equation in addition to 
three others were used to calculate taxable capacity for each group. The authors 
concluded that the expression function, involving non-exportation income (Yp-
Xp), the portion of mining in GDP (Ny) and the portion of non-exportation 
mining in GDP (X'y), was still the most reasonable one. 
Truong and Gash (1979) followed another route by objecting to specifying 
whether economic combination results in higher or lower taxable capacity for 
developing countries. They used multiple regression model that included 
income per person and "export/GDP" or "import/GDP" ratios as the explanatory 
variable. In addition, indicator variable "I" was involved where "I" =1, if a 
country took part in a particular form of economic combination such as a free 
trade area, customs union, or common market, and zero otherwise. They 
indicated that the taxable capacity in developing countries is reduced by an 
economic combination plan. Taxable capacity, however, grows with 
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establishing free trade areas compared with other members of customs unions or 
common market. 
Askari, Cumming and Glover (1982), in their study on taxing system and tax 
policy in Middle Eastern countries, amended Chelliah's model by adding four 
explanatory variables: portion of agriculture in the GNP (Ay); sum of 
exportation and importation ratio to GNP (Fy); export elasticity index (EI) and 
money supply to GNP (M2/Y). Although this form performed better than 
Chelliah's model, Askari et al. showed some reservations to a model which 
depended widely on the portion of mining in GNP (Ny) to clarify differences in 
taxable capacity. They therefore substituted this variable with the mineral 
exportation ratio to GNP (Xm/Y). They used importation ratio (My) rather than 
foreign trade ratio (Fy) because there were collinearity problems. This model 
alteration clarified the significant difference in the explanatory variable. 
However, it can be argued that such a result was not accurate: Firstly, 
concerning the explanatory power's viewpoint (R2), the first form produces 
better at 0.772, 0.866 and 0.602 for the first form and for the entire group and 
the other two subgroups (19 middle eastern and 48 other LDCs) respectively, 
while it was 0.646, 0.803 and 0.588 for the second form for the same samples. 
Secondly, the mining portion (Ny) as an independent variable yields a better 
conclusion in the first equation of Askari et al.'s form than mineral export ratio 
(Xm/Y) in the rechecked equation. 
Chelliah's study (1971), s CBK study (1975) and Tait, Grantz and Eichengreen's 
study (1979), published by IMF, were tested by Newlyn (1985) who provided 
criticism for these studies due to their methodology, which he argued led to a 
prejudiced result. So, Newlyn developed another model called tax effort 
measurement (TEM). It depended on the total of the initial growth in revenue 
(∆Rd) as a result of discretional modifications in the tax base that involved 
changes in the existing tax rates and offering or omitting taxes over a specific 
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period. Under this method, the modification in the sum of annual tax revenue 
(∆XR) over the same period should be computed. The "TEM" was identified as 
the ratio of (∆Rd) to (∆XR), as the following equation: 
  
The computation should go forward to modify the tax effort measurement ratio 
(TEM) for each country to tax effort index (TEI) by dividing the former over 
the average sample value of "TEM". If the result for any country goes beyond a 
unity or 100%, that means the tax performance is met and vice versa. Yet, this 
study will not use Newlyn's model since it requires determining the initial 
growth of revenues resulting from discretional modifications. The elimination 
impact difficulties of tax base growth from the discretional modifications 
impact are likely to restrict the use of such a method. This model, moreover, 
disregarded the willingness to pay taxes and tax burden. It is significant to argue 
that excessive rates of imposing tax must be avoided. 
A study by Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) provided a model that explains the 
affectivity of tax effort to four explanatory variables (reflects the average 
response of tax bases), for estimated relative taxable capacity using cross-
sectional data of some less developed countries (LDCs). The  explanatory 
variables were : per capita income (YP);  Share of exports in Gross national 
product (X/Y) ; Share of the extractive industries product  in Gross national 
product  (E/Y); and  Share of the agricultural product in Gross national product  
(A/Y. The explanatory power of this model amounted to 50 %, and they showed 
that relative taxable capacity depended on the economic structure of each 
country. The study found that the relationship between relative taxable capacity 
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and each independent variable is positive, except that which is between the 
capacity and the share of agriculture in the GDP (Abu-Hammour, 1997) . 
Also this study indicated that index number of the tax burden (tax effort) can be 
accounted for by dividing the actual T/Y to the predicted (T/Y), and this helps 
us to evaluate and compare the tax effort between the various countries. That 
study also expected that the ratio of taxes to GDP would be less than 18% in 
developing countries. 
A study was conducted by Leuthold (1991) on eight African countries over the 
period 1973-1981. He offered the total foreign subsidies and loans as 
explanatory variables, beside many others. The performance of regression 
model was poor where the trade portion coefficient was the only one out of five 
coefficients that was of anticipated indicator and statistically different from 
zero. The study suggests many reasons to change the tax revenues ratio to GNP 
or GDP: development phase, accessibility and non-tax income sources etc. He 
concluded that "care must be taken in the interpretation placed on the tax effort 
index [...] because it is unclear whether or not all relevant influences on tax 
effort have been included" (p. 184). All relevant elements in regression models 
are impossible to be involved because of econometrics problems.  A model 
similar to the one illustrated by Bahl (1972) and confirmed by Tait and 
Eichengreen (1978) was adopted by Roberti (1992). The main idea of Roberti’s 
approach is demonstrated by specifying the sum of tax revenues and then 
connecting each tax to its basis, and also relating each tax basis to GDP. This 
approach is sometimes named a "chain approach". Such a process of measuring 
the tax ratio of individual income tax is illustrated by the following equation: 
  
Where 
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T= individual income tax revenue. 
Il=prospective income tax. 
SH=income subject to tax. 
SH*=income the tax actually imposed. 
GDP=Gross Domestic Product. 
"T/H" described the mean income tax rate on the potential tax base, "H/SH" 
considers discharges that is likely to happen in the possible basis.  "SH/SH*" is 
taken into account to be what might be called the base erosion. "SH*/H” 
demonstrates the potential tax handle rate on which revenue taxes are actually 
levied. 
This approach is somewhat complex and does not refer to tax effort. Moreover, 
it is better related to calculating the tax rate for each tax instead of taxable 
capacity. 
Another two studies are worthy of mention here: in the first an ordinary least 
square was functioned by Sarojini (1992) to evaluate taxable capacity for fifteen 
Indian states covering two periods: 1970-1973 and 1980-1983. Each period was 
averaged to eliminate the variations impact on the variable. Two explanatory 
variables only were used. Abu Hammour (1997) dealt with taxable capacity in 
Jordan for the period 1973-1995.  The form he used included the portion of the 
wholesale and retail trade sectors in GDP (WA); in addition to five more 
explanatory variables. He used the two stages least squares (2SLS) model rather 
than using "OLS" to evaluate taxable capacity. He also examined whether log-
linear modeling or linear one approach was better, concluding that linear 
modeling was more appropriate. The most significant conclusion of this study 
regarding the Jordanian economy was that Jordan did not achieve the maximum 
use of its relative taxable capacity during 1973-1989. That means tax effort for 
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each year during this period was lower than one. Nevertheless, not only did 
Jordan fully use its taxable capacity during 1990-1995, but also went beyond its 
taxable capacity to the extent that the tax effort for each year aggregated to 
more than one. Such a situation it is likely to be somewhat connected to the 
impacts of the second Gulf War. 
Al Mutawkel (2000) took up, in his study about Yemen and twenty-five other 
developing countries, a form of two explanatory variables (income per person 
and importation ratio) to evaluate taxable capacity and tax effort. He concluded 
that both variables were significant. He illustrated that the taxable capacity of 
Yemen was 14% of the Yemeni GNP. Al Mutawkel considered computing the 
income elasticity of tax revenue from 1976 to 1990, which was found to be 
1.3%. That meant that if GNP raised by a unit, tax revenue would have been be 
raised by 0.13 of this unit. 
Finally, Eltony (2002) conducted an updated study connected to this subject. 
Such a study functioned cross-sectionally and pooled time series data using the 
"OLS" method from 1994 to2000, for sixteen Arab countries. He presented one 
more significant variable, outstanding foreign debt (OFD) in addition to the 
frequently explanatory variables that has been used in earlier studies. Thus, the 
model he evaluated consisted of six explanatory variables. The Gulf 
Cooperative Council (GCC) Countries (such as oil countries) and the other ten 
countries as non-oil Arab countries formed the two subgroups sample. Such an 
evaluation was applied for these subgroups and for the entire sample. There was 
a statistically significant result of the mining portion and income per person for 
the GCC countries. All explanatory variables were conversely significant except 
the production portion in the GDP for the result of the second group. 
Outstanding foreign debt (OFD) was statistically significant and had a positive 
indicator, which was likely to reflect the effect of IMF financial reform 
programs taken up by many countries in this group. The most significant sign 
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likely to be calculated was that for the majority of the entire sample, the actual 
tax revenues were less than the possible tax revenues. That meant there was 
some potential to obtain more tax earnings as the countries did not make full use 
of their taxable capacity. 
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Table (2.1) Results of the estimated taxable capacity in previous models                     
Chelliah, Kelly & Bass Model Bahl Model Morss & Lotz Model Model 
69-1971 66-1968 69-1971 62-1965 62-1965 62-1965 Period 
47 countries 49 dev 47dev 20 adv 52 dev 72 adv,devSample 
K I H G F E D C B A Source 
15.66 
( 11.07 ) 
14.46 
( 8.12 ) 
10.36 
( 6.31 ) 
11.47 
( 7.84 ) 
11.65 
( 7.77 ) 
14.95 
( 9.68 ) 
15.66 
( 11.07 ) 
23.65 
( N/A) 
10.21 
( N/A) 
10.47 
( N/A) 
constant 
--- --- --- --- 0.002 
( 0.5 ) 
--- --- 0.002 
( 0.826 ) 
0.0085* 
( 2.963 ) 
0.0081* 
( 10.89 ) 
Yp 
T
he
   
in
de
pe
nd
en
t  
va
ri
ab
le
s
 
--- --- --- --- 0.06 
( 2.36 ) 
--- --- 0.0373 
( 0.55 ) 
0.0712* 
( 2.573 ) 
0.079* 
( 2.74 ) 
F/Y 
0.35 
( 4.44 ) 
0.32 
( 3.85 ) 
--- 0.044 
( 5.45 ) 
--- 0.2951 
( 3.68 ) 
0.35 
( 4.44 ) 
--- --- --- NY 
-0.08 
(2.37) 
-0.07 
(2.04) 
--- --- --- - 0.0742 
( 2.07 ) 
- 0.08 
(2.37) 
--- --- --- AY 
--- --- 0.005 
( 1.32 ) 
0.001 
( 0.38 ) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- ( YP – XP ) 
--- --- --- 0.05 
(1.17) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- X `Y 
--- 0.04 
(1.10) 
0.15 
(3.35) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- XY 
44% 45% 18% 38% 11% --- 44% --- 20% 64% R2 
The Table sources:  
Alkatheri, Mustafa , Revenue collection system and Economic development in Morocco , publications of Arab 
organization for Administrative Sciences , Amman , first edition ,1985 , p. 200. 
Gupta, Abhijit Sen (2007), Determinants of tax revenue efforts in developing countries, IMF, working paper 
No.184. 
Hamma , Khalil Tthe tax structure in Jordan , Reasearch of Yarmouk  Magazine , Yarmouk University , Irbid , 
Jordan , vol.5 , No.2, 1989 , p. 63.. 
Lotz ,J.R and .Morss, E. R., 1967 , `` Measuring tax Effort in developing countries ``, I.M.F staff papers , Vol: 
14 , pp.487,497 .  
Musgrave, R and Musgrave. P, Public Finance  in Theory and Practice , Arabic edition, 1992  ,translated by 
Dr. Mohamed Alsabakhi , Almerekh publishing house , Saudi Arabia , Riyadh ,  p.470. 
Raja  J. Chelliah , Hassel J. Bass and Margeret R.Kelly , `` Tax Ratios and Tax Effort in Developing countries 
1969-71 `` , I.M.F , Staff papers , vol : XXII , No :1 , March 1975 , pp.204-205.  
Roy W.Bahl ,`` A Representative Tax system  , Approach to Measuring Tax Effort in Developing countries `` , 
I.M.F , staff papers , vol ( XIX ) , No: 1 , March , 1972 , p. 109 
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Table (2.2): Summary of findings of empirical studies 
Author 
Significant Explanatory 
Variables (Sign) 
Other  variables 
included in the 
regression 
Goodness 
of Fit 
Countries 
covered 
Time 
period 
Lotz & Morss 
(1967)a 
Per capita GNP(+), trade 
share(+) 
  64%  72 developing 
and developed 
countries 
1962‐65 
Lotz & Morss 
(1967)a 
Per capita GNP(+), trade 
share(+) 
  20%  52 developing 
countries 
1962‐65 
Lotz & Morss 
(1967)a 
Per capita GNP(+), trade 
share(+) 
  Not 
reported 
20 developed 
countries 
1962‐65 
Bahl(1972)a  Mining share(+), 
agriculture share (‐) 
  44%  47 developing 
countries 
1969‐71 
Bahl(1972)a  Mining share(+), 
agriculture share (‐) 
  Not 
reported 
49 developing 
countries 
1966‐68 
Chelliah (1971)b  Mining share(+),non‐
mineral export 
share(+),agriculture 
share(‐) 
Per capita non‐
export income, 
export ration. 
25‐50%  50 developing 
countries. 
1953‐55 
and 1966‐
68 
Chelliah, Bass 
and 
Kelly(1975)b 
Mining share(+), 
agriculture share(‐) 
Trade share, non‐
mineral exports, 
per capita non‐
export income. 
11‐45%  47 developing 
countries 
1969‐71 
Tait, Gratz and 
Eichengreen(19
79)b 
Mining share(+),non‐
mineral export share(+), 
export share(+) 
Per capita income, 
per capita non‐
export income, 
agriculture share. 
26‐54%  47 developing 
countries 
1972‐76 
Tait, Gratz and 
Eichengreen(19
79)b 
Mining share(+),non‐
mineral export share(+), 
export share(+) 
Per capita income, 
per capita non‐
export income, 
agriculture share. 
34‐59%  63 developing 
countries 
1972‐76 
Contd. 
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Table 2.2 (Cont.). 
Author 
Significant Explanatory 
Variables (Sign) 
Other  variables 
included in the 
regression 
Goodness 
of Fit 
Countries 
covered 
Time 
period 
Tanzi(1981)c  Mining share(+),non‐
mineral export share(+) 
Per capita non‐
export income 
15‐52%  34 Sub 
saharan 
African 
countries 
1977 
Tanzi(1992)c  Agriculture share(‐), 
import share(+), foreign 
debt share(+) 
Per capita income  54%  88 developing 
countries  
1978‐88 
Leuthold(1991)  Trade share(+), 
agriculture share(‐) 
Foreign grants, 
mining share 
38%  8 African 
countries 
1973‐81 
Stotsky and 
WoldeMariam 
(1997)c 
Agriculture share(‐), 
mining share(‐), export 
share(+),per capita 
GDP(+), IMF dummy(+) 
Manufacturing 
share, import share 
57‐94%  46 sub 
Saharan 
African 
countries 
1990‐95 
Author 
Significant Explanatory 
Variables (Sign) 
Other  variables 
included in the 
regression 
Goodness 
of Fit 
Countries 
covered 
Time 
period 
Ghura (1998)c  Per capita 
income(+),agriculture 
share(‐), trade 
openness(+), existence of 
oil and non oil mining 
sector(+), structural 
reforms(+),human capital 
development(+), 
inflation(‐), corruption(‐) 
Percentage change 
in terms of trade, 
percentage change 
in real exchange 
rate , change in 
external debt to 
GDP ratio 
Not 
reported 
39 sub 
Saharan 
African 
countries 
1985‐96 
Piancastelli 
(2001)c 
Trade share(+), 
agriculture share(‐), 
manufacturing share(+), 
services share(+) 
Per capita GDP  38‐84%  75 countries  1985‐95 
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Table 2.2 (cont. ). 
Author 
Significant Explanatory 
Variables (Sign) 
Other  variables 
included in the 
regression 
Goodness 
of Fit 
Countries 
covered 
Time 
period 
Eltony (2002)c  Per capita GDP(+), mining 
share(‐) 
Import share, 
export 
share,manufacturin
g share, agriculture 
share, outstanding 
foreign debt 
50%  6 oil producing 
Arab countries 
1994‐
2000 
Eltony (2002)c  Per capita GDP 
(+),import(+),export(+),mi
ning share(+), agriculture 
share (‐)outstanding 
foreign debt(+) 
Export share, 
manufacturing 
share 
78%  10 non oil 
producing 
Arab countries 
1994‐
2000 
Bird, Martinez‐
Vasquez & 
Torgler (2004)d 
Population growth(‐
),agriculture share(‐), 
inequality(‐), shadow e 
economy(‐), 
institutions(+),entry 
regulations(‐) 
Per capita GDP  48‐85%  110 developng 
and 
transitional 
countries 
1990‐99 
Gupta (2007)e  Per capita GDP(+), 
agriculture share(‐), trade 
openness (‐), foreign aid 
(+) 
Corruption, 
political stability, 
share of direct and 
indirect taxes  
  105 countries  1980‐
2004 
Source : Gupta , Abhijit Sen ; 2007 ; Determinants of Tax Revenue Efforts in Developing Countries ; 
IMF working paper, wp/07/184. 
a. Dependent variable is ratio of tax revenue to GNP.; b. Dependent variable is ratio of tax revenue 
(excluding social security payments)  to GNP.; c. Dependent variable is ratio of tax revenue to GDP.; 
d. Dependent variable is ratio of tax revenue to GDP and ratio of current revenue (minus grants ) to 
GDP.; e. Dependent variable is ratio of central Government revenue ( excluding grants )  to GDP. 
 
109 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION   
This chapter reviewed tax effort, taxable capacity and many other ideas related 
to them. It addressed a number of techniques and approaches that try to estimate 
tax effort and taxable capacity. The essential elements and their proxy variables, 
which specify taxable capacity, were observed. The final part in this chapter 
was dedicated to discussing the related studies of this subject. A number of 
significant points can be summarised from the studies reported in this chapter: 
1. Although the Laffer curve estimation can theoretically be used to evaluate 
Absolute taxable capacity, it will not be used in this study because there is not 
enough data. 
2. Relative taxable capacity was severally defined. Some of these definitions 
refer to the methodology of model that has been used to evaluate relative 
taxable capacity. Representative tax system (RTS) method provided, for 
example, a definition valid for this model only. Nevertheless, it is likely to be 
concluded that the term "relative taxable capacity" refers to the ratio which can 
be gathered from GNP by the government as taxes, considering two most 
significant factors: the ability and the compliance to pay and gain taxes. Both 
must be taken into account due to their direct effect on the level of tax gains. 
3. Wide tax bases are preferred over a narrow tax base, because the latter may 
be linked to a higher tax burden rather than a wide tax base. 
4. Two main techniques, econometric and arithmetic method, have been used to 
evaluate relative taxable capacity and tax effort. Such techniques contain a 
number of approaches. The former relies chiefly on three elements; the 
development degree, the economy sector, and the economic openness degree. 
Several variables can be represented in each of these elements. Earlier studies 
adopting the econometric method took into account the fact that taxable 
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capacity is a function of these elements. One or more of these variables is 
included in the econometric approach.  
5. The difference of earlier studies results concerning income per person (Yp), 
as an independent variable in the econometrics methods, is believed to be 
important variable. While (Yp) was statistically significant for developed 
countries, referring to the influence of direct taxes in those countries, (Yp) was 
statistically insignificant for developing countries in which indirect taxes are 
more vital. 
6. This discussion of earlier studies has indicated an essential and exciting 
advantage connected to the methodology used for evaluating relative taxable 
capacity. More than one model will be adopted by this study connected to both 
econometric and arithmetic methods. Such models will be utilised to involve 
those variables that show certain basic characteristic of the Libyan economy. 
In terms of theory, contemporary studies of the tax effort should focus on some 
important variables, such as:  oil revenues, non-oil exports, currency in 
circulation, money supply (M1), and tax penalties.   
In practice, they must also include comparative studies of the tax effort, 
especially among oil-producing countries. 
The study of tax effort studies requires the application of new methods such as 
ordinary ridge regression (ORR) and unbiased ridge regression (URR), because 
the majority of economic factors are related to each other. Also, successful tax 
studies also require the creation of wide and accurate databases.  
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Chapter Three 
The Development of the Libyan Economy 
 
The development of the Libyan Economy, 1970-2005 
This chapter provides an overview of the Libyan economy for the period 1970-2005. 
It consists of four parts, as follow: 
Libya's economic structure and contribution of individual sectors to GDP is 
presented in the first part.  In the second part, the development of the Gross 
domestic product (GDP) is outlined. The third part explores the main characteristics 
of the Libyan economy, while the fourth part provides analyses of the structure of 
income and production in the Libyan economy. 
3.1 - Libya's economic structure and sectoral contribution to GDP  
In this section, an analysis of the GDP structure of the Libyan economy and the 
contribution of different sectors to it are examined. 
The Libyan GDP is composed of several economic activities, and can be generally 
classified into two parts: the income from extraction of crude oil and natural gas, and 
income from non-oil economic activities, which include several sub-sectors such as 
agriculture, manufacturing and services; and others. 
 
3.1.1-  The development of value added in the agricultural sector: 
Over the study period, this sector witnessed a great adjustment in terms of its 
importance to Libya, as the oil sector came to completely dominate the national 
economy (Ghanem, 1985). Agricultural product reached LYD 33.1 million in 1970 
at current factors cost - which represented 2.6% of the total GDP in that year.  
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Although it produced an output of LYD1447.5 million in 2005 at current factors cost 
(as shown in table 1), its relative importance to the gross domestic product declined 
to 2.2%.  
However, if estimated by the cost expenses, the total product of this sector reached 
approximately LYD20.3 billion and represented 4.6% of the gross domestic product 
during the years 1970-2005 (tables 1 & 2 in the statistical appendix).  
During the same period the relative importance of agriculture to the non-oil sector 
reached 8.4%; the annual ratio of agricultural product to GDP increased during this 
period, ranging between 1.6 % and 10.3 %, but did not exceed the highest 
percentage of 11.1% in 1998.  
Despite some improvement in the relative importance of the agriculture sector as of 
the beginning of the 1990s, agricultural activity did not have significant relative 
importance in the composition of GDP in Libya. The relative importance of the 
agriculture sector rose nearly 0.9 percentage points only in 2003 over what it was in 
1970. In addition, compared with some Arab countries where the agricultural sector 
has greater importance, the poor performance of agriculture of Libya was evident 
(see table 2 in the statistical appendix). This was due to the poorer environmental 
conditions, for example 90% of Libyan land consists of desert areas. 
3.1.2-  The development of value added in manufacturing industries: 
The product of the manufacturing sector reached LYD22.5 million in 1970 at current 
factors cost, which represented 1.7% of the gross domestic product and 4.7% of the 
total non-oil sector product (see tables 1 & 2, statistical appendix).  
The growth rate of the product of the manufacturing sector fluctuated during the 
period 1970-2005. It increased almost more than 139 times compared to 1970, 
reaching LYD3131.7 million in 2005 with a compound annual growth rate of 
15.1%, and representing 4.7% of GPD and 13.6 % of the total non-oil product in 
2005. During the period 1970-2005, the highest ratio of the manufacturing sector 
product to GDP was 9.4% in 1996 (see table 2). However, the share of this sector in 
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GDP composition was less than the share of the agricultural sector during 1970-76, 
and1980-82. However, it rose between 1984 and 1996.  
Nevertheless, compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of the manufacturing sector 
was higher than what it was in the agricultural sector during the period of 1970-
2005. This was a result of the successive development plans which aimed to develop 
the manufacturing sector, either through the establishment of new projects or by 
improving the operational efficiency of existing projects, or by the exploitation of 
idle capacity.  
 
3.1.3-  The development of value added in other non-oil sectors: 
The category of other non-oil sectors refer to services, electricity, gas, water, 
construction, trade, transportation, storage, communications, finance, insurance and 
real estate. The total product of all these economic activities was approximately 
LYD420.1 million in 1970, with a compound annual growth rate of 11.4%. It 
reached LYD18522.4 million in 2005. Its relative importance decreased from 32.6% 
to 27.6% of the gross domestic product between 1970 and 2005. 
The total product of this sector during 1970-2005 reached approximately 
LYD196327.1million, which represented 44% of the gross domestic product. 
Generally speaking, the share of these sectors (including the service sector) to the 
entire non-oil product slightly decreased from 88.3% in 1970 to 80% in 2005. This 
can be explained by the gradual rise in the share of the agricultural and industry 
sectors in the non-oil product. 
However, the services sector largely dominated non-oil economic activities, 
accounting for nearly 69% of total non-oil GDP during 1970-2005, (Economic 
Research Centre, 2009). As a result of the inability of commodity production to 
meet domestic demand, imports increased in order to cover the increased local 
demand, so that Libyan imports grew at a CAGR of 13.5% during the study period 
(table 3). 
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3.1.4-  The development of value added in the non-oil sector: 
The total non-oil activities included: the agriculture, forestry and fishing sector; the 
manufacturing sector; other non-oil economic sectors. By 2005, the product of this 
sector had increased by 48 times more than it was in 1970. It grew from LYD475.7 
million in 1970 to LYD23101.6 million in 2005, with a compound annual growth 
rate of 11.7 %.  It came in second rank after the oil sector in the structure of gross 
domestic product during the period 1970-80 and 2003-2005 (see table 12). However, 
this part of the economy took a leading role between 1982 and 2002 as the 
government made attempts at restructuring the national economy. The relative 
importance of the total non-oil sector continued to increase from 1982 onwards, 
until it reached 76% of GDP in 1996, compared to 36.9% in 1970. This was a 
reflection of the newly adopted diversification of the income sources strategy. The 
transition five-year plan (1976-80) targeted "work to generate economic surplus in 
the non-oil sectors to be able to finance investments after the depletion of oil 
reserves” (The Planning Secretariat, 1978, p. 6). 
Figure (3.1) Gross Domestic product  
 
Where: A1: Agriculture & forestry and fishing sector,   A2: The manufacturing sector; A3: Other non-oil economic 
sectors. 
Source: Statistical Appendix, Table 1. 
.                                                                      . 
The Structure of non-oil GDP during 1970-2005
A3
82%
A2
10%
A1
8%
A3
A2
A1
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The succeeding five-year development plan (1981-1985) also aimed at "making an 
increase in the output of non-oil industries - value added - more than the growth rate 
of output of the oil industry" (The Secretariat of Information, 1989, p. 56). 
This embedded all economic policies that aimed to "achieve balanced and increasing 
development in non-oil economic activities in order to compensate for any shortfall 
in oil reserves" (The Planning Secretariat, 1978, p. 12). For example, the Libyan 
government tried to diversify the economy in several ways, such as: encouraging 
non-oil exports, which grew from 9% to 24% of total exports during 1970-2005 
(Economic Research Centre, 2009); adopting a privatisation policy under which the 
gross fixed capital formation for the private sector improved from 15% ( in 1970-80) 
to 17% (between 1990 and 2005); also by investing oil revenue in the establishment 
of petrochemical industries . 
 
Table 3.1 The evolution of GDP at current factors of the income cost of non-oil activities in Libya 
(million dinars) 
Years A1 A2 A3 
Rate of overall increase 
A1 A2 A3 
1970 33.1 22.5 420.1 ــ ــ ــ 
1980 236.4 210.4 3581.3 614.2 835.1 752.5 
1990 391 547.1 4062.6 65.4 160 13.4 
1997 1250.4 848.9 7584.2 219.8 55.2 86.7 
2005 1447.5 3131.7 18522.4 15.8 268.9 144.2 
A1: Agriculture & forestry and fishing sector,   A2: The manufacturing sector; A3: Other non-oil economic sectors. 
Source: Statistical Appendix, Table 1. 
.                                                                      . 
 
3.1.5-  The development of value added in the oil sector: 
The total product of the oil sector was LYD812.6 million in 1970 by current prices. 
Over the study period it increased 54 times, reaching LYD43946.7 million in 2005. 
Its compound annual growth rate was 12.1% during the period 1970-2005. 
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As for the relative importance of the oil sector in the composition of GDP: it was 
63% in 1970; thereafter it started to decrease from 1982 onwards until it reached 
only 22.1% in 1998, then returned to a gradual rise again, representing 65.5% in 
2005. This was partly a direct impact of the sharp decline in the production, export 
and prices of crude oil during the 1980s, although it can also be explained by the 
“preservation of the country’s oil wealth from the waste and depletion (exhaustion) 
of oil resources in a short period may not be able to develop other economic 
activities of the national economy to compensate the continuing shortage of oil 
reserves” (The planning secretariat, 1978, p. 14). 
 
Figure 3.2 Structure of Libyan GDP, 1970-2005 
 
oil sector
43%
non‐oil sector
57%
Structure of the GDP during 1970‐2005 ( Average )
 
3.2  Development of the Gross Domestic Product : 
With respect to the GDP at current factors cost of production (for all sectors), it  had 
increased by more than 4 times by 2005 compared to what it had been in 1970, with 
a compound annual growth rate of 12 %. The total GDP (at the constant price of 
1970) developed from LYD1288.3 million in 1970 to LYD5231.2 million in 2005, 
with a compound annual growth rate of 4.1% (see table 4). 
Table 3.2 shows that the overall economic performance underwent a positive growth 
in the first half of the 90s, even though the growth rate (at current prices) during the 
eighties was negative (-4.3%). This was due to the decline in oil prices and 
production.  
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However, GDP started to increase again, with a growth rate of 6.9% during the 
period of 1990-99. This happened as a result of corrective programmes that 
helped reform the structure of the national economy and diversify the 
productive base, so that the Libyan economy no longer depended on oil 
revenue as the main or primary source of national income (The General 
People’s Committee of Planning, 1989, p. 12).
For three decades, great efforts were exerted by the Libyan government in this 
direction. Although these efforts were considered being somewhat satisfactory, yet they 
were far from being optimum in making major leaps in the national economy. Table 3.2 
illustrates GDP growth during 1970-2005 at current prices.  
Table  3.2  evolution of GDP at current prices, 1970-2005  
  
period GDP (Milliard dinars) Compound annual growth rate ( CAGR )
1970 – 79 37.8 21.8% 
1980 – 89 78.4 -4.3% 
1990 – 99 106.1 6.9% 
2000-2005 223.5 30.6% 
1970-2005 445.8 12% 
   Source: Statistical Appendix, Table 1. 
 
3.3. The Main characteristics of the Libyan Economy 
The main characteristics of Libyan economy may be summarised as follows: 
First:  The Libyan economy is a developing economy which is relatively small in size 
(the GDP was ranked 61st among 180 nations in 2005 (Nation Master, 2005). It is 
mainly an economy in which foreign trade plays a crucial role in developing the GDP 
(the ratio of foreign trade to GDP was 68% on average during 1970-2005). The 
volume of exports largely depends on external factors, with domination of oil product 
exports on the Libyan export structure. 
Second: The public sector dominates most economic activities due to the adoption of 
the system of socialism and social and economic planning. The economic planning 
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focus has been on building the material base (material investment) of society without 
giving great importance to building the social base (human capital). 
Third: There is a structural imbalance in the national economy due to heavy 
dependence on the production and export of oil as the primary source of revenue in 
the national income, which contributes about 77% of export earnings on average 
during 1970-2005. 
Fourth:  A very striking feature of the Libyan economy is the relative failure of the 
banking and monetary sector, and the absence of an active and healthy financial 
market. In fact the Libyan stock market was only established in 2005 (Libyan Stock 
Market, 2010). 
Fifth:  The shortage in technically qualified workforce has eventually led to a heavy 
reliance on foreign workforce, which accounted for 11.3% of the total workforce in 
2006.  
3.4- Income and product analysis in the Libyan economy 
There are two parts to this section; the first one reviews economic evolution during 
several periods. Development of individual income is the second part. 
 
3.4.1-The economic development  in Libya and its impacts on tax effort / burden 
in subsequent periods: 
The impact of economic development on the tax effort can be divided into three 
periods. This division is based on the distinctive features of the economy within each 
period.  
1) : From 1970 till 1979. 
2) : From 1980 till 1989. 
3) : From 1990 till 2005. 
119 
 
 
 
First, during the period 1970-1979: 
The Libyan economy during this period was mainly considered as a free-market 
economy. In the early 1970s, there was a significant increase in the profitability of oil 
exports compared to earlier periods. It was marked by a high growth rate of the 
domestic product and total taxes in general. The surplus in trade balance amounted to 
LYD14.5 billion. This was due to: 1) increased income from oil exports became the 
primary source of GDP and total tax revenue, which accounted for 77% of total 
revenue:  and 2) the relative increase in oil prices in the mid 1970s. As a result, the 
government's tax revenue was increased from LYD66.7 to LYD591 million between 
1970 and 1979. 
At the same time, public expenditures did not constitute a significant burden on the 
public budget during this period, because there was no heavy dependence on tax 
revenue in the public budget. During this period, the percentage of tax revenues to 
GDP was low (see table 3.5). 
Table 3.5 demonstrates that, in general, the 70s witnessed: a) a relatively low tax 
burden, b) increase of taxable capacity due to the variability of economic activities, 
especially oil production and oil exports; c) flourishing investment projects in the 
private sector and increases in individual incomes. Overall there was an improvement 
in economic performance and the availability of financial resources for the public 
treasury. However, there were some problems in the economy; public expenditures 
were not efficiently managed according to the priorities of strategic development 
policies and plans (1 ) . There were also shortages in other types of natural resources 
than oil. In addition, the private sector started to shrink, especially in the field of light 
industry, as a result of some economic and social changes that were happening during 
this period. For example, even the relative expansion in the grants and loans allocated 
to support the private sector in certain areas did not help much (table 3.3 shows the 
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distribution of planned investments between the private and public sector). It was 
obvious that the government was more supportive of the public sector.  
There were a number of pieces of legislation and operational procedures that paved 
the way for the transformation of the economy to help the public sector dominate 
economic activities. In the 1980s, the public sector eventually completely took over 
the national economy.  Among these important tax legislations at this period were: 
the Customs Act number 67 of 1972 and income tax law number 64 of 1973.  
Along with those, there was other supportive legislation that regulated other forms of 
tax, namely the Jihad tax, stamp duty and taxes for the blind. Public organisations 
were also subjected to income and customs taxes through the 39 act in 1973. 
Table 3.3 The relative distribution of planned capital formation in Libya during the 
period of 1970-80 (million dinars).  
Commercial bank loans 
for the self-employed and 
individuals 
Fixed capital formation 
Periods Private sector Public sector 
percent Value percent Value 
48.4 30.9 298 69.1 669.1 1970-72 
85.3 20.9 555.9 79.1 2114.4 1973-75 
       ( * ) 276.6 12 1023.9 88 7714.4 1976-80 
410.3 15 1877.9 85 10497.9 1970-80 
( * ) Includes data up to 1979. 
Sources: 
(1) The Secretariat of Information (1989),'' Libya's revolution in twenty years 1969-89”, sep 1989, tables (2-
5), p.226. 
(2) Central bank of Libya, the economic bulletin, 1982, vol.22, No.4-6, table.12. 
(3) Central bank of Libya, the economic bulletin, 1986, vol.27, No.4-6, table.12. 
(4) Economic research centre, Total Economic, financial and demographic data in Libya during 1962-2006, 
Benghazi, Libya, July 2009. 
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Second: the period 1980-1989: 
The second period saw a greater control of the government over the economy.  
During the period of 1981-1988 the Libyan economy was suffered from a shortfall in 
the planned investments in the private sector, which reached less than 8% of the total 
investment allocation (2) . Participatory production in the form of joint ventures was 
encouraged as an alternative to the earlier private sector through credit facilities 
which did not exceed LYD3.5 million in total (see table 3.4). 
 
Table 3.4 The relative distribution of planned capital formation in Libya during the 
period 1981-88 (million dinars).  
Credit facilities granted by commercial banks  
)Monetary and non-monetary(  
 
Fixed capital formation 
Private sector Public sector Period  
( B ) ( A ) years percent value percent value 
-- 384.79 1985 10 1189.190 10692.8 1981-85 
0.807 402.79 1986
1.023 395.92 198722 747.7 78 2627.9 1986-88 
-- 389.9 1988 
1.667 389.56 198913 1936.887 13320.7 1981-88 
3.497 1962.96 1989-85
(A) For former private sector; (B) for Craftsmen and productive projects. 
Sources:  
(1) The Secretariat of information (1989),'' Libya's revolution in twenty years 1969-89”, sep 1989, tables (2-5), p.226. 
(2) Central bank of Libya, the economic bulletin, 1997, vol.37, No.4-6, table.10. 
(3) Central bank of Libya, the economic bulletin, 1997, vol.37, No.7-9, table.10. 
(4) Economic research centre, Total Economic, financial and demographic data in Libya during 1962-2006, Benghazi, 
Libya, July 2009. 
________________________________________________ 
Therefore, in 1981 the public sector started to take control over many economic 
activities such as the distribution of goods and there was a cancellation of private 
122 
 
 
trade for a certain period and restrictions on land ownership in the private sector, 
while facilitating the establishment of public companies and organisations. 
As a result, the public sector was fully in charge of carrying out strategic projects, 
local and foreign trade, and offering distribution services. However, this sector 
expanded so much as to be unable to efficiently control all economic activities, which 
eventually led to its inefficiency and high production costs.  This meant that the 
public sector was a heavy burden on the treasury from the 1980s, due to the decrease 
in oil revenues and shrinkage of the tax base. 
Table 3.5 shows that the growth rate of GDP started to decline in this period, and so 
did the productivity of manufacturing industries and non- oil products, because of a 
decline in oil prices.  
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During this period, the increase of indirect tax revenues was at a diminishing rate 
because of the decrease of the growth rate of imports. The fallback in the increasing 
rate of direct tax revenues, which almost reached 1.3% during this period, as 
compared to 32.1 % in the 1970s, was due to the reduction in the size of the tax base. 
Many private economic activities were removed from the tax funding circle due to 
the marginalised role of the private sector in the beginning of 1980s. 
Moreover, the increase in the population, the rise of the cost of living index 
(1970=100), and increase in the average tax revenues per capita which reached 
LYD225.5 per year compared to the LYD97.8 per year as an average for the earlier 
period (1970-79), all led to an increase in the tax burden.  Although the size of the tax 
base was low during this period, due to many private projects leaving the economic 
exchange field, without making any applicable discounts on the tax rates, this meant 
that many taxes imposed during that period brought no material advantages. 
Income tax mainly consisted of a salary tax, especially in the public sector. This tax 
did not match the taxpayer’s estimated ability to pay due to a cap on salary schedules, 
and many social bonuses being cancelled, together with rising living costs.  
There were some other phenomena worth mentioning - namely: the emergence of 
parallel markets, the fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates and the 
instability of service and product prices. Though these activities generally generate 
high rates of revenues, this did not reflect the tax ability or overall economic 
development. It was only an added burden on the individual. 
The oil market in the 1980s also witnessed a relative decline in oil prices and 
revenues, which led to the growth of domestic public debt and an increase in current 
and investment public expenditures, which reached their highest rates in the history 
of the country. In addition, some projects were either cancelled or frozen during the 
transformational plan. There were also modifications of tariff items to look for 
alternative financing resources. 
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Then, in the mid 1980s, oil prices drastically declined and so did the oil revenues of 
foreign currency, causing an imbalance in the balance of payments. The growth of 
non-oil products revenues (between 1980-1989) led to a deficit in the administrative 
budget reaching LYD2.6 billion. This was an outcome of exceeding the ceiling of 
expenditure of the non-oil revenues at their current price. 
The treasury then resorted to deficit financing by providing a flow of money, which 
led to inflation, the emergence of the black market in some basic products and 
eventually an increase in the volume of illegal trade. 
Meanwhile, a number of austerity measures were undertaken, such as: a) a decrease 
in imports; b) layoff of some foreign workers in 1984; c) a decrease in travel 
allowances and other social benefits; d) an exchange rate devaluation for the Libyan 
currency.  On the other hand, taxes were imposed on land property and real estate 
following Act 2 in 1986. Another act was issued against the smuggling of goods, 
known as Act 17; in 1989.There was also a growing tendency to give the private 
sector some restricted economic roles. Yet all these measures -though effective- were 
not quite sufficient to help with the development of the economy and tax effort. 
Therefore, a total reform in the economic system was called for, especially in terms 
of the role of the public and private sectors in developing the Libyan economy. 
To sum up, the 1980s were marked by some distinct features in the Libyan economy: 
namely, the new socialist transformation, the leading role of the public sector, a 
reduction in the role of the private sector, decrease in tax effort and increase in tax 
burden, and certainly there were no clear economic and tax policies during this 
period. 
Third, the period 1990 - 2005: 
Through some established private companies, the private sector started to play a role 
in the economy. The government also sold the shares of some public sector 
companies and gave some production units to their producers. Apart from this 
privatisation of some public sector units, the private sector was encouraged to take 
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initiatives, especially in the areas of import and export, providing products and 
services. Banks also contributed through giving credit facilities to the private sector 
in the form of small loans.  
Table 3.6 The Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Credit Facilities granted by Libyan Commercial 
Banks (million LYD). 
 The Gross fixed capital formation 
*credit facilities 
period public sector private sector total 
  value  percent CAGR value percent CAGR value CAGR A B 
1990-96 7183.1 13.1% 12.1% 2004.7 17.0% -8.8% 9187.8 6.3% 157.019 2880.8 
1997-05 47473.3 86.9% 29.1% 9809 83.0% 31.7% 57282.3 29.5% - - 
1990-05 54656.4 100.0% 20.2% 11813.7 100.0% 11.4% 66470.1 17.8% - - 
 
( * ) credit facilities granted by commercial banks " monetary and non-monetary" ., ( A ) for craftsmen and productive projects ., 
(B) for private sector . 
Source: Economic research centre, Total Economic, financial and demographic data in Libya during 1962-2006, 
Benghazi, Libya, July 2009. 
 
 
Below are some features of the third distinctive period of 1990 to 2005 (see section 
3.4.1): 
First, there was an increase in the growth rate of GDP, which reached 15.5% on 
average for the whole period (1990-2005). 
Second, the production of the non-oil sector reached LYD179.5 billion with a growth 
rate of 10.7%, which shows that this sector became extremely influential in the 
national income. It contributed 54.5% of the GDP. 
Third, the growth rate of direct tax revenues increased by 4.8%, and indirect taxes by 
8.9 %, due to the development of private productive enterprises and an increase in the 
growth rate of import taxes, reaching almost 6.1 %. Regulations of production taxes 
were modified and extended to cover additional products in 1992. 
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Some customs regulations also allowed an evaluation system on products to prevent 
tax evasion, as well as customs being removed across some neighboring Arab 
countries, and conditional customs exemptions on some Arab-made products. 
However, these measures did not add much to tax customs revenues due to the low 
growth rate of foreign trade between Arab countries, and limitations of products for 
export which were duty free.  
During this period, the administrative budget also suffered from a deficit due to 
administrative expenditures exceeding non-oil revenues. During the period of 1990-
2005, administrative expenditures reached LYD53.6 billion, while non-oil revenues 
were merely LYD41.8 billion.  
Generally speaking, during this period, there was some specific expansion in the tax 
base, and a slight decline in the tax burden, but the tax base did not reach the 
requested economical level due to the inflexibility of the tax system. 
The absence of a stock market and economic instability led to investments not being 
at their best, since investors had to make very tough decision as to whether to invest 
or save money. The investors' vision was blurred and decisions of return on 
investment were not clear, the degrees of investment risk were high and 
circumstances of uncertainty prevailed at this time. Therefore, the private sector 
continued to hesitate to take initiatives, especially in the absence of investment 
facilities. The real problem lay in the obstacles that private investors faced in 
obtaining credit facilities. There were a great deal of restrictions and bureaucratic 
procedures in order to get even limited loans. Repayment installments were not 
regularised. Priority was given to corporate and operating business only in certain 
fields, and unfortunately these fields were not the ones most needed economically at 
the time. There were also more restrictions and conditions on the number of business 
partners an investor could have. 
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 The complexity of procedures of business start up led to a lot of manipulation and 
the emergence of some fake companies, and productive projects which did not 
comply with the legal requirements. 
Added to this, because of the low investment returns and irregular credit facilities, 
many companies failed to pay their loans or interest rates owed to the banks.  
It should be noted, however, that the inability of the private sector to pay its financial 
debts was a consequence not a cause of default of the loans granted to this sector by 
the banks. 
Therefore in 1999, the General Planning Council in Libya started an economic 
reform covering some important procedures and recommendations concerning: the 
monetary system, encouraging individual and corporate savings, encouraging real 
estate investment, improving conditions for low-income citizens and finally, 
developing and improving the tax system and simplifying its procedures. 
3.4.2- The development in individual money and real income from 1970-2005: 
The available data indicates that there was a relative rise in the average per capita 
nominal income, which increased by about 18.8 times by 2005 compared to what it 
had been in 1970, with a compound annual growth rate of almost 8.7%  (see table 5). 
The real per capita income (1970 = 100) increased at a compound annual growth rate 
of 1.1% approximately, this was due to the remarkable growth rate in GDP, which 
amounted to 12% as an average for the period 1970-2005 (table 5). 
Many factors contributed to the growth of Libyan incomes, including: the increase in 
oil revenues, following a number of economic policies that aimed at increasing the 
individual's real income, raising the standard of living, subsidising some basic goods, 
lowering and fixing the prices of some basic goods and services e.g. oil products, 
electricity and house rents. 
The average annual income per employee in the public sector - at current prices - also 
reached LYD3016.5 on average during the same period due to the growth in the rate 
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of compensations of employees in this sector by 11.2 %. This even exceeded the 
growth rate of employee numbers during this period, which was 3.9 % (see table 6 in 
the appendix). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
131 
 
 
 
Notes. 
 
(1) There are many causes of these phenomena to mention only a few: 
a- Lack of investment on human resources which levelled up with the development process. 
b- Inability to establish a sound production base especially in the area of export industries through depending almost exclusively on 
oil and neglecting other resources. 
c- Wasting of money resources which took the form of not putting them in their best usage. Therefore public expenditures were not 
productive and so were most public projects and even manpower. 
d- Most of the targets of the consecutive development plans were not achieved and there were not any new areas of investment. 
e- There was no real improvement in the quality of basic services besides their high cost and the wide spread of bureaucracy. 
 
(2) While gross fixed capital formation (actual) during the period (1981-88) was as the following table:  
Gross fixed capital formation for all sectors ( * ) ( actual values , million dinars )  
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 total 
2900.3 2771.5 2524.3 2127.7 1558.1 1375.9 949.9 1049.8 15257.5 
 ( * ) Includes the public sector and private sector. 
Source: The General people’s committee of planning, The Economic & social indicators during 1962-96, Dec 1997,tables 1,3 
p.33;p.35. 
Economic research centre, Total Economic, financial and demographic data in Libya, during 1962-2006, Benghazi, Libya, July 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
132 
 
 
Chapter Four  
Development of the Public Finances in Libya. 
This chapter reviews the development of public revenue; public expenditure; and the 
status of public budgets in Libya during the period 1970-2005.  
4.1  The development of public revenue during the period 1970-2005 
The analysis of public revenues is extremely important in financial and economic 
studies. It helps identify the main resources available for generating revenue, and to 
classify and rank them according to their relative importance. It also sheds light on 
the flexibility of the economy to tackle sudden emerging changes in its economic 
activities, the financial position of the country and the extent to which the treasury 
can cover public expenditures. It also shows if revenues are well used or not. 
Financial resources available to the Libyan treasury vary and mainly include taxes, 
fees, services revenues, and revenues from oil and natural gas extraction (Ajam & 
Maithem, 1999, pp.99-100). 
Through the review of the data in Table 7 ( in the statistical appendix)  it can be seen 
that there was an increase in public revenue in Libya from LYD535.8 million in 1970 
to LYD 38943.3 million in 2005: this was a remarkable increase, with a compound 
annual growth rate of 13%. 
However, the rapid increase of Libyan public revenue was mainly due to an increase 
in oil revenues, which increased from LYD453 million in 1970 to LYD34378 million 
in 2005, with a compound annual growth rate of 13.2%. It was also due to the 
increase in tax revenues on salaries since the 1970s, import duties, and indirect taxes. 
Oil revenues alone constituted the biggest share of public revenues over the study 
period, reaching 66% of total public revenues on average during the period of 1970-
2005, as shown in Table 8 (in the statistics appendix) . Although oil revenues 
declined during the study period due to fluctuation in oil prices (see Table 9 in the 
statistics appendix), it still represented the largest share of revenues. 
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a rate of 11.3%. As for the relative importance of public expenditure in the gross 
domestic product at the current income factors during 1970-2005, it ranged between 
45% in 1981 and 17% in 2003, with an average of 32% - see Table 13 in the 
statistical appendix. 
Public expenditure also increased in the period under investigation compared to 
public revenues, which were growing with a compound annual growth rate of 13%, 
whereas public expenditure was growing at a compound annual rate of 11.3%. 
As shown in Tables 13 and 14 in the statistical appendix, public current expenditure 
accounted for 54 % of the total public expenditure during the period 1970-2005. It 
increased from LYD288.5 million in 1970 to reach LYD8282 million in 2005, with a 
compound annual growth rate of 10.1%. 
As for investment expenditure, it represented 46% of total public expenditure on 
average. Furthermore, it increased from LYD146 million in 1970 to LYD10273 
million in 2005. 
Generally speaking, the steady increase in the public expenditure of the Libyan 
government during 1970 and 2005 was due to the following reasons: 
First, there was a continuous increase in the payment of salaries to individuals 
employed in the public sector (compensation to employees) which reached a 
compound annual increase rate of 11.2% during 1970-2005. The total of salary 
provision alone during 2001-05 was LYD45822 million, which accounted for 22% of 
GDP in the same period - as shown in Table 37 in the statistical appendix. 
Second, the excess provisions within the administrative budget, meaning the actual 
administrative expenditure was generally in excess of the provisions in the budget in 
most of the years under investigation. 
Third, the persistent high inflation rate in Libya, which led to an increase in public 
expenditure as compared to its current value. This inflation led to the need to extend 
expenditure to keep pace; for example, using the constant price of 2003 (2003=100) it 
can be found the cost of  living index had increased to 104% by 2005 . 
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Fourth, there was an extremely high demand on public services due to the remarkable 
increase of the population, so that although per capita administrative expenditures did 
not exceed LYD1487 in 2005, the government faced increases in public expenditure 
due to an increase in population.  
 
4.3  The status of the public budget during the period 1970- 2005. 
The Libyan public budget is generally characterised by achieving a constant 
surplus in most years under investigation. On average, this surplus was around 
LYD1714.7 million during 1970-2005, and it had a compound annual growth rate 
of 16.4% over the same period. Generally, public revenues were able to cover 
around 136% of public expenditures (see Table 45). 
If we compare oil revenues with investment expenditures (see Table 18), it was 
clear that the oil revenues achieved a surplus in all years of study except in 1986 
and 1994. In fact the ratio of investment expenditure to oil revenues was only 56% 
on average. 
However, Table 19 clearly shows that the non oil revenues were not able to cover 
the current expenses since the administrative budget was suffering a constant 
deficit, which amounted to LYD394 million on average between 1970 and 2005. 
Figures show that the ratio of current expenditure to non-oil revenues reached 
131% on average during 1970-2005, meaning that the deficit ratio was 31%. 
The budget surplus as a ratio of the gross domestic product was around 11% during 
1970-2005, as shown in the data in Table 20. The biggest source of this surplus was 
the oil revenues, which were mainly used to cover investment expenditures.  
Meanwhile, the Libyan authorities pursued a fiscal policy with finance made 
available through a deficit in the public budget for some years, including: 1983 , 
1984 , 1986 , 1987 and 1994 , and by financing through a deficit in the administrative 
budget for the period of 1990-2005. This financing by deficit actually means a 
“deliberate increase in public expenditures more than the public revenues. When the 
State is taking this policy, it takes the form of public budget with an intended deficit 
which will be financed by the loans, in order to reactivate the national economy and 
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employment through the injection of additional purchasing power” (Haykl, 1980, p. 
207). 
The excessive public expenditure left gaps which were filled with loans from the 
central bank of Libya, which increased the size of the domestic public debt. Thus 
deficit financing can be illustrated by using the data of Table No.21, and by finding 
the difference between:  
1) The treasury and public enterprises account at the central bank of Libya (as one 
of CBL’s liabilities). 
Table (4.1): Net claims on the public treasury to the Central Bank of Libya and the commercial 
banks (to the banking system)  ( million dinars )  
Years ( A ) ( B ) ( C )  Years ( A ) ( B ) ( C ) 
1990 4327 2890.6 1436.4 1997 3536.6 2148.6 1388 
1991 4489.1 3052.6 1436.5 2000 1135 (275.5) 1410.5 
1992 4818.6 3374.5 1444.1 2001 940.5 (611) 1551.5 
1993 3988.1 2544 1444.1 2002 (376.5) (1577.7) 1201.2 
1994 4215.4 2764.4 1451 2003 (4708.3) (5952.8) 1244.5 
1995 4518 3067 1451 2004 (19464.8) (18691.1) (773.7) 
1996 3939.1 2502.1 1437 2005 (32588.31) (31734.5) (853.8) 
( A ) Net claims for banking system .  ; ( B ) Net claims for central Bank of Libya 
( C ) Net claims for the  commercial banks. 
Source: Central bank of Libya, the economic bulletin: 1998, vol.38, Tables 2, 3, 7. 
              Central Bank of Libya, the Annual reports of 2003 (No.47), 2004 (No.48) and 2006(No.50).  
( During 1990-93 , B calculated as   B = A – C ). 
 
and 2) The treasury and public enterprises Loans and Advances (as one of CBL’s 
assets). After making this calculation, it can be shown that this difference consisted 
of negative values during the period 1988-2002, and that this difference amounted to 
about LYD550 million annually on average for the period 1970-2004, indicating the 
high indebtedness of the treasury and public enterprises to the CBL. 
As a result, the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) has expanded its monetary issuance 
(money supply), as shown in table 4.2, to meet the increasing demand for cash and 
the expansion of credit operations for the treasury and individuals. These all led to 
the emergence of pressures on prices. Using the constant prices of 1984 (1984=100) 
it can be found that the general cost of living index increased to 447% in 2005 from 
34.9% in 1970 compared with the constant prices of the base year 1984. 
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Table ( 4.2 ) Money supply     ( million dinars ) 
Years 1970 1980 1990 1997 2005 
Value 240.6 2856.83 4452.3 8007.7 14028.1 
Source : the Statistical appendix , table 22 
. 
In fact, adopting a policy of deficit financing is not effective, especially in a 
developing country, which according to Al-Ali Sulaiman (1988, p. 143) “which 
generally suffer from the stagnation of their productive machinery and 
underdevelopment in the composition of their economic structure”.  
For that, the increase in public expenditure cannot lead to the stimulation of 
economic activity due to the corruption, but could be reflected in higher prices 
(Niblock, 2001). In addition, it encourages the financial authorities to continue to 
expansion of the expenditure. 
However, any attempt to overcome this reliance on deficit financing by using tax 
policy to improve the government's financial status must take consideration of the 
determinants of the tax effort, and the taxable capacity of the national economy in 
order to achieve the full objectives of public policy without any damage to economic 
activities, and to avoid exceeding the reasonable burden on individuals incomes. 
These issues will be dealt with later in this research.  
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Chapter Five: The Libyan Tax System  
5.1 Introduction: 
This chapter explains the Libyan tax base, together with its rates in 
accordance with Libyan legislation. It clarifies the most significant 
developments and trends of tax revenue and provides an analysis of tax 
structure along with a discussion of the relative importance of different types 
of tax. It also examines the marginal propensity to tax and income elasticity 
of tax in the Libyan economy during the period from 1970 to 2005. Finally, 
the evaluation of Libyan income tax system is discussed   
The tax system in Libya is based upon two main methods for tax deduction 
(for imposing tax) which are as follows: direct method (Direct Taxes) and 
indirect method (Indirect Taxes).  
 
5.2 Libyan Tax Structure: 
 
The Libyan tax system consists of two broad types of taxes: direct tax and 
indirect tax as shown below:- 
1- Direct Taxes : following table provides detailed structure of direct tax :
1-1- Direct taxes on income (Act No.64 of 1973 and  Law No.23 of 1996 )
  :a -11- tax on real estate incomes  
  :b-11- tax on the business incomes: -   
    1-1-b- I  : Tax on the incomes of trade & industry and crafts. 
  1-1-b- II : tax on the corporate incomes.
 1-1-c : tax on the individuals incomes: -
 1-1-d : Additional taxes, include: - 
  1-1-d- I  :  tax of Al-Jihad (Law No. 44 of 1970).
  1-1-d- II  : tax of the Palestinian National Fund (Law No. 67 of 1970).
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1-1-d- III  :
social security contributions (Law No.13 of 1980&Law No.16 of 1985 and 
Law No.20 of 1999).
 
 
1-1-d- IV :
tax of the Great Man-Made River (Law No. 10 of 1983 and Law No. 19 of 
1991)
1-2- Direct taxes on capital, include: -
 1-2-a : tax on vacant ( unused ) lands : Law No. 116 of 1972 .
  :b-21- tax on properties of real estate (the ownership): Law No. 2 of 1986.
 1-2-c : Tax on ownership of livestock : Law 17 of 1991 
2- Indirect taxes ,  include the following:          
2-1 - Indirect taxes on consumption and production, include:-
  :a -12- customs taxes: Law No. 67 of 1972,then law No.10 of 1981 and law No.13of 1999.
  :b-12- production & consumption tax: Law No. 16 of 1964 and Law No. 19 of 1992.
  :c -12- tax of the entertainment: Law No.39of 1968(tax on entry to entertainment sites)  
 
 :d-12- tax for the blind: Law No.4 of 1972(tax on entry to cinemas, its earnings  are in 
favor of the blind) 
  :e -12- monopoly Tax : ( tax on the monopolies Economic activities ,  include: -
  2-1-e- I  : salt monopoly: Law No. 25 of 1968 .
  2-1-e- II  : tobacco monopoly: Law No. 26 of 1968.
2-2 - Indirect taxes on circulation (Act No. 65 of 1973 which replaced by Act No.12 of 2004), include:
  :a -22- stamp tax on official edited documents .
  :b-22- stamp tax on actions & disposes (transactions and facts).
 
5.2.1   The rate of direct taxes 
As shown in section 5.2 , the income tax structure consists of a multiple tax 
system, whereby direct taxation include various taxes, such as:  tax on real 
estate incomes, tax on the business incomes, and tax on the incomes of 
individuals. Over the study period, various rates were applied for different 
types of tax base according to the nature and source of income, such as 
income from capital and income from work, or mixed income from both 
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capital and work. With regard to the tax rate levied on income, progressive 
rates were introduced (see Table 5.1). However, other taxes were levied at 
fixed rates, such as tax on agricultural income, tax on external incomes and 
tax on bank deposits and saving accounts at banks, as shown in Table 5.2.  
During the period 1923-1968, Italian income tax law was used in Libya, 
with modifications to suit Libyan circumstances. In 1968 the first Libyan 
Income Tax Law was issued, (Mahmud, 1997, p. 131). 
During the period under investigation,  income taxes in Libya passed 
through three main stages of evolution, the stipulations of which were 
governed by a succession of various laws, as follow:  
- The first stage 1968-73: - income tax law No.21 of 1968. 
- The second stage 1973-2004:- income tax law No.64 of 1973, which was 
amended by Act No.23 of 1996. 
- The third stage 2004 – 2005:-  income tax law No.11 of 2004. 
5.2.1. a    The Libyan Income Tax System, 1968–1973  
During this period, income tax in Libya was payable under law No.21 of 
1968 which imposed on taxable incomes according to their sources as 
follows:  
Tax on real estate income was levied at 15%. 
Tax on income of trade; industry and crafts: Tax on Income from 
commercial and industrial activities and crafts were levied at 13%. 
Tax on the corporate incomes: progressive rates were applied as follow: 
First 10000    LYD   …………………………………………. 15% 
Next 40000    LYD   …………………………………………. 18% 
Next 50000    LYD   …………………………………………. 20% 
Over 100000 LYD   …………………………………………. 25% 
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The incomes from agriculture; free professions; and foreign sources were 
levied at flat rates of 5%; 10%; and 10% respectively. That law also imposed 
a levy on taxable salaries; wages at a rate of 8% with the following 
exemptions: salaries below LYD480 for a single person, LYD720 for a 
married man (with or without children). 
General tax on income:  This tax was also assessed under law No.21/1968 
and taxed at the following progressive rates: 
Net annual income (LYD)  Rate 
First   4000  0%  
Next   2000  5% 
Next   2000  7.5% 
Next   2000  10% 
Next   4000  12.5% 
Over  14000  15% 
 
 
5.2.1.b   The Libyan Income Tax System, 1973-2004 
According to the income tax law No.64 of 1973 there were different types of 
tax levied in Libya, whereby the individual income taxes were levied at 
different rates for income from real estate, agriculture,  commerce, industry, 
crafts, independent professions, and income from wages and salaries. 
Corporate taxes ranged from 20–60%, with a general income tax of up to 
90%, in addition to a Jihad tax that was levied on individual incomes, (Gale, 
2007) 
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Income tax rates according to tax law no. 64 of 1973* 
type  Tax Rate range
Tax on real estate income 15%-25%
Tax on agricultural income 5%
Tax on commerce , industry and crafts 15%-30%
Tax on independent (free) profession income 15%-35%
Tax on Wages and salaries 8%-35%
Tax on corporate income 20%-60%
General income tax 0%-90%
( * ) Progressive rates, except on agricultural income, tax on bank deposits and tax on 
external incomes. 
The Libyan salaries and wages tax applied to all salaries, bonuses and 
benefits that accrued from employment in Libya.  Tax rates ranged from 8% 
to 35%.  Foreign companies were able to pay their foreign nationals 
overseas, but needed to deduct the Libyan tax due (UK Trade & Investment, 
2009). 
The tax rates on salaries and wages during 1973-2004 were as follows: 
No.  
Gross Salary Brackets 
Tax Rate  
Per Year Per Month 
1 1800 150 8% 
2 1200 100 10% 
4 1800 150 15% 
5 1800 150 20% 
6 1800 150 25% 
7 Over 8400 Over 700 35% 
Source: Sultan; Abdussalam, 2009. 
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There were some exemptions for certain taxpayers, as follow: 
Social Status Per Year Per Month 
Single 480 40 
Married man with no children 720 60 
Married or widower or divorced with 
children 
900 75 
Source: Sultan; Abdussalam, 2009. 
 
Tax on companies, 1973-2004: 
Companies were assessed for tax in two stages, a preliminary assessment 
when the company’s accounts were submitted and a final assessment when 
the tax department made a detailed examination of the accounts submitted 
(usually not more than two years after submission).  Taxes were levied on 
profits assessed by the tax department who assumed a certain profit margin 
for different business activities (e.g. 6%-10% profit on importation, 20%-
25% profit on services).  Corporation taxes ranged from 20% on LYD10,000 
profit to 60% on profit of over LYD150,000. The details of the corporate tax 
bands are shown below. 
No. Brackets Income tax rate Jihad tax rate 
 First  10000 20 % 4 % 
Following  20000 25 % 4 % 
Following  30000 30 % 4 % 
Following  40000 40 % 4 % 
Following  50000 45 % 4 % 
Over Over 150000 60 % 4 % 
Source: Sultan; Abdussalam, 2009. 
 
144 
 
General income tax, 1973-2004: 
In accordance with tax law no. 64 of 1973, the total of personal income tax 
on total income over LYD 200,000 was 90%. The law no. 23 of 1996 raised 
the threshold for tax payable on income from LYD4000 to LYD6000. 
The general income tax rates were as follow: 
 
Details Amount Rate  
 First  6000 Exempt 
Following  3000 15 % 
Following  5000 25 % 
Following  8000 35% 
Following  15000 45% 
Following  25000 55% 
Following  40000 65% 
Following  100000 75% 
Over 202000 90% 
Source: Sultan; Abdussalam, 2009. 
 
However, given these stipulations on tax, it should be noted that that due to 
taxation issues being complex in Libya, and the fact that rules were not 
interpreted in a consistent way, practices during the time under study were 
subject to change with little notice, (Libyan British Business Council, 2009).  
This situation prompted the authorities responsible for Libyan fiscal policy 
to seek advice from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which 
recommended that the Libyan authorities simplify their tax system, develop 
tax payment arrangements for corporations, and restructure their tax and 
customs departments (Freedom House, 2009). So, the government responded 
to the advice of the IMF and took essential steps to reform the tax sector (Al-
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Baddawy, 2009). Many fundamental tax changes were implemented as new 
tax laws were issued, such as law no.11 of 2004. In 2005 import taxes were 
abolished. In addition, a series of three General People Congress (GPC) 
secretariat resolutions (numbers 394-6) were issued in early October 2006, 
which called on Libyan citizens to openly declare their tax obligations. 
These resolutions also prompted the establishment of a high-level review of 
the tax declarations of senior-level government and private-sector officials 
(Country Commercial Guide; 2009). 
 
5.2.1. c   The Libyan Income Tax System, 2004 – 2005  
On the 6th of March 2004 the General People Congress issued a new income 
tax law (no. 11 of 2004) which replaced the previous income tax law (no. 64 
of 1973) and which came into force as from the date of its issue (Sultan, 
2009). 
According to the new tax law, general income tax was abolished, the top tax 
rates on wages and salaries were reduced, and the personal tax exemption 
bands were increased. The corporate tax remained progressive, on a sliding 
scale from 15 to 40 percent, compared to 20 to 60 percent under the previous 
law (ANIMA Investment Network, 2009). 
In accordance with the new tax legislation, resident individuals were taxed 
on their worldwide income; non-resident individuals became subject to 
Libyan tax only on Libyan-derived income. The income of individuals 
became subject to varying tax rates depending on the category of income at 
the following rates: agricultural activities (5%); commercial, industrial and 
handicraft activities (15-35%); professional activities (15-30%); 
employment income (8-15%); partnership income (10-20%); foreign income 
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(20%); and income from deposits in banks and financial institutions (5%). 
Capital gains were taxed as normal business income, (Country Codes and 
International Resources, 2009). 
 
5.2.1.d   The Main Features of the new Income Tax Law   
The Libyan Income tax law (no. 11 for 2004) consists of 112 Articles 
divided into five parts, as follow (El Neihom, 2007):- 
 
5.2.1.d .1  General provision: 
From article No. 1 to article No. 34 the general provisions are explained, 
such as tax subjection; tax assessment; procedures for the submission of tax 
declarations; procedures of tax appeal; tax collection; fines for delays of tax 
payment; tax debts; and tax exemptions. 
 
5.2.1.d .2   Taxes on individuals and partnerships: 
Articles nos. 35 to No. 71 are distributed through eight chapters which 
include specific tax rules, as follow: 
 
5.2.1. d .2.1  General Provisions.   (Articles 35- 46): 
The main points of these articles are as follow: 
They imposed specific taxes on the following incomes: a) agricultural 
income; b) Income of trade, industry and crafts; c) Income of partners; d) 
Income of independent works (free professions); e) Income resulting from 
work and the like; f) Foreign income for residents in the country; g) and 
income resulting from deposits with banks. 
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Exemptions from these imposed taxes were granted to those persons whose 
annual taxable incomes indicated in (a, b, c, d, e) was less than LYD1200 for 
a single person , or LYD1800 for a married person with no dependent 
children, or LYD2400 for a previously married person, widowed or 
divorced, having dependent children.  
Also, the following amounts were exempted from tax: 1) Life insurance 
premiums up to a maximum of LYD600; 2) General insurance premiums up 
to a maximum of LYD420. 
 
5.2.1. d .2.2  Tax on Agricultural Income.  (Articles 47- 48): 
This tax was applicable to the net income resulting from pure agricultural 
exploitation of agricultural lands, whether afforested or not planted with 
trees. 
The tax rate was 5% annually. 
5.2.1. d. 2.3 Tax on income of trade, industry and crafts. (Articles 49-52): 
The income resulting from the exercise of any commercial, industrial or 
craft activity, even if incidental or unrelated to crafts, was subjected to tax. 
Also any income arising from any other source to which another specific tax 
was inapplicable was subjected to tax, unless excluded by special provision 
of the Law. 
The following activities were considered as commercial activities:- 
a) Land division and sale thereof. 
b) Management of fixed and movable productive and service properties. 
c) Brokering activities (commission business). 
d) Use of agricultural lands by their owners. 
The tax rate on income from commercial activities is 20% for the first 
LYD10,000; 25% for the subsequent 20,000 tranche ( bracket ); 30% for the 
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subsequent 30,000 tranche, and a flat 35 % on income above this amount. 
Tax on income from industry and crafts is levied at a 5% discount per 
tranche over taxes levied on income from (other) commercial profits 
(Country Commercial Guide).  
 
The details of annual tax rate were as follow: 
                                           Commercial profits              Industry and craft profits 
First (10,000 LYD): ……………… 20%  .............................................. 15% 
Next (20,000 LYD):………………..25% ……………………………..  20% 
Next (30,000 LYD): ……………… 30% ……………………………..  25% 
Additional income: ………...…….. 35% ……………………………..  30% 
 
5.2.1. d .2.4  Tax on the income of partners in productive units to which the 
dictum (partners, not wage-workers) is applicable. (Articles 53-55):  
The annual tax rate was as follows: 
The first (LYD10,000) of income:  ……………….10% 
The next (LYD20,000) of income: ……………….15% 
Additional income:………………………………..20% 
 
5.2.1. d .2.5  Tax on Income of Independent work ( Free Jobs). (Articles 56-
57): 
This tax is imposed on the incomes of liberal professions performed by the 
taxpayer independently, using the work as a main factor therein. 
The annual tax rate was as follows: 
The first (LYD10,000) of income: ………………15% 
The next (LYD20,000) of income: ………………20% 
The next (LYD30,000) of income: ………………25% 
In excess thereof: ……………………………….. 30% 
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5.2.1.d .2.6  Tax on Income resulting from work and the like. (Articles 58-
63): 
This tax was imposed on permanent and temporary income derived from 
work and similar incomes, including: Remuneration against work (salaries 
and wages); allowances; commissions; gratuities; privileges; representation 
allowances; and all periodical or non-periodical payments, whether in cash 
or in kind. 
The exemptions from this tax were as follow: 
1) Contribution of the taxpayer to the social security system. 
2) Income received by the taxpayer in return for the actual expenses incurred 
thereby for performing his/her work. 
3) Any deduction from the taxpayer as a result of imposing disciplinary 
penalty thereon by deduction or fining. 
4) Cash allowance for accumulated leave at the end of service. 
The Libyan salaries and wages tax applied to all salaries, bonuses and 
benefits that arise from employment in Libya. Personal tax rates ranged from 
8% to 15% in progressive rates (Libyan British Business Council, 2009)  
 
This means that the upper limit of tax rate on individual income from labor 
and any service or function, permanent or temporary, was 15 percent 
(Heritage Foundation, 2009).  
The income tax of persons’ salaries and wages remained in the tax structure. 
It varies thereafter from a minimum to maximum rate according to three 
brackets (Egyptian Export Promotion Center, 2009). 
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The following salary tax rates had to be deducted from the gross salary, less 
employee social insurance contribution, employee social solidarity fund 
contribution and income tax exemptions mentioned below: 
No. 
Gross Salary Brackets 
Tax Rate 
Per Year Per Month
1 4800 400 8%
2 4800 400 10%
3 Over 9600 Over 800 15%
Source: Sultan, Abdussalam; 2009. 
While the exemptions from wages and salaries tax were: 
Social Status Per Year Per Month 
Single 1200 100
Married man with no children 1800 150
Married or widower or divorced with children 2400 200
Source: Sultan, Abdussalam; 2009. 
 
Foreign nationals employed and paid in Libya were able to remit 50% of 
their net salary in foreign currency to his or her home country.  
The percentage was increased to 75% in exceptional cases, for example in 
the case of desert-based employees.  
Foreign companies choosing to pay their foreign nationals overseas were 
permitted to do so but were required to account for these payments and to 
deduct the Libyan tax due, and pay it to the Tax Department, (The Business 
Environment, 2009). 
 
5.2.1. d .2.7  Tax on Foreign Incomes on those resident in the Country. 
(Articles 64-68):  This tax was imposed on the income of citizens and 
residents’ generated from outside the country. Foreign employees coming to 
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the country under contract of employment were exempted from this tax .The 
tax rate was (20%) of the taxable income. 
 
5.2.1. d .2.8  Tax on interest from bank deposits. (Articles 69- 71) 
This tax was imposed on interest resulting from deposits with banks, 
whatever the period of these deposits. The tax rate was 5% of the taxable 
income. 
 
5.2.1. d .3   Tax on Companies – Corporate Income Tax (Articles 72 – 80): 
This tax was imposed on the income resulting inside the country and abroad 
by national companies and branches of foreign companies in Libya, 
whatever the type and nature of their activities. 
The annual corporate tax rates range varied from 15% on LYD200,000 
profit to 40% on profit of over LYD2,000,000  according to the following 
progressive brackets:  
 
No. Brackets Income Tax Rate Jihad Tax Rate
 First  200000 15 % 4 %
Following  300000 20 % 4 %
Following  500000 25 % 4 %
Following  500000 30 % 4 %
Following  500000 35 % 4 %
Over Over 2000000 40 % 4 %
Source: Sultan, Abdussalam; 2009. 
 
This tax was payable on the net profit assessed by the tax department.  
Corporation tax was charged under Law 11 of 2004. This was done in two 
stages: 
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1) Preliminary assessment: Tax was assessed on income of the preceding 
year. Under Libyan tax law, a company is required to submit a tax 
declaration at the end of its financial year, which usually runs from January 
to December. A company can choose a different financial year if it has 
obtained approval from the Libyan tax authorities, and if so this must be 
stated in its article and memorandum of association. (Libya Tax Resources, 
2009).  
2) Final assessment: After the preliminary assessment is filed by the 
company, the tax department made a final assessment using the new tax rate 
of the company’s income. 
Foreign companies submitted preliminary (self) assessments of their tax 
liabilities, which Libyan tax authorities then reviewed against a theoretical 
(and rarely attainable) industry average. After a period of time, the tax 
authorities issued a final assessment, incorporating whatever additional 
information they believed relevant. A company could appeal this final 
assessment. Companies with no fixed address or few tangible assets were 
often overlooked (Country Commercial Guide, 2008). 
5.2.1. d .3.1   Additional taxes on companies (Other corporate taxes): 
A further 0.5% was also payable on any official receipt, including receipts 
for contract registration duties, corporation taxes, personal tax etc. (Libyan 
British Business, 2009).  
5.2.1. d .3.2   Registration tax for contracts: This tax was 2% for the main 
contract and 1% for a sub-contract. 
More specifically, any contract negotiated in Libya for anything other than a 
direct supply had to be registered with the Tax Department within 60 days of 
signing the contract. 
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 A duty of 2% of the total contract value, and 1% on sub-contracts was 
payable on registration.  All invoices were required to bear the tax 
department stamp to show that the registration duty had been paid.  Fines 
were levied at a rate of 3% per monthly delay (The Business Environment, 
2009). 
Foreign oil companies were subject to a special tax regime, defined in the 
Petroleum Law of 1955, later amended, with three tax brackets at 8, 10, or a 
flat 15 percent of income instead of the 25 percent previously (Al-Baddawy, 
2009). 
Under the provisions of the original petroleum law and concessionary 
agreement terms, income tax was based on 50 per cent of operating 
companies' net profits. This tax-rate had been applied during the 1955-1971 
period. 
The principle of a 50-50 profit sharing formula was first introduced in 
Venezuela in 1948 and subsequently in Saudi Arabia in 1950, Kuwait in 
1951, and Qatar and Bahrain in 1952. On 1 September 1970 (September 
Agreement), the operating companies agreed to pay a supplementary tax to 
compensate the government for previously undervalued Libyan crude posted 
prices, and accordingly lost revenues. The supplementary tax was to be 
applicable until the end of each concession. It varied from company to 
company depending on the past output levels and the number of years a 
company had operated in Libya. It added approximately 5 per cent to the 
basic 50 per cent income tax rate. When both posted prices and tax rates 
were first successfully negotiated to higher levels in 1970 - outside OPEC - 
the Libyan government concluded the Tripoli Agreement with the operating 
companies on 20 March 1971. The Tripoli Agreement, among other things, 
increased the basic income tax rate to 55 per cent. This rate, which became 
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the standard tax rate in all Middle East exporting countries, was marked up 
again to 60 per cent in October 1974 by a unilateral decision of the Libyan 
government. On 1 January 1975, a new tax rate of 65 per cent was applied in 
Libya and other member countries according to an OPEC recommendation. 
The new rate was applicable in Libya up to the end of the period studied, 
(Mahmud, 1997, p. 182). 
 
5.2.1. d .4   Penalties : (Articles: 81–89) which mentioned all kinds of 
penalties. 
5.2.1. d .5   Final provisions: (Articles: 90–112) clarified some final matters 
and issues such as the organisation of co-operation with the tax authority; 
conditions of whole and part exemption from the tax and penalty for delayed 
payments; with the repeal of the previous income tax law, number 64 of 
1973. 
 
5.2.1. d .6  General income tax (GIT): This tax was imposed on the General 
Income of individuals. According to the new law, this tax was cancelled and 
ceased to exist. (Sultan; Abdussalam, 2009). 
 
6.2.1. d .7  Jihad Tax: This tax was payable under Law 44 of 1970 and is 
levied on personal incomes and corporation profits (The Business 
Environment, 2009). 
5.2.1. d .7 .1  Jihad tax on personal incomes (individuals) or (personal jihad 
tax): It varies from 1% to 3% according to income. 
Jihad tax rates on salaries and wages remained unchanged. 
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The following are the progressive rates of this tax, deductible from gross 
salaries less Employee Social Insurance Contribution and Employee's Social 
Solidarity Fund Contribution, as follow: 
 
Details Tax Rate
If salary does not exceed LYD50 per month 1 %
Over LYD50 to 100 per month 2 %
Over LYD100 per month 3 %
Source: Sultan,; Abdussalam, 2009. 
 
5.2.1. d .7 .2  The Jihad tax on companies: This tax also remained 
unchanged; it was levied at a flat 4% on companies' annual taxable profits 
(net income)  for the funding of national defense (Egyptian Export 
Promotion, 2009). 
 
5.2.1. e   Social security deductions. These deductions included social 
security contributions and Employee Social Solidarity Fund contributions. 
The details were as follow: 
 
5.2.1. e .1  Social Security contributions: These contributions were imposed 
in accordance with Law No. 13 of 1980, as amended by Law No. 1 of 1991.  
The contributions were payable by all employees working in Libya, whether 
local or foreign, based on gross income.  Contributions could be made either 
weekly or monthly.  The gross salary with regard to foreign nationals was 
required to include an amount for housing and subsistence, regardless of 
whether this was paid to the employee or not. (The Business Environment, 
2009). 
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Social Security Contribution Law No. 13 of 1981 
The initial social security deductions, according to law No.13 of 1980, were: 
Details Rate
Employee contribution 3.75 % of gross salary
Employer contribution 11.25 % of gross salary 
Total Contribution 15 % of gross salary
 
The total contribution of employees and employer had to be paid by the 
employer directly to the Department of Social Security Contributions, 
(Sultan, 2009). 
 
The revised social security deductions, according to law No.1 of 1991were: 
The social security contributions were payable on the 10th of the month 
following the payment of salary. Late payment carried a fine of 5%.  The 
rate of social security contributions effective from 1st June 1991 were as 
follow:-  
 
 Details Foreign Companies  Libyan Participation  
Employee 4.75 % 4.75 % 
Employer 11.25 % 10.50 % 
Government - 0.75 % 
Total Contribution 16.00 % 16.00 % 
             (Source: The Business Environment, 2009). 
5.2.1. e .2  Employee Social Solidarity Fund Contribution: 
A rate of 1% of the gross salary was deducted from the gross salary of each 
employee and was paid to the Social Solidarity Fund Department (Sultan, 
Abdussalam, 2009). 
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Notes: 
 
1) The Libyan tax structure does not include a gift or inheritance tax, also 
neither locality taxes nor tax on insurance premiums - i.e. these are 
deductible expenses - (Heritage Foundation, 2009). In addition, the tax 
system does not impose any taxes on dividends and no withholding taxes. 
(Libya Tax Resources, 2009). 
 
2) Penalties for late payment 
Tax not paid by the due date becomes immediately due, together with all 
other tax that may not yet be due for payment, and is subject to a penalty of 
1% per month on the amount due plus collection charges (The Business 
Environment, 2009). 
 
3) Tax appeal  
If the tax payer does not accept the tax department assessment, he has the 
right to file an objection or an appeal (Mayet, 2009). 
The taxpayer can accept the Tax Department’s assessments or can object. 
The objection can be made to:-  
A) An arbitration committee or 
B) A Court   (The Business Environment, 2009). 
 
4) Double Taxation Agreements: 
Libya concluded seven double taxation agreements with several countries in 
the Middle East (Country Commercial Guide, 2008). 
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Hereinafter, a summary of tax base in accordance with tax laws:  
 (1-A) Tax on real estate income: Levied on income resulting from 
investments in constructed real estate as well as investment in lands, 
and lease of agricultural lands, which are all incomes resulting from 
capital. Notable is that such tax has lost its applicable relevance in 
Libya due to the issuance of Law no. 7 (1978) which banned the rental 
of real estate.  
 
(1-B) Tax on business income, which includes:  
(a)  Tax on Commerce, Industry and Crafts: This tax is levied on activities 
involving both elements of capital and human effort, whether in the 
commercial, industrial fields or handicrafts. It is imposed on 
taxpayers, individuals and companies, joint ventures and limited 
partnerships as well as companies limited by shares.  
In 1984, Law no. 8 was issued, which banned the practice of business 
and brokerage in the private sector, which led to a reduction of the tax 
base on commerce, industry and crafts.  
(b)  Tax on Corporate Income: This tax was imposed on Libyan 
companies and branches of foreign companies, no matter of 
whatsoever type of business or objective, which was subject to 
commercial law, such as corporations, limited liability companies and 
cooperative companies, whether its income had been earned internally 
or externally, and whether they were owned by individuals or state-
owned.  
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Table (5.2) The Tax base and fixed rates imposed on it annually 
Tax  Tax law 64/1973 
Tax on bank deposit benefits and savings accounts. 15%  ( 20% ) 
Tax on external incomes 15%  ( 20% ) 
Tax on agricultural income 5%  
Rates between brackets are the fixed tax rates according to tax law 23/1996 
 
(1-C) Tax on individual incomes, including: 
(a)  Tax on wages and salaries: This tax was imposed on the income of a 
employee resulting from a service or job whether permanently, or 
temporarily in the form of wages or salaries, paid by private or public 
businesses or if internal or external bodies paid such salaries.  
(b)  Tax on independent (free) professions income: The base of this tax 
was the net income resulting mainly from employees and specifically 
from the intellectual effort as well as physical effort in any activities, 
which the taxpayer practiced at his/her own expense within the 
country.  
(c)  Tax on bank deposits: Such a tax was imposed on income resulting 
from the taxpayer’s income from interest of savings accounts and 
other deposits in national banks, regardless of the duration or value. A 
large portion of this tax did not take into account any personal 
exemptions, such as cost of living and private insurance.  
(d)  Tax on external incomes: This tax was levied on all income arising 
outside the state of any kind whatsoever, and was imposed on external 
incomes of citizens or resident foreigners in the country who had 
projects within the State.  
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(1-D) Tax on agricultural income: The tax legislation specified the tax base 
of this tax, which included net income resulting from production of 
raw agricultural activities without any industrial processes. This 
meant that the base of this tax was the income from agricultural crops 
produced directly by the land. Such a tax could be paid in kind.  
(1-E) General income tax: The base of this tax was the sum of specific tax 
bases imposed on various incomes, i.e. the net incomes subject to 
specific taxes in case of diversity of sources of income for the 
taxpayer. Also, this tax was imposed on profits distributed to partners 
or shareholders in companies subject to corporate tax. This tax was 
canceled in accordance with Act No. 11 of 2004.  
(1-F) Additional direct taxes, which included:   
(a)  Jihad Tax: this was an additional tax for the benefit of the Jihad Fund, 
imposed on all profits and incomes subject to tax income excluding 
agricultural incomes. In addition, it was imposed on national entry and 
exit visas and motor vehicle licenses - see the rates in Table 5.D.  
(b)  Tax of the Palestinian National Fund: A tax imposed on all wages and 
salaries as well as similar incomes of all Palestinian workers, for the 
benefit of the Palestinian Red Crescent.  
(c)  Social Security Contributions: Such compulsory contributions were 
imposed with a rate of 15% out of the income of workers and 
employees in Libyan and foreign public and private sectors, whether 
they were employees or workers, and whether they were working 
under contracts with third parties or self-employed. If the taxpayers 
were working within the administrative corps and national 
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institutions, social security contributions were paid by the insured 
person, and the employer, as well as the public treasury.  
 
5.2.1. f   Exemption from the Specific Income Taxes:  
- There were several exemptions from the payment of specific income 
taxes (see Table 5.3). The most important of these exemptions is to 
protect the minimum cost of living and private insurance.  
 
 
Table (5.3) Tax exemption for specific income taxes, (LYD: means Libyan Dinar) 
TAX EXEMPTIONS GRANTED UNDER TAX LEGISLATION TYPE OF TAX 
(1) Minimum cost of living (LYD/year): 480 LYD for a single 
person, 720 LYD For married person with no dependents, 
900 LYD for married person with dependents. (*)  
(A), (B), (E), (I) 
(2) Private insurance premiums and social security contributions  (D), (E), (I) 
(3) Expenses necessary for the performance of work and 
equivalent of discount penalty or administrative fines  
(D) 
(4) Benefits of accommodation and subsistence in business 
premises in remote areas  
(D) 
(5) Income of short-term jobs for domestic non-local 
experiences, provided that it does not exceed one month  
(D) 
(6) End of service benefits  (D) 
(7) Wages and salaries and the like incomes earned abroad for 
works performed and paid to non-national employees   
(G) 
(8) Total cash bonuses paid by institutions or third-party 
companies to resident members in the country for their 
cooperation; they maintain their businesses locally provided 
that neither the State nor its any of its institutions may 
contribute therein. 
(G) 
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(9) Exemption and earned income taxpayer subject to this tax for 
a period of two years of practice; whether at home or abroad 
(this exemption was canceled with effect from 1990). 
(E) 
(10) (20%) of the income as maintenance expenses (A) 
(11) Private accommodation of taxpayer (residential premises)  (A) 
(12) Real estate allocated for agricultural purposes  (A) 
(13) Real estate allocated for practicing the taxpayer’s business   (A) 
(14) Establishment expenses and premiums of the depreciation of 
fixed assets for the production of income subject to this tax  
(B) 
(15) Taxes and duties paid on the occasion of any business other 
than taxation of business profits, industrial and general 
income tax  
(B) 
(16) Bad debts  (B) 
(17) Social security contributions which should not exceed 10% of 
the total receivables by employees  
(B) 
(18) Contributions to charities (with the requirement not to exceed 
2% of net income) 
(B) 
(19) Loss stage and consumption of goodwill for the project. (B) 
(20) Joint ventures subject to taxation of business and industrial 
profits 
(C) 
(21) Ratio (30%) of tax due on the national corporate companies 
on the condition that it should abide by its obligations, (this 
exemption was canceled by Act 23 of 1996.)  
(C) 
(22) The benefits of savings accounts if the value of the amount 
saved at national banks did not exceed LYD5000   
(F) 
(23) Interest on individual deposits with foreign banks abroad 
subject to external income tax  
(F) 
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(24) Interest to companies of their deposits in banks subject to 
corporate tax  
(F) 
(25) External incomes for foreign employees who entered the 
country upon an employment contract signed with the State, 
public or private bodies, companies or individuals  
(G) 
(26) LYD4000./year (increased LYD6000 under the Act 23/1996) (H) 
 (*) According to Act no. 11 for the year 2004: LYD1200 for single person, LYD1800 for married with no 
dependents, LYD2400 for the married or widowed or divorced with dependents.  
Where:  
(A)  Taxes on real estate income  
(B)  Taxes on commerce, industry and crafts income 
(C)  Corporate income tax 
(D)  Tax on salaries, wages and the like incomes  
(E)  Tax on the income of independent (free) professions 
(F)  Tax on interests of bank deposits and savings accounts 
(G)  Tax on foreign income  
(H)  General income tax 
(I)  Tax on agricultural income  
 
 
 
Additional taxes imposed on certain incomes subject to specific income tax: 
In addition to imposing taxes on income, however, some types of income are 
also subject to additional taxes, as described in table 5.4.  
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Table (5.4) Additional taxes imposed on certain types of income  
Additional Tax Relevant Income
Ji
ha
d 
Ta
x 
2% from the income tax exemption, and rate of 
4% from the taxable amount  
(A), (B), (E) 
4% on total income   (F), (G) 
1% if the monthly income was less than LYD50. 
2% if the monthly income was less than 
LYD100. 3% if monthly income greater than 
LYD100. 
(D) 
Security subscription premiums of 3.75% of total income  (D) 
Tax of Palestinian National Fund, of a rate 7% of total target 
taxpayers’ total income 
(D) 
Stamp Tax (D) 
NOTE: Additional taxes are levied on certain types of income subject to specific tax referred to 
earlier with the same symbols contained in the previous Table (5.3). (LYD: Libyan 
Dinar). 
  
5.2.2 Indirect taxes:  
The indirect taxes in Libya included: Customs taxes; Production and 
Consumption Tax; Stamp tax; Tax on Entertainment; Tax for the Blind. The 
details of Libyan indirect tax structure are shown below: 
5.2.2.1   Customs taxes:  during the study period, several customs laws were 
issued, including Act 67/1972 which was amended by Act No. 10 in 1981; 
Act No. 13 in 1999 and tax amendments in 2005.  
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The Libyan customs tax structure consists of import tax; export taxes; 
charitable tax; municipality tax; tax of the man-made river project; stamp tax 
for customs purposes;  quay returns. These taxes can be shown as the 
following: 
 
5.2.2.1.a   Import tax:   Most import taxes were ad valorem taxes that were 
levied as a percentage of the imported product's value. This tax varied with 
the change of prices of imported products ranging between 2% to 300% of 
the value of item in accordance with the customs tariff for the year of 1981. 
There were many customs exemptions for essential consumer goods and 
personal luggage as well as some capital goods and goods of Arab origin. 
The previous tariff of 1981 was replaced by the coordinated customs tariff 
from the beginning of 1998. 
Libya applies the common market for Eastern and Southern Africa’s 
common external tariff of 0% for capital goods and raw materials, 10% for 
intermediate products, and 25% for finished products (Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade Canada, 2009). 
As of 1996, the average weighted tariff was 21.3%. Import controls 
remained extremely tight, even by regional standards, which made Libya a 
difficult place to do trade. UN sanctions exacerbated the matter, and in 1977, 
13 industries were exempt from taxation and customs to encourage domestic 
production, including plastics, footwear, and metal goods. 
 
Before 2005 Libya used a single-column tariff schedule of Customs Co-
operation Council Nomenclature (CCCN). According to CCCN tariff 
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schedule, imported goods from all countries were subject to the same duties. 
Also levied were customs surcharges totaling 15% of the application 
customs duties, and 16.7% royalty on petroleum production, (Gale, 2007).  
Imports from all countries were subject to the same rate of tax except for 
goods originating in Arab countries, which were exempted from tax if the 
Arab content was in excess of 40%.  
Imports of intermediate goods used in export industries were subject to duty 
and tax refund if the goods so produced were re-exported within one year 
from the date of the importation of the raw materials. 
Generally, the kinds of applicable customs taxes and duties in Libya 
included: 
5.2.2.1.a.1 Specific taxes: tax was levied based on the gross weight of the 
goods. 
5.2.2.1.a.2    Ad valorem taxes: most import taxes were charged on an ad 
valorem basis. The taxable value was the value of the goods delivered to the 
port of entry including costs of freight, insurance, commissions, landing 
charges, and other expenses. 
5.2.2.1 .a.3   Preferential duties: there were preferential agreements between 
Libya and the following countries: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritania, 
The State of Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and 
Yemen.  
Libya was a member of the Arab Common Market, which provides in 
principle for the removal of all customs duties on agricultural, animal, and 
natural resources commodities.  
5.2.2.1 .a.4   Customs surcharges and indirect taxes: imports are subject to 
customs surcharges totaling 10% of the applicable customs tax. According to 
Libyan customs law, a countervailing tax had to be imposed on imported 
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goods subsidised by the exporting country and on any goods that competed 
with Libyan products.  
Private individuals were allowed to import goods duty free on the 
commodity budget list up to a maximum value of LYD3,000 from Arab 
countries with the exception of medicine, milk, meat, insecticides, petroleum 
products, tobacco, gold and nine other essential food items imported by 
either public or private entities within the provisions of the annual 
commodity budget, (Muslim Countries Trade Network, 2009). 
 
According to the previous tariff, personal effects were exempt from customs 
tax within certain limits, whilst others were restricted, also other goods were 
not allowed to be imported, as in the following list : - 
 
Customs tax & duty free allowances and restrictions  
• Tobacco.............200 cigarettes or 250g of tobacco 
• Liquor................Prohibited 
• Perfume.............Reasonable for personal use 
• Cameras.............Should be declared on arrival 
• Film...................Reasonable for personal use 
• Gifts...................No restrictions 
• Currency............Must be declared on arrival 
(Travel Document system, 2009). 
 
Since January 1998 the Libyan Customs tariff has used a simplified 
harmonized system. The Government adopted this tariff as a prior condition 
to its application for World Trade Organization (WTO) membership 
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(Emporiki Bank, 2009). Indirect taxes in 2002 were mainly sales taxes at 
various rates (Gale, 2007).  
Since 2003, importing goods into Libya is no longer subject to import 
license but all imports must be accompanied by a certificate of origin. 
(Emporiki Bank, 2009). In other words the taxation and customs formalities 
evolved, with licenses being abolished in 2003 (ANIMA investment 
network, 2009). 
In 2004 the United States lifted its restrictions and eased economic sanctions 
against Libya, the sanctions were later removed. Soon after this the U.S 
released Libyan assets frozen (Country Commercial Guide, 2009). Since 
2004, Libya has been an observer at the WTO prior to becoming a member 
(Emporiki Bank, 2009). 
In summer 2005, substantial modifications to Libyan customs taxes were 
conducted. Customs taxes on more than 3500 imported product categories 
were abolished by the Libyan Customs Administration on 1 August 
2005.The import tax was replaced by a port services tax at a flat 4% rate 
which was levied on most imported products, except for approximately 85 
items which remained subject to consumption taxes of between 25 and 50 %, 
and a 2% production tax for domestically produced goods. 
 
Briefly, the new tariff schedule for the year of 2005 had only two rates (10 
percent for tobacco products and 0 percent for all other products). The 
higher customs taxes were reserved for luxury items such as furs and very 
high-end furnishings; taxes on cigarettes and tobacco products remained 
unchanged. While customs taxes were drastically abated, additional 
“consumption” and “production” taxes were applied to some imported goods 
(at rates of 25-50% and about 2%, respectively), often as a form of 
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protection for local goods and companies. These taxes were borne by the 
importing agent and frequently passed to the consumer, (Country 
Commercial Guide, 2009). 
 
Moreover, decree number 139 of 25 August 2005 divided 84 products into 
two lists:  
- First list:  those that, as well as the port tax of 4%, were subject to a 
production tax of 2% and a consumption tax of 25%. 
- Second list: those that, as well as the port tax of 4%, were subject to a 
production tax of 2% and a consumption tax of 50%. This last category 
included 13 luxury products, such as works of art, vehicles of more than 
3000cc, and similar luxury items (Emporiki Bank, 2009; Heritage 
Foundation, 2009; Al-Baddawy, 2009; Egyptian Export Promotion Center, 
2009). 
In addition, Libya does not impose value-added tax (VAT). Equipment 
imported into Libya for use in the oil sector has traditionally been exempt 
from customs duties, under Article 16 of Law No. 25/1955 “Petroleum Law” 
(Libya Tax Resources, 2009; Country Commercial Guide, 2009). 
 
5.2.2.1 .a.5   Customs tax exemptions: Some products are exonerated from 
customs duties, for example, equipment necessary for the completion of a 
project in Libya. Tax rebates are available to foreign investors importing 
merchandise under the terms of law No. 5 of 1997. In addition, the 
government has created an investment fund to handle a portion of the 
government’s oil revenues, (Emporiki Bank, 2009; ANIMA, 2009). 
As previously mentioned, products of at least 40% Arab origin content were 
exempt from customs duties. The authorities implemented other important 
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measures, including the elimination of the Great Man-Made River exchange 
tax, which was levied on private foreign exchange transactions, and the 
devaluation of the exchange rate by 15%,  (Country Commercial Guide, 
2009;  Arabic Hellenic chamber of commerce & development, 2009). 
The Libyan Tax System table can be seen in summary in the appendices. 
5.2.2.1.b Export tax: All domestic exports were exempted from customs 
duties in accordance with customs resolution No. 20 of 1990. 
5.2.2.1 .c    Charitable Tax:  which was a tax imposed for charitable purposes for 
the benefit of Social Security Fund. In 1985, the price of this tax was (5%) 
of the value of customs duties on imports and this rate was increased to 
(7.5%) in 1986. 
  5.2.2.1 . d   Municipality Tax:   this tax was imposed from 1968 at a rate of 
5% of the customs duties on exports and imports in favor of municipalities 
and hwasimposed in virtue of applicable Act No. 39 of 1975. 
 5.2.2.1. e Tax of the Man-Made river project:   Act No. 19 for the year of 
1991 levied such a tax at a fixed price to be imposed on the production or 
import of tobacco and certain petroleum products, as well as on the purchase 
of currency from the banks and documentary credits, as well as selling travel 
air-tickets for the benefit of the Man-Made river project.  
  5.2.2.1. f   Stamp tax for customs purposes:  stamp tax for customs purposes 
was imposed by Act No. 65 of 1973 and Act  No.12 of 2004. This tax in was 
developed in favor of the Tax Authority.   
5.2.2.1. g   Quayages (Quay returns) :  which were paid in favour of  harbour 
Company, as well as storage fees. 
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5.2.2.2    Production & Consumption Tax:  This was one of the indirect taxes 
imposed on any item due to its production or consumption. It was imposed 
initially on local products of carbonated water at a fixed rate according to 
Act No. 16 of 1964, then it was also applied to petroleum products, and then 
the base of this tax was widened under Act No. 19 for the year of 1992 under 
the name of production or consumption taxes. Production tax was the tax 
imposed owing to the production of goods locally. When imposing such a 
tax on similar goods imported from abroad, it was known as the 
consumption tax, which was imposed on all natural or legal persons to be 
charged to pay it. The resolution of the Ministry of Economy No. 942 for the 
year of 1993 referred to clarifying the categories of goods subject to this tax 
together with the tax of production rates, ranging between 5%-50% of the 
cost of production and consumption tax, with rates ranging between 10%-
100%. This means that tax on domestic production was less than or equal to 
the consumption tax. Meanwhile this tax was imposed at constant rates on 
oil products and carbonated drinks.  
 5.2.2.3 Stamp tax:  This tax is levied for circulation on all documents 
and transactions. It was imposed under Act No. 35 for the year of 1968 and 
Act No. 65 for the year 1973. During the period of 2004-2009, the stamp tax 
was regulated by Act 12 for the year 2004. It is an indirect tax imposed for 
non-periodic acts (non-recurrent), such as circulation or consumption, and is 
imposed on the occasion of a particular incident. It is also an in-kind tax 
imposed without taking into account the taxpayer's ability to pay.  
The stamp tax is divided into two types:  stamp tax on documents/writs and 
stamp tax on dispositions/transactions. The details are shown below: 
173 
 
5.2.2.3.1 Stamp Tax on Documents/Writs: In accordance with Act No. 12 of 
2004, such a tax is imposed on official documents at a steady rate (a 
specific value) in most cases and can be often low-priced, ranging 
from 10-2000 dirham for the document subject to this tax with the 
exception of some licenses that impose a tax between LYD10-500.    
In rare cases, it was subject to a relative price ranging between 
0.002% - 5% of the value of tax base, such as financial receipts and 
invoices, bills of exchange and promissory notes, securities and 
advertisements.  
5.2.2.3.2 Stamp tax on dispositions/transactions: It was an indirect tax 
imposed as a specific tax base, under its (the value of transaction), 
rates ranged between 0.001% -10%. Sometimes this tax was imposed 
at a fixed rate ranging from 1000 dirham – LYD20 for each 
transaction; this tax was often paid by buying stamps, or paid in cash 
if the value of the tax exceeded 5 LYD.  
5.2.2.3.3 Stamp Tax Law No. 12 of 2004: 
This law was issued by the Libyan General people’s congress on 06 of 
March 2004 to replace the previous stamp tax law Number 65 of 1973;  "The 
stamp tax law issued by law No. 65 of 1973 shall be repealed " (Article 49, 
law 12 of 2004 ). It came into force from the date of its issue. The new law 
contained 50 articles divided into 5 parts as follow:  
5.2.2.3.3.a  General provisions (Articles 1–7): 
Under this part, stamp tax is defined as a fixed or relative tax, and shall be 
imposed on the papers, documents, publications, advertisements, registers 
and other writs, as well as acts, transactions, and facts in the manner and the 
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rates/prices indicated in the annexed table. It also shows some of other 
General provisions related to the stamp tax. 
5.2.2.3.3.b Payment of the tax (Articles  8–20): 
This part explains the following:  how to pay the stamp tax; determines the 
forms and categories of duty stamps and papers by the executive regulation; 
penalty of delayed payments; complaining against the imposed tax; and 
determining who bears the burden of this tax. 
5.2.2.3.3. c  Exemption from Tax (Articles  21–22):  
The following bodies and cases  were exempted from the stamp tax: public 
bodies; syndicates ; private bodies of public interest and official societies 
with social, cultural, charity or sport purposes; the foreign diplomatic and 
consular corps;  the international bodies; procedures of Pilgrimage rituals; 
procedures of study; persons receiving basic incomes; work seekers; 
procedures subjected to  judicial fees. 
5.2.2.3.3.d  The Penalties  (Articles 23–31): to determine the taxpayer’s 
responsibility for tax payment, and clarify some financial penalties resulting 
from contravention to this law. 
5.2.2.3.3.e  Final provisions (Articles  32 50): to identify some of the 
organisational procedures for collection of this tax. 
 
According to the mentioned new tax law, the Libyan Government created a 
new Stamp Tax. This tax specified the following tax rates on important 
items procured in Libya by a foreign firm: 
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Taxable Item Rate 
No. Details Rate Item 
no. 
1 Auditors Certificate & Reports to be paid  by the company 100LYD 2A 
2 Accounting Books (Registered) on each page 0.250LYD 4A 
3 Invoices (sales, purchase of cars to be paid by the buyer)        3% 24A 
4 Invoices (sales, purchase of material) over 100 LYD to be paid by the 
buyer. 
2% 24B 
5 Rental Contractors to be paid by the tenant Contracts for supplies, 
services. 
1% 27 
6 Contracting, Public works  ... etc. to be paid by the contractor  2% 28A 
7 Sub-contractor.                                                                               0.1% 28B 
8 Opening of Letters of credit.                            0.2% 33A 
9 Guarantee , Insurance … etc. of Value 0.5% 35 
10 Receipts 0.5% 36 
11 Amounts paid by any public body to others to be paid by the receivers 0.5% 43 
Sources:  Sultan, Abdussalam, 2009,   How to do business in Libya. Country Commercial Guide,, 
2009). 
 
Any contract signed in Libya for anything other than a direct supply was 
subject to stamp tax and had to be registered with the tax department within 
60 days of the effective date of the contract (usually the date of signature). A 
tax of 2% of the total contract value and a further 0.1% on any proportion 
that is sub-contracted was payable on registration. All invoices were 
required to bear the tax department stamp to show that stamp tax had been 
paid. Any delays result in a penalty of 2% of the tax per month up to a 
maximum of 50% of the tax. The contractor was liable for the payment of 
tax and a company could not accept an invoice from a contractor that had 
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not been registered - if the contractor had not paid the registration duty then 
the company became liable.  
Government bodies withheld a stamp tax of 0.5% from all payments made 
by them (Libyan British Business Council, 2009). 
There is a 5% sales stamp tax on all local sales, which was added to the 
invoice at the time of sale, (UK Trade & Investment, 2009).  
In the appendices can be see a schedule of 45 items showing the details and 
tax stamp rate of each item according to the mentioned new law (No.12 of 
2004). 
5.2.2.4 Tax on Entertainment: It was one of the indirect taxes on 
consumption, under Act No. (39) for the year of 1968, and was imposed on a 
percentage 10% of the entry fees to theaters and entertainment concerts as 
well as parties, and on a percentage of 15% for entry tickets to movies.  
5.2.2.5 Tax for the Blind: A tax imposed on cinema tickets for supporting 
the Blind Association under Libyan Act No. (4), adopted in 1972, a 
surcharge tax imposed for amusement on all tickets to the movies only at 10 
dirham per ticket.  
 And so on, through the review of tax base and tax rates as well as tax 
exemptions, the objective of the tax target in Libya could be set out as 
follows:- 
(1) Fundamental objective: which was designed to achieve social purposes 
such as reducing income inequality. There were certain indicators inclusive 
of imposing specific taxes (general income tax), the rise of tax price for the 
tax rate due to increasing income of taxpayers as well as granting certain tax 
exemptions.  
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(2)   Financial objective:  for funding the expenses of administrative budget 
by fiscal resources and reducing dependence on oil revenues.  
  
5.3 Tax revenue in Libya during the period 1970-2005 . 
In this part, the development of direct and indirect tax revenue during the 
period under this investigation will be discussed. 
  
5.3.1 Revenue from direct taxes during the period 1970-2005:  
This section includes the development tax revenue from: real estate tax, 
business incomes tax, individual incomes tax, agricultural income tax, total 
income tax, other direct tax revenue, and tax penalties.  
5.3.1.1 Revenue from real estate tax: According to current prices, the value 
of real estate tax revenues by 92% from LYD410.1 thousand in 1970 to 
LYD1.196 million in 1976, then decreased by 32% to LYD277.3 thousand 
in 1979, see Figure 5.1 and Table 24 of the Statistical Annex - annual 
growth rate for this tax reached (- 4.3%) during the period 1970-1979.  
As for the contribution of real estate tax in the income tax, it reached the 
highest rate amounting to 6.3% in 1971, while the lowest rate was at 0.2% 
in the year 1979.  
 
In practice, this tax was stopped during the period from 1980-1993 and then 
began working out again in 1994 until it reached LYD16.2 million in the 
year 2005.  
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Table 5.5 Tax on real estate during the period 1970 - 1979 (millions LYD at 
current prices) 
% of income tax  
Annual change  Tax on real estate 
income 
years 
% value 
3.0% - - 0.41 1970 
6.3% 80.0% 0.328 0.738 1971 
6.0% 12.5% 0.092 0.83 1972 
4.0% -24.0% -0.199 0.631 1973 
2.0% 42.0% 0.265 0.896 1974 
2.0% 5.6% 0.05 0.946 1975 
2.0% 26.4% 0.25 1.196 1976 
1.0% -18.2% -0.218 0.978 1977 
0.5% -40.4% -0.395 0.583 1978 
0.2% -52.5% -0.306 0.277 1979 
1.0% - - 7.485 Total 
2.7% 3.0% -0.015 0.749 Average 
  - - -4.30% CAGR 
 
0
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Figure 5.1 tax on real estate income (million LYD )
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5.3.1.2 Revenue from tax on business incomes:  
Table 5.6 shows that the compound annual growth rate of income tax on 
Trade, Industry and Crafts during the period 1970-2005 reached 
approximately 4.8% and that the value of this tax developed more than five 
times compared to the beginning of the study period.  
Table 5.6 Compound annual growth rate of businesses income during the period 1970-
2005 (values: LYD Million) 
tax years Average 0f 
annual increase 
CAGR
1970 2005
Tax on the incomes of Trade & Industry 
and crafts 
4.771 24.407 16% 4.8% 
Tax on corporate incomes 0.373 323.28 25% 21.3% 
Tax on business incomes 5.145 347.687 25% 12.8% 
In the meantime, the annual average tax revenue for business incomes was 
LYD12 million for the entire period between 1970-2005. In 1998, the tax 
revenues amounted to LYD33.1 million, which was the highest value during 
the period.  
The corporate income tax grew from LYD373 thousand in 1970 to 
LYD323.3 million in 2005 (see statistical appendix, table 24). This increase 
was at a compound annual growth rate “CAGR” of 21.3%.  Total revenue 
of this tax during the period 1970-2005 reached about LYD4.8809 million  
at an average annual rate of LYD135.6 million per annum. The maximum 
value of these revenues reached LYD403 million and this tax was 
significantly decreased in 1990 (see figure 5.3).  
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 In general, the tax on business has been developed from LYD5.145 million  
in 1970 to LYD347.7 million in 2005 (i.e. it multiplied by 67 times 
compared to what it was in the beginning of the period). This increase in tax 
revenues on business income tax was at a compound annual growth rate of 
12.8%.  
In view of the above, we can say that the trend on Total Income Tax on 
business income was annually at a height ranging between 3% and 347%, 
although this trend witnessed a remarkable decline in some years of the 
study period between 1984 and 1997.  
Table (5.7) Income Tax on business during the period from 1970 to 2005 
(current prices)  
 Tax on income of trade,industry and crafts:
B A value* period 
16% 9% 39.611 1970-79 
4% 13% 56.241 1980-89 
10% 78% 336.442 1990-05 
8% 100% 432.294 1970-05 
Tax on the corporate incomes: 
B A value* period 
84% 4% 204.461 1970-79 
96% 31% 1494.2041980-89 
90% 65% 3182.2451990-05 
92% 100% 4880.91 1970-05 
Total of tax on Business incomes: 
B A value* period 
100% 5% 244.074 1970-79 
100% 29% 1550.4461980-89 
100% 66% 3518.6851990-05 
100% 100% 5313.2051970-05 
A: As ratio of the total of each  tax during 1970-2005 
B:  As ratio of total tax on Business incomes for each period. 
(*) in current million LYD. 
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5.3.1.3 Revenue from tax on the individual incomes: 
This tax included tax on salaries, wages and income tax free professions as 
well as tax on the interest banks and savings accounts, and tax on foreign 
income and general income tax. In respect of taxes on salaries and wages, 
the data indicate that it reached during the period 1970-2005 about LYD3.7 
billion, as described on table 25 in the statistical appendix. The tax list of 
the components of the tax on individual incomes in all years of study ranged 
between 51% and 100% of the Income Tax on individuals; there was an 
annual growth rate of the payroll tax of about 8.9% during the period 1970  
(See table 5.8.).  
On the other hand, total tax on the income of independent professions 
reached LYD46.63 million during the period from 1970 to 2005 with a 
complex annual growth rate of 29.8%. As for the total tax on the interests of 
banks and savings accounts, it amounted to about LYD2.481 million during 
the study period. This tax is a very small proportion of the components of 
tax on income of individuals (see table 5.9).  
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Table (5.8) Income Tax on individuals (Million Libyan dinars) 
total of tax 
on the 
individuals 
incomes 
tax on 
external 
incomes 
tax on the 
banks 
deposit 
benefits 
and saving 
accounts 
General tax 
on the 
income 
 tax on the 
free 
professions 
incomes 
tax on 
salaries & 
wages  
years 
7.257 0 00.1420.0017.114 1970 
34.559 0 0.0274.1450.08230.305 1975 
82.78 0 0.0136.6280.47175.668 1980 
138.581 0 0.06411.7210.099126.697 1985 
157.629 0.001 0.22521.1190.203136.081 1990 
153.293 0.006 0.11623.4970.769128.905 1995 
159.027 0.074 0.03620.8395.04133.038 2000 
160.961 0.054 0.08410.5599.12141.144 2005 
9.3% 28.3% 5.7% 13.1% 29.8% 8.9% CAGR 
 
Starting from 1989, the tax was applied on foreign income in practice, but 
their relative importance in tax revenue was still very low.  
With regard to general income, its tax was ranked second in the structure of 
tax on individual incomes during the period 1970-2005, bringing total 
general income tax during this period of about LYD654.3 and an annual 
average of LYD18.2 million with a compound annual growth rate of 13.1% 
per annum. This general tax was canceled in 2004 with continued collection 
of revenues for previous years.  
In general, during the period 1970-2005 the total tax on individual incomes 
reached about LYD4.4 billion, the annual average was LYD123.2 million 
and the compound annual growth rate was 9.3%.  
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Table (5.9) Income Tax on individuals’ income during the period 1970-2005 
(Million LYD)  
total of tax on 
the individuals 
incomes 
tax on 
external 
incomes 
tax on the 
banks 
deposit 
benefits 
and saving 
accounts 
General tax 
on the 
income 
 tax on the 
free 
professions 
incomes 
tax on salaries 
& wages  
period 
values ( Million LYD ) 
310.377 0 0.199 31.379 0.856 277.943 1970-79 
1352.535 0.001 0.564 226.093 1.884 1123.993 1980-89 
2771.605 0.398 1.718 396.809 43.89 2328.79 1990-2005 
4434.517 0.399 2.481 654.281 46.63 3730.726 1970-2005 
As % of total of tax on the individuals incomes 
100% 0% 0% 10% 0% 90% 1970-79 
100% 0% 0% 17% 0% 83% 1980-89 
100% 0% 0% 14% 2% 84% 1990-2005 
100% 0% 0% 15% 1% 84% 1970-2005 
As % of the whole study period 
7% 0% 8% 5% 2% 7% 1970-79 
31% 0% 23% 35% 4% 30% 1980-89 
63% 100% 69% 61% 94% 62% 1990-2005 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 1970-2005 
Source : Table 25, statistical appendix 
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Figure 5.5 Individual income tax 
 
 
 
5.3.1.4  Tax revenue from agricultural income & livestock: practically, a tax 
was imposed on agricultural income on a regular basis in 1983, with a total 
revenue about LYD4.32 million during the period 1983 to 2005, and an 
average LYD120 thousand per annum; this tax had a maximum value of 
LYD0.653 million in 1987. The tax on livestock entered into force starting 
from 1994, whereby the total income tax during this period reached in 1994-
2005 about LYD0.029 million only, which meant that the tax did not 
constitute any importance.  
In general, the rate of annual increase (average) of the total taxes of 
Agriculture and Livestock reached 50% annually during the period 1983-
2005. As can be seen, these two taxes (agriculture and livestock) increased 
from LYD14 thousand in 1983 to LYD56 thousand in 2004, and then 
declined to LYD11 thousand in 2005, (see Table 5.10). 
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Table 5.10 Tax on the income of Agriculture & Livestock      (Million LYD)  
total of 
agricultural 
, livestocks 
tax 
tax on the 
ownership 
of 
livestocks 
tax on 
agricultural 
income 
years 
total of 
agricultural 
, livestocks 
tax 
tax on the 
ownership 
of 
livestocks 
tax on 
agricultural 
income 
years 
0.13 0.001 0.129 1996 0.014 0 0.014 1983 
0.151 0.003 0.148 1997 0.035 0 0.035 1984 
0.144 0.001 0.143 1998 0.369 0 0.369 1985 
0.135 0.001 0.134 1999 0.506 0 0.506 1986 
0.11 0.001 0.109 2000 0.653 0 0.653 1987 
0.144 0 0.144 2001 0.463 0 0.463 1988 
0.207 0.01 0.197 2002 0.317 0 0.317 1989 
0.045 0 0.045 2003 0.291 0 0.291 1990 
0.056 0 0.056 2004 0.133 0 0.133 1991 
0.011 0 0.011 2005 0.124 0 0.124 1992 
4.349 0.029 4.32 TOTAL 0.05 0 0.05 1993 
0.121 0.001 0.12 Average  0.149 0.001 0.148 1994 
‐1.1% - ‐1.1% CAGR 0.112 0.011 0.101 1995 
source : the Libyan tax authority , Tripoli . 
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5.3.1.5 Total income tax revenue:  
Data in Table 26 in the statistical appendix indicate that the outcome of 
income tax has increased from LYD12.8 million in 1970 to LYD524.9 
million by the end of 2005. The total for such tax during the period 1970-
2005 was about LYD9.8 billion.  
Table 5.11 Total income tax during the period 1970 - 2005 (Million LYD)  
total of 
the 
income 
tax  
other 
items 
tax on the 
livestocks 
tax on the 
agricultural 
incomes 
tax on the 
individuals 
incomes 
tax on the 
Business 
incomes 
tax on the 
real estate 
incomes 
years 
12.816 0.004 0 0 7.257 5.145 0.41 1970 
56.337 0 0 0 34.559 20.832 0.946 1975 
201.815 0 0 0 82.78 119.035 0 1980 
303.701 0 0 0.369 138.581 164.751 0 1985 
250.574 0 0 0.291 157.629 92.654 0 1990 
353.975 0 0.011 0.101 153.293 200.57 0 1995 
336.717 0 0.001 0.109 159.027 177.547 0.033 2000 
524.902 0 0 0.011 160.961 347.687 16.243 2005 
11.2% - - -1.1% 9.3% 12.8% 11.1% CAGR 
Figure 5.7 Totals for income tax 
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In an overview of the components of income tax during the period from 
1970-2005 (as in Table 5.12), it is found that income tax of commerce, 
industry and crafts amounted to about LYD4.8 million in 1970 and increased 
fivefold, to reach LYD24.4 million in 2005, whereas the compound annual 
growth rate reached 4.8%. The tax on corporate income increased at a 
compound annual growth rate of 21.3% until it reached LYD323.3 million in 
2005.  
  
Total tax on business incomes doubled to reach about 68 times rose from 
LYD5.1 million and reached about LYD347.7 million between 1970 and 
2005, respectively. During the period 1970-2005 an increase in the tax on 
salaries and wages of LYD7.1 million reached LYD141.1 million, as well 
as an increase in the tax on income of independent professions from 
LYD1000 to LYD9.12 million, an increase of general tax on income from 
LYD0.142 million to LYD10.6 million. This led to a rise in income tax on 
individual incomes of about 22 times, whereby the LYD7.3 million raised 
in 1970, reached nearly LYD161 million in 2005.  
The total income tax revenue increased at a compound annual growth rate 
of 11.2% to reach LYD525 million in 2005.  
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Table 5.12 The development of income tax during the period from 
1970 to 2005   
CAGR 
No. of 
times 
2005 * 1970 * Tax 
11.1% 40 16.243 0.41 tax on the real estate incomes 
4.8% 5 24.407 4.771 Tax on income of trade,industry and crafts tax on the 
Business 
incomes 
21.3% 867 323.28 0.373 Tax on the corporate incomes 
12.8% 68 347.687 5.145 Total tax on the Business incomes 
8.9% 20 141.144 7.114 Tax on salaries & wages 
Tax on the 
individuals 
incomes 
29.8% 9120 9.12 0.001 Tax on the free professions incomes 
5.7% 6 0.084     0.015 † Tax on the banks deposit benefits and saving accounts 
28.3% 54 0.054     0.001  †† Tax on external incomes 
13.1% 74 10.559 0.142 General tax on the income 
9.3% 22 160.961 7.257 Total of tax on the individuals incomes 
‐1.1%- 0.011     0.014 ††† Tax on agricultural income Agricultural 
, livestocks   
tax 
- - 0 - Tax on the ownership of livestocks 
‐1.1%- 0.011 - Total agricultural , livestocks tax 
11.2% 41 524.902 12.816 Total of incomes tax 
(*) in current Million LYD.; (†) in 1974; (††) in 1989; (†††) in 1983 . 
 
 5.3.1.6 Other direct tax revenue: There were two main other types of direct 
taxation in Libya: Jihad tax and the Palestinian National Fund Tax. 
5.3.1.6. a Jihad tax revenue:  Table 27 in the statistical annex indicates that 
the outcome of the Jihad Tax increased from LYD2.3 million in 1970 to 
LYD83.2 million in 2005 (which was the highest value during the study 
period) and this means that they increased at a compound annual growth 
rate of 10.9%, and that the total income of this tax was LYD1.3746 billion 
during the period 1970-2005.  
5.3.1.6. b Revenue from the Palestinian national fund tax:  During the period 
1970-2005, these tax revenues rose at a compound annual growth rate of  
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2.9%, and increased from LYD72 thousand in 1970 to LYD198 million in 
2005, which was of little value compared to other taxes.  
 
Figure 5-8  Tax of  Al-jihad & Palestinian fund 
 
 
5.3.1.7 Tax penalties: According to the applicable administrative division in 
the Taxation Authority, fiscal fines were usually included in part six (section 
VI). Such fines were imposed in cases of tax evasion, delay in the payment 
of tax and violation of tax legislation.  
 
Through the data in Table 28 in the Statistical Appendix, it can be seen that 
the value of fiscal fines and forfeitures during the period 1970-2005 
increased from LYD231 thousand in 1970 to LYD11.4 million in 1997 
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(which was the highest value during the study period) and then declined to 
LYD6.5 million in 2002, while the total of such fines during the period 
1970-2005 was LYD126.8 million. 
 
5.3.2 Revenues from indirect taxes during the period 1970-2005:  
This section includes the development tax revenue from: import tax, other 
customs duties and production taxes, stamp tax, entertainment tax, tax for 
the blind. 
 
5.3.2.1 Import tax revenue:  
Table 29 in the Statistical Annex, indicates that import taxes amounted to 
LYD36 million in 1970, and reached its highest value (LYD623 million) in 
2003, then declined to LYD350.1 million in 2005, which means that 
compound annual growth rate of the import tax was 6.8% during the period 
1970-2005. On the other hand, the level of import tax was as much as the 
customs duties, which was about 76% in 1970 and gradually increased until 
it reached its highest level of 94% in 1975. It then declined to 40% in 2005. 
The available data suggest that the contribution of import tax to total 
indirect taxes fell from 70% in 1970 to 29% in 2005 (see table 5.13).  
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  Table 5.13 Import tax 1970 - 2005           (Million LYD)  
     ( A ) : ( C )   
% 
     ( A ) : ( B )   
% 
  ( C )       
Indirect taxes 
   ( B )        
customs & 
production 
tax 
       ( A )        
import tax 
years 
70% 76% 50.5 46.634 35.5 1970 
78% 94% 220.029 184.377 172.7 1975 
57% 70% 509.483 419.172 291.762 1980 
47% 84% 413.946 232.66 194.624 1985 
43% 76% 334.577 188.915 143.61 1990 
50% 57% 640.09 557.696 316.905 1995 
50% 64% 598.026 465.111 299.831 2000 
29% 40% 1206.952 874.408 350.392 2005 
Source: The Statistical Appendix, table 29.  
 
5.3.2.2 Revenue from other customs duties and production taxes:  
Other customs duties included some miscellaneous duties and taxes on 
petroleum products as well as taxes on carbonated water, production and 
consumption taxes, and some supplementary tariffs collected by the 
Customs Department in favor of other third parties such as municipal 
revenue and earnings on charity as well as quayages, and some other 
safeguards and warrants. Table 29 in the Statistical Appendix indicates that 
the total customs duties and production taxes reached about LYD46.6 
million in 1970, representing 92.3% of indirect taxes and totaled LYD874.4 
million in 2005, accounting for 72% of indirect taxes, which means that the 
compound annual growth rate of taxes and customs production was 8.7% 
during the period 1970-2005.  During the period 1994-2005 production tax 
revenue declined by 19%, while consumption tax rose by 15.3%. Table 5.14 
shows the changes of customs taxes between 1970 and 2005.  
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Table 5.14 Growth rate in customs taxes for various periods  
CAGR 
overall 
increasing rate 
value ( Million 
LYD ) 
period customs tax 
last year 
first 
year 
6.8% 887% 350.4 35.5 1970-2005 Import tax 
11.6% 4606% 524 11.11970-2005 Other customs& production 
8.7% 1775% 874.4 46.61970-2005 Total customs & production 
5.5% 222% 7.4 2.3 1983-2005 Miscellaneous customs tax 
-2.3% -38% 12.5 20.2 1983-2004 Tax on oil products 
-16.0% -98% 0.015 0.7 1983-2005 Tax on carbonated water 
-19.1% -90% 6.9 71.4 1994-2005 Production tax 
15.3% 379% 195.9 40.9 1994-2005 Consumption tax 
16.1% 707% 4.6 0.57 1991-2005 Customs stamp tax 
1.5% 39% 4.3 3.1 1983-2005 Customs fines & recaptures 
18.6% 992% 266.5 24.4 1991-2005 Other customs tax 
5.5% 226% 793.3 243.1983-2005 Collected tax for public 
4.3% 96% 23.9 12.2 1985-2001 Municipality returns 
6.4% 138% 42.6 17.9 1991-2005 Charitable returns 
-35.3% -100% 0.018 8 1991-2005 Quayages(Quay returns) 
10.2% 600% 85.4 12.2 1985-2005 Collected tax for other bodies 
Source: Records of the Libyan customs authority, Tripoli. (for various  years). 
 
5.3.2.3 Stamp tax revenue: 
This tax was inclusive of:   
? Stamp tax on official edited documents  
? Stamp tax on the actions & disposes (transactions and facts)  
? Sale of stamped papers & official document 
  
With regard to stamp tax on official edited documents, this reached nearly 
LYD517 thousand (14% of the total stamp tax) in 1970, then increased with 
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a growth rate of 8.2% to LYD8 million in 2005. The stamp tax on the 
actions and disposals increased considerably, with a growth rate of 14.5% 
as it increased from LYD2.7 million (72% of the total stamp tax) to 
LYD312.4 million (94% of the total stamp tax) between 1970 and 2005.  
In general, the total stamp tax on the actions and disposals during the period 
1970-2005 was about LYD2886 million, with an average of LYD80.15 
million a year, but their relative, which means that stamp tax on actions and 
disposals was a significant proportion of  stamp tax.  
With regard to the total stamp tax, it increased from LYD3.8 million in 
1970 to LYD332.5 million in 2005, with a compound annual growth rate of 
13.7% (see Table 30 in the statistical appendix). 
  
5.3.2.4 Entertainment tax revenue:  According to the Taxation Authority’s 
classifications, entertainment tax, as well as the medicine rationalisation 
tax, were usually included under section III.  
With regard to the outcome of the entertainment tax, it amounted to LYD96 
thousand in 1970 and about LYD288 thousand in 1997, and constantly 
decreased until it reached LYD5 thousand in 2005, a decline at a rate of 
8.1%. It is worth mentioning that the entertainment tax did not represent 
any relative importance in total indirect taxes during the study period due to 
its small absolute amounts.  
 
With regard to medicine rationalisation charges, it was imposed as of 1984, 
whereafter the value of these fees increased from LYD457 thousand in 1984 
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to LYD5.18 million in 1986, and started to decline gradually until it reached 
LYD1.075 million in 1993; it continued to decline in subsequent years. 
  
5.3.2.5 Revenue from tax for the blind:  
Tax for the blind amounted to LYD93 thousand in 1972 and reached the 
greatest value (LYD144 thousand) in 1987, then declined until revenues 
reached one thousand dinar only in 2004. This means that the tax did not 
represent any relative importance in the structure of indirect taxes during 
the study period. 
Table 5.15 Indirect taxes during the period 1970-2005 (Million LYD)  
total indirect 
taxes 
other 
indirect 
taxes 
tax of the 
blind 
tax of the 
entertainments 
stamp tax 
customs & 
production tax 
years 
50.5 0 0 0.096 3.77 46.634 1970 
220.029 0 0.129 0.172 35.351 184.377 1975 
509.483 0 0.083 0.276 89.952 419.172 1980 
413.946 139.381 0.046 0.285 46.618 232.66 1985 
334.577 69.691 0.077 0.322 78.597 188.915 1990 
640.09 0 0.062 0.307 82.232 557.696 1995 
598.026 0 0.009 0.124 132.782 465.111 2000 
1206.952 0 0 0.005 332.539 874.408 2005 
Source:  The Statistical Appendix, table 29. 
 
5.4 The relative importance of direct and indirect tax revenue during 
the period 1970-2005: 
Data in table 31 of the statistical appendix indicate that direct tax revenues 
were LYD16.2 million (24% of total taxes) in 1970, and rose to LYD618.8 
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million (34% of the total taxes) by 2005, and that the compound annual 
growth rate of direct taxes was 11% during the period of 1970-2005. 
Therefore, the total direct tax revenues during that period were LYD11.5 
billion, the highest value of direct tax revenue was LYD682.7 million in 
2003, and that the rate of annual increase in these taxes ranged between 1% 
and 180%.  
With regard to the contribution of direct taxes to the tax structure, it was 
40% on average for the period 1970-2005.  
On the other hand, indirect taxes reached the highest rate of annual increase 
(77.2%) in 1988, and the highest value of the outcome of indirect taxes was 
LYD1.2069 billion in 2005 from LYD50.0 million in 1970. The data also 
indicate that the rate of compound annual growth was 9.5% of such taxes 
during the period 1970-2005. This means that despite the domination of 
indirect taxes on the tax structure (60% of the total taxes on average), it was 
indirect taxes that were growing at a rate higher than the growth of direct 
taxes during the study period.  
In general, the total tax revenues (direct and indirect) were about LYD66.7 
million in 1970, to LYD1.8257 billion in 2005, at a compound annual 
growth rate of 9.9%, and varied in the rate of annual increase in tax revenues 
between 0.3% (in 1982) and 88.5% (in 1994). It is worth mentioning that the 
total tax revenues during the period 1970-2005 were almost LYD30 billion. 
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5.5 Marginal propensity to tax in Libyan economy: 
The usual method of assessing Public Finance is to assume a linear 
relationship between taxes and Gross National Product (GNP).  
T = a + b Y 
Where T = direct taxes + indirect taxes.  
Y = gross national product.  
a, b = constants (parameters), and coefficient (b) is a measure of marginal     
propensity to tax. 
 
The marginal propensity to tax can be defined as the increase in taxes due to 
increased GDP of a single monetary unit.  
In order to find the marginal propensity to tax, Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) can be used to estimate the linear regression equation between the tax 
(dependent variable) and total GDP (independent variable), as follows:  
 Where: 
  
T = α 0 + α 1 GDP 
TD = β 0 + β 1 GDP 
TI = γ 0 + γ 1 GDP 
 
 
T = Total taxes at current prices (Million LYD)  
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TD = TD at current prices (Million LYD)  
TI = TI at current prices (Million LYD)  
α0, β0, γ0  = Constants   
α1, β1, γ1 = Marginal Propensity to Tax 
 
5.6 Income elasticity of tax in Libya for the period 1970-2005: 
While measuring the income elasticity of tax theoretically, the impact of tax 
rate is ignored if small, and years characterised by relative stability in tax 
rate are selected with different average income levels, assuming that income 
is the only variable with the constancy of other factors influencing tax 
outcome. However, this assumption is unrealistic in practice because there 
are other factors that affect the tax outcome, among those factors are:  
1-  The disappearance of many of the tax bases in Libya because of the 
dominance of the public sector over economic activities in the early 
1980s.  
2-  Instability of tax policy because of emergency amendments from time 
to time, on all of the tax base and rate of tax.  
3-  Instability of economic conditions.  
Moreover, the increase of income levels may not have resulted in an increase 
in the outcome of some types of tax during the same period. Such a case can 
be seen in the expansion in granted tax exemptions or the imposition of 
downward tax rates.  
Therefore, income was not the only factor affecting tax outcome, but there 
were other factors. These factors may either have been the result of 
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temporary changes in political or social conditions, or alternatively, they 
may have stemmed from tax policy decisions.  
Therefore, tax revenues were affected by many other factors, such as: tax 
rate, the nature of the tax base, sources of tax base (work or capital or both), 
cyclical economic changes (recovery/contraction), level of economic 
activity, the sensitivity of tax base towards economic changes, the prevailing 
tax structure, tax legislation as well as the degree of stability of fiscal policy.  
In addition to all that, gross domestic product (GDP) did not accurately 
reflect the real tax base, as it contributed to production activities that may 
enjoy tax exemption (partial or total exemptions or temporary). This means 
that such activities that are exempted from taxes do not contribute directly in 
the development of tax outcome.  
However, because of the difficulty in isolating the impact of such factors on 
the tax outcome in view of available data, it is necessary to use the indicator 
of income elasticity of various taxes, which relies on changes in income 
assuming the constancy of other factors. 
Therefore, the coefficient of income elasticity of tax herein refers to the 
responsiveness of tax changes in national income (overall tax base). Income 
elasticity of tax can be measured in the national economy by dividing the 
percentage of change in tax outcomes by the percentage of change in 
national income. If the result of this process is greater than one (1), the tax 
can be regarded as an elastic tax which is responsive to changes in income, 
and this means that the tax structure is more responsive to changes in GNP, 
as an indication that the tax is imposed at upward rates. But if it is less than 
the one (1), it may be admitted that taxes are not flexible to changes in 
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income. In the case that it is equal to one (1), this indicates that the marginal 
propensity to tax mpt is equal to tax ratio.  
Hereinafter the mathematical derivation of the income elasticity coefficient 
of taxes: 
  
E = (∆% in Tax Revenues) ÷ (∆% in GNP)  
 = (∆ T/T)  ÷ (∆ GNP/GNP)  
 = (∆ T/T). (GNP/ ∆ GNP)  
 = (∆ T/ ∆ GNP). (GNP/Τ)  
 = (∆ T/ ∆ GNP) ÷ (T/GNP)  
 
Where (E) represents the income elasticity coefficient of taxes 
The symbol (∆) represents the absolute change.  
The last mathematical result shows that the income elasticity of tax (E) 
equals the marginal propensity to tax divided by the tax rate (tax burden) 
expressed as (T/GNP). To measure the coefficient of income elasticity of 
taxes in Libya during the study period (1970-2005), we assume the 
following exponential relationship ( Okech & Mburu, 2011;  Hiti, Khalaf & 
Altai, 2008): 
T = α  GDP β 
 
T = Total taxes (direct and indirect):  
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Dependent Variable : T* 
  Coefficient Std. Error t R2 F D.W 
Constant 259 40.5 6.4       
        48% 31.3 1.56 
GDP 0.022 0.004 5.6       
  
Dependent Variable : TD* 
Constant 129.05 22.6 5.7       
        36% 19.2 1.62 
GDP 0.008 0.002 4.4       
  
Dependent Variable : TI* 
Constant 167.4 25.4 6.6       
        58% 46.96 1.55 
GDP 0.015 0.002 6.9       
Where GDP: Gross domestic product; T: total tax; TD: direct tax; TI: indirect tax. 
( * ) Estimates after treatment for autocorrelation. 
  
 
Taking the non-oil sector output (GPa) as an independent variable, the 
results of the assessment of marginal propensity to tax for tax deduction in 
Libya during the period 1970-2005 is as follows: 
 
Dependent Variable : T* 
  Coefficient Std.Error t R2 F D.W 
Constant 180.75 41.1 4.4       
        69% 74.9 1.81 
GPa 0.07 0.008 8.7       
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Dependent Variable : TD* 
Constant 91.71 23.5 3.9       
        55% 41.4 1.92 
GPa 0.026 0.004 6.4       
  
Dependent Variable : TI* 
Constant 111.25 24.2 4.6       
        76% 110.2 1.79 
GPa 0.048 0.005 10.5       
Where GPa: Output of non-oil sector; T: total tax; TD: direct tax; TI: indirect tax. 
 ( * ) Estimates after treatment for autocorrelation. 
 
It is clear from the estimates (output of non-oil sector as an independent 
variable, Gpa), that the value of the marginal propensity to tax in Libya on 
the level of the national economy during the study period were equal to 0.07 
annually, and this means that the increase in the output of non-oil sector by 
one Dinar led to increase in total taxes by 0.07 unit of the Libyan Dinar 
(LYD ), while the value of the marginal propensity to direct taxes, indicating 
that the increase in non-oil sector output value of one Dinar lead to an 
increase of direct taxes by 0.026 per unit of the LYD and to increase indirect 
taxes, the value 0.048 per unit of the LYD. As such, it is clear that the 
marginal propensity to indirect taxes was greater than marginal propensity to 
direct taxes during the study period. Moreover, it is indicated in statistical 
tests that the designation of model is correct and auto correlated, Table 5.16 
shows the results of estimates. 
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Table 5.16 The marginal propensity to tax in Libya   
period Tax 
Independent 
variable 
Constant 
term 
Marginal 
propensity 
to tax 
t0 t1 R2 F D.W 
19
70
-2
00
5 
Direct tax 
GDP* 129.05 0.008 5.7 4.4 36% 19.2 1.62 
Gpa* 91.71 0.026 3.9 6.4 55% 41.4 1.92 
GPb* 94.16 0.028 3.99 6.5 55% 41.99 1.87 
Indirect 
tax 
GDP* 167.4 0.015 6.6 6.9 58% 46.96 1.55 
Gpa* 111.25 0.048 4.6 10.5 76% 110.2 1.79 
GPb* 115.3 0.052 4.7 10.5 77% 110.7 1.74 
Total tax 
GDP* 259.8 0.022 6.4 5.6 48% 31.3 1.56 
Gpa* 180.75 0.07 4.4 8.7 69% 74.9 1.81 
GPb* 187.4 0.078 4.6 8.7 69% 75.7 1.76 
 
Where ; GDP: Gross domestic product  ; Gpa : non-oil sector product  ; Gpb: non-oil sector product  minus   
agricultural product;and (b ^ 0; b ^ 1)are estimated parameters;(t0; t1) calculated t test results(Gujarati,2004 ); 
R2: coefficient of determination ; F calculated F test results; and DW: calculated Durban Watson test result 
( * ) Estimates after treatment of the autocorrelation. 
For explanation of Durbin Watson test and autocorrelation treatment, see the appendix. 
 
Accordingly, the present study has estimated the logarithmic equation of 
income elasticity of tax which shown in section 5.6 , and using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) to total taxes firstly for direct taxes and secondly for 
indirect taxes separately, and the results are as listed in table 5.17 below:  
Table 5.17 Coefficient of income elasticity of taxes during the period from 
1970 to 2005 (absolute values)  
period direct tax indirect tax total tax 
1970-2005 0.28  * 0.50  * 0.47  * 
( * ) Estimates after treatment of the autocorrelation.  
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According to this indicator, it is noted that taxes are not elastic to changes in 
national income during the study period (1970-2005) as the coefficient of 
elasticity to direct taxes was 0.28, and 0.50 to indirect taxes, while it is 0.47 
for total taxes. There is also a decrease in the coefficient of elasticity to 
indirect taxes (and total taxes) during the same period. Replacing the non-oil 
sector output (GPa) with gross domestic product (GDP) (an independent 
variable in the foregoing relationship), the results (listed in table 5.18) were 
revealed as follows: 
 
Table 5.18 Coefficient of income elasticity of taxes during the period 1970 -
2005 (absolute values)  
period direct tax indirect tax total tax 
  A B A B A B 
1970-2005 0.49  * 0.63  * 0.62  * 0.65  * 0.62  * 0.56  * 
    . )A ) Using the following linear algorithm function :         Ln ( Ti ) = f Ln ( Gpa (  
( B ) Using the following linear function :  Ti = b^0  +  b^1  Gpa   , and the average elasticity calculated 
according to :                                        , where  ( I ) : kind of the tax ; Gpa : non‐oil product ; Gpa' :  average 
  
of non‐oil product ; Ti' : average of the tax revenue . ( * ) Estimates after treatment for autocorrelation. 
 
From table 5.18, and in accordance with average elasticity indicator, it is 
possible to conclude that taxes in Libya were not flexible to changes in the 
output of the non-oil sector, and that the change in the output of the non-oil 
sector during the study period led to less change in tax. This means that the 
Libyan Tax System does not respond well to any increase in the output of 
non-oil sector significantly (there is rigidity within the tax system).  
)(1
iT
aGPb ′
′= ∧η
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The coefficient of income elasticity of tax can be used for tax predictions in 
the future planning as shown in the following : The non-oil product in Libya 
in 2004 was LYD 19566 million grew to LYD 23101.6 million in 2005 ( see 
Table 1 in the statistical appendix ) . The coefficient of the income elasticity 
of tax in Libya during 1970-2005 was 0.56. Since  
 
݁ ൌ
∆்
்ൗ
∆ீ௉௔
ீ௉௔ൗ
               
 
Where, 
 
e: the coefficient of the income elasticity ; T : tax revenue ; GPa : non-oil 
product . 
 
Then 
  
∆ܶ
ܶ ൌ ݁  ൬ 
∆ܩܲܽ
ܩܲܽ  ൰ ൌ   0.56  ൬ 
3535.6
19566 ൰ ൌ   0.101193  
 
 
Thus, Libyan tax revenue would go up 0.101193 or 10 percent .For example 
, the tax revenue in Libya was LYD 1825.724 million in 2005( see Table 31 
in the statistical appendix )  , thus tax revenue would increase  0.101193  ൈ
1825.724 ൌ ܮܻܦ 184.7499 ݈݈݉݅݅݋݊ . 
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Upon calculating the coefficient of income elasticity of each type of direct 
taxation, we find that such specific taxes are not flexible to changes in GDP 
(independent variable) during the study period, as seen from the following 
Table (5.19):  
 
Table 5.19 Coefficient of income elasticity of direct taxes in Libya during the 
period 1970-2005 (independent variable is GDP /absolute values1)  
    TAX       Coefficient of income elasticity  
Tax on real estate incomes -- 
tax on income of trade,industry and crafts 0.38  * 
tax on the corporate incomes 0.38  * 
tax on Business incomes. 0.34  * 
tax on salaries & wages 0.16  * 
tax on the free professions incomes        1.95 
General tax on the income 0.53  * 
tax on the banks deposit benefits and saving accounts 0.05  * 
tax on external incomes 0.50  * 
total of tax on the individuals incomes 0.15  * 
tax on the agricultural incomes and the ownership of livestock. 0.81  * 
total of the income tax 0.27  * 
tax of Al-jihad 0.04  * 
tax of the Palestinian national fund 0.58  * 
( 1 )  Using the following linear algorithm function :    Ln ( Ti )  = f  Ln ( GDP ) ,  
where Ti : revenue of the specific tax;GDP : Gross domestic product  
( * ) Estimates after treatment the autocorrelation.  
 
 
Wherein measurement of the coefficient of income elasticity of direct taxes 
for the qualitative changes in the output of non-oil sector (GPa) has been 
obtained for the estimates in table 5.20.  
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Table 5.20 Coefficient of income elasticity to direct taxes 1970-2005 
(independent variable is Gpa  / absolute values) 
TAX 
Coefficient of income 
elasticity 
A B 
Tax on real estate incomes     -- 0.59  * 
Tax on income of trade,industry and crafts   0.74  * 0.56  * 
Tax on the corporate incomes    0.51  * 0.69  * 
tax on Business incomes.    0.99  * 0.68  * 
tax on salaries & wages     0.23  * 0.26  * 
tax on the free professions incomes    1.8 2.07  * 
General tax on the income    1.2  * 0.63 
tax on the banks deposit benefits and saving accounts  0.12  * 0.19  * 
tax on external incomes     1.2  * 1.81 
total of tax on the individuals incomes   0.38  * 0.43  * 
tax on the agricultural incomes and the ownership of livestock. 1.12  * 0.55  * 
total of the income tax      0.58  * 0.59  * 
tax of Al-jihad     0.02  * 0.53  * 
tax of the palestinian national fund    0.70  * 0.51 
    . )A ) Using the following linear algorithm function :         Ln ( Ti ) = f Ln ( Gpa (  
( B ) Using the following linear function :  Ti = b^0  +  b^1  Gpa   , and the average elasticity calculated 
according to :                                        , where  ( I ) : kind of the tax ; Gpa : non‐oil product ; Gpa' :  average 
  
of non‐oil product ; Ti' : average of the tax revenue . ( * ) Estimates after treatment of the autocorrelation . 
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Table 5.21 Coefficient of income elasticity of indirect taxes 1970-2005 
(absolute value)  
  Tax   ( A ) ( B ) ( C ) 
 Import tax   0.46 * 0.39 * 0.36 * 
Other customs tax** 1.11 * 1.24 * 0.53 * 
 Customs & production tax 0.65 * 0.64 * 0.50 * 
Stamp tax 0.36 * 1.01 * 0.65 * 
 Tax of the entertainments 0.66 * 0.36 * 0.59 * 
 Tax of the blind    1.1   * 1.27 * 0.98 * 
 Other indirect taxes 0.37 * 0.46 * 0.30 * 
 Total indirect taxes   0.62 * 0.63 * 0.50 * 
    . )A ) Using the following linear algorithm function :         Ln ( Ti ) = f Ln ( Gpa (  
( B ) Using the following linear function :  Ti = b^0  +  b^1  Gpa   , and the average elasticity calculated 
according to :                                       . 
 
    . )C ) Using the following linear algorithm function :         Ln ( Ti ) = f Ln ( GDP ( 
 , where  ( I ) : kind of the tax ; Gpa : non‐oil product ; Gpa' :  average of non‐oil product ; Ti' : average of 
the tax revenue ; GDP: Gross domestic product .  ( * ) Estimates after treatment the autocorrelation . 
 ( ** )  includes : Oil products; Carbonated water; Other products; and consumption tax; Medicine 
consumption fees). 
 
The tax outcome may be affected by a number of other factors, such as: 
change in tax rates, the amendment of tax legislation, and the nature of the 
prevailing economic and social system. Therefore, a dummy variable has 
been included in this model. This dummy variable represents changes in the 
Libyan economy during the study period; among such changes are: public 
sector domination of economic activities and a reduced role for the private 
sector during the period 1980-1989, as well as some modifications. On these 
grounds, the result shown in table 5.22 has been reached.  
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Table 5.22 Coefficient of income elasticity of direct & indirect taxes  
during the period 1970-2005.  
Tax b^0 b^1 b^2 t0 t1 t2 R2 F DW 
Total tax * 0.07 0.74 0.3 0.22 10.5 2.7 77% 56.5 1.69 
Direct tax * -1.02 0.84 0.45 -1.8 7.2 2.4 62% 26.9 1.31 
Indirect tax * -0.12 0.73 0.29 -0.31 11.2 2.8 80% 64.4 1.69 
Tax on income of trade,industry and 
crafts* 
-2.7 0.81 -0.45 -3.7 5.6 -1.88 54% 19.1 2.1 
Tax on the corporate incomes  * 2.1 -0.26 0.51 2.85 -0.98 1.25 7% 1.36 0.93 
Tax on Business incomes  *. -5.9 1.3 0.77 -10.8 18.3 5.7 92% 179.5 1.55 
Tax on salaries & wages  * 0.58 0.29 0.03 1.76 2.3 0.18 14% 2.6 0.98 
Tax on the free professions incomes -16.1 1.8 -0.91 -11.1 10.6 -2.59 79% 60.7 2.04 
General tax on the income -8.4 1.24 0.6 -7.98 10.1 2.36 76% 53 1.46 
Total of tax on the individuals incomes * -0.24 0.58 0.26 -0.4 3.8 1.07 31% 7.3 0.98 
Total of the income tax  * -2.59 1.07 0.6 -4.2 9.7 3.3 75% 49.7 1.26 
Tax of Al-jihad  * 1.05 -0.02 -0.03 4.2 -0.17 -0.18 0.2% 0.03 1.72 
Tax of the Palestinian national fund  * 1.08 -0.33 1.4 0.76 -1.5 3.5 32% 7.6 1.78 
Import tax * 0.56 0.46 0.1 1.81 4.96 0.69 43% 12.3 2.08 
Other customs tax   * -3.75 1.32 -0.3 -4.6 7.5 -1.07 64% 30 1.27 
Customs & production tax  * -0 0.68 0.016 -0.01 7.81 0.12 65% 31 1.75 
stamp tax  * 0.54 0.34 -0.08 0.98 2.1 -0.31 12% 2.3 1.31 
Tax of the blind   * 6.3 -1.1 0.05 3.7 -5.6 0.12 49% 15.9 1.49 
 
( 1 ) Using the following linear algorithm function :  Ln( Ti ) = Ln ( b^0 )  +  b^1  Ln( Gpa ) +  b^2 Db    .   
Where  Ti : revenue of each specific tax .; Gpa : non-oil product .; Db : dummy variable ( Db =0 during 
1970-79 and 1990-2005 ; Db=1 during 1980-89 to indicate the extent of the public sector contribution in 
the economic activity and some tax adjustments have occurred ) and (b ^ 0; b ^ 1; b ^ 2) are estimated 
parameters; (t0; t1; t2) calculated t test results; R2: coefficient of determination ; F calculated F test results; 
and DW: calculated Durban Watson test result.;  ( * ) Estimates after treatment of the autocorrelation . 
 
 
The overall conclusion regarding calculations of the income elasticity of tax 
is that system in Libya were not enough flexible to changes in the tax base 
(see section 7.2.1 chapter seven). 
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5.7. Evaluation of Libyan Income Tax system  
Any attempt to develop and reform tax policy in Libya must start from the 
assessment of the tax system and measurement of certain tax indicators such 
as tax burden, taxable capacity and tax effort, and in light of the results of 
these indicators, the process of tax reform can begin. In order to clarify the 
problems of this system, this study must end with an assessment of the tax 
system assessment in Libya. 
 
5.7.1. Introduction. 
  
The evaluation process of any tax system, or one of its basic elements, 
involves a determination of its degree of validity, and a judgment as to 
whether it is successful or not is not an easy matter. Therefore, it is a 
difficult task requiting knowledge, experience and a special capability. This 
process needs broad, profound acquaintance with an important number of 
branches of economic knowledge, full cognisance of the effects of tax on 
individuals, sectors and different economic activities. It also needs a special 
capability to use economic analysis instruments for analysing the 
microeconomic and macroeconomic effects (qualitative, quantitative) 
brought about by taxes on the whole of a society, because the assessment of 
a tax system is an official act of great significance (Crockett, 1955, p. 178).  
The difficulty of evaluation is because the canons used in this process – 
although they are important and necessary to be found in any good taxation 
system – are difficult to be verified in practice. Since some of them are 
qualitative, not quantitative, that is, some of these canons are connected to 
issues and aspects that are difficult to measure and identify, and for which 
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the laboratory is human society with its complex interaction of innumerable 
and often unmeasurable variables (Clark, 1998, p. xi). 
Though the other canons are measurable, their application needs access to a 
wide database about many important variables in economics, such as income 
and its distribution (vertically and horizontally), consumption and its types, 
continuous time chains of prices and wages, and other related variables. It is 
generally known that developing countries, especially Libya, suffer from a 
lack of accurate economic information, and there is often a complete 
absence of information about many economic variables.  
Nevertheless, in the scientific method in evaluation of tax legislation under 
these conditions; two matters are the most important to consider. The first is 
to clarify what the economic, financial, and social objectives are that the 
state desires to achieve using tax policy, by engaging with quantitative 
methods, where and whenever the necessary data are available.  The second 
matter is to verify the accordance of national tax legislation to the rules and 
principles accepted in the most recent thinking on tax.  
5.7.1.1. Role of Tax Policy in Economics. 
Unlike the ancient and Middle Ages, the role of tax is no longer limited to 
financing public expenditure (neutral role of tax). Instead, it has become an 
effective instrument of economic, social and financial policy, which all 
countries in the world use. For example, tax is used as a basic instrument to 
reduce undesirable economic activities or to prevent them, and to direct 
investments to certain areas and activities. Tax is an instrument to treat the 
problem of unemployment and to fight inflation. It is also a means to re-
distribute incomes and wealth to realise justice among a society’s 
individuals.  
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Although there is a very weak tax effort in the developing countries, their 
systems of taxation have objectives that needed to be realised. These 
objectives differ in each developing country, in accordance with: the 
economic system applied; the development phase the economy is in; and the 
abundance of economic resources. Tax systems reflect a broad and 
competing range of goals pursued by the state. Through its system of 
taxation the modern state not only raises revenues and redistributes income, 
but also encourages or discourages secondary goals: it stimulates and 
channels economic growth into certain sectors, and it may penalise 
consumption and channel investment into economic activities it considers 
important to its overall economic and social objectives (Vandewalle, 1998, 
p. 19). 
Generally, although systems of taxation have many objectives and purposes, 
the most important of their objectives in developing countries can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. To provide financial resources for the treasury to expend on 
infrastructure projects,  
2. To redistribute income to realise the principles of social justice. 
3. To limit consumption and encourage savings and investments, 
whereby the role of taxation in the development process is through its 
linkage with savings (Kumar, 1994, p. 52). 
4. To direct a state’s foreign trade in a way that accomplishes external 
equilibrium. In this regard, tax policy can be an important instrument 
to reduce a country’s foreign exchange gap through import tariffs, free 
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trade zones, and incentives for export diversification (Kumar, 1994, p. 
53). 
5.7.1.2 General conditions for any good tax system 
To be appropriate and reasonable, the tax system must be based on a group 
of canons, of which the most important are:  
1. Canon of tax justice: Fairness is the equal treatment of persons in 
equal circumstances. If this condition is violated, people will be 
treated inequitably, and incentives will be created to base economic 
decisions on tax considerations rather than on true economic gain 
(Aaron & Galper, 1985, p. 20). 
This means that the optimum tax system is the one that leads to 
distribution of financial burdens of taxes equally among the society’s 
individuals, and eradicates differences in the distribution of incomes. 
2. Canon of clarity: clear specification of tax elements in terms of their 
base, rate, and time of payment requires the tax legislations to be 
characterised by simplicity and not complexity, so that the individual 
can know the tax amount he/she must pay, and the method and time of 
payment. Where tax complexity leads to noncompliance with the tax 
system, this causes both confusion and a desire to evade taxes (Crane 
& Boaz, 2003, p. 244). 
3. Preserving the efficiency of the market system (tax neutrality): under 
full competition, economic efficiency is realised in aspects of 
production, consumption and allocation of resources through a price-
mechanism. Therefore, types of taxes not affecting the economic 
decisions of individuals and projects must be selected, rather than 
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objective that affect these decisions when the market system fails. A 
neutral tax is a tax which does not lead to a change in relative prices. 
Neutral taxes therefore do not distort the market and are considered to 
be efficient. For example, VAT is a neutral tax, because it raises the 
absolute level of prices rather than relative prices. On the other hand, 
an excise tax on a commodity raises the price of the taxed commodity, 
and distorts consumer choices. Therefore, an excise tax is non-neutral. 
Policy makers may sometimes impose non-neutral taxes to raise 
revenue, for equity considerations, or to achieve other goals besides 
efficient resource allocation (Howard, 2001, p. 160). 
4. Non-conflict within objectives of the tax system: this means that 
accomplishing a certain objective by levying a certain tax must not 
affect negatively the other objectives of society.  For example, use of 
tax exemptions and incentives to increase investments must not lead 
to inequitable distribution of income in society; in addition, it must 
not lead to a decline in tax revenues.  
5. Effectiveness of the taxation system in mobilising possible economic 
surplus: the tax system must be able to increase and consolidate tax 
capacity in the national economy, and guarantee its expansion in order 
to involve incomes and revenues escaped from tax .The government 
should be able to collect enough revenue to carry out its welfare and 
development programmes, without significantly disturbing the 
efficiency of the market system (Howard, 2001, p. 159). 
6. To enable the state to meet its internal and external liabilities without 
causing internal or external pressures.This is very important in small 
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open economies which suffer from cyclical instability as a result of 
crop failures and falling export prices (Howard, 2001, p. 161). 
These are the most important principles and rules on which the design of a 
tax system should be based. Moreover, these canons of those which some or 
all of the tax structure in any country can be evaluated, and by which the 
quality and validity of this system can be judged. Here, it should be noted 
that some of these principles might not harmonise with others; indeed, they 
may contrast with each other. For example, to accomplish justice in the 
distribution of tax burden might require the imposition of several taxes, at 
progressive rates and complex brackets. However, this may lead to an 
increase in tax collection expenses and opposition to principles of neutrality 
and efficiency. Thus, the importance of selection of these taxes appears 
which accomplish the greatest possible number of objectives at the least 
amount of social costs.   
 
5.7.2. Aims of the Libyan Tax System  
Tax legislation is founded on a philosophy that justifies its existence, the 
importance of its implementations and the range of needs it seeks to 
accomplish; the chief of which is usually to treat the social and economic 
problems that appear in a society. 
In Libya, tax law No. 64/1973 was promulgated in accordance with a certain 
philosophy. This philosophy identified the importance of tax law and the 
range of its validity in solving some of the problems (whether economic or 
social) expected to appear in the Libyan society and under the economic, 
social and political relations prevailing in the 1970s. Among the aims 
declared by the constitutional proclamation promulgated in 1969 included 
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the implementation of socialism and its principles, including the 
accomplishment of justice among citizens, justice of income distribution, in 
addition to offering basic services to the citizens, such as health and 
education services, and the other social and economic objectives supposed to 
be reflected in the tax law promulgated in 1973.   
At the time of this law’s promulgation, the economic system in Libya was 
characterised by the existence of only two sectors, which were the private 
and the public. The private sector played a main role in the management of 
economic activity at this period (1970’s); that is, the economic system was 
distinguished by freedom of economic activity and the sovereignty of market 
mechanisms at that period.  
That period was also characterised by an economic boom due to the increase 
of public expenditure on successive economic development plans. However, 
this led to the appearance of some undesirable economic and social 
phenomena, such as the phenomenon of excessive differences in income 
levels. 
 
Under the economic system prevailing at that period, the instrument of 
taxation was adopted to achieve many purposes, such as reform of 
undesirable economic and social phenomena, and financing the 
administrative budget by non-oil revenues.   
It is possible to conclude therefore, that the limitation of inequality of 
income distribution and seeking to realise social justice (horizontal and 
vertical) among society’s individuals were a basic objective of the fiscal 
policy objectives of the state. 
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5.7.2.1. Libyan Tax Law Structure 
Prior to the harmonisation of tax law in Libya, different items of tax 
legislation were applied simultaneously. In the west of Libya, a law 
promulgated in 1923 was applied, whereas in the east of Libya, a law 
promulgated in 1952 was applied. For the south of Libya, a tax law 
promulgated in 1953 was applied. Then, tax law No. 21 of the year 1968 was 
promulgated, which was considered the first unified (common) tax 
legislation in Libya.   
In the first half of 1970s, many items of tax legislation were promulgated. 
The most important one of them was Law No. 64/1973 relating to tax on 
income. This law was one of the reform policies the government carried out 
to treat the inequality phenomenon in incomes. Re-distribution of incomes 
was the main aim of this law. Law No. 64/1973 is considered an extension 
of the previous tax law No. 21/1968. Some of the structural characteristics of 
Law No. 64/1973 are mentioned as follows: 
1. Consistency of tax structure: Law No. 64/1973 did not change the tax 
structure that prevailed pursuant to the previous tax law No. 21/1968, 
where the said law has differentiated between types of economic 
activities and different income resources. It levied specific taxes 
according to type of activity or income realised. This law subjected 
each type of incomes to an independent tax taking into account the 
nature and resource of income gained. It also levied another tax, which 
was a general tax on income; its base consisted of a combination of 
different specific tax bases.  
2. Articles of Law No. 64/1973 were similar to the articles of previous 
tax law No. 21/1968, excluding four articles (cancelled), along with 
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the addition of new eight articles, and the amendment of thirty-six (36) 
articles of the same. Tax on bank deposits was also levied, which was 
a new tax not included in the previous law No. 21/1968.  
3. Law No. 64/1973 depended on progression in specific tax rates, 
excluding tax on external incomes, tax on bank deposit benefits, and 
tax on agricultural income. 
4. For exemption of minimisation of living costs, Law No. 64/1973 
included the same exemptions determined in the cancelled Law No. 
21/1968. Nevertheless, the new law increased the exemption limit to 
LYD900 annually per married person who did not support children.  
 
5.7.2.2 Principles and Canons of the Evaluation of Taxes on Income 
System. 
The evaluation of taxes on income will be based on the following two 
canons: 
a) Canon of realisation of law objectives will be based on the following two 
aims: 
 - Tax justice. 
 - Increase of tax yield (financing). 
b) Canon of tax law; to be subject to the rules and principles of modern tax 
thought, the following will be discussed: 
- Tax generality. 
- Double taxation. 
- Problem of inflation. 
- Problem of incentives. 
220 
 
 
5.7.2.3 Tax system and accomplishment of objectives 
1- Tax justice: here, two issues should be distinguished: 
− The first is tax justice itself in terms of its financial burden on 
taxpayers (individuals). Here, justice is to be achieved horizontally 
and vertically. 
− The second is justice of income distribution as an aim the state seeks 
to achieve, using taxation as an instrument of general economic 
policy.  
In both cases, it is thought that there was a deficiency in the Libyan tax 
system, even if it was difficult to prove the second issue and verify it since 
the necessary data and information are not available.  
 
5.7.2.3.1 Justice of Distribution of Financial Burdens. 
Justice is a relative concept that varies with a difference of time and place, 
and changes when economic, political and social positions alter. However, 
ultimately, it means distribution of tax burdens among society’s individuals 
fairly, so that everyone's contribution to the public financial burdens can be 
compatible with his/her ability of payment (ability-to-pay principle of 
taxation); the most common notion of tax equity is the "ability to pay" which 
prescribes that the tax burden should vary directly with an individual's 
wealth or income (Mattoon &Testa, 2007). 
Generally, tax justice imposes certain conditions the a tax should have, 
including tax generality, distribution among individuals of sacrifice due to 
tax, consideration of the financial ability and personal circumstances of the 
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taxpayer.     
To attain tax justice in modern financial thinking, there are many common 
methods, such as:  
− Distinction in tax rates according to income sources of individuals, 
− Implementation of progression method in tax rates, and, 
− Grant of some tax exemptions and reductions in consideration of 
personal and social estimations of taxpayers. 
Theoretically, the Libyan tax system aimed to achieve the realisation of tax 
justice.  Evidence for that is as follows: 
− Imposition of a system of specific taxes, 
− Distinction among tax rates according to income sources of 
individuals, 
− Most tax rates being progressive rates, and, 
− Grant of tax exemptions considering the minimisation of living costs. 
Yet, was the objective of tax justice actually realised? 
This question can be answered through reviewing two basic indicators:  
actual tax rates, and tax exemptions.  
 
5.7.2.3.1.1 Actual Tax Rates: 
Based on what has been previously mentioned, the order of tax rates must be 
progressive for the types of taxes according to tax rate and income source, as 
follows: 
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Table 5.23 Tax type according to tax rate and income sources 
Type of Tax Source of Income Order According to Tax Rate 
- Tax on real estate incomes 
- Tax on bank deposit 
Only capital 4 
- Tax on the income of trade, industry and crafts Capital and work 3 
- Tax on the free professions income Capital and work 2 
- Tax on salaries and wages Work only 1 
The table was prepared by the researcher. 
In other words, tax rates on real estate incomes and tax on bank deposits 
should be the highest rates of specific taxes, followed by tax rates on the 
income of trade, industry and crafts, followed by tax rates on the free 
professions' incomes, and at the bottom of the list come tax on salaries and 
wages. 
Although marginal tax rates indicate the realisation of vertical justice, 
horizontal justice was not achieved under this law. To underline this fact, the 
following notes are provided from table 5.2: 
a. Although the tax system attempted to distinguish between work 
income and the other incomes by imposing low marginal rates of tax 
on salaries and wages, these rates increased until the tax rate of 
salaries and wages became greater than the rest of the other tax types. 
b. Differences among the actual rates of different taxes were often slight.  
c.  Beginning with the fifth bracket of income, it is seen that actual rates 
of tax on real estate income (its income source is only capital) were 
less than tax rate on the income of trade and industry and crafts and 
tax on the free professions income (their income source is work and 
capital together). 
d. According to the Tax Law No. 23 of 1996, tax rates were increased, 
and the number of income brackets of some specific taxes was 
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decreased. However, it did not amend any of taxes on work incomes 
like tax on wages and salaries. 
Table 5.24  Actual rates of income taxes according to tax law 64/1973  
*Adjusted 
income 
brackets 
before 
exemption  
Tax on salaries 
& wages 
Tax on the free 
professions 
income 
Tax on the income 
of trade & 
industry and crafts 
Tax on real 
estate incomes 
rate 
% 
*yield 
rate 
% 
*yield 
rate 
% 
*yield 
rate 
% 
*yield 
1000 0.8 8 1.5 15 1.5 15 1.5 15 
2000 4.4 88 8.5 165 8.5 165 8.5 165 
3000 5.8 174 10.5 315 10.5 315 10.5 315 
4000 7 279 11.6 465 11.6 465 11.6 465 
5000 10.3 514.7 13.5 675.3 14.3 715.3 13.5 672.8 
6000 13.4 804.9 16.3 978.3 17.3 1035.3 15.8 950.3 
7000 16.1 1124.9 18.3 1281.3 19.4 1355.3 18.1 1270.3 
8000 18.3 1466.2 19.8 1584.3 20.9 1675.3 19.9 1590.3 
9000 21.1 1901.8 21.9 1968.5 23.2 2086.3 21.9 1973.8 
10000 23.9 2391.8 23.7 2368.5 25.2 2523.8 23.7 2373.8 
11000 26.4 2904.3 25.2 2768.5 26.9 2961.3 25.2 2773.8 
12000 28.5 3416.8 26.4 3168.5 28.3 3398.8 26.8 3211.3 
13000 30.2 3929.3 27.7 3606 29.8 3873.8 28.1 3648.8 
14000 31.7 4441.8 28.9 4043.5 31.1 4348.8 29.2 4086.3 
15000 33 4954.3 30.1 4510.2 32.2 4823.8 30.3 4547.3 
16000 34.4 5497.9 31.7 5022.7 33.5 5352.3 32.8 5254.8 
17000 35.7 6075.4 32.9 5600.2 34.7 5897.3 33.9 5767.3 
18000 36.9 6649.6 34.3 6177.7 35.8 6442.3 34.9 6279.8 
19000 38.1 7230.4 35.6 6755.2 36.8 6987.3 35.7 6792.3 
20000 39 7807.9 36.7 7332.7 37.7 7532.3 36.5 7304.8 
( * ) in Libyan dinars .        
Estimated numbers         
Adjusted income values are taxable income.      
The tax rates are rates of the specific tax before the adjustment, also rates of the general tax on income. 
Source: Elfatori, Atia; tax system in Libya – Part one ; Academy of Graduate studies, Tripoli , 2003. 
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Table 5.24  Actual rates of specific income taxes according to tax laws 64/1973 and 
23/1996 
* 
Income 
brackets 
Tax on 
salaries&wages 
Tax on the free 
professions 
income 
Tax on the 
income of 
trade&industry 
and crafts 
Tax on real estate 
incomes 
rate % *yield rate % *yield rate % *yield rate % *yield 
2000 4.4 88 11 220 11 220 8.5 165 
4000 7 279 15.5 620 15.5 620 11.6 465 
6000 9.9 594 17 1020 17 1020 12.8 765 
8000 14.6 1166.2 18.8 1507 18.8 1507 15.7 1252 
10000 19.5 1950.7 23.9 2865 21.5 2147 18.9 1892 
12000 24.3 2916.8 23.9 2885 23.9 2885 22.3 2681.3 
14000 28.2 3941.8 26.2 3685 27.1 3788.8 25.4 3556.3 
16000 31 4966.8 27.9 4465 30.1 4813.8 27.7 4431.3 
18000 33.3 5991.8 30.2 5430.3 32.4 5838.8 29.8 5358.8 
20000 35.5 7107.9 32.9 6585.3 34.9 6975.3 31.9 6383.8 
( * ) in Libyan dinars . 
Estimated numbers       
Adjusted income values are taxable income. 
The tax rates are rates of the specific tax according to tax laws 64/1973 and 23/1996  
Source: Elfatori, Atia; tax system in Libya – Part one; Academy of Graduate studies, Tripoli , 2003.  
 
Reviewing the figures of table 5.25 and beginning with income bracket of 
LYD12000, it is clearly seen that the actual tax rate on work income (24.3%) 
is greater than the rate other specific taxes (23.9% for free professions 
income; 23.9% for income of trade & industry and crafts; 22.3% for real 
estate incomes) indicating injustice among income sources. So a solution to 
this problem should be found, especially in periods of inflation, due to the 
following causes:  
1. It is difficult to evade tax from work on income or avoid it, since it is 
deducted at source; that is, payment of this tax is at or before receiving 
income. Therefore, the taxpayer bears the complete burden of this tax. 
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2. As for other types of income, tax is often collected by taxpayers' 
returns, which means the following: 
− Possibility of tax evasion or avoidance, 
− Taxpayer does not pay tax except after receiving their income, 
whereby taxpayers pays their tax in the year following receipt of their 
income, and, 
− Possibility of negotiation with tax authority to pay tax by instalments 
convenient to taxpayer. 
In brief, it can be said that the most important conclusion in this stage is that 
although, theoretically, the tax system targeted the realisation of horizontal 
justice, this objective was not accomplished in practice. 
 
 
5.7.2.3.1.2 Tax Exemptions: 
As for tax exemptions for living costs, the tax system includes the following: 
1. Deduction of exemption limits from the first bracket of income results 
in an indirect increase in the actual tax rate, 
2. The objective of exemption is not achieved completely because tax 
exemption limits are subjected to additional taxes such as tax on jihad, 
general tax on income and contribution (sharing) in companies … etc., 
in other words, though exemption limits are tax income exempt, they 
are not exempt from other additional taxes. 
3. In the case of a multiplicity of income sources, there is complexity in 
the calculation of the tax exemption amount, as the exemption is 
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deducted from the lowest tax rate. This procedure is complex due to 
the difficulty of determining the lowest tax rate under a progressive 
tax system. 
4. Tax exemption did not accurately distinguish among social 
dependency support-levels (such as number of children, support of 
minors, support of parents, etc), which are important aspects in the 
Libyan society. 
5. The exemption limits have been constant or quasi-constant since 1962, 
and they have not been linked to inflation rates, and therefore they 
have not changed according to the economic and social development. 
 
5.7.2.3.2 Tax System and the Objective of Income Re-distribution: 
Taxation can enable government to stabilise the economy and adjust income 
distribution (Howard, 2001, p. 166). Furthermore, the state was not able to 
find an instrument to amend income distribution other than tax policy for the 
following reasons: 
First: The dominant situation of income distribution indicates clear, 
remarkable difference in levels of incomes. This breaks the principle of 
social justice. 
Second: this difference in levels of incomes was the result of free interaction 
of demand and supply powers in goods and services markets and markets of 
production elements.  
During the 1970s, business economics was dominant. The private sector 
dominated economic activity. There was a worry that the upturn and then 
boom in the Libyan economy was passing because the public expenditure 
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programmes on successive development plans were expected to bring about 
a vast difference in distribution of incomes among society’s individuals. A 
justification of this worry was that the expenditure on development was 
tremendous and the economy was growing rapidly. Therefore, the state 
could not affect that economy except by taxes.   
In the beginning of the 1980s and implementation of an economic system 
based on socialism (Kamoche et al., 2003), the economic conditions and 
social system changed. Roles carried out by both public and private sectors 
were exchanged. The role of the private sector receded, and it had no longer 
a dominant part in driving economic activity. The public sector totally 
dominated most economic activities, having the principal role in bringing 
about production and generating income. . The public sector has always been 
the main source of investment in Libya (Abidar & Laytimi, 2005). Thus, the 
economy depended on planning and orientation. 
Accordingly, the economic position in Libya indicated a set of important 
facts to be considered with regard to using the tax system as an 
instrument to redistribute income. Some facts important to note are as 
follows: 
1. No studies about distribution of national income are available that 
base their distribution of income on an evaluation of how tax can be 
amended to orientate it to achieve the state’s objectives. 
2. As long as the public sector has dominated the greatest part of the 
national income, it is responsible for distribution of this income 
according to the requirements of economic and social development, 
and investment policies.  
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3. Through expenditure programmes, the state alone can directly 
orientate the income and distribute it in the way realising the principle 
of social justice. This is due to the practice of the private sector of 
economic activities (services or goods) by the administrative budget 
or the transfer budget.  
4. At the end of the 1980s, although the private sector was encouraged to 
resume its main role in economic activity (some laws were 
promulgated in that concern), the public sector still in practice 
dominated economic life, and the state still depended on the method 
of direct interference in economic affairs. Since the socialist 
government took over, private sector investments decreased from 
about 30%  in 1970 to 10 % in 1990 , and State investments increased 
from about 70% to 90% by 1990 (Abidar & Laytimi, 2005).  
Therefore, it can be said that there was no justification for using tax policy 
as an instrument to redistribute income under these conditions: the greatest 
part of economic activity and income were continuously dominated by the 
public sector. The income redistribution achieved in the Libyan economy did 
not result from this tax system. In fact it resulted from a policy of socialist 
implementation started from the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 
1980s, whereby income and wealth were redistributed by the direct 
interference of the state represented in nationalisation and the conveyance of 
ownership to the public sector, for example.  
 
5.7.2.3.3 Tax System and Financing Objective (Financial): 
Although tax policy is an important and necessary ingredient for 
development finance (Kumar, 1994, p. 53), the objectives of tax systems in 
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developing countries are different from developed countries, which apply a 
market mechanism in their economic administration. The objectives of tax 
systems in developed countries is to accomplish short-term economic goals 
such as limitation to trade cycles, achievement of economic stability and 
elimination of unemployment, whereas the objective of a tax system in 
developing countries is to accomplish long-term objectives, such as 
development and economic growth. 
In addition to that, objectives of systems of taxation differ among 
developing countries according to economic systems and situations, and the 
financial resources available in each country. In general, the objective of a 
tax system in most developing countries is to realise as many financial 
outcomes as possible, because of the scarcity of capital and the shortage of 
financial resources in most developing countries (especially non-oil 
producing ones). 
The financing (financial) objective of the systems of taxation in the oil states 
was not important, especially in the 1970s, because these countries had huge 
financial surpluses due to high oil prices at that period, so their systems of 
taxation focused on economic and social objectives. However, these 
countries, including Libya, witnessed a sharp deterioration in their oil 
revenue during the 1980s, so they resorted to taxes to solve some of their 
financial problems and the financing (financial) objective became important 
in their systems of taxation. 
Regarding the role of the tax system in achieving tax revenues in Libya, the 
following points can be noted: 
1. In general, taxes on income represent a relative importance in terms of 
the yield (revenues) in the tax system in Libya. Despite the fluctuation of 
such percentage (up and down) from year to year during the period of 
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study, the percentage increased from 19% of the total tax revenues in 
1973 to 53% in 1994, and then declined to 34% in 2005 (see table 24). It 
should also be noted that most taxes on income were the tax on incomes 
of individuals and tax on income of companies (see table 21). 
2. The base of tax on income became narrower and declined in Libya for the 
following reasons: 
a) The role of the private sector in economic activity was reduced 
(declined) and some tax bases disappeared, because of the application 
of the socialist system in the 1980s. The activities practiced by the 
private sector were the main base for the application of taxation. 
Therefore, in the absence of the private sector, tax becomes merely a 
deduction of public funds and to transfer (convey) to other public 
funds. 
Table 21 assures the validity of this observation. Specific tax on the 
income of trade, industry and crafts, tax on real estate, tax on 
agriculture, tax on bank deposits, and tax on external incomes 
contributed small amounts compared to the revenues of taxes on 
income, due to the disappearance of their bases. It is also thought that 
the most important two taxes were tax on wages and salaries, and tax 
on companies. Here, it should be noted that the source of wages and 
salaries was the public sector. As for corporate tax, it could be argued 
that there were no private companies during the 1980s, and then their 
presence grew though remained very limited in the 1990s. 
b)  The phenomenon of tax evasion in Libya spread for several reasons, 
such as lack of awareness of taxation, lack of conviction to pay a tax, 
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failure to regulate economic activity, lack of efficiency of tax 
administration, multiple types of taxes and their high rates. 
c)  Non-generality of tax: many economic activities are not subject to tax, 
such as commercial transactions in the informal markets, as well as 
economic activities of the workers and foreign businesspersons. 
3.  All types of taxes in Libya are progressive in terms of their bases; their 
yield depends on the rate and on the base. In the case of taxes with fixed 
tax rates, the increase in their yield is due to the growth of their tax base. 
4.  Because there is an inverse relationship between a tax rate and its yield, 
there is overestimation (excess) in increasing tax rates in Libya, which 
negatively affects tax yield, especially under the implementation of the 
progressive tax system.  
5. The nature of the tax system, the diversity of its taxes, its multiple and 
progressive tax rates all lead to many difficulties in application. Therefore, 
greater simplicity of tax systems in terms of selecting the appropriate type 
and the appropriate rate would lead to an increase in tax productivity. 
 
5.7.2.4 Extent that the Tax system is Subject to General Principles and 
Rules of Tax Imposition. 
5.7.2.4.1 Tax Generality. 
Theoretically, tax generality means its imposition on all individuals, wealth, 
and incomes realised in society, without exception. The justification of this 
principle is that for the state to be able to carry out its commitments and 
offer its services to all individuals of society, it uses taxation as an 
instrument to distribute the financial burdens of these commitments among 
all individuals equitably.  
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Accordingly, tax as per this principle should be general, to which all 
individuals, income sources and wealth are to be subjected. That is, tax 
should not be imposed on certain people or classes, with other people and 
classes being exempt. Similarly, it should not be imposed on certain types of 
income, while excluding others, since this breaks the principle of tax 
generality.  
In practice, the principle of tax generality is not an absolute one in modern 
systems of taxation. Nevertheless, there are some tax exemptions for some 
individuals and classes, or some income sources, for economic, social and 
human reasons or regulatory ones (such as prevention of double taxation).   
In theory, the Libyan tax system considers the principle of tax generality as 
other countries do. However, the evidence is that taxes are diverse and 
numerous in the Libyan tax structure, and this has allowed some exceptions 
provided there has been the promulgation of a legal provision.  
In practice a clear breach of the principle of tax generality is found where 
many economic activities are not subject to taxation, though they realise 
high revenues, examples of that are as follows: 
a) Most commercial activities practiced by citizens are unorganised and 
difficult to subject to taxation (to be taxable) for many reasons: these 
projects are hidden, and conducted without licenses, or these projects 
do not keep registers or accounting books.  
b) Commercial activities practiced by non-Libyan individuals from Arab 
countries. These activities evade taxes in two stages: 
1. Tax on imports is not paid, because the goods this class trades in 
do not pay tax on entering the state.  
233 
 
2. Tax on commercial profits realised in Libya is not paid. 
c) Brokering activities, speculation in real estate and second-hand goods 
are not subject to tax, although these activities are not recognised. 
Nevertheless, they are widely practiced in practice, realising incomes for 
their respective owners. They are not taxable. 
d) Informal foreign workers entering Libya illegally, even though they 
earn high incomes, are not subject to tax. 
 
All this suggest a conclusion that there is a deficiency in the Libyan tax 
system in terms of the principle of tax generality. The class most subject to 
tax is the class of employees in the public sector, where tax is deducted at 
source of income, while there are other sources of income not subject to tax. 
 
5.7.2.4.2 Double Taxation: 
Double taxation means imposition of the same tax more than once on the 
same taxpayer, and on the same tax base during the same period.  
Conditions of double taxation can be explained from the previous definition 
as follows: 
a) Taxes levied are of the same type or at least similar, 
b) Repeated taxes are imposed on the same tax base (money), 
c) Repeated taxes are imposed on the same taxpayer, and 
d) Taxes are imposed within the same period. 
In this sense, double taxation is an undesirable phenomenon because it leads 
to deterioration of the financial capacity of the taxpayer, because of 
recurring (double) payment of tax. This is a breach of the principles of tax 
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justice, so double taxation must be avoided in order to achieve equality of 
tax sacrifice among taxpayers. The Libyan tax system suffers from the 
problem of double taxation. 
 
 
5.7.2.4.3 Tax System and Inflation Problem. 
Most countries do not adjust their tax systems for inflation, or do so only 
partially. When inflation reaches significant levels, however, its effects on 
the tax system cannot be ignored. The best remedy is to bring inflation under 
control; when this is not possible, it is often desirable to adjust the tax 
system to inflation in some manner (Thuronyi, 1996, p .1). 
Therefore, the tax systems in general and progressive income taxes in 
particular need to be periodically reviewed, in order to cope with inflation 
rates. Inflation affects the financial situations of the taxpayer through two 
elements of tax: the tax rate and tax base. 
Briefly, the most important problems resulting from inflation are explained 
through their effect on tax rate and tax base: 
5.7.2.4.3.1 Tax Rates. 
If a system of progressive taxation is applied in times of inflation, the rise in 
prices is found to lead to rise in nominal (monetary) income of the taxpayer. 
In addition, if a system of progressive taxation is applied, this leads to a high 
tax rate imposed on the taxpayer (although their real income did not rise) 
and because the tax rate rises with the rise in nominal income, every time a 
tax law contains an amount expressed in national currency, the value of this 
amount is eroded by inflation (Thuronyi, 1996, p. 2). If the tax system deals 
with the actual value of the tax base (real income), the effects of inflation are 
controlled. 
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5.7.2.4.3.2 Tax Base. 
Inflation has its effects on the tax base or so-called taxable income through a 
variety of aspects, such as: the limits of tax exemption, the impact on 
amortization instalments, real assets, and the impact on debt. That is briefly 
explained as follows: 
 
a. Effect on Limits of Tax Exemption: 
In the tax system, when the tax exemptions are of a fixed amount or with 
fixed maximum limits, such exemptions are effectively meaningless in terms 
of both economic and social aspects in the case of inflation, because the rise 
in prices leads to a rise in costs of living. 
Therefore, the limits of tax exemption must be linked to the prevailing costs 
of living, and it is necessary to modify the limits of tax exemptions in times 
of inflation to suit the economic and social situations. Moreover, such 
amendments cannot be carried out only if the tax system is characterised by 
sufficient flexibility. 
 
b. Effect on Amortization Instalments:  
This effect is found clearly in the case of income tax, especially in the tax on 
company income. Inflation results in a rise of amortization instalments 
(market prices), which negatively affects the exemption of amortization 
instalments. 
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c. Effect on Real Assets : 
An increase in prices leads to an increase in the nominal value of the fixed 
real assets. In this case, there will be capital gains, nominal and not real. 
Moreover, as long as the taxable capacity should be measured in real value, 
not in a monetary one, so taxes should not be imposed on these profits, 
because the inflation tax causes a reduction in real money balances and 
penalises fixed income groups (Howard, 2001, p.126). 
 
d. Effect on Indebtedness:  
A rise in prices leads to a decline of the real value of debts, and this means 
achieving real profits for the debtor and real losses for the creditor. 
-The above-mentioned problems have not been taken into account by the tax 
system in Libya, so it is necessary to focus on them when conducting any 
programme of tax reform. 
 
5.7.2.2.4 Tax System and Tax Incentives. 
Tax is one of the most important instruments many countries use (especially 
capitalist countries) to increase the rate of economic growth. Tax may lead 
to a slow-down of economic growth if it is levied at very high rates. On the 
other hand, it may lead to increases in economic growth by encouraging 
saving, investment and production. Briefly, this can be explained as follows: 
a) Investment Incentives 
Income tax plays an important role in determining the supply of liquid 
money required by economic projects of various sizes. For example, the net 
income of companies will be reduced if the corporate tax burden is high, and 
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this leads to weakness in the ability of these companies to invest. Therefore, 
most countries seek to mitigate the negative effects of income taxes on 
economic growth, by providing some tax incentives that encourages 
investment. 
Of the most important types of tax incentives are credit deduction of tax for 
investment, the ability to carry losses forward and back, tax exemptions for a 
certain period (tax holiday), the tax treatment of small industries, and the tax 
treatment of depreciation allowances, as well as others. 
Regarding Libya, although economic growth has always been one of the 
main objectives of the state for its successive development plans, the tax 
system is totally devoid of any kind of exemptions that encourage 
investment, except for carrying losses forward. 
As long as there is a call for encouraging the private sector in the economic 
aspect, the best way is tax incentives. This is a strong justification to amend 
the system of tax on income, and provide some incentives to both encourage 
the Libyan investor, and attract foreign investors. 
b) Saving Incentives: 
Taxation constitutes an involuntary saving by taxpayers, which is diverted to 
the government for use in resource allocation (Howard, 1992, p.109). 
For that reason, tax can be used to encourage saving through exempting 
individual with savings earnings in the form of interest from taxes (or 
reducing tax rates on them), in addition to the encouragement of establishing 
private savings organisations and exemption of their interest from taxes. 
By reviewing the tax legislations applied in Libya, it can be concluded that 
tax policy has targeted the encouragement of saving, since it levies a fixed 
tax rate on the savings of individuals in banks. 
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c) Production Incentives 
The tax system in Libya does not include actual incentives for work and 
production since it is a progressive tax, which does not encourage an 
increase of work hours. Thus, this tax has led to a downsizing of additional 
income earned. 
Based on what mentioned above, it can be said that although tax incentives 
in any tax system allow it to have flexibility, making tax an effective 
instrument to direct economic activity towards desirable goals, the Libyan 
tax law No. 64 of 1973 often lacks incentives to encourage saving, 
investment and production. 
 
5.7.3 Conclusion. 
The tax system in Libya was subjected to the law of tax on income No. 
64/1973 for a long time (1973 – 2005), over a period in which many 
economic and social changes occurred; it is therefore a suitable period to 
evaluate this law through practical application. The following point can be 
explained based on what was previously mentioned: 
1. The tax law did not realise the objectives for which it was 
promulgated. It has been shown that it is unjust in equalising its 
financial burdens, through which equitable distribution of income 
cannot be achieved. Moreover, it did not bring about a remarkable 
increase in tax yield. 
2. The tax law does not agree with the basic principles of tax imposition 
in that it lacks neutrality and efficiency.  
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3. This law has some drawbacks and problems, such as the problem of 
non-generality, double taxation, problem of inflation and lack of tax 
incentives. 
_________ 
The success of any tax system depends on the possibility of its application. 
The tax system can only be applied if it is convenient and appropriate for the 
economy. 
To adhere to the principle of convenience of the tax system, a group of 
important factors should be taken into account when designing and 
determining the structure of the tax system. The success of any state in 
choosing the appropriate tax system depends on it having full knowledge of 
the following aspects: the ideology of society, the reality of the prevailing 
economic system, its institutions and laws, the nature of economic relations, 
the method of managing the economy, the economic, social and political 
situation in the society, the stage of development in the country and the 
degree of its growth, in addition to the objectives of the tax system. 
In addition, the choice of a good tax system requires a deep understanding of 
scientific foundations and technical methods of tax system design, and 
conscious knowledge of the practical possibilities available, which reflects 
the quality and efficiency of the legislative power, the judicial power, 
taxpayer, and tax administration. 
Despite the similarity of economic objectives among developed countries 
and developing countries, such as the objective of the satisfaction of public 
needs, achievement of development and stability, equitable distribution, this 
does not mean that there is a similarity of the tax systems among these 
countries, since there are differences in ideologies, regimes, economic and 
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social systems, economic structures and situations, culture, customs and 
traditions, levels of awareness and education, and levels of economic 
progress. 
In order to design the optimal tax system for a society, such a system must 
reflect the economic, political and social prevailing conditions in this 
society. 
Most of the tax laws constituting the current structure of the Libyan tax 
system were promulgated in the early 1970s, and the establishment of the 
Libyan tax system was completed by the promulgation of two of the most 
important tax laws, namely the Income Tax Law No. 64 of 1973, and the 
Stamp Tax Law No. 65 of 1973. 
Some major justifications for the tax system at that time were as follows: 
1. The Libyan economy was based on a business economics system, 
which allows the private sector to engage in various economic 
activities. 
2. Wealth was accumulated and there was a great disparity in incomes 
among segments of society, due to rises in oil prices and an increase 
in the volume of public expenditure. 
3. There was a desire to adopt socialism.  
Tax Law No. 64/1973 was prevalent for a long time (more than three 
decades), during which the Libyan society witnessed many fundamental 
changes in economic, social, political and administrative structure. 
Therefore, all the financial legislation that makes up the tax structure of the 
state must be reviewed and evaluated in order to recognise the convenience 
of such legislations for developments that have taken place in society. 
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5.7.4 Resources of Financing the Public Budget. 
Resources of financing the public budget in the Libyan economy are formed 
as follows: 
 
5.7.4.1 Revenues of Natural Resources Owned by Society. 
In accordance with current legislation, the society has two types of natural 
resources: 
a. Renewable resources, such as: agriculture, marine resources, and real 
estate leased. 
b. Exhaustible (depletable) resources: such as oil, iron, and cement. 
5.7.4.2 Return on Capital Invested in Society. 
In the 1980s, the state intervened in all branches of economic activity. The 
state had the sole right to practice economic activity (with some exceptions). 
The state nationalised the economic activity of the private sector, and 
directly invested in all areas of production and service (in addition to its 
traditional tasks). 
Since the public sector now carried out the roles performed previously by 
the private sector, it had a key role in the production process. So the public 
sector became the main financier of the public budget. State intervention in 
this way replaced the two basic elements in the production process (capital, 
organisation). The state was the owner of the capital employed, and at the 
same time, the state acted as an organiser in the production process. 
Therefore, the public sector was chiefly responsible for financing the public 
budget, so this sector had to provide three types of resources: 
242 
 
It can be said that public sector projects were supposed to provide the public 
treasury with important resources, which were the following:  
1. Return (share) on capital in the production process, 
2. Profit (return on organisation), only if the principle of profit-
realisation in these institutions (or not to sell at cost) were applied, 
and 
3. Income tax, if imposed on this sector. 
Therefore, the Libyan society relied heavily on the public sector in providing 
the funds necessary to finance public expenditures, because the private 
sector role was reduced in the size and scope of its economic activity, and its 
taxable capacity became insufficient to finance the increased expenditures of 
the state. 
 
5.7.4.3 Tax Revenues. 
Under the new reforms (after 1988), the private sector was allowed to play a 
greater role in economic activity, and taxes (direct or indirect) and fees 
became a significant source of financing the public budget. However, when 
taxes are used to achieve the financial (financing) targets, the terms and rules 
of the good tax system must be taken into account. 
 
5.7.5 Economic Policy 
When tracing the developments in the economic environment in Libya over 
the past years, no economic policy, declared with clearly defined objectives 
and means, is found: This is due to the ambiguity of many important issues 
and matters concerning the Libyan economy. They are, for example, the 
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nature of the economic system in force over the study period (or intended to 
be applied), the extent and limits of the state's role in economic activity, 
prevailing legislation, the basic features of economic activities allowed to be 
practiced, the movement of production elements, and other important 
aspects, which contribute towards the whole form structure of the system. 
Since these issues are important in determining the economic policy and its 
methods, they must be clearly disclosed and declared without hesitation. The 
ambiguity and hesitation on these issues had serious negative impacts on the 
economic situation, and its economic cost was high. 
The economic reform that emerged after 1988 was accepted, which gave a 
greater and more distinct role to the private sector in investment and 
production, this meant the need to reduce the activity of the state and reduce 
its monopoly over the means of production. However, the exodus of the state 
from economic activity quickly and suddenly without an orderly 
arrangement had a serious and negative impact on many economic aspects of 
the lives of Libyan citizens. It was wrong for the state, which had been 
everything in the economy, suddenly to give up everything. Therefore, in the 
medium term, the state should remain responsible for achieving a set of 
main, public objectives in the economic aspect, including: 
1. To ensure the optimal use of economic resources, 
2. To ensure equity in income distribution, 
3. To create an appropriate economic environment, which encourages 
individuals and private institutions, especially in production and 
investment, 
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4. To achieve balanced, sustainable economic development to ensure the 
individual an advanced level of economic welfare, and 
5. To fill the economic gap that appears because of the failure of the private 
sector to perform certain basic services to satisfy the public needs. 
For the economic role of the state, the change was in how to access general 
economic objectives, and in the means to manage the economy in order to 
achieve these goals. It was intended that such objectives be achieved through 
oversight rather than direct ownership of the means of production and 
production units, and the monopoly of some important economic activities 
such as trade, banks, and following the method of direct intervention in the 
exercise of economic policy. Libya showed all characteristics of a centrally 
guided, distributive economy. The government's intervention in the economy 
was extensive, both in a direct and an indirect way. The state dominated all 
manufacturing, agriculture, foreign and domestic retail trade, and owned all 
banking, insurance, and other major services (Layachi, 1998). 
It may be a necessity of the next phase that the state uses a method of 
indicative planning in setting up its economic policy. This method relies on 
the traditional instruments of economic policy and its impact on market 
indicators to direct economic activity. Therefore, the economic policy during 
the coming period should target achieving the following objectives: 
1. To encourage individual initiative and support of various private 
sector institutions in the field of productive investment, supporting the 
rates of growth and development, 
2. To broaden the base of private property, 
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3. To rationalise costs and increase operational efficiency in productive 
units, 
4. To protect domestic industries in a manner ensuring their 
development, and then enabling them to compete, 
5. To help the rule of competition in domestic markets and price 
stability, 
6. To mobilise national savings, and 
7. To rationalise public expenditure and improve the methods of 
collection of the state’s revenues. 
The success of the new economic reforms in achieving the above objectives 
requires that the state adopts economic policies (fiscal, monetary, 
commercial) that are based on business economics and market indicators, 
along with the need to integrate these policies in directing the economic 
activities. 
Concerning the application of fiscal policy, its instruments (public 
expenditure and taxation) must be used in directing economic activities. 
 
5.7.5.1 Openness of Libyan Economy. 
The Libyan economy is characterised by a high degree of openness to the 
outside world, and this is illustrated by the data contained in tables 1 and 45. 
The percentage of total foreign trade to GDP varied between 41% - 87% 
during the period 1970-2005, while the percentage of imports to GDP 
ranged between 15% - 36 during the same period. These rates are very high 
when compared with those in many developing countries. It should be noted 
that the degree of openness of the Libyan economy to the outside world is 
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primarily concentrated on the flow of commodity foreign trade and not on 
the side of the flow of capitals. Some characteristics of Libyan foreign trade 
are as follows: 
1) Crude oil forms a high proportion of total Libyan exports, 
2) A large proportion of Libyan imports are either food or raw materials 
(production requirements), or equipment and machinery required by 
development plans and their various programmes. A large proportion 
of these goods and requirements enjoy customs exemptions. 
3) Other materials or industrial goods were subject to customs duties 
ranging between 32% - 38% during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
4) Most Libyan trade is with Western Europe, South Asia, and most of 
these countries are members of the world trade organization (WTO). 
Commercial exchange with them may require reduction of restrictions 
and customs duties according to the rules and procedures of the WTO. 
5.7.5.2 Structure of the Tax System. 
The Libyan tax structure depends on a system of manifold taxes. It 
comprises several types of tax imposed in different locations of the flow of 
monetary income. There are taxes levied upon receipt of income and others 
levied on expenditure of this income. The Libyan tax system is based on 
both direct and indirect taxes. The direct taxes consist of taxes on income 
and taxes on capital. Income taxes are divided into taxes on income of 
natural persons and taxes on company income. 
Taxes on income of natural persons include several specific taxes and 
general tax on income, in addition to additional taxes such as Jihad tax, tax 
of the Palestinian national fund, stamp tax, support for national companies 
247 
 
tax, and central bank tax. For the taxes on capital, they include the tax on 
vacant (unused) lands, and tax on properties of real estate. 
The Income Tax Law No. 64/1973 is considered the most important tax law 
at all. It represents the main pillar on which the structure of the Libyan tax 
system is based. 
This law was promulgated based on the principle of distinction or 
differentiation among different sources of income. Therefore, the structure 
of income taxes has focused on the imposition of specific taxes according to 
a source of income, in addition to imposing another tax (general tax) on 
gross income realised by an individual from different sources of income 
(after deduction of specific taxes). 
The tax law had allocated provisions relating to each type of specific tax 
quality. It took into account the source of income, whether this source was 
from capital, work or both elements together (work and capital). For 
example, it reduced the tax rate on incomes from sources of work (wages 
and salaries and the like), while it raised the tax rate on incomes from  
sources of capital (real estate and the interests of banks). Since the person 
who receives income from work is often a low-income worker, it is difficult 
to evade tax, or transfer its burden to others. Moreover, such a worker is 
exposed to risks that may outweigh such risks of an investor of capital. 
For the tax rates according to law 64/1973, the following can be noted: 
 
a) Based on the principle of tax personality, the tax system imposed 
progressive tax rates in most specific income taxes, and in the general 
income tax. 
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b) The tax system attempted to distinguish between sources of income in 
its tax treatment, especially when determining nominal (marginal) tax 
rates on specific incomes. 
c) Tax exemptions allowed (cost of living and personal insurance 
premiums) were withheld (deducted) from the first bracket of income, 
then imposed on the amount of income remained after the exemption. 
With regard to indirect taxes, they were divided into: 
1) Taxes on goods, including customs duties, taxes on production and 
consumption, entertainment tax, 
2) Taxes on trading represented in the stamp tax. 
For taxes on commodities, they were subject to a method of price 
differentiation according to the nature of the item, and its importance to the 
consumer. Customs tariff distinguished between essential goods and luxury 
goods, whereby essential commodities were tax exempt, while luxury goods 
were subject to progressive tax rates. 
 
5.7.5.2.1 Tax System and Economic System. 
The prevailing economic system in any country is one of the most important 
factors affecting the tax system in that country. Under a market system 
(capitalism), countries take the philosophy of free enterprise in economic 
terms. They believe in freedom of work, freedom of production, freedom of 
ownership, freedom of choice and the free interaction of demand and supply 
in the market for final products, and services market of production elements, 
in order to resolve economic problem. Here, the private sector practices most 
economic activities, with varying degrees of competition, price mechanisms, 
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and consumer sovereignty. The state neither holds resources nor practices an 
activity to bring returns. 
Under this tax system, taxes occupy a prominent place as an instrument of 
economic policy. In order for the state to perform its functions and achieve 
the objectives of society, it should design a tax system that enables it to do 
so. Its tax structure must contain taxes that provide sufficient revenues, 
achieve the principle of justice, stimulate production and growth, maintain a 
level of decent living for members of society, and maintain the productive 
capacity of its economy. 
In socialist countries, the state owns most elements of production, and 
adopts the method of comprehensive planning to practice economic 
activities efficiently, and achieve the objectives of society. Here, the state 
owns and manages public projects, so it identifies by itself what to produce, 
how to produce, and for whom to produce. The state also pursues a policy of 
income distribution through direct intervention, in order to determine wages 
and the prices of goods and services produced in the public sector. By 
setting a public price, the state can change the volume of the surplus of the 
public sector to finance its public expenditures. 
Theoretically, in the light of this economic system there may be no need to 
use taxes either to finance public expenditure, or to direct the economy or to 
redistribute income. This is because most people's incomes become one of 
the types of public expenditure, while the costs of individuals are a source of 
public revenues. In this case, the state can achieve its objectives without the 
use of tax. 
From this simple comparison between the forms of economic systems and 
their impact on the role of tax, some observations can be made about the role 
of taxation in the Libyan economic system. 
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The Libyan socialist economic system has been in force since the 1980s. The 
state imposed the implementation of socialism, whereby it took control of all 
elements of production in society (except for human effort). In addition, it 
abolished all forms of private property (with some minor exceptions such as 
the ownership of private housing and means of transportation). The state 
practiced all areas of productive activity without exception, leaving no 
significant role to the individual organiser of economic activity. Moreover, it 
closed down all private enterprises, allowing for individual projects that 
relied on human effort, while the vast majority of individuals worked in a 
public capacity in the public sector. As a result, the state adopted the method 
of direct intervention to solve its economic problem. The government took 
certain steps and performed functions such as the task of creating production 
and its distribution through the public project, adopting a policy of incomes 
to determine the salaries and wages in the public sector in accordance with 
Law No. 15 of 1981. It also determined the prices of goods and services 
provided by the public sector, with the obligation to provide all basic 
services free of charge, determined by the size of individual savings. This 
situation continued until 1988. 
This application resulted in a set of situations, which were reflected in the 
tax system, and the most important of them were: 
a) Disappearance of all bases of specific taxes except work income 
(wages and salaries), with multiple sources of income not allowed 
b) Income from work realised through the public sector, and determined 
according to a public policy of income 
c) Restriction and limitation of individual property so as not to become a 
source of individual income 
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d) The most important source of financing the budget, in light of the 
economic system, was supposed to be the operating surplus of the 
public sector 
e) Lack of opportunities for accumulation of wealth by individuals, so 
there was no disparity (difference) in income among individuals, and 
f) The state's reliance on the method of direct intervention in the 
management of the economy, intervening directly in order to direct 
economic activity and income distribution. 
 
This change in the economic system was supposed to lead to changes in the 
tax system in line with the new economic application. Despite the 
disappearance of most sources of individual income such as real estate, 
commercial, industrial, professional activity and the disappearance of 
individual savings (like bases of specific taxes); the state did not adjust the 
tax system. 
The state continued to introduce general income tax (at their progressive 
rates). It was a personal income tax, imposed if there were multiple sources 
of individual income, also imposed to achieve vertical justice in the 
distribution of income. However, this tax (in this case) was not appropriate 
to the economic situation because multiple sources of income were not 
allowed. Therefore, there was no justification for the imposition of this tax. 
Personal income tax revenues constituted a large proportion of the total 
income for income taxes, and this was due to a narrowing of the base of 
income tax for several reasons, including: 
1. Disappearance of bases of other specific income taxes, 
2. Decline in company income tax revenues because of: 
252 
 
a. Large tax exemptions granted to firms (especially foreign companies), 
b. Low profits in most public sector companies, and 
3. Spread of tax evasion among taxpayers, and lack of willingness to pay 
tax. 
After 1988, there was a gradual transition towards market economics; the 
country took several measures in order to allow the private sector to practice 
economic activity, but those actions were not sufficient. This meant that the 
state’s policy in this regard was not clear. 
Therefore, if the state wanted to restructure its economy and give a 
significant role for individuals to practice the economic activity, the state 
had to provide the appropriate atmosphere for achieving these objectives. 
This required the state to take a series of practical steps such as: 
1. Clear disclosure of the new (target) economic reforms and confirmed 
compliance with them through promulgation of clear, non-conflicting 
legislation, 
2. Putting this legislation into actual application and taking the actions 
required for its success. Such a move enhances the credibility of the 
state. 
3. The state's obligation to be transparent in its methods when practicing 
economic policy. 
In terms of the requirements for the next phase of economic development, it 
may be that the state has to abandon the method of direct intervention in its 
management of the economy, and use economic policy tools that suit the 
nature of the economic system targeted. 
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If these new economic reforms were to be successful, and if the prevailing 
tax system were re-considered, tax (in any of its forms) would have a crucial 
and effective role (as an instrument of fiscal policy), in achieving the 
objectives of the economic system. 
 
5.7.5.2.2 Tax system and economic situation. 
In any country, the tax structure reflects the true picture of its economic 
structure. The tax structure (quantitatively and qualitatively) is associated 
with the size, structure, and method of distribution of national income. 
Increases in the size of income, a high diversity of its sources and the high 
degree of disparity (difference) in income levels lead to the following, 
increase of importance of direct taxes imposed on the incomes, and multiple 
types of taxes and increase of importance of progressive tax rates in the tax 
structure. If the incomes are low and close, the tax imposed will be less 
progressive, and it may be a flat rate. 
Through the study of economic characteristics and the structure of national 
income in the Libyan economy, the inadequacy of the prevailing tax 
structure can be seen, for several reasons, including: 
1. Under the current conditions of the Libyan economy, there is a weakness 
in the role of income tax. This is demonstrated by the current structure of 
factors of domestic income; the most two important bases of income tax 
are found to be remunerations of employees (wages and salaries) and 
operating surpluses. These two bases are incomes from the public sector. 
Therefore, income tax in the Libyan economy cannot be relied upon either 
for financing or for redistributing income. All individual incomes result from 
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work. These incomes are from the public sector and identified by the state. 
Consequently, its base is very narrow and growth is weak. 
With regard to the operating surplus, most of this surplus is the result of the 
public sector; its growth depends on revenues. 
By calculating the ratio of total tax revenue to the remunerations of 
employees (for the representation of tax burden of individual income), it is 
found that this ratio averaged about 28% during the 1980s (see table 8, 
statistical appendix). This means that despite the state, having assumed 
responsibility for setting and paying individual incomes according to law 
No. 15 of 1981, deducted 28% of these incomes. 
2. The proportion of Libyan imports from the other countries of the world is 
high; it was found that a large proportion of imports were either foodstuff, 
raw materials (production requirements), or equipment and machinery. 
Most of these goods and supplies enjoy customs exemptions. 
 
5.7.5.2.3 Tax system and financing objective. 
Like other oil-producing countries, Libya witnessed a significant decline in 
oil revenues during the 1980s due to the sharp decline in crude oil prices 
during that period. As a result, it began to focus on the role of tax to cover 
public expenditure. 
The financing objective of tax has become one of the most important 
objectives of the tax system. Some practical steps were taken, which confirm 
the financing objective of tax. Some of these steps were as follows: 
1. The promulgation of a tax law on real estate in 1986, 
2. Amendment of the stamp tax law and increase of its rates, 
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3. Amendment of the Income Tax Law No. 64/1973, and the abolition of 
Article 103 (it was the only article of incentives in the tax on the 
company income), 
4. Increase in the rates of tax on the income of trade, industry and crafts, 
and amendment of its brackets. 
Despite the decline of the rate of contribution of tax revenues to cover 
current public expenditure (administrative), the proportion fluctuated 
between 55% -70% during the 1980s, and then decreased to 26% in 1996. 
However, if the nature of the economic system and economic situations are 
taken into account, will there be a reduction in income tax? If the income tax 
revenues are already low, will the reason be a shortage of the number of 
taxes levied or decline in tax rates? These questions can be answered by 
comparing actual tax revenues and potential tax revenues. 
Although there is a difference between the actual tax revenues and the 
potential tax revenues, the number of taxes imposed and tax rate are not the 
two main reasons for the reduction in the actual tax revenues, rather there 
are other reasons, the most important of which to be mentioned are as 
follows: 
1. Small size of income tax base, 
2. Low rate of growth of individual incomes, 
3. Excessive increases in tax rates, and 
4. Manifold taxes and the complexity of the tax system. 
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5.7.6 Problems and difficulties the tax system faces. 
The tax system includes: tax legislation (laws) and tax administration (tax 
authority). Tax problems resulting from tax legislation and tax problems 
resulting from tax administration will be addressed. 
 
First: Problems of Tax Policy (Tax Legislation). 
The Libyan tax system suffers from the problem of double taxation, as 
follows: 
a. Income realised from the practice of any economic activity in Libya is 
subject to two main taxes: specific tax, and general tax on income, in 
addition to other taxes such as: Jihad tax; Palestine tax; tax for support 
the national companies; the central bank tax; and stamp tax. All these 
taxes are similar and imposed on the same income, and this is proof 
that the tax system suffers from the problem of double taxation. 
b. Income of partners and shareholders in companies is subject to two 
taxes: corporate tax on income and general tax on income. 
c. Despite the imposition of income taxes, an additional tax was imposed 
in favour of the Jihad Fund under Law No. 18 of the year 1971. The 
tax was imposed on entry and exit visas, and on driving licenses of 
motor vehicles. 
d. Despite the imposition of customs duties, additional taxes were 
imposed, which were production and consumption tax, and tax of the 
man-made river project, which were imposed on commercial 
transactions. 
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e. Foreign exchange tax (dollar tax): imposed on the difference between 
the official price and the commercial price of foreign exchange, which 
has become a source of financing the budget. 
Second: difficulties and problems of tax administration. 
Tax administration plays a key and important role in determining the real, 
effective tax system. That is, it is the tool which transfers the tax system 
under its legal framework to its practical framework. In other words, tax 
administration can turn the provisions of tax legislation into a real, effective 
tax system. 
No objectives of any tax reform can be achieved without making change in 
tax administration. This means that change and reform of tax administration 
is essential to ensure the effectiveness of changes in tax policy. 
Here, it should be noted that the canon of tax collection alone is not enough 
to evaluate a tax administration. In other words, collecting as many tax 
revenues as possible does not mean that the tax administration is a 
successful one. In fact, many issues must be taken into account such as how 
to obtain these revenues, and tax justice and level of economic welfare. For 
example, there may be a tax administration that is a failure, but it can collect 
high yield of taxes, because of its focus on the taxpayers who fall into easily 
taxable sectors, such as those who earn wages and salaries, even though this 
administration is unable to apply tax efficiently to companies, large 
enterprises and owners of private professions. 
Accordingly, the volume of tax revenue is not evidence of the effectiveness 
of a tax administration. Even so, the exact criterion is the extent of 
application of tax law correctly. In other words, the exact criterion would be 
the size of the gap between the actual tax revenue and potential tax revenue, 
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if the tax law were applied to all tax bases correctly. Whenever the tax 
administration can narrow this gap, or fully close it, it is evidence of its 
efficiency. 
To try to achieve this objective, however, the tax administration faces many 
problems and difficulties, some of which are mentioned as follows:  
− Problems arising from the provisions of tax legislation. 
− Problems arising from the surrounding environment. 
− Problems arising from the same tax system (tax administration). 
Some of these problems and difficulties faced by the Libyan tax authority 
will briefly be mentioned: 
 
5.7.6.1 Problems of legislative provisions. 
This kind of problem can be explained through the following points: 
1- Manifold Taxes: 
The Libyan tax system includes (especially income taxes) a set of specific 
taxes, which are subject to several tax laws to regulate issues relating to the 
collection of such taxes. Income is subject to several taxes, such as 
numerous specific taxes and general tax on income, and other additional 
taxes such as Jihad tax, Palestine tax, defence tax, stamp tax, support of 
national company tax and the central bank tax. Therefore, manifold taxes are 
a major source of the problems the tax administration faces on carrying out 
its functions, such as the difficulty it faces determining certain tax bases, 
difficulty of tax assessment and tax collection, and issues of tax complaint 
and other problems. 
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2 - Complexity of the Tax System: 
The use of progressive tax rates (such as some specific taxes on income, as 
well as general income tax) has increased the complexity of the tax system, 
which means a waste of time, effort and the tax administration due to the 
difficulty of doing its tasks well. 
3 - Ambiguity and Contradiction: 
There is some ambiguity and contradiction (sometimes failure) in some 
provisions of tax laws in force, which leads to a confusion of tax 
administration work. This problem is evidenced by the large number of 
explanatory generalisations issued by the commissioner of the (central) tax 
authority to the tax officials in tax sub-circuits. As a clear example of this 
problem, the following is stated: 
a) Contradiction between paragraphs of Article 36 governing the tax 
exemption compared to the minimum cost of living: the first 
paragraph refers to levying a tax on income in excess of the limits of 
the exemption, while another paragraph refers to the deduction of 
limits of exemption from the first bracket of income.  
b) In the case of multiple sources of income, there are difficulties arising 
from the application of Article No. 36, insofar as this article refers to 
the deduction of the amount of exemptions from the tax base with the 
lowest rate. Nevertheless, in practice there is a real difficulty in 
determining tax with the lowest rate under the progressive tax rates. 
c) In accordance with Article 36 of the tax law, there is ambiguity in 
determining the exemption of personal insurance premiums. This 
ambiguity could be clarified in the following points: 
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− In cases of a multiplicity of the income of taxpayers, the tax law is 
found to be not specific as to the type of income from which the 
amount of the exemption must be deducted. 
−  Is the amount of this exemption (relating to be personal insurance 
premiums) deducted from the net income before exemptions, or after 
other exemptions (such as exemptions relating to costs of living)? 
− There are practical difficulties in applying this exemption to taxpayers 
of the tax on salaries and wages. 
4- Tax legislation have a lack and shortage of and many procedures and 
technical regulations that help the application of the tax system such as 
registration systems, follow-up, review and clear explanations. 
 
5.7.6.2 Problems resulting from the application environment. 
A good surrounding environment is one of the most important constituents 
that helps in the application of the tax system, regardless of the degree of 
complexity of this system. 
In any country, the environment surrounding the tax system consists of a 
group of important elements such as the economic system, economic 
conditions, the phase of economic progress, the availability of information, 
laws governing economic activities, awareness of taxation, and political will; 
and other issues that affect the application of the tax system. 
The following points can illustrate this kind of tax problem: 
1. The applied economic system made many changes in the legal forms 
of business enterprises, whereby new forms have emerged such as: 
participatory, productive families, in addition to the ambiguity of the 
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system of joint stock companies and obliging enterprises to apply the 
dictum of partners, not wage-earners. Some results of these changes 
include an increase in the degree of complexity of the tax system, the 
difficulty of choosing the appropriate tax, the difficulty of determining 
the tax base and tax collection method. 
2. There is a very large sector of the Libyan economy working outside 
the scope of the law. This sector is sometimes called the informal 
economy (informal sector, or black economy), which includes the 
activities of popular markets in most cities, street vendors and 
informal foreign employment. 
3. The constant change in the administrative structure of the state, and 
transition to the administrative decentralisation has led to a failure in 
regulation and follow-up of economic activities. Therefore, projects 
without permits have appeared, and some projects have been awarded 
certificates for stoppage of production, even though they continue to 
engage in activity (evading tax). 
4. The tax authority lacks the effective cooperation of relevant 
authorities such as municipal guard, police, bodies of the ministry of 
economy and customs. 
5. Effective laws to regulate economic activities are not promulgated. 
Laws promulgated are not enforceable; this leads to the chaos within 
activities, and the avoidance and evasion of payment of tax. 
The existence of this legislation ensures the documentation of economic 
activities and makes them subject to laws, which helps the tax authority to 
collect taxes on those activities, and follow-up. The commercial law, for 
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example, indicates that all economic activity with capital of more than 
LYD1000 should follow the method of regular accounting books and 
records on which the tax authority can depend when determining the tax 
base and tax assessment. 
 
6. Although the efficient administration of taxation requires information 
about different income sources, such as agriculture, industry and 
services sector in addition to data on some economic indicators such 
as national income and prices, the tax authority (tax administration) 
suffers from a lack of data and information on many economic 
activities. 
7. Most members of Libyan society have a lack of tax awareness and a 
feeling of the futility of taxes due to the shortage of basic services 
(infrastructure) provided by the state, such as education and health 
(housing for the low-income) and some public utilities. Where the 
livelihood of most Libyans became much more dependent on direct 
state support, through rationed subsidized goods (Niblock, 2001). 
8. Means of communications between the tax authority (tax 
administration) and financiers are insufficient due to the inefficiency 
of the postal system and its unreliability as a means to contact 
taxpayers, in addition to the underdevelopment and low quality of the 
telecommunications network. 
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5.7.6.3 The problems resulting from the tax administration. 
These problems can be summarised as follows:  
1. The human element: the tax authority suffers from a weakness in human 
resources in terms of number and level of efficiency. 
2. Material capabilities: the tax authority suffers from a severe shortage of 
material capabilities such as buildings, furniture, means of transport and 
means of communications. 
3. Serious IT deficiencies in the work of the tax authority. 
4. Financial incentives for the employees of the tax authority are weak. 
5.7.7 Conclusion. 
Through the review of the structure of the economic system given above, 
together with consideration of the prevailing tax system and the problems it 
faces, some of the important findings of this chapter can be summed up as 
follows: 
1. The tax system does not correspond to the existing economic system. 
2. The provisions of tax law are not consistent with the objectives of the tax 
system. 
3. The tax system suffers from some ambiguity, contradiction, and 
complexity. 
4. A priority must be given to tax reform in the programmes of economic 
policy. Since there are ample justifications for tax reform, such as the 
need to achieve convenience within the tax system, and thereby the 
economic system in order to cope with prevailing economic situations. It 
is also necessary to achieve social justice in the distribution of the 
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financial burdens of the state, and to address certain chronic problems 
such as inflation. All of these issues are basic demands and essential 
justifications for the process of tax reform in Libya. 
5.7.8 Tax Reform. 
The tax system suffers from several distortions that can be observed through 
the following historical outline, which describes the most prominent features 
of this system, its defects, as well as giving suggestions for the most 
important reforms that are required. 
During the 1970s, the Libyan tax system had the following characteristics: 
1. Decline of the ratio of tax deduction to gross domestic product (tax 
burden). 
2. Domination of indirect taxes- especially customs duties- on the tax 
structure. 
3. A clear reduction of the proportion of direct taxes, especially taxes on 
income, and 
4. Main reliance on private and specific taxes in relation to income taxes 
and taxes on expenditure. 
For economic reform and restructuring of the Libyan economy after the 
1990s, it was necessary for the tax system to achieve two main tasks: 
− The first was to collect as much revenue as possible for the treasury in 
order to reduce the budget deficit. 
− The second was to stimulate the private sector to invest. 
In this context, the authorities concerned took a number of actions. In 1996, 
substantial amendments were made on each of the tax rates and the income 
brackets of some certain types of taxes, such as tax on the income of trade, 
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industry and crafts, and tax on free professions income, as well as increases 
in tax exemptions for the general tax on income. 
These amendments can be summarised as follows: 
1) Tax on income of trade, industry and crafts; 
a. Reducing income brackets from four to two; 
b. Expansion (increase) of the tax base of the first income bracket from 
LYD4000 to LYD12000 annually, and; 
c. Increasing tax rate from 22.5% to 27.5% (average). 
2) Tax on the income of free professions: 
a. Reducing income brackets from five to two, 
b. Expanding the tax base of the first income bracket from LYD4000 to 
LYD16000 annually, and 
c. Increasing tax rate from 25% to 27.5% (average). 
3) Increasing the tax rate for both tax on bank deposits and tax on 
external incomes from 15% to 20%. 
4) Increasing tax exemptions for general tax on income from LYD4000 
to LYD6000 annually. 
In 2004, substantial changes were made to most types of income taxes, as 
follows: 
1) Tax on the income of trade, industry and crafts: 
a. Distinguishing between sources of income for this tax (commercial 
profits and industrial profits), 
b. Increasing the number of brackets of taxable income from two to four, 
and 
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c. Imposition of progressive tax rates ranging between 20% - 35% on 
income from commercial activities, and 15% - 30% on income from 
industrial activities. 
2) Tax on corporate income: 
a. Reducing tax rate from 40% to 27% (average), and 
b. A significant and remarkable expansion of the tax base for each 
income bracket. 
3) Tax on wages and salaries: 
a. Reducing the number of brackets of taxable income from six to three 
brackets only, 
b. Increasing the tax base for each income bracket, and 
c. Reduction in the average tax rate from 21.5% to 11.5%, while the 
range of a tax rate was reduced from 8% - 35% to 8% - 15%. 
4) Tax on the income of free professions: 
a. Increasing the number of income brackets from two to four, 
b. Reducing the taxable base for each income bracket compared with 
amendments made in 1996, and 
c. Tax rate range changes from between 15% - 30% to 20% - 35%. 
5) The imposition of a new income tax, which is a tax on partnership 
income; its rates range between 10% - 20%. 
6) An important and significant reduction in the rate of tax on bank deposits 
from 20% to 5%. 
7) The abolition of general income tax in order to avoid double taxation. 
8) Increasing the limits of tax exemptions by almost more than twice, taking 
into account all the possible marital statuses of individuals. 
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With regard to indirect taxes, the production and consumption tax was 
imposed in 1992.  Many different amendments were conducted on the rate 
and base of the stamp tax in 1998 and 2004, in addition to some amendments 
to customs rates in 1981, granting some conditional customs exemptions in 
1989, and finally the abolition of import tax in 2005, which was replaced 
with port services tax at a 4% flat rate. 
Because of these amendments, tax revenues increased between 1997 and 
2005, but most of that increase came from indirect taxes, which increased by 
78%, while direct taxes increased by 60%. 
It should be noted that the main characteristics of the tax system in the 
nineties (1990 - 1999) remained almost as it was in the seventies (1970-
1979). The tax revenues represented 9% of gross domestic product, having 
been 7% in the earlier period. In addition, the share of indirect taxes was 
reduced as a proportion of total tax revenues from 69% to 60%. Moreover, 
the share of direct taxes rose from 31% to 40%. This means that the 
characteristics of the Libyan tax system are similar to the properties of tax 
systems in developing countries with low incomes. 
On the other hand, it is noted that the actions taken in the fiscal area in the 
period of 1973 - 2004 were not able to achieve the objectives set for it. The 
budget deficit continued to rise. Income tax cuts did not have a significant 
impact on promoting investment in the productive sectors. The abolition of 
general income tax and tax cuts for the upper brackets of salaries and wages 
led to a reasonable increase in the real income of the owners, but this 
increase in income started to decline due to inflation. 
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Table 5.27 Changes in Exemptions from Libyan  Income Tax                 ( annual Libyan dinar ) 
Marital status 
Act 
No.21 for 
1968 
Act No.64 for 
1973 
Act No.11 for 
2004 
Act No.7        
for 2010 
For single person 480 480 1200 1800 
For married person with no dependant children 720 720 1800 2400 
For married person having dependant children  720 900     
For Married person, widowed or divorced, having 
dependant children  
    2400 
2400 + 300 for 
each child 
 
 
 
Table 5.26 Changes in Libyan Income Tax Rate (range and average)  
Tax 
Act No.21 
for 1968 
Act No.64 for 
1973 
Act No.23 
for 1996 
Act No.11 
for 2004 
Act No.7 for 
2010 
Tax on real estate income 15% 
15%-25%  
( 20%) 
      
Tax on agricultural income 5% 5%   5%   
Tax on 
Commerce , 
industry and 
crafts 
Commercial 
profits 
      
20%-35%  
( 27.5% ) 
15% 
Industrial profits       
15%-30%  
( 22.5% ) 
10% 
Total 13% 
15%-30% 
 ( 22.5% ) 
20%-35% 
 ( 27.5% ) 
15%-35%  
( 25% ) 
10%-15%  
( 12.5% ) 
Tax on independent ( free ) 
professions income 
10% 
15%-35%  
( 25% ) 
20%-35%  
( 27.5% ) 
15%-30%  
( 22.5% ) 
15% 
Tax on wages and salaries  8% 
8%-35%   
 ( 21.5% ) 
  
8%-15%  
  ( 11.5% ) 
5%-10%           
( 7.5% ) 
Tax on corporate income 
15%-25% 
( 20% ) 
20%-60%  
( 40% ) 
  
15%-40%  
( 27% ) 
20% 
Tax on partnership income 
 
    
10%-20%  
(15% ) 
10% 
Tax on banks deposits   15% 20% 5% 5% 
Tax on external incomes    15% 20% 20%   
General income tax 
0%-15  
 ( 7.5% ) 
0%-90%  
  ( 45%  ) 
0%-90%    
( 45% ) 
0%   
Rates between brackets are averages. 
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 Table 5.28 Evolution of tax  revenue  in Libya during the period 1970-2005 (Values at current 
prices) 
Period 
Tax revenue   ( LYD  million ) The rate of increase Tax structure 
GDP TT/GDP 
TD TI TT TD TI TT TD TI 
1970-1979 847.752 1871.337 2719.089 -- -- -- 31% 69% 37760 7% 
1980-1989 3423.59 5068.964 8492.554 304% 171% 212% 40% 60% 78419.5 11% 
1990-1999 3882.483 5709.225 9591.708 13% 13% 13% 40% 60% 106092 9% 
2000-2005 3385.154 5832.977 9218.131 -13% 2% -4% 37% 63% 223483.8 4% 
Derived from table 24, statistical appendix . 
TD: direct tax; TI: indirect tax; TT: total tax; GDP: Gross domestic product. 
 
In short, the tax system did not play the role required to push the process of 
economic growth and economic development, either in financial, economic, 
or social terms. Tax policy adopted (used) in recent years has remained a 
mere instrument of fiscal policy, which has attempted to reduce the budget 
deficit (unsuccessfully), without taking into account the economic and social 
damage of this policy. This has led to the ineffectiveness of tax policy at the 
economic level and its inequity at the social level. 
 
5.7.8.1 Economic Effectiveness of Tax System. 
In theory, one of the main justifications for reducing corporate income tax, 
tax on individual incomes and the abolition of import tax was to encourage 
domestic and foreign private investment, and advance the process of 
economic growth. Nevertheless, this was not achieved in practice. 
Economic growth rates in Libya, in recent years, still remain low, yet tax 
policy has succeeded in increasing the distortions in resource allocation. It 
has created more obstacles to economic growth, especially to employment. 
This is because the abolition of import tax has led to excessive imports of 
consumer goods and lack of protection for domestic products, and a 
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significant decrease in domestic production, which has led to a significant 
increase in the rate of unemployment. 
5.7.8.2 Reform Required for the Tax System. 
The creation of a kind of balance in the tax system is simply required so that 
it can once again act to achieve the state’s financial objective (realisation of 
revenues for the public budget), as well as aiming to achieve its economic 
and social objectives as well. In other words, the amendments required in 
terms of tax policy are very similar to the properties of tax systems in the 
group of developing countries with high income. 
Finally, in order to alleviate the problem of the public budget deficit, the tax 
base could be expanded and additional sources of tax should be searched for, 
through the expansion of the privatisation programme and the transfer of 
ownership of many economic projects (non-strategic) to the private sector, 
under certain conditions. In its recent but slow process of economic reform, 
Libya had proceeded to privatize some public companies and allowed the 
creation of private banks (Abidar & Laytimi, 2005). 
 
The general framework to make the Libyan tax system more equitable 
requires a restructure of tax revenues, so that the percentage of direct taxes 
increases in the tax structure, alongside the development of tax 
administration on the human level and on the level of equipment and 
collection techniques. 
 
5.7.8.3 Areas of tax reform. 
There are many issues related to tax reform, which need review in order to 
develop proposals for tax reform, and the most important of these issues are 
the following: 
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5.7.8.3.1 Expansion of tax base. 
The tax base should be expanded through two methods: the first one is to 
create tax bases, such as an environmental tax, and to impose taxes on 
certain activities of the informal economy. The second method is to increase 
the efficiency of the tax system by imposing a tax on tax basses, which were 
not subject to tax in the past. 
 
This study has shown that expanding the tax base while reducing the tax rate 
is the best method to increase tax revenues (Boskin & Mclure, 1990). 
Tax base reform can be made through the following: 
1) Shift from the narrow field of tax on foreign trade to taxes on 
consumption, spending and trading.  
2) Value-added tax is an effective tax, as it leads to an increase in tax 
revenues, reduces the waste of economic resources, and raises the 
efficiency of tax administration.  
3) Exemption of basic commodities consumed by the poor and low-
income people from paying value-added tax and imposition of 
consumption tax on certain luxury items, or goods harmful to public 
health. 
4) Reduction of tax exemptions granted to some productive sectors, 
because this policy leads to lower tax revenues. 
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5.7.8.3.2 Adjustment of tax rate. 
The phase of tax rate adjustment comes after the expansion of the tax base. 
It is well known that a high tax rate leads to tax evasion and tax avoidance, 
and this leads to lower tax revenues. Therefore, tax rate adjustment means 
the reduction of differences between tax rates in the tax structure at specific 
rates (World Bank, 1991). 
Tax rate reform can be made by reducing the marginal rate of income tax, 
and limiting the inequality between all tax rates; all this can lead to an 
increase in tax revenues, reducing the degree of economic imbalances and 
encouraging taxpayers to pay tax. 
 
5.7.8.3.3 Consistency between fiscal tools. 
This step is intended to avoid any conflict between the various types of tax 
in the tax structure, as the reform of one type of tax could adversely affect 
another type of tax. For example, import tax reform could have adverse 
effects on consumption tax. 
5.7.8.3.4 Improvement of the performance of the tax administration. 
The tax administration's ability to achieve rapid adaptation helps the success 
of tax reform, as the tax administration is the executive tool of the tax reform 
process. 
An improvement of the incentive system (salaries and wages) is an 
important tool for the reform of tax administration, for several reasons, 
including: the elimination of corruption, and attracting the best experts. 
5.7.8.4 Conclusion. 
The Libyan economy is suffering from a deficiency (decrease) in tax 
revenues due to its weak tax structure, and these problems can be illustrated 
as follows: 
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1- Ineffectiveness of the current tax system, which has led to an 
imbalance in the macro-economic variables and in the structure of 
incentives. 
2- Worsening of the fiscal deficit in the public budget.  
3- Weak taxable capacity and imbalance of the financial system: 
Libya's economy is suffering from weak taxable capacity (low tax revenues), 
for several reasons, including: 
1) Low level of national income, and low per capita income, as the 
decline in per capita income leads to lower tax rates to the national 
income (Greenway & Sapsford, 1984). 
2) Control of the public sector over economic activity (state 
intervention). The nationalization of oil and land and the monopoly 
over imports and exports gave the state control over all sectors of the 
economy but kept economic regulation at a low level (Layachi,1998). 
3) Large size of the informal economy (black market). 
4) Lack of regular accounting/ bookkeeping in the business sector, this 
leads to difficulty in estimating the results of special projects. 
5) The large number of tax exemptions in tax policy.  
6) The spread of tax evasion and tax avoidance due to weak tax 
administration. 
7) Low tax awareness. 
4- Imbalance of the tax structure: 
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High reliance on indirect tax as a proportion of the tax structure is noted, 
unlike the situation in developed countries that depend primarily on direct 
taxes. The percentage of indirect taxes reached about 60% of the tax 
structure during 1970-2005 in Libya. 
Reliance on indirect taxes, especially import taxes, in Libya, is due to 
several reasons, including: undiversified production base, the large volume 
of foreign trade, and the ease of imposing and collecting such taxes (Zaki, 
1984). 
5- Inadequate treatment of tax equity: 
The tax system in Libya is characterised by inequity, as low-income people 
bear a high-tax burden because income tax is imposed on salaries and wages, 
but not imposed on the interest accrued on capital (absence of horizontal 
equity). 
 
6- Weakness of tax administration: 
There is a significant lack of information and financial data, leading to 
administrative corruption, the spread of tax evasion and tax avoidance. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Measuring the tax burden and tax effort for the national 
economy in Libya 
 
6.1 Introduction. 
In this chapter, the study’s empirical testing is carried out. This testing 
measures both the individual tax burden over the period 1970-2005 and tax 
effort in Libya for the period 1970-2000. It incorporates the most recently 
available data and relevant econometric techniques such as OLS Regression 
Model, Ordinary Ridge Regression Model (ORR), and Unbiased Ridge 
Regression Model (URR). In addition, it also measures the Libyan tax effort 
for the period 2001-2007 and makes a comparison with that of selected oil 
producing countries using both cross-sectional Analysis and Panel Data 
Analysis. 
6.2 Measuring the individual tax burden in Libya, 1970-2005. 
The individual tax burden can be measured through the ratio of per capita 
personal taxes to the annual individual income. 
The calculation of these two indices in Libya during the period 1970-2005 
has been carried out, as shown in table 48 in the statistical appendix, and the 
following table 6.1: 
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Table 6.1. Individual tax burden in Libya, 1970-2005 US$ / year* 
Years 
Direct  taxes 
per capita*
Indirect  
taxes per 
capita* 
Total taxes 
per capita* 
Per capita 
income * 
Total taxes 
per capita as 
percentage 
of per capita 
income 
1970 22.57 70.36 92.92 1794.7 0.052 
2005 150.2 292.97 443.16 16274.8 0.027 
Average 184.91 295.40 480.308 5969.91 0.082 
Source: Calculated from tables 5 , 32 and 34 in the statistical appendix. 
 
Through a review of the data in this table, it can be seen that total taxes per 
capita in Libya increased from US$92.9 in 1970 to US$443 in 2005, and the 
total tax per capita as a percentage of the individual income was 0.082 on 
average of the same period . 
 
6.2.1 Direct taxes per capita: 
From the data presented in table 48 of the statistical appendix, the average 
direct taxes per capita (in all classes and nationalities) was $184.91 during 
the period 1970-2005. This means that the individual paid a direct tax of 
$15.1 per month as an average. During 1970-2005, the direct tax per capita 
grew at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 5.6%, so that the per 
capita quota of direct taxes in 2005 was about 6.7 times of that it was in 
1970. Overall, the individual direct tax burden ranged between $22.57 in 
1970 and $150.2 in 2005. 
 
277 
 
6.2.2 Indirect taxes per capita: 
During 1970-2005, the average indirect tax per capita was $295. This meant 
that each individual paid an indirect tax of $24.6 per month on average. On 
the other hand, the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of per capita 
indirect taxes was about 4.2% during the same period, and this means that 
the per capita indirect taxes tended to increase.  
It can be noted that the per capita direct tax was increasing at a rate greater 
than the per capita indirect tax during the period 1970-2005. 
6.2.3 Total taxes per capita: 
From the data in table 48 in the appendix, it can be seen that the total tax per 
capita (direct and indirect) increased from $92.92 in 1970 to $443.16 in 
2005, at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 4.6%. In contrast, the 
annual per capita income increased from US$1794.7 in 1970 to US $16274.8 
in 2005, at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6.5%, meaning that 
the rate of growth of per capita income was greater than the rate of growth of 
per capita tax burden. 
The detailed changes of taxes per capita and income per capita are 
summarised in table 6.2 below: 
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Table 6.2 Total taxes per capita in Libya, 1970-2005 
Item 
1970 2005 Compound annual 
growth rate CAGR US$/year US$/year 
Direct taxes per capita 22.57 150.2 5.6% 
Indirect taxes per capita 70.36 292.97 4.2% 
( A ) Total taxes per capita 92.92 443.16 4.6% 
( B ) Per capita income 1794.7 16274.8 6.5% 
Ratio ( A ) to ( B ) 0.052 0.027 -1.9% 
Source : Table 6.1 
 
In table 6.3, it is notable that the average per capita tax reached $230.5 over 
the years 1970-1976, and then increased to $703 during 1977-1983, equal to 
3 times what it was in the previous period. However, it decreased by 2%, 
21%, and 51% during the periods 1984-1990, 1991-1997 and 1998-2005, 
respectively, while the average was $480 per year for 1970-2005. 
Table 6.3 Individual tax burden in Libya 
Period 
Average per capita tax  
Average per capita 
income Taxes per capita as percentage of 
per capita income 
US$/year US$/year 
70-1976 230.5 3571.5 6% 
77-1983 702.9 7959.1 9% 
84-1990 689.2 6000.2 11% 
91-1997 545.1 5967.6 9% 
98-2005 264.7 6303.4 4% 
70-2005 480.3 5969.9 8% 
Source : Table 6.1 (Statistical appendix) 
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It can be also noted that tax per capita as a percentage of per capita income 
increased from 5% in 1970 to 9% in 1998, and then decreased until it 
reached 3% in 2005. Overall, the average figure was 8% for the whole 
period of 1970-2005 (see table 48 in the statistical appendix). 
When compared with other oil producing countries, it can be seen that the 
tax burden per capita in Libya was slightly higher than its counterparts, with 
the exception of Qatar (see table 6.4). 
Table 6.4 Individual tax burden in Libya and selected oil producing countries (2001-
2007) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Libya 5.60% 4.70% 4.90% 3.80% 2.70% 2.20% 2.10% 
Iraq 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.40% 1.00% 0.70% 1.40% 
Kuwait 0.90% 2.20% 1.90% 1.60% 1.40% 1.20% 1.30% 
Liberia 0.20% 0.10% 0.10% 0.30% 0.20% 0.20% 0.30% 
Qatar 3.30% 4.20% 3.40% 25.50% 21.30% 23.20% 24.20% 
Sudan 0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 17.20% 
United Arab Emirates 2.10% 2.50% 3.10% 3.40% 2.40% 2.90% 2.90% 
  
One explanation of Libyan relatively high tax burden (individual tax burden) 
may be because of the slow growth of its labour force. 
The rate of percentage growth of the labour force population in Libya was 
8% in 1981, which decreased to 4% in 1983 and then to 3.3 % in 2005, with 
an average growth rate of 1.04% for the period 1970-2005.  This means that 
the labour force was growing at a CAGR of 2.6% only, while the CAGR of 
the population was 3% (see table 6.5). 
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Table 6.5  Employment and population in Libya, 1970-2005 
  Population Labour: population  
Average rate of annual change 3.02 % 1.04 % 
CAGR 3 % 2.6  % 
Source: Calculated from tables 32 and 33 in the statistical appendix  
 
This meant that the rate of population growth was greater than the rate of 
labour force growth (potential employment), leading to a higher tax burden 
per capita. 
 
6.3 The Model description. 
6.3.1 Measuring the Libyan tax effort, 1970-2000. 
This section measures the tax effort in Libya for the period 1970-2000, using 
the following three methods: OLS Regression Model, Ordinary Ridge 
Regression Model (ORR), and Unbiased Ridge Regression Model (URR). 
 
6.3.2 Identification of multicollinearity problem:  
The multicollinearity problem occurs due to the existence of some 
correlations among some or all explanatory variables of a regression model 
(Gujarati, 2004). 
 Multicollinearity can create inaccurate estimates of regression coefficients, 
and inflate the standard errors of the regression coefficients (Hintze, 2007). 
 
a. Sources of Multicollinearity. 
To deal with multicollinearity, it is necessary to be able to identify its source. 
The source of the multicollinearity impacts the analysis, the corrections, and 
the interpretation of the linear model. Outlined below are five sources of 
multicollinearity (Hintze, 2007):  
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1. Data collection. In this case, the data have been collected from a narrow 
subspace of the independent variables. The multicollinearity has been 
created by the sampling methodology, for example, sampling over a 
limited range of the values taken by the regressors in the population 
( Gujarati, 2004). If the multicollinearity has been created by the data 
collection method employed, then it is necessary to collect additional data 
over a wider X-subspace that can resolve this multicollinearity problem.  
2. Physical constraints of the linear model or population. This source of 
multicollinearity will exist no matter what sampling technique is used. Many 
manufacturing or service processes have constraints on independent 
variables (as to their range), physically, politically, or legally, which have 
the potential to create multicollinearity.  
3. Over-defined model. In this case, there are more variables than 
observations. This situation should be avoided.  
4. Model choice or specification. This source of multicollinearity comes 
from using independent variables that are powers or interactions of an 
original set of variables. It should be noted that if the sampling subspace of 
independent variables is narrow, then any combination of those variables 
will increase the multicollinearity problem even further.  
5. Outliers. Extreme values or outliers in the X-space can cause 
multicollinearity as well as hide it. This is called outlier-induced 
multicollinearity. This should be corrected by removing the outliers before 
ridge regression is applied. 
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b. Detection of Multicollinearity. 
There are several methods of detecting multicollinearity. These include: 
1. Begin by studying pairwise scatter plots of pairs of independent variables, 
looking for near-perfect relationships. Also glance at the correlation matrix 
for high correlations. However, multicollinearity does not always show up 
when considering the variables two at a time.  
2. Consider the variance inflation factors (VIF). VIFs over 10 indicate 
collinear variables.  
3. In terms of the eigenvalues of the correlation matrix of the independent 
variables, a value close to zero indicates multicollinearity. Alternatively, it is 
possible to consider the numerical size of the eigenvalue, using the condition 
number. Large condition numbers indicate multicollinearity. 
4. Investigate the signs of the regression coefficients. Variables whose 
regression coefficients are opposite in sign from what you would expect may 
indicate multicollinearity. 
 
6.3.3 Regression methods and treatment of multicollinearity problem. 
There are three methods which can be used, namely: Ordinary linear 
regression OLS, Ordinary ridge regression ORR, and Unbiased ridge 
regression URR. These three types of regression were selected for their 
advantages, as shown in the following: 
OLS regression has several advantages, among which are: 
1- the possibility of measuring multicollinearity using the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) which indicates how strongly each explaining 
variable is correlated to the others (Kestens, 2004). 
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2- OLS has a well-developed theory, and has available a battery of 
diagnostic statistics that make interpretations easy and straightforward 
(Getis & Griffith, 2002). 
3- OLS has a small number of used parameters, and low calculation cost. 
It estimates the regression coefficients by minimizing the sum of the 
squared errors between the estimated and the desired values (Mariolis 
& Dermatas, 2001). 
4- the OLS procedure is the simplest type of estimation procedure used 
in statistical analyses (Burke, 2010). 
5- It is known that an ordinary least square estimator (OLS) is the best 
linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) of the vector of unknown 
regression coefficients in a linear regression model (Xu & Yang, 
2011). 
But in the multicollinearity case the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator 
for the regression coefficients or predictor based on these estimates may give 
very poor results. With multicollinearity, the estimated OLS coefficients 
may be statistically insignificant (too large, too small and even have the 
wrong sign) even though the R-Square may be high (Yeniay & Gaokta, 
2002). Moreover, the estimators obtained from OLS are unbiased but have 
inflated variances under multicollnearity (Abd El-Salam, 2011). 
Plenty of methods have been developed to overcome multicollinearity 
problem, such as ordinary ridge regression (ORR) and Unbiased ridge 
regression (URR). 
In the presence of multicollinearity the OLS estimators could become 
unstable due to their large variance, which leads to poor prediction. One of 
the most used solutions of this problem is ordinary ridge regression (ORR) 
(Dorugade & Kashid, 2010). When multicollinearity exists, selection of 
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ridge parameter plays an important role, because the idea that adding a small 
constant to the diagonal elements of the matrix X'X will improve the 
conditioning of a matrix has been used numerical analysis, for the reason 
that this dramatically decreases its condition number (Dorugade & Kashid, 
2010). 
The following are some of ORR’s advantages:  
1- Ordinary ridge regression has a smaller mean squared error than 
ordinary least squares (Janakiraman, 1980). 
2- Ordinary ridge regression may be a viable estimation procedure for 
mitigating the deleterious effects of multicollinearity (Burt, Frank & 
Beattie, 1987). 
3- ORR takes advantage of the fact that under certain conditions it is 
possible to obtain biased estimates with small standard errors that are 
more useful than unbiased estimates with large standard errors (Myers & 
Well, 1995). 
Ordinary ridge regression generates biased estimates but with smaller 
standard errors than those provided by ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression in the presence of multicollinearity. On the basis of the Mean 
Square Error criterion, therefore, ridge regression estimators are sometimes 
preferred to those of OLS regression when there is multicollinearity among 
the explanatory variables (Crown, 1998). In other words, when 
multicollinearity is present, ridge regression techniques result in estimates of 
the coefficients that are biased, but have smaller variances than that of 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) (Rahuma, 1978). 
Meanwhile, the URR method is based on realistic empirical prior 
information that can be measured by taking the average of the regression 
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coefficients of OLS. URR regression achieves smaller mean squared error 
than ORR and is more stable than the OLS (Janakiraman, 1980;  Jahufer & 
Jianbao, 2008). In addition, the ridge regression with empirical prior 
information leads to smaller mean square error MSE than does ORR 
procedure, and substantially smaller than OLS (Crouse, Jin & Hanumara, 
1995 ). URR regression has consistently maintained less bias than ORR 
although at the expense of a slightly greater variance. Both of the ridge 
estimators have been able to achieve a smaller mean squared error than 
ordinary least squares for at least some values of k (Janakiraman, 1980). All 
models of ORR and URR are better than OLS when the multicollinearity 
problem exists in data (El-Dereny & Rashwan, 2011). In general URR is 
seen as having less bias than ORR although both estimators have significant 
bias relative to the zero bias of OLS (Janakiraman, 1980). 
In general, researchers should consider using ridge regression when 
working with tax and regulatory variables because public policy 
variables tend to be highly correlated with each other (Doviak, 2010). 
 
 
6.3.3.1    OLS Regression Model: 
Consider the ordinary linear regression model: 
 
Y=Xβ + ε 
 
where  Y is an p × 1 vector of observations on dependent variable  , X is a 
known independent variables  n× p matrix of rank p; β  is a p × 1 vector of 
unknown parameters; and ε  is a random n × 1 vector the components of 
which are independent and follow a normal distribution with mean zero and 
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unknown variance σ2. The ordinary estimator is found by solving for β^ in 
the system of equations: 
 
࡮෡ࡸࡿ ൌ ሺ ࢄሖ  ࢄ ሻି૚ࢄሖ  ࢅ 
 
6.3.3.2   Ordinary Ridge Regression Model (ORR): 
 
Ordinary Ridge Regression is a technique for analysing multiple regression 
data that suffer from multicollinearity. When multicollinearity occurs, least 
squares estimates are unbiased, but their variances are large so they may be 
far from the actual value.  
Ridge regression is a method by which one can systematically introduce a 
small amount of bias and obtain more precise estimates. Often, the resulting 
models make more sense intuitively (Polhemus, 2005). 
By adding a degree of bias to the regression estimates (K), ridge regression 
reduces the standard errors. It is hoped that the net effect will be to give 
estimates that are more reliable. ORR can be expressed as (Hintze, 2007):  
 
 
࡮෡ሺ ࡷ ሻ ൌ ሺ ࢄሖ  ࢄ ൅ ࡷࡵ࢖ሻି૚ࢄሖ  ࢅ        ,              K ≥ 0 
 
where k is the shrinkage parameter (it is a positive constant). This study 
assumed that the X and Y matrix are standardized. 
 
6.3.3.3 Unbiased Ridge Regression Model (URR): 
As mentioned before, when preparing data for regression it is not always 
possible to design the data collection to avoid correlations between predictor 
variables. In such cases, ridge regression provides a way to obtain precise, 
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meaningful model coefficients. By allowing a small amount of bias in the 
coefficient estimates, the variability of those estimates can often be reduced 
dramatically. The resulting models may well give a better understanding of 
the true relationships in the data (Polhemus, 2005).  
Furthermore, Crouse et al. (1995) defined the unbiased ridge regression 
(URR) estimator as follows: 
 
࡮෡ሺ ࡷ,ࡶ ሻ ൌ ሺ ࢄሖ  ࢄ ൅ ࡷࡵ࢖ሻି૚ ሺ ࢄሖ  ࢅ ൅ ࡷࡶ ሻ ,              K ≥ 0 
 
In URR the data of the variables are transferred to the standardised form (Z-score): 
ݖ ൌ  
ܵܿ݋ݎ݁ െ ݉݁ܽ݊
ݏݐ݀ ݀݁ݒ݅ܽݐ݅݋݊        ՜      ݕ
כ  ൌ  
ܻ െ  തܻ
ܵݕ   ,    ݔ
כ  ൌ  
ܺ െ  തܺ
ܵݔ  
Where: 
 
ࡿ࢟ ൌ  ඨ
∑࢟૛
࢔ െ ૚           ;          ࡿ࢞ ൌ  
ඨ ∑࢞
૛
࢔ െ ૚ 
 
 
And, 
K = the shrinkage parameter    ;   
         J is prior information, where:     J =   
 
 
        And n* is the number of OLS estimated parameters. 
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6.4 Estimating Libya's tax effort. 
As an economic indicator, tax effort reflects a country’s ability to raise 
revenues for covering the expenses of infrastructure, social services, and 
other public expenditure. The estimation of tax effort can indicate how well 
Libya is doing in terms of tax collection, relative to what could be 
reasonably expected given its economic potential. Tax effort is calculated by 
dividing its actual tax share by an estimate of how much tax Libya should be 
able to collect, given the structural characteristics of its economy. 
Tax effort is calculated in this section for the period 1970-2000, using OLS 
regression, Ordinary ridge regression (ORR), and Unbiased ridge regression 
(URR) respectively. Section 6.5 will compare Libya to selected oil 
producing countries during 2001-2007 due to several reasons, including: 
Firstly, the absence of data for these countries for the same variables 
covering the years1970-2000. Secondly, to compare the domestic tax effort 
with the tax effort in the countries under study in recent years. Finally, lack 
of data for the same previous variables from local sources over the years 
2001-2007.  
 
6.4.1 Data description. 
The dependent variable is the contribution of tax revenue to gross domestic 
product (Ty) (where Ty was calculated from tables 1, 31 in the statistical 
appendix). After estimation,   ்௬^   becomes an indicator of the taxable 
capacity. The four explanatory variables are: non-oil exports (nox); tax  
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penalties (vp); oil revenues (oilR); and money supply (Msp) (see table 22 in 
the statistical appendix ) . 
  
 
ܮ݊ ܶݕ ൌ ߚ0 ൅ ߚ1 ܮ݊ ݊݋ݔ ൅ ߚ2 ܮ݊ ݒ݌ ൅ ߚ3 ܮ݊ ݋݈ܴ݅ ൅ ߚ4 ܮ݊ ܯݏ݌ ൅ ݑ݅ 
 
 
The number of observations is 31 for the period of 1970-2000. 
All the variables have been given logarithms in order to mitigate the scale 
problem. Table 6.6 describes the variables during the period of 1970-2000.  
The study has selected these four related independent variables including oil 
revenue (OilR), non-oil exports (nox), money supply (Msp), and tax 
penalties (Vp) which received for analysis in the study. These variables were 
selected because of their considerable importance to tax system in Libya and 
they represented reasonable causes of change the tax effort, also data on 
these variables could be quantified and reliably obtained. 
Oil revenue was chosen because it is the backbone of Libyan economy and 
the success of economic policies and plans in this economy depend on the 
timely and reliable test the impact of oil revenue on tax effort. 
Non-oil exports were included because this variable refers to the degree of 
independence from the oil resources in Libyan economy. The money supply 
has been included in this relationship because the tax is a monetary 
phenomenon.  The study selected the tax penalties as one of its independent 
variables because tax penalties contribute to reducing tax evasion. 
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Table 6.6 Descriptions of the Variables  
( 1970-2000 ) 
   Standard   
Variable Count Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
      
Lnnox 31 1.936736 2.410845 -1.609438 7.759486 
LnvP 31 1.101341 1.347665 -1.6874 3.174339 
LnOilR 31 7.484972 0.6575881 6.115892 8.808653 
LnMsp 31 7.854831 1.000366 5.48297 9.329181 
LnTy 31 -2.470264 0.2899662 -3.079114 -1.903809
  
Where Ty: the contribution of tax revenue to gross domestic product; nox: non-oil exports; vp:  
tax penalties; oilR :oil revenues; and Msp : money supply. 
For see the completed table of values, see the appendix to Chapter six in the statistical appendix.   
 
6.4.2 Detecting multicollinearity for the variables used in this study. 
A correlation matrix was used to detect any multicollinearity problem and 
the results are provided in table 6.7. Two independent variables, tax 
penalties (lnvp) and money supply (lnMsp) were found to be highly 
correlated; therefore the methods of ordinary ridge regression and 
unbiased ridge regression will be used to avoid the correlation 
between these variables.  
 
                                    Table 6.7   Correlation matrix 
( 1970-2000) 
 Lnnox LnvP LnOilR LnMsp LnTy 
      
Lnnox 1.000000 0.566703 0.291712 0.433032 -0.235235 
LnvP 0.566703 1.000000 0.573246 0.888370 0.543761 
LnOilR 0.291712 0.573246 1.000000 0.636981 0.224461 
LnMsp 0.433032 0.888370 0.636981 1.000000 0.604152 
LnTy -0.235235 0.543761 0.224461 0.604152 1.000000 
 
Where Ty: the contribution of tax revenue to gross domestic product; nox: non-oil exports; vp:  
tax penalties; oilR :oil revenues; and Msp : money supply. 
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Table 6.8 shows the variance inflation factor (VIF) and condition number. 
 
Table 6.8  The variance inflation factor and condition number.  
( 1970-2000 ) 
Independent 
Variable 
R2 Versus Other 
I.V.'s 
Variance Inflation 
Factor 
Tolerance 
 
Condition 
number 
Lnnox 0.3448 1.5263 0.6552 1 
LnvP 0.8300 5.8823 0.1700 3.72 
LnOilR 0.4061 1.6839 0.5939 6.36 
LnMsp 0.8196 5.5423 0.1804 29 
 
From the literature, if any variable has a variance inflation factor (VIF) 
greater than 10 (greater than 5 to be very conservative), collinearity could be 
a problem (Hintze, 2007; Kutner, 2004; Ethington, 2011; Guiar, 1987). 
Condition numbers (C.N) between 100 and 1000 imply moderate to strong 
collinearity (Hintze, 2007; Carvalho & Cruz, 1996; Montgomery & Peck, 
1981 ). 
According to Table 6.8, since all VIF's are less than 10 and all condition 
numbers less than 100, indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem. For 
example, the condition number of  money supply variable ( equal to 29 ) is 
less than 100. This means that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a major 
issue to interpreting the results of analysis. 
 
The resulted coefficients were different between the OLS, ORR, and URR 
methods due to differences in the methodology between these methods. 
Whereas ORR method depends on adding a small ridge parameter, the URR 
method relies on realistic empirical prior information.  
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6.4.3 Regression results. 
OLS, ORR, and URR regression approaches are applied to the data 
described above. The regression results are presented in table 6.9. 
 
Table 6.9 Estimated coefficients using OLS; ORR, and URR methods 
(1970-2000). 
Independent 
variables* 
Coefficients and tests OLS ORR URR 
0b
)
-2.690 -3.076 0.128 
t0 (-5.7) NA (1.575) 
sb^0 0.47 NA -0.813 
nox 
1b
)
-0.092 -0.052 -0.737 
t1 (-6.892) (-4.166) (-6.220) 
sb^1 0.0133 0.0125 0.0118 
VIF1 1.526 0.576 NA 
vp 
2b
)
0.151 0.079 0.502 
t2 (3.226) (3.964) (2.988) 
sb^2 0.0468 0.0199 0.1680 
VIF2 5.882 0.453 NA 
oilR 
3b
)
-0.114 -0.033 -0.234 
t3 (-2.218) (-0.710) (-1.844) 
sb^3 0.0514 0.0465 0.1269 
VIF3 1.684 0.590 NA 
Msp 
4b
)
0.138 0.110 0.394 
t4 (2.253) (4.089) (2.337) 
sb^4 0.0613 0.0269 0.1686 
VIF4 5.542 0.463 NA 
R2 0.7908 0.5133 0.8041 
F 24.571 6.86 23.788 
dw 2.026 1.51 2.016 
 
Where the dependent variable: Ty; sb^i: the standard error; R2was adjusted for number 
of variables; NA: not available in NCSS software. 
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To test for the statistical significance of true parameters b0, b1, b2, b3, and b4 
in the above regression model, the following null hypotheses were set:  H0, 
and alternative hypothesis, H1 (Salvatore & Reagle, 2002): 
 
ܪ଴:  ܾ௜ ൌ 0    ݒ݁ݎݏݑݏ    ܪଵ: ܾ௜ ് 0     ;   ݅ ൌ 0,1,2,3,4 
 
The purpose of the null hypothesis is to answer the following question: do 
the explanatory variables have an effect on the dependent variable? the null 
hypothesis in words is: the true values of the parameters in the regression 
model are equal to zero. In other words, there will be no relationship 
between the explanatory variables (nox; vp; oilR; Msp) and the dependent 
variable (Ty).  
The alternative hypothesis in words is: The explanatory variables (nox; vp; 
oilR; Msp) are related to the dependent variable (Ty). The alternative 
hypothesis means that b0, b1,b2,b3, and b4 are significantly different from 
zero. In other words, each parameter is less than or greater than zero under 
the alternative hypothesis. 
In terms of a linear relationship between variables, the null hypothesis 
means that each of the bi parameters=0 (the slope coefficient is zero) and the 
explanatory variable does not appear in the regression model; that is, the 
explanatory variable fails to provide explanatory power for the dependent 
variable. The rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the explanatory 
variable to which this estimate relates does in fact correlate with the 
dependent variable (Ty).  
The hope in regression analysis is to reject H0 and to accept H1, that 
b0 ,b1,b2,b3,and b4 ≠ 0 , with a two-tail test. 
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In order to test for the statistical significance of the parameter estimates, 
Table 6.9 shows that the absolute values of computed (calculated ) t-values 
t1, t2 and t4 exceed the critical (tabular) value of t=2.056 with n-k=31-5=26 
df at the 5% level of significance, using a two-tail test (from Koutsoyiannis, 
1992). It can be concluded that b1, b2, and b4 are statistically significant at 
the 5% level (i.e., the alternative hypothesis H1, that b1, b2, and b4 are 
different from zero cannot be rejected). Applying ORR and URR methods, 
b3 is not statistically significant at 5% level. 
The difference in results between ORR and URR methods, as previously 
mentioned, are due to the different methodology. Whereas the ORR method 
relies on adding a small constant to the diagonal elements of the matrix X'X, 
the URR method relies on prior empirical information. 
 ்௬^  was found to be positively related to tax penalties and money supply, 
while negatively related to non-oil exports and oil revenues. For example , 
between 1970-2000, by using URR model, the regression coefficient of the 
oil revenues -0.234 means that, holding all other variables constant,  a 100 
percent increase of Libyan oil revenue is accompanied by a decrease in 
taxable capacity of about 23 percent. Conversely, holding all other variables 
constant, the mean taxable capacity increased by about 39 percent when 
money supply increased by 100% during the same period. Similarly, 0.502 
attached to vp means that, other things being equal, a 100 percent increase in 
tax penalties led on average to about a 50% increase in the taxable capacity. 
There was a negative relationship between the taxable capacity (Ty) and the 
non-oil exports (nox). If nox went up by 100 %, on average, taxable capacity 
decreased by about 70 %.   
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According to the ORR, there was a negative relationship between oil 
revenues and taxable capacity in Libya between 1970-2000. This means that 
an increase in oil revenues of 100% led to a reduction in tax effort of 3%. 
This negative relationship was due to a reduced reliance on tax revenues in 
the years when there was a rise in oil revenues. In other words, when oil 
revenues increased, there was no urgent need for tax revenues. As one of the 
measures of fiscal policy, the government also reduced taxes and increased 
public spending when oil revenues increased. 
The relationship between tax penalties and taxable capacity was positive in 
Libya. Increasing the tax penalties led to an increase in tax capacity. This 
positive relationship is attributed to the fact that these penalties encouraged 
taxpayers to comply with tax payment on time; it was also a tool to combat 
tax evasion. According to the ORR, increases in tax penalties of 100% led to 
an increase in tax capacity of 8% during the period 1970-2000.  
The money supply (in the narrow sense) was positively related to taxable 
capacity in Libya. This relationship was positive because the increase in the 
money supply led to an increase in the volume of transactions and trade 
exchanges that were subject to taxes. For example, increasing the money 
supply by 100% led to an increase in tax capacity of 11% in Libya between 
1970-2000, using ORR analysis. 
There was a negative relationship between non-oil exports and taxable 
capacity in Libya during the study period: increases in non-oil exports led to 
lower taxable capacity. This negative relationship may have been due to 
several reasons, including : that exports were exempt from taxes, and the size 
of non-oil exports was low. 
When using OLS method, the R2 value was reasonably high, being 79% 
during the period 1970-2000, this means that about 79 percent of the 
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variance in taxable capacity in Libya was explained by the predictor 
variables, while R2 is reasonable using the ORR method, being 0.5133 over 
the 1970-2000 period. This shows that the explanatory variables nox, vp, 
oilR, and Msp accounted for over 51% of variation in the response variable 
(Ty) in Libya over the period 1970-2000. 
Finally, although this study didn't conduct a unit root test, it used the 
Durbin-Watson test to detect autocorrelation problem, a cause of non-
stationarity of the data. The Durbin-Watson test did not find any 
autocorrelation problem in the data. 
The Durbin-Watson test was conducted. It found that for 31 observations 
and 4 explanatory variables, lower and upper d.w limits are dL = 1.2 and du 
= 1.7 at 5 percent level, while dL=0.96 and du = 1.5 at 1% level (Gujarati, 
2004, pp. 970-972), (for more details about the conditions for the null 
hypothesis, see the appendix, pp. 408-409).  
From the data given in table 6.9, the estimated Durbin-Watson statistic can 
be shown to be within the upper du, suggesting that there was low serial 
correlation in the residuals. 
Using OLS for 1970-2000, d.w test value was equal to 2.03, and 2.016 using 
URR method, which is close to the crucial value of 2 (which corresponds to 
a zero autocorrelation). In the table with critical values for the Durbin-
Watson test it was found that dL=1.16 and du=1.74 (Gujarati, 2004, pp. 970-
972). Therefore, the computed d.w lies within upper du. 
In general, by looking at the d.w value for dL and du and the estimated d.w 
values lying within upper du, we can reject the null hypothesis that there 
were serial correlations in the residuals; this mean Ty regression does not 
suffer from pure autocorrelation.  
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Applying OLS and URR models to the data, and using analysis of variance 
to test the overall significance of the fit, the computed F-value is obviously 
highly significant. This means that all the independent variables as a 
package have a relationship with the taxable capacity, so that it is possible to 
reject the null hypothesis, accepting the alternative that there is a significant 
relationship between taxable capacity and the explanatory variables, and that 
all the variables are important explanatory variables in the models.  
The forecasting accuracy is tested using Theil's inequality coefficient TIC 
(Uhl , 2011): 
 
 
ܶܫܥ ൌ  
ට∑ ሺ ݕො௧
  െ  ݕ௧ ሻଶ/்݄ା௛௧ୀ்ାଵ
ට∑ ݕො௧ଶ்ା௛௧ୀ்ାଵ /݄   ൅ ට∑ ݕ௧ଶ்ା௛௧ୀ்ାଵ /݄ 
 
 
 
Where    ݕ௧  ܽ݊݀  ݕො௧  denoted the actual and forecasted values, respectively. 
This coefficient is always lies between zero and one, where zero indicates a 
perfect fit of the model (Basdas, 2009). Empirically, TIC = 0.026251, this 
means that the forecasting power of the model is quite high. 
Applying OLS, ORR and URR models to the observations, the following tax 
effort index in Libya during the period of 1970 – 2000, is obtained. 
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Table 6.10 Tax effort in Libya, 1970-2000, using OLS, ORR and URR methods 
Actual tax burden 
year OLS* ORR* URR** year OLS* ORR* URR** 
1970 -2.957 -2.9565 -1.0364 1986 -2.226 -2.2256 0.9089 
1971 -3.079 -3.0791 -1.3627 1987 -2.198 -2.1982 0.9819 
1972 -2.9 -2.9004 -0.8871 1988 -1.904 -1.9038 1.7655 
1973 -2.882 -2.8824 -0.8392 1989 -2.172 -2.1716 1.0528 
1974 -2.83 -2.8302 -0.7003 1990 -2.489 -2.4889 0.2081 
1975 -2.489 -2.4889 0.2081 1991 -2.477 -2.4769 0.24 
1976 -2.604 -2.6037 -0.0973 1992 -2.43 -2.4304 0.3638 
1977 -2.645 -2.6451 -0.2075 1993 -2.631 -2.6311 -0.1703 
1978 -2.43 -2.4304 0.3638 1994 -2.071 -2.0715 1.3192 
1979 -2.551 -2.551 0.0428 1995 -2.323 -2.3228 0.6503 
1980 -2.604 -2.6037 -0.0973 1996 -2.364 -2.3645 0.5394 
1981 -2.254 -2.2538 0.8339 1997 -2.489 -2.4889 0.2081 
1982 -2.273 -2.273 0.7828 1998 -2.386 -2.386 0.4822 
1983 -2.293 -2.2926 0.7306 1999 -2.477 -2.4769 0.24 
1984 -1.945 -1.9449 1.6561 2000 -2.882 -2.8824 -1.3921 
1985 -2.323 -2.3228 0.6503 Average -2.4703 -2.4703 0.24 
predicted taxable capacity 
1970 -2.952 -2.8448 -1.0331 1986 -2.025 -2.2308 1.3598 
1971 -2.918 -2.7988 -0.9238 1987 -2.084 -2.2574 1.2214 
1972 -2.889 -2.7855 -0.8519 1988 -2.091 -2.2728 1.1935 
1973 -2.853 -2.7603 -0.7558 1989 -2.155 -2.2929 1.0496 
1974 -2.698 -2.6365 -0.3423 1990 -2.497 -2.4701 0.2196 
1975 -2.677 -2.6247 -0.2886 1991 -2.43 -2.4278 0.3886 
1976 -2.575 -2.5485 -0.0167 1992 -2.452 -2.453 0.3293 
1977 -2.693 -2.5951 -0.2913 1993 -2.664 -2.5451 -0.1763 
1978 -2.562 -2.5254 0.0306 1994 -2.217 -2.3412 0.896 
1979 -2.589 -2.5143 -0.0122 1995 -2.27 -2.3313 0.7943 
1980 -2.53 -2.4587 0.1534 1996 -2.112 -2.2316 1.1935 
1981 -2.341 -2.367 0.6117 1997 -2.543 -2.4696 0.1381 
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Following Table 6.10 
year OLS ORR URR year OLS ORR URR 
1982 -2.228 -2.2599 0.9401 1998 -2.495 -2.4548 0.2459 
1983 -2.295 -2.3588 0.7119 1999 -2.525 -2.4597 0.1816 
1984 -2.322 -2.3822 0.6381 2000 -2.619 -2.5269 -0.6143 
1985 -2.277 -2.3528 0.7555 Average -2.4703 -2.4703 0.2499 
Tax effort index 
1970 1.002 1.039 1.003 1986 1.099 0.998 0.668 
1971 1.055 1.1 1.475 1987 1.055 0.974 0.804 
1972 1.004 1.041 1.041 1988 0.911 0.838 1.479 
1973 1.01 1.044 1.11 1989 1.008 0.947 1.003 
1974 1.049 1.073 2.046 1990 0.997 1.008 0.948 
1975 0.93 0.948 0.721 1991 1.019 1.02 0.618 
1976 1.011 1.022 5.823 1992 0.991 0.991 1.105 
1977 0.982 1.019 0.712 1993 0.988 1.034 0.966 
1978 0.948 0.962 11.877 1994 0.934 0.885 1.472 
1979 0.985 1.015 3.51 1995 1.023 0.996 0.819 
1980 1.029 1.059 0.634 1996 1.119 1.06 0.452 
1981 0.963 0.952 1.363 1997 0.979 1.008 1.508 
1982 1.02 1.006 0.833 1998 0.956 0.972 1.961 
1983 0.999 0.972 1.026 1999 0.981 1.007 1.322 
1984 0.838 0.816 2.595 2000 1.1 1.141 1.366 
1985 1.02 0.987 0.861 Average  1.0002 0.9979 1.7136 
* logarithm values ; ** standardized values ; *** Predicted Values  for k = 0.352658 
 
As already mentioned, the study used the OLS, ORR, and URR methods in 
order to improve the results of the estimation.   
From tables 6.10, it can be seen that Libya’s tax effort index tends to be 
above 1 in most of the years. 
According to the ORR method, the country’s tax effort increased from 1.039 
in 1970 to 1.141 in 2000.  
During the period 1970-2000, the OLS, ORR and URR results of the tax 
effort index in Libya were 1.0002, 0.9979 and 1.7136 on average. This 
means that the tax effort was high, because these indices were greater than 
one in most of the study years. 
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6.5 Comparing the Libyan tax capacity and tax effort with selected oil 
producing countries over the period 2001-2007. 
6.5 .1.  Introduction. 
Many developing countries are continuously experiencing pressure to spend 
more on infrastructure, public amenities, education, health care services etc. 
This obviously puts pressure on the tax regime of these countries. However 
developing countries in general have difficulties in generating adequate 
revenues for public expenditure (Stotsky & WoldMariam, 1997).  In many 
developing economies, an undesirable budget deficit and the inefficient use 
of public expenditure have limited many crucial investments in both basic 
infrastructure and human capital that are necessary for providing a 
foundation for sustainable economic growth. In recent years, many 
developing economies have undertaken economic and financial reform 
programmes. Some of these programme implementation exercises were 
supported by the International Monetary Fund. One of the critical 
components of these reform programmes has been measures to raise tax 
revenues and to restructure tax systems (Eltony, 2002). For a developing 
country, tax performance is of crucial importance since it is the prime source 
of domestic resource mobilisation (Begum, 2007). Many developing 
countries often face difficulty in augmenting tax revenue to the desired level 
and considerable attention is being devoted to formulating fiscal policy best 
suited for increasing revenue (Begum, 2007). Conventionally, tax effort has 
been used as an indicator of how much a country is utilising its taxable 
capacity. Tax effort is measured as the ratio of tax revenue to a simple tax 
base, such as GDP. However, this measure does not typically provide a 
proper measure of a country’s tax potential, since there are several other 
factors which affect taxable capacity, such as a country’s economic structure, 
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level of socio-economic development, administrative and political 
constraints, and the indices of business, economic, trade and fiscal freedom 
(these indices are explained in table 6.11). Therefore, a more complete and 
appropriate measure of tax effort index may be defined as the ratio of the 
actual tax share to the predicted (or potential) tax share (Stotsky, 
WoldMariam, 1997). If the ratio or the index is less than one, it means that 
the country is not utilising its full revenue potential. If the value of the index 
is greater than one, it implies that the country is collecting more taxes than 
predicted and the tax burden is high. Measuring the tax performance using 
tax effort based on the ratio of actual tax revenue to the potential or expected 
tax revenue is essentially a ‘static’ one in the sense that it gives the potential 
for tax increases in a country at a given point of time through comparisons 
with other countries (Begum, 2007). However, in order to ascertain whether 
a particular country has made efforts to increase tax revenue over a period of 
time or not, it is important to consider the tax performance in the dynamic 
sense. That is, the tax performance must be viewed longitudinally over a 
period of time to gauge the significance of the changes in this variable over 
time, to give an indication of the efforts made over this period to increase the 
tax revenue. 
 
One of the main purposes of this study is to examine the determinants of tax 
effort and to construct indices of tax effort for Libya and compare them with 
some other oil producing countries. This study makes use of panel data 
regression and cross-sectional country data for the period 2001-2007 for a 
sample of countries. The index of tax effort is constructed as the ratio of 
actual tax share to the predicted (or potential) tax share, as defined and 
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estimated in the literature on this topic by Stotsky and WoldeMariam (1997); 
Leuthold (1991) and Tait and Eichengreen (1978) among others.   
In general, tax shares in developing countries tend to be lower than in 
industrialised countries, (Tanzi, 1992).  
 
In addition to inefficient tax structures, many developing countries are 
characterised by weak tax and customs administrations, which impair efforts 
to collect tax revenues. Tax and customs administrations in these countries 
typically have excessive numbers of poorly trained and supervised staff, 
weak management practices, low salaries, and inadequate equipment and 
supplies.  Discretion in the application of the tax and customs law, owing to 
weak domestic legal and institutional structures, creates opportunities for 
corruption and tax and customs fraud (Eltony, 2002). In recent years though, 
some developing countries have made progress in improving their tax 
systems. An IMF study by WoldeMariam (1995) found that several 
countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Sudan, 
Mauritania and Yemen had all have undertaken a comprehensive programme 
of reform of both tax policy and tax administration, resulting in a significant 
improvement in the structure of their tax systems and an increase in the tax 
share to GDP ratio in the year 2000. 
 
In order to present this study of the tax performance of developing countries, 
section 6.5.2 summarises the methodology of the study; section 6.5.3 
presents the data and variables used in the study; section 6.5.4 gives the 
analysis and discusses the empirical results; while section 6.5.5 provides a 
summary of the empirical results. 
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6.5.2. The methodology. 
This section shows the analysis objectives, statistical methods and analysis, 
and panel regression model and its different types.  
6.5.2.1 Analysis objectives. 
This section presents a description of the methodology adopted in estimating 
both taxable capacity and tax effort using both a cross-section and panel data 
approach. 
This approach has been used widely and applied to samples of both 
developing and industrialised countries (see Tanzi, 1992; Leuthold, 1991; 
Tanzi, 1987; Tanzi, 1981; Tait, Gratz, & Eichengren, 1979; Tait & 
Eichengreen, 1978; Chelliah, Bass, & Kelly, 1975; Chilliah, 1971; Bahl, 
1971; Litz & Moress, 1967). 
Estimating taxable capacity involves regression of the tax/GDP ratio on 
variables that serve as proxies for a country’s tax handles (Tait, Gratz & 
Eichengreen, 1979). 
  
ܶ ܩܦܲ⁄  ൌ ݂ ሺ ܣ ሻ 
 
Where: 
T = tax revenue;   GDP = Gross Domestic Product;   A =  a vector of tax 
base also called tax handles . 
One variant of the approach measures taxable capacity by regression for a 
sample of country or countries, regressing the tax revenue to GDP ratio on 
explanatory variables that serve as proxies for possible tax bases and other 
factors that might affect a country's ability to raise tax revenues. 
Therefore the methodology employed to estimate tax capacity and tax effort 
involved in identifying major economic factors that influence the taxable 
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capacity to levy and to pay taxes and in measuring their relative influences 
through regressions based on cross-section and panel data. Given the 
coefficients of the chosen explanatory variables, a tax ratio can be predicted 
for each country, and this ratio may be taken to present average use of 
taxable capacity factors (Chelliah et al., 1975). 
Generally speaking, this type of tax ratio analysis aims to explain the main 
determinants of differences in the tax ratio across countries. It uses a 
stochastic model  
 
ܶ ܻ ൌ ݂ ሺ  ௜ܺ  , ………… . . , ܺ௡ ,   ܷ ሻ⁄  
 
where T is the total tax revenue , Y is a proxy for income ( either GDP or 
GNP), T/Y is the tax revenue/GDP ratio, Xi ( i=1 ……..n ) represent various 
independent variables expected to influence the tax ratio and U is the error 
term (Piancastelli , 2001): 
The independent variables that have been used by previous researchers 
included: GDP per capita, which is positively related to T/Y; the ratio of 
trade to GDP (imports plus exports value over GDP), which is also assumed 
to be positively related to T/Y because international trade is still an 
important source of tax revenue in developing countries; domestic per capita 
income, which is also expected to be positively related to the tax ratio; the 
share of the mining sector in GDP is also expected to be positively related to 
the tax income ratio; the share of the agricultural sector in GDP is expected 
to be negatively related to T/Y in developing countries and this reflects a 
possible degree of tax evasion in this sector . A high literacy rate and higher 
degree of monetisation of the economy are variables which are expected to 
show a positive relation to the tax/GDP ratio (Piancastelli, 2001). In some 
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literature, value added services, index of fiscal freedom, index of business 
freedom, currency in circulation , index of trade freedom, and value added 
agriculture were also used as regressors of  tax/GDP.  
The present study uses a regression approach to estimating (measuring) 
taxable capacity and tax effort in Libya for the period 2001-2007 and 
comparing it with that of 37 other petroleum-producing countries, which are : 
Algeria; Argentina; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Bolivia; Botswana; Brazil; 
Cameroon; Chad; Chile; Colombia; Congo, Rep.; Cote d'Ivoire; Ecuador; 
Egypt; Equatorial Guinea; Ethiopia; Ghana; Guatemala; Guyana; Indonesia; 
Iran; Kenya; Kuwait; Lesotho; Mauritania; Nigeria; Oman; Peru; Saudi 
Arabia; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; United Arab Emirates; Venezuela; 
Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe.   
Thus the sample consists of countries that tend to have some similar 
economic characteristics. For example, they are all developing countries and 
mainly rely on petroleum-based sources of income. One advantage of 
considering countries having a similar level of development is that it gives a 
better picture when relative tax efforts are compared.  
Another selection criterion of the sample size was the availability of 
information and data. A set of the selected petroleum-producing countries 
was taken. The analysis employed in this part of the study was panel data, 
which uses the common multiple regression model to examine the effects of 
some variables on taxable capacity.  In the panel data analysis, the full 
sample of 38 countries included Libya, and 266 observations over the period 
of 2001 and 2007 were used. These analyses involved two methods, which 
were: cross-sectional data and panel data analysis. The basic regression 
estimated for the 34 cross-sectional analysis was: 
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ܶݕ௜ ൌ  ߙ  ൅ ߚଵܵ݁ݎ ൅ ߚଶܨݏ݂ ൅ ߚଷܤ݂ ൅ ߚସܥ݅ݎ ൅ ߚହ݂ܶ ൅ ߚ଺ܣ݃ݎ ൅ ߝ௜ 
Where: 
ߙ ൌ ܽ ܿ݋݊ݏݐܽ݊ݐ  
ܶݕ௜ ൌ ܶܽݔ ݎ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ ܩܦܲ ⁄ , measure of taxable capacity of country i. 
ܵ݁ݎ ൌ ݏ݁ݎݒ݅ܿ݁ , ܸ݈ܽݑ݁  ܽ݀݀݁݀ ሺ ܽݏ ݏ݄ܽݎ݁ ݋݂ ܩܦܲ ሻ. 
ܨݏ݂ ൌ ݅݊݀݁ݔ ݋݂ ݂݅ݏ݈ܿܽ ݂ݎ݁݁݀݋݉. ( * ) 
ܤ݂ ൌ ݅݊݀݁ݔ ݋݂ ܾݑݏ݅݊݁ݏݏ ݂ݎ݁݁݀݋݉ .( * ) 
ܥ݅ݎ ൌ ܿݑݎݎ݁݊ܿݕ ݅݊ ܿ݅ݎܿݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ % ݋݂ ܩܦܲ . ( * ) 
݂ܶ ൌ ݅݊݀݁ݔ ݋݂ ݐݎܽ݀݁ ݂ݎ݁݁݀݋݉ .( * ) 
ܣ݃ݎ ൌ  ܽ݃ݎ݅ܿݑ݈ݐݑݎ݁  , ܸ݈ܽݑ݁  ܽ݀݀݁݀ ሺ ܽݏ ݏ݄ܽݎ݁ ݋݂ ܩܦܲ ሻ. 
ߝ௜ ൌ ݀݅ݏݐݑݎܾܽ݊ܿ݁ ݐ݁ݎ݉. 
( * ) The measurement of these variables is shown in the appendix to chapter 
six. 
According to the panel data model: 
ܶݕ௜ ൌ  ߙ  ൅ ߚଵܣ݃ݎ ൅ ߚଶܨݕ ൅ ߚଷܣݎ݅ ൅ ߚସܧ݂ ൅ ߚହܥ݌݅ ൅ ߚ଺ܵ݀݁ ൅ ߝ௜ 
ߙ ൌ ܽ ܿ݋݊ݏݐܽ݊ݐ  
ܶݕ௜ ൌ ܶܽݔ ݎ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ ܩܦܲ ⁄ , measure of taxable capacity of country i . 
ܣ݃ݎ ൌ ܽ݃ݎ݅ܿݑ݈ݐݑݎ݁ , ܸ݈ܽݑ݁  ܽ݀݀݁݀ ሺ ܽݏ ݏ݄ܽݎ݁ ݋݂ ܩܦܲ ሻ 
ܨݕ ൌ ݅݊ݐ݁ݎ݊ܽݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ ݐݎܽ݀݁ ሺ ܽݏ ݏ݄ܽݎ݁ ݋݂ ܩܦܲ ሻ 
ܣݎ݅ ൌ ܽ݊݊ݑ݈ܽ ݎܽݐ݁ݏ ݋݂ ݂݈݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ ሺ % ݃ݎ݋ݓݐ݄ ሻ. 
ܧ݂ ൌ ݅݊݀݁ݔ ݋݂ ݁ܿ݋݊݋݉݅ܿ ݂ݎ݁݁݀݋݉  .  
ܥ݌݅ ൌ ܿ݋ݎݎݑ݌ݐ݅݋݊ ݌݁ݎܿ݁݌ݐ݅݋݊ ݅݊݀݁ݔ  . 
ܵ݀݁ ൌ ݏ݄ܽ݀݋ݓ ݁ܿ݋݊݋݉ݕ ݅݊݀݁ݔ. 
ߝ௜ ൌ ݀݅ݏݐݑݎܾܽ݊ܿ݁ ݐ݁ݎ݉. 
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Variables included in the cross sectional analyses are based on the results 
obtained for best possible model performance statistics (R2, Adjusted R2 & 
Standard error of the estimate). This is also validated by variable selection 
methods like forward selection, backward elimination and stepwise with all 
these methods giving almost all of the variables in the final model fitted.  
 
Following the literature, the current study considers GDP as the tax base, 
because GDP includes non-resident income earned locally and excludes 
income received from abroad by residents. Typically, local income of non-
residents is taxed while remittances from abroad are not, and therefore GDP 
produces a more accurate measure of taxable capacity.  
Using aforementioned independent variables, inter-country tax effort 
comparisons can be make for Libya with its peers. It should be noted that tax 
effort indices may be considered to be superior to tax/GDP ratio 
comparisons because they take into account the differences in the way each 
country exploits its taxable capacity. Thus, the tax effort indices are 
computed and used for comparing Libyan tax performance with some 
selected oil producing countries. The index of tax effort is measured by 
taking the ratio of the actual tax share to the predicted (calculated) tax share 
(Piancastelli, 2001). This index can be taken for the purposes of international 
tax comparison. 
According to the literature (e.g. Shamsub & Akoto, 2004; Mertens, 2003; Le 
Minhl, 2008; Sobarzo, 2004): 
 
ܶܽݔ ݂݂݁݋ݎݐ ൌ    ௧௔௫ ௖௢௟௟௘௖௧௜௢௡௧௔௫௔௕௟௘ ௖௔௣௔௖௜௧௬ 
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If this ratio is greater than one, the country is said to be a high tax effort 
country; conversely if the ratio is less than one the country is a low tax effort 
country (Leuthold, 1991). An index of one means the country's tax effort is 
at the “expected" level, given the structural factors of that country. By 
comparing tax effort across similar countries, it may be possible to identify 
countries which have the potential to increase tax revenues through 
increasing their tax effort. Alternatively, countries may be identified where 
tax effort is already high and it would be more advantageous to closely 
examine the expenditure side of the budget (Mertens, 2003). 
 
6.5.2.2 Statistical Methods and Analysis. 
Based on the study objectives, an appropriate research design was 
constructed. This essentially involves a secondary data design with data 
collected on a sample of counties for a set of variables with tax burden being 
the target or dependent variable. This was collected for a period of seven 
years from 2001 to 2007. This effectively makes the data set a longitudinal 
one.  
Both cross sectional and panel data analysis methods were used in this study. 
Cross sectional data assumes that the data on several variables is collected 
for different well defined sampling elements (selected oil-producing 
countries in this study) only once in a fixed period of time. However, the 
data in this study comes from a time period of 2001 to 2007, and hence a 
representative value (mean) s used for each variable and each country, to 
form part of a cross sectional data analysis. Furthermore, a multiple 
regression model was fitted by taking the actual tax burden data (mean value 
for 2001 to 2007 for each country) as the dependent variable and mean value 
across the time period for all the variables as set of predictor variables to be 
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included the regression model. Ordinary least squares method was used to fit 
the regression model.  
The availability of longitudinal and cross-sectional data makes panel data 
analysis possible. Panel data regression models are increasingly being used 
in applied economics.  
With repeated observations of an adequate number of cross-sections, panel 
data analysis permits the researcher to study the dynamics of change even 
with a short time series data. The combination of time series data with cross-
sectional elements can clearly improve the quality and quantity of data in 
ways that would be virtually impossible using only one of these two 
dimensions (Gujarati, 2004).  
Panel data sets remain a consistently used research technique, and there are 
several reasons for this continued interest. An important one is that their use 
may offer a solution to the problem of bias caused by unobserved 
heterogeneity, a common problem in the fitting of models with cross-
sectional data sets (Dougherty, 2007). The second reason is that with panel 
data analysis it is possible to reveal dynamics that are very difficult and at 
times impossible to detect with cross-sectional data. A third attraction of 
panel data sets is that they often have very large numbers of observations 
(Szarowska, 2010).  
The spatial dimension of panel data analysis pertains to a set of cross-
sectional units of observation. These could be firms, commodities, countries, 
states, groups of people, or individuals. Temporal dimension of panel data 
refers to periodic observations of a set of variables characterising these 
cross-sectional units over a particular time span. 
310 
 
Apart from the variable number, the data structure confers upon the 
variables two dimensions, and the error term also has two dimensions, one 
for the country, and one for the time period (Dhamija, 2010). 
 
6.5.2.2.1 Panel Regression Model and its different types. 
A general panel data regression model is of the following form 
Yt = α + β1 X1t + β2 X2t + β3 X3t + …………………………+ βkXkt+ εt.  Here 
t is the index for time, Y is the dependent variable, X1, X2,…………….Xk 
are set of independent predictor variables. There are several types of panel 
data analytic models, namely: (1) Constant coefficients model (2) Fixed 
effects models and (3) Random effects models. Within each of these models 
it is possible to fit different types of models including dynamic panel, robust, 
and covariance structure models (Yaffee, 2003). 
  
(1) The Constant Coefficients Model 
One type of panel model has constant coefficients, referring to both 
intercepts and regression coefficients. Supposing that there is neither 
significant country nor significant temporal effects, it is then possible to pool 
all of the data and run an ordinary least squares regression model. Such 
models are called the pooled regression model. 
 
(2) The Fixed Effects Model  
Another type of panel model will have constant regression coefficients but 
varying intercepts that differ according to the cross-sectional unit—for 
example, countries. Although there are no significant time effects, there are 
significant differences among countries in this type of model. While the 
intercept is cross-section (group) specific and differs from country to 
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country, it may or may not differ over time. These models are called fixed 
effects models (Yaffee, 2003).  
 
Another type of fixed effects model could have constant regression 
coefficients but intercepts that differ according to time. In this case, the 
model would have no significant country differences but might have serial 
correlation because of time-lagged effects. The residuals of this kind of 
model may have autocorrelation. In this case, the variables are homogenous 
across the countries.  
 
Although fixed effects models offer more flexibility than constant 
coefficients model, they are not without their drawbacks. Fixed effects 
models may have large number of cross-sectional units which means a 
requirement of s large number of dummy variables in the regression model. 
Too many dummy variables may reduce the number of degrees of freedom 
for powerful statistical tests (Zhang, 2010) and may seriously affect the 
simplicity of the model. Also, a model with many such variables may be 
affected by the issue of multicollinearity, which inflates standard errors and 
hence drains the model of statistical power to test parameters.  
 
(3) The Random Effects Model 
Random effects model is a regression with a random constant term (Greene, 
2003). That is, intercept is a random variable. The random outcome is a 
function of a mean value plus a random error. But this cross-sectional 
specific error term which indicates the deviation from the constant of the 
cross-sectional unit (country) must be uncorrelated with the errors of the 
variables if this model is to be estimated (Yaffee, 2003).   
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(4) Robust Panel Models 
Panel data models work under some stringent assumptions. Outliers can 
easily bias regression coefficients, particularly if they report very bad 
leverage values. These outliers can be weighted down with the use of M-
estimators in the model. Heteroskedasticity problems arise from group wise 
differences, and often taking group means can remove heteroskedasticity. 
The use of a White heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimator with 
ordinary least squares estimation in fixed effects models can yield standard 
errors robust to unequal variance along the predicted line (Greene, 2002; 
Wooldridge, 2002). 
 
Sometimes autocorrelation inheres within the panels from one time period to 
another. Some problems with dynamic panels that contain autocorrelation in 
the residuals are handled with a Prais-Winston transformation or a 
Cochrane-Orcutt transformation that amounts to a first partial differencing to 
remove the bias from the autocorrelation. Arellano, Bond, and Bover (1995) 
developed one and two step general methods of moments (GMM) estimators 
for panel data analysis. GMM is usually robust to deviations of the 
underlying data generation process to violations of heteroskedasticity and 
normality, insofar as they are asymptotically normal, but they are not always 
the most efficient estimators. If there is autocorrelation in the models, it is 
possible to obtain a weight-adjusted combination of the White and Newey-
West estimator to handle both the heteroskedasticity and the autocorrelation 
in the model (Yaffee, 2003). 
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6.5. 3. Data and Variables used in the study. 
The data for the present study were obtained from the World Development 
Indicators 2008, (World Bank, 2008) and the Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbooks, (International Monetary Fund, various years). 
The tax revenue and GDP data are from IMF sources, including various 
country reports and the International Financial Statistics Yearbook. The 
study obtained data on tax revenue published by governments of the 
countries under study. The sectoral shares of GDP were obtained from the 
World Bank Development Indicators. 
The estimations of tax capacity and tax effort were carried out using STATA 
12 and Eviews 6 econometric software packages. 
 
Table 6.11 Methods and variables description 
Analysis 
Variable 
Abbreviation 
Variable name Description 
C
ro
ss
   
Se
ct
io
na
l 
Ser 
Services, value 
added (% of 
GDP) 
Include wholesale and retail trade (including hotels and 
restaurants), transport, and government, financial, 
professional, and education, health care …etc. Value 
added is the net output of a sector after adding up all 
outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. 
Agr 
Agriculture, 
Added value ( % 
of GDP ) 
Includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation 
of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net 
output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting 
intermediate inputs. 
Fsf 
Index of Fiscal 
Freedom 
Measures the fiscal burden in an economy, i.e., top tax rates 
on individual and corporate income; 0 = least fiscal freedom, 
and 100 = maximum degree of fiscal freedom. 
Bf 
Index of business 
freedom 
Measures the time and efforts of business activity ranging; 0 
= least business freedom, and 100 = maximum business 
freedom. 
Contd. 
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Following Table 6.11 Methods and variables description 
Analysis 
Variable 
Abbreviation 
Variable name Description 
C
ro
ss
   
Se
ct
io
na
l 
Cir 
Currency in 
Circulation % of 
GDP 
 
Currency outside the banks as a proportion of GDP 
Tf 
Index of Trade 
Freedom 
Measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that 
affect imports and exports of goods and services. 
Pa
ne
l  
D
at
a 
 A
na
ly
si
s 
Agr 
Agriculture, 
Added value ( % 
of GDP ) 
Includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation 
of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net 
output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting 
intermediate inputs. 
Fy 
Foreign trade 
( Imports + 
Exports) % of 
GDP 
The sum of exports and imports of all goods and services 
measured as a share of gross domestic product. 
 
Ari 
Annual Rates of 
Inflation ( % 
growth ) 
Measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual 
percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of 
acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed 
or changed at specified intervals (annual %). 
Ef 
index of 
Economic 
Freedom 
Economic Freedom Index; 0 = least economic freedom, and 
100 = maximum economic freedom. 
Cpi 
Corruption 
Perceptions Index  
The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector. The 
scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is the highest level of perceived 
corruption, where the country with the lowest score is the 
one perceived to be the most corrupt and 10 is the lowest. 
 
Sde 
Shadow Economy 
index 
Weighted average size of the shadow economy (as a 
percentage of gross domestic product). Measure of informal 
economy caused by economy reasons. Estimated for 162 
countries during 1999-2007 using multiple indicator- 
multiple causes model. 
Tax burden (Ty) was taken as a dependent variable. 
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Panel data analysis, including the same set of variables used in cross 
sectional data, gave a significantly large number of missing values for 
several countries for several years. Therefore, variables included as predictor 
variables in panel analysis were based on the same logic adopted in cross 
sectional data analysis (based on model performance measures).  
 
The data on all the variables are quantitative in nature and are continuous. A 
sample of 38 oil producing countries was taken for this study (using the 
panel regression model). Initially a sample of 56 oil producing countries was 
taken and the data on all the variables for the time period 2001 to 2007 were 
recorded. This was reduced to 38 as the data on all the variables for all the 
years for the period 2001 to 2007 was not available for all the countries. 
Therefore only those countries which reported data for all the variables for 
all the years during 2001 to 2007 were included as a part of the analysis. The 
list of variables included for cross sectional and panel regression model 
analysis is presented in table 6.11. 
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Table 6.12 The International data sources 
Variable 
symbols  
Variable name  Data Sources  
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
Ty    Tax revenue  (% of GDP ) 
 Economic Commission for Latin America 
and Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic Survey 
of Latin America and Caribbean, 2009-2010., 
and World Bank, World Development 
Indicators database.  Zimbabwe: 2001-2003 
from African Economic outlook, 
AFDB/OECD, 2003; data of 2004 were 
estimated; and 2005-2007 General 
government revenue % of GDP from 
Economy watch: 
http://www.economywatch.com. 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Agr 
Agriculture, Added value ( % of 
GDP )  World Bank  
Ser Services, value added (% of GDP) World Bank; OECD National Accounts data. 
Fy 
Foreign trade ( Imports+exports) % of 
GDP 
LSE London School of Economic database. 
Ari   
Annual Rates of Inflation ( % 
growth ) 
 International Marketing Data and Statistics,  
Euromonitor International Plc; 33rd edition , 
2009., Data of 2001 estimated . 
Ef Index of Economic Freedom Heritage Foundation. 
Cpi Corruption Perceptions Index CPI Transparency International Organisation. 
Sde Shadow Economy index 
 Friedrich Schneider; Andreas Buehn ; and 
Claudio E. Montenegro . " Shadow 
Economies All over world - new estimates for 
162 countries from 1999 to 2007 " , The 
world Bank , Development Research Group , 
July 2010 , WPS5356 . 
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Follows Table 6.12 The International data sources 
 
Variable 
symbols  Variable name  Data Sources  
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Cir     Currency in Circulation % of GDP 
IMF, and LSE London School of Economic 
database, and ESCWA Economic and social 
commission for western Asia. 
Bf    Index of Business Freedom Heritage Foundation. 
Tf Index of Trade Freedom Heritage Foundation. 
Fsf Index of Fiscal Freedom Heritage Foundation. 
 
 
6.5 .4.  Analysis and Results. 
6.5.4.1  Cross Sectional Analysis. 
Cross sectional data analysis is performed by taking the mean of the 
variables for both dependent and independent variables in the regression 
model. Taking the mean for all variables in both sides of the regression 
equation does not ignore any big difference between these variables. 
Table 6.13 gives the descriptive statistics for all the variables. 
 
Table 6.13 Descriptive Statistics of variables included in cross sectional 
analysis 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Ty 1.5197 28.457 15.1456 7.8044 
Ser 24.126 65.686 49.079 9.852 
Fsf 53.028 99.900 75.596 11.9284 
Bf 34.285 75.814 59.5273 9.7420 
Cir   1.476 2170.657 570.874 697.828 
Tf 26.142 77.828 61.4403 11.701 
Agr .39954 45.4446 13.6202 11.295 
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Cross sectional analysis is performed by fitting a multiple regression model 
with mean of variables representing sample realisations. 
Countries used in the cross sectional data analysis consisted of 34 oil 
producing countries which were: Algeria, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, 
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Gabon ,Ghana, Guatemala ,Guyana ,Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Kuwait, Libya, 
Mauritania, Oman, Peru, Saudi, South Africa, Suriname, Syria, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia ,Emirates, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe , using data for the 
period of 2001-2007. 
The fitted regression model gives coefficient of determination R2 = 0.622, 
Adjusted R2 = 0.593. The overall regression model fitted was statistically 
significant as indicated by the ANOVA F test (F (6, 27) = 7.420, p <0.001). 
Tolerance level and Variance inflation factors (VIF) were computed for each 
predictor variable. All the VIF values were below 3.00, which indicates that 
there was no problem of multicollinearity in the fitted regression model.  
Table 6.14 reports estimates of regression coefficients, their standard errors, 
t statistics values, and associated p values to test the significance of each 
predictor variable included in the model.  
 
Table 6.14 Model parameter estimates and test for their significance for cross sectional OLS 
regression model 
 
Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 16.711 8.777  1.904 .068 -1.298 34.720   
Ser .232 .099 .293 2.345 .027 .029 .436 .893 1.119 
Fsf -.444 .102 -.678 -4.347 .000 -.653 -.234 .574 1.741 
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Follows Table 6.14 Model parameter estimates and test for their significance for cross sectional 
OLS regression model 
 
 
Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound Tolerance VIF 
Bf .365 .118 .456 3.095 .005 .123 .607 .644 1.552 
Cir .002 .002 .198 1.471 .153 -.001 .005 .770 1.299 
Tf -.010 .097 -.015 -.106 .917 -.209 .189 .661 1.514 
Agr -.132 .093 -.192 -1.427 .165 -.323 .058 .775 1.291 
 
Three predictor variables included in the model were found to be statistically 
significant predictors of tax burden. These were:  Services, value added as % 
of GDP " Ser "  ( t= 2.345 ), Index of Fiscal Freedom " Fsf" ( t=-4.347 ), and 
Index of Business Freedom" Bf " ( t= 3.095 ). Other variables included in 
the model were statistically not significant predictors of Ty.   
The effect of the relative importance of the agricultural sector was weak 
on the taxable capacity of oil-producing countries in Libya during the 
period under study, in the sense that the taxable capacity was not 
responding to changes in the agricultural sector product. According to the 
cross-sectional analysis, this weak relationship was negative and 
statistically not significant. This is attributed to the agricultural sector not 
representing great importance in the structure of GDP in Libya, as well as 
the exemption of the agricultural sector from taxation.  
According to cross-sectional analysis, the product of the service sector 
and index of business freedom were positively and significantly 
correlated with taxable capacity, while the index of fiscal freedom was 
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negatively correlated with taxable capacity in Libya and other oil-
producing countries under study during the period 2001-2007. 
There was a relationship, semi-strong, positive and significant, between 
the service sector product and the taxable capacity in Libya and other oil-
producing countries under study. According to the cross-sectional data, 
the study showed that the increase in the relative importance of the 
product of this sector at 10% leads to an increase in the contribution of 
taxes in GDP at (2.3%) during 2001-2007. 
Applying the cross-sectional analysis, the currency in circulation, the 
index of trade freedom, and the agriculture added value were statistically 
not significant in determining the taxable capacity.  
There was a positive relationship between currency in circulation and the 
taxable capacity. However, there was a negative relationship between the 
taxable capacity and the index of trade freedom on the one hand and 
agricultural product on the other. 
To summarise, Services as a percentage of GDP and index of business 
freedom were positively and significantly correlated with taxable capacity. 
This means that as the percentage of services in GDP and level of business 
freedom increases, the associated taxable capacity is expected to increase.  
However, index of fiscal freedom is negatively correlated with tax burden 
when controlled for other variables.  
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Figure 6.1 Residual plot of the regression analysis performed. 
 
 
An important assumption of the classical linear regression model is that the 
error terms have the same variance, meaning to be homoscedastic. The 
violation of this assumption results in the heteroscedasticity problem. Figure 
6.1 shows scatterplot of the studentized residuals against the standardized 
predicted values of dependent variable Ty . Values along the horizontal axis 
are the standardized predicted Ty, and vertical axis are studentized residuals 
Ty. The scatterplot shows that the residuals fall between -3 and +3 . Also , it 
reveals that the most points are in a constant horizontal band , this means 
that the residuals are randomly scattered around zero (the horizontal line) , 
and no systematic pattern between the residuals and predicted values , 
suggesting the absence of heteroscedasticity problem in the data , and the 
model fits well, because the assumption of constant variance is not violated. 
322 
 
According to the figure 6.1 of Residual plot of the regression model for 
cross sectional analysis, the residual plot gives a healthy pattern of random 
scatter of residual values in the scatter plot indicating that assumptions of the 
regression model are satisfied. 
 
6.5.4.2 Panel Data Analysis. 
Panel data analysis was conducted by taking countries as panel elements and 
year as time index. Panel data regression offers several forms of the model 
based on the assumption of homogeneity of estimates, either for time or for 
panel elements. In this study a mixed (both fixed and random effects 
included) is performed. Robust standard errors were extracted to account for 
any deviation from homogeneity of error variance assumption.  
Countries used in the panel data analysis were 38 oil producing countries, 
namely: Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, 
Cameroon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Rep. of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, E.Guinea, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Emirates, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Indonesia, 
Iran, Kenya, Kuwait, Lesotho, Libya, Mauritania, Nigeria, Oman, Peru, 
Saudi, T.Tobago, Tunisia, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Hausman’s test is used to validate the consistency and efficiency of 
parameter estimates fitted using random effects model after making a 
comparison with fixed effect model as an alternative. Hausman’s test 
confirms the appropriateness of the model form taken, as results clearly 
indicate that it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of consistent and 
efficient estimates from the fitted model compared to the alternative (χ2 (6) = 
0.228, p = .996). Table 6.15 reports the summary of results of panel data 
regression. The overall model is reported as statistically significant (Wald χ2 
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(6) = 93.04, p < .001). This means that there was at least one significant 
predictor of the dependent variable in the fitted panel regression model.  
 
Table 6.15 Panel data mixed effect regression model parameter estimates and test for 
their significance. 
 Robust 
 Coef.  Std. Err.       Z statistics P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
Agr .0471756    .2146138      0.22     0.826     -.3734597     .4678109 
Fy -.0808207    .0274052     -2.95     0.003     -.1345339    -.0271076 
 Ari    -.0006022    .0001205     -5.00     0.000     -.0008383     -.000366 
Ef .8564374    .8210275      1.04     0.297      -.752747     2.465622 
Cpi -5.096667    5.736827     -0.89     0.374     -16.34064     6.147308 
Sde .3979752    .2620084     1.52     0.129     -.1155518     .9115021 
 _cons    -24.76919    34.03386     -0.73     0.467     -91.47434     41.93595 
 
The assessment of significance of each predictor variable reveals that 
foreign trade as a percentage of GDP and annual rates of inflation were 
significant predictors of tax burden in the set of predictors included in the 
model. Signs of the regression coefficient estimated were negative for these 
significant predictors. Other variables included in the panel data regression 
model were statistically not significant (p > .05), with different signs (+/-).  
According to panel data analysis, foreign trade and the rate of inflation 
were negatively significantly correlated with taxable capacity in Libya 
and oil countries under study during the period 2001-2007. 
Also, the taxable capacity correlated positively with these variables: 
agricultural product, the index of economic freedom, the shadow economy 
index, while it correlated negatively with corruption perceptions index. 
However, these variables were statistically not significant in determining the 
taxable capacity. 
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Based on the panel regression results, both the actual tax burden and tax 
capacity of 38 oil producing countries were obtained, as presented in table 
49 and table 50 respectively, in the statistical appendix.  
There were two stages involved in estimating tax effort. First, using fitted 
panel regression model and substituting the values of the predictor variables 
to get the estimated expected tax revenue (potential tax revenue or simply, 
estimated taxable capacity of a country). Second, the ratio of actual tax 
burden to estimated taxable capacity was then computed for each country for 
each year for the period 2001 to 2007. This ratio is called the tax effort.  
Using the panel data method, the level of taxable capacity was low in Libya 
compared to some oil-producing countries, in that estimated taxable capacity 
in Libya was about 2.22 during the study period. The reason behind that 
decline in taxable capacity was the narrow tax base, and a failure to diversify 
the sources of tax, as well as the public sector being subject to tax (see table 
53 in the appendix). 
Table 6.16, Average tax effort in selected oil producing countries, 2001-2007. 
Country 
average tax 
effort Country 
average tax 
effort Country average tax effort 
Algeria 1.119 E.Guinea 1.297 Libya 2.549 
Argentina 0.641 Ecuador 0.748 Mauritania 1.785 
Bahrain 1.179 Egypt 0.781 Nigeria 0.409 
Bangladesh 0.321 Emirates 0.404 Oman 5.891 
Bolivia 0.481 Ethiopia 0.394 Peru 0.414 
Botswana 1.712 Ghana 0.197 Saudi 0.436 
Brazil 0.748 Guatemala 0.302 T.Tobago 1.004 
Cameroon 0.58 Guyana 0.906 Tunisia 2.167 
Chad 0.34 Indonesia 0.673 Venezuela 0.282 
Chile 1.659 Iran 1.802 Yemen 0.518 
Colombia 0.614 Kenya 0.584 Zambia 0.576 
Congo.Rep 0.811 Kuwait 0.185 Zimbabwe 1.115 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.451 Lesotho 3.416 Overall Average 1.039 
Source, Table 51 in the statistical appendix . 
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Table 51 in the appendix shows the estimated tax effort in the selected oil 
producing countries, 2001-2007. The average tax efforts for selected 
countries during the same period are presented in table 6.16. This table 
contributed to this study by helping to hold the comparison of the tax effort 
between Libya and the rest of the countries in the study sample. 
 
According to the literature ( Mertens, 2003; Begum, 2007; Hoek, 2008; Le  
et al., 2008; AFDB/OECD, 2010) any country with tax effort value more 
than 1.00 indicates high tax effort and those with tax effort value less than 
1.00 indicates the existence of a low tax effort.  
According to the panel data analysis, the index of national tax effort in Libya 
indicates an approximate value of 2.55 as an average for 2001-2007, which 
is high compared to some oil-producing countries. This means that the 
Libyan economy has exceeded its full utilisation of the taxable capacity. 
 
Table 52 in the appendix provides the comparison of each country's mean 
actual tax burden in relation to the overall mean tax burden for all samples. 
Out of a sample of 38 countries, 18 countries were found to have high tax 
burden status with the remaining 20 low tax burden countries. Libya was one 
of the countries with lower than average tax burdens. 
Table 53 in the statistical appendix shows the comparison of each country's 
mean estimated taxable capacity in relation to the overall mean taxable 
capacity for all the countries. Out of a sample of 38 countries, 19 countries 
had high taxable capacity, whilst the remaining 19 had low taxable capacity: 
Libya was one of them. 
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Table 6.17 provides a cross tabulation of taxable capacity status against tax 
burden status.  
Eleven countries fall in the categories of high tax capacity and high tax 
burden status: these were Algeria; Bolivia; Brazil; Colombia; Congo.Rep;  
E.Guinea ; Guyana; Kenya ; Nigeria ; T.Tobago; Zambia. Eight countries 
fell in the categories of high taxable capacity and low tax burden. These 
countries were Bangladesh; Cameroon; Chad; Côte d'Ivoire; Ethiopia; 
Ghana; Guatemala; and Peru. This means that these countries were not fully 
utilising the taxable capacity of their economies and they had opportunities 
to increase tax rates thus enhancing government tax revenues to be 
potentially used for economic development. Only seven countries fell into 
the categories of low taxable capacity and high tax burden: these seven 
countries were Botswana; Chile; Egypt; Lesotho; Mauritania; Tunisia; and 
Zimbabwe. Finally, twelve countries fell in the categories of low taxable 
capacity and low tax burden.  
 
Table 6.17 Cross table of Taxable Capacity and Tax Burden 
taxable  Tax burden  
capacity High Low 
High 
Algeria Guyana Bangladesh Ethiopia 
Bolivia Kenya Cameroon Ghana 
Brazil Nigeria Chad Guatemala 
Colombia T.Tobago Côte d'Ivoire Peru 
Congo.Rep Zambia     
E.Guinea       
Low 
Botswana Mauritania Argentina Kuwait 
Chile Tunisia Bahrain Libya 
Egypt Zimbabwe Ecuador Oman 
Lesotho Emirates Saudi 
    Indonesia Venezuela 
    Iran Yemen 
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These were: Argentina; Bahrain; Ecuador; Emirates; Indonesia; Iran; 
Kuwait; Libya; Oman; Saudi; Venezuela; Yemen.  
 
6.5. 5. Summary of the empirical results. 
Both cross sectional and panel data analysis were performed in this study 
covering data for the period 2001 to 2007. In cross section analysis the share 
of services in GDP and indices of fiscal and economic freedom were found 
to be significant influencers of tax capacity for all countries.   
Specifically, the share of services in GDP and level of business freedom 
given in the country were found to be positively and significantly correlated 
with tax capacity, while index of fiscal freedom was negatively correlated 
with tax capacity. 
The panel data analysis, which incorporated the dynamic of changes over 
time, conducted in this study revealed that foreign trade and inflation were 
significant predictors of tax capacity.  
According to the research analysis, Libya was one of 12 out of 38 oil-
producing countries with low tax capacity and low tax burden.  
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Chapter Seven:  Conclusions and recommendations of the study. 
7. 1 Summary of this study:  
This dissertation has provided a comprehensive study of Libyan tax system, 
structure and its evolution for the period of 1970 to 2005 (chapter 3, 4, and 
5). Moreover, the measurement of the taxable capacity and the tax burden in 
the Libyan economy during the period 1970-2000 have also been examined 
using OLS, ORR and URR approaches.  Furthermore, the major 
determinants of tax effort of Libya have been explored and discussed in 
comparison with a range of oil-producing countries for the period 2001-
2007, using both cross-sectional and panel analyses. 
This study shows that Libyan tax revenue derives primarily from indirect 
taxes, such as import tax and production tax.  It has also found that the 
marginal propensity to indirect taxation exceeds the marginal propensity to 
direct taxation.  One of the key findings of this study reveals that there is a 
low tax burden with a lower taxable capacity in Libya. 
It is also noted that the impact of economic factors on the level of taxable 
capacity in Libya varied significantly over the study period. 
 
7.2 Empirical results of the study. 
7.2.1. The main empirical results. 
The empirical study of this work found the following results: 
First, indirect taxes are heavily relied upon and the importance of direct 
taxes in tax revenue is relatively small. During 1970-2005, the relative 
importance of indirect taxes reached on average 60% of tax revenue, 
compared to 40% for direct taxes, despite of the higher growth of the direct 
tax rate (11%), than that of  indirect taxes (9.5%).The predominance of 
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indirect taxes in the Libyan tax structure may be attributed to a number of 
reasons, including the high relative importance of the foreign trade sector, 
high marginal propensity to consume of the consumers, the participation of 
all residents in the burden of indirect taxes, the integration of indirect  taxes 
in relation to the prices of goods and services, the clarity of the indirect tax 
base; the ease of collecting such taxes; and the difficulty of payment 
evasion. Meanwhile, the decline in the relative importance of direct taxes in 
Libya was due to the narrow income tax base in general. 
Second, the marginal propensity to tax was generally high, as this indicator 
reached 0.03 for direct taxes, 0.05 for indirect taxes and 0.08 for total taxes. 
In the case of tax on the non-oil sector’s product, an increase in the non-oil 
sector’s product by one Libyan Dinar was taxable at 0.08 of the Dinar.  
Third, the Libyan tax system was not effectively responding to the changes 
in the non-oil sector product during 1970-2005. This was illustrated by the 
low coefficient of income elasticity of tax, which amounted to 0.63 for direct 
taxes, 0.65 for indirect taxes and 0.56 for total taxes. This means that the 
change in the revenue of non-oil sector product during the study period led 
to only a small change in the tax revenue. 
Fourth, the tax burden in Libya was relatively high in relation to citizen’s 
income. This was evident from the per capita tax, which was on average 
LYD480 per year during 1970-2005, which was equivalent to LYD40 per 
month on average. It was a high burden compared to the growing cost of 
living and to average per capita income, which was close to LYD498 a 
month. It was estimated that the tax burden per capita was in the range of 
8%, necessitating a reduction in this burden so as not to adversely affect the 
level of taxable capacity in the Libyan economy. 
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In contrast, the tax bases in Libya were weak during the study period, due in 
part to tax avoidance and tax evasion. In addition, there was a lack of 
information that could be used to monitor tax compliance (Stiglitz et al., 
2006). Specifically, the reasons contributing to the narrow tax bases 
including: poor economic performance of most public productivity projects, 
reduction of the private sector’s role in economic activity, nullification of 
estate tax, postponement of some taxes such as income on agriculture tax, 
expansion of the black market and low rate of return of investment due to oil 
prices' instability. 
Fifth, the income tax rates were inconsistent with other tax bases. For 
example, the average rate of estate tax (its base is an income resulting from 
capital) was 20%, which  is less than the average rates of the rest of the 
specific progressive income taxes,   which are the taxes  deducted from the 
incomes resulting from the work element only, or income from work and 
capital elements together. For example, the average rate of tax on commerce, 
industry and crafts (the income source of which is both capital and work) 
was 25%. 
Finally, Libyan tax legislation is complex. Its implementation lacks stability, 
and the continuation of adjustments sometimes does not comply with the tax 
law. The tax system also suffers from excessive complexity in its 
administrative procedures for assessing and collecting tax. As a result, there 
is a widespread tax evasion and avoidance and a high cost of collection, all 
of which adversely affected the country’s taxable capacity. During the study 
period, the growth rate of the tax legislation penalties in Libya reached 11%, 
and as an example of the effect of this, customs penalties were up to 
LYD12.4 million in 1997. This was a clear indication of low tax 
331 
 
consciousness and the phenomenon of tax evasion.  In the meantime, 
however, there was an over-collection of tax. This overtaxing was for a 
number of reasons such as: finance the public budget, absence of efficient 
tax policy, and absence of studies on tax effort. This excessive tax imposed 
by several ways, such as: arbitrary tax assessment, exceeding the planned tax 
revenue in some years, raising some tax rates, and imposing new taxes. It 
exceeded, at high and ongoing rates, the planned targets under the law of the 
annual public budget, during the vast majority of the years under study in 
Libya. According to table 42 (see the statistical appendix) the excess of tax 
collection was about LYD535 million on average between 1970-2005, 
which indicates a high tax burden inside the Libyan economy.  
 
7.2.2. Regression results. 
This section details the regression results of this study. 
7.2.2.1. The ORR:  Determinants of Libya’s Tax Capacity between 1970 
and 2000. 
 
Here the period 1970-2000 was chosen in order to obtain the best estimates, 
and also because the period 2001-2007 was analysed using other methods 
(cross-sectional and panel data). The period 1970-2000 was used to study 
the tax effort inside Libya only; therefore, OLS, ORR and URR methods 
were used.  In contrast, the period of 2001-2007 was used for comparison of 
the tax effort between Libya and the other  countries in the study . Therefore, 
the cross sectional and the panel data methods are appropriate for these 
international comparisons. 
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Firstly, according to the ORR, there was a negative relationship between oil 
revenues and taxable capacity in Libya for the period 1970-2000. The 
regression result shows that increasing the oil revenues by 100% led to a 
reduction in taxable capacity of 3%. This negative relationship was due to 
reduced reliance on tax revenues in the years when there was a rise in oil 
revenues. In other words, when oil revenues increased, there was no urgent 
need for tax revenues. In fact, as one of the measures of fiscal policy, the 
Libyan government even reduced taxes and increased public spending when 
oil revenues increased.  
Secondly, according to the ORR, there was a positive relationship between 
tax penalties and taxable capacity in Libya over 1970-2000. The regression 
results indicate that increasing tax penalties by 100% led to an increase in 
tax capacity of 8%. This positive relationship is attributed to these penalties 
encouraging taxpayers to comply with tax payment on time.  
Thirdly, according to the ORR, there was a positive relationship between 
money supply (in the narrow M1 sense) and taxable capacity in Libya during 
1970-2000, to the extent that increasing the money supply by 100% led to an 
increase in tax capacity of 11%. This relationship was positive because the 
increase in the money supply led to an increase in the volume of transactions 
and trade exchanges that were subject to tax. 
 
7.2.2.2. Cross-sectional Regression: Determinants of Libya’s Tax 
Capacity between 2001 and 2007, and Comparison with that of Selected 
Oil-Producing Countries. 
The cross-sectional regression yielded the following results. Firstly, the 
importance of the agricultural sector was weak in terms of taxable capacity 
both in Libya and in other oil-producing countries during the period under 
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study, although this weak relationship was not statistically significant. This 
is attributed to the agricultural sector not representing great importance in 
the structure of GDP in these countries. Some areas of the agricultural 
sectors were even exempted from taxation.  
Secondly, according to the cross-sectional analysis, the product of the 
service sector and index of business freedom were positively and 
significantly correlated with taxable capacity, while the index of fiscal 
freedom was negatively correlated with taxable capacity in Libya and oil-
producing countries under study during 2001-2007; this was because the 
high index of fiscal freedom indicates a relative decline in the level of state 
intervention in economic affairs. This led to lower taxable capacity. 
Thirdly, there was a positive relationship between currency in circulation 
and taxable capacity. At the same time, there was a negative relationship 
between taxable capacity and the index of trade freedom. This is a natural 
result of the reduction of some customs tax and barriers; this led to lower tax 
revenue and decreased taxable capacity in the short term. Also there was a 
negative relationship between taxable capacity and the agricultural product, 
for several reasons such as: tax exemption to the private agricultural sector, 
high degree of risk in this sector, and decline in the relative importance of 
the agricultural sector in most oil-producing countries. 
 
7.2.2.3. Panel data regression: Determinants of Libya’s Tax Capacity 
between 2001 and 2007 and Comparison with that of Selected Oil-
Producing Countries. 
First, it was found that using the panel data method, the level of taxable 
capacity was lower in Libya compared to some oil-producing countries. It 
was estimated that taxable capacity in Libya was about 2.22 during 2001-
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2007, whereas the overall average of the taxable capacity in selected oil-
producing countries was 20.15 during the same period. The reason behind 
the relative lower taxable capacity in Libya was Libya’s narrow tax base, 
and the failure to diversify the sources of tax, as shown by the fact that the 
relative importance of non-oil product to GDP in Libya has decreased from 
36.9% in 1970 to 34.5% in 2005 (see table 2 in the statistical appendix).  
Second, according to the panel data analysis, the index number of national 
tax effort in Libya was very high, reaching 2.55 on average for 2001-2007 
compared to some oil-producing countries, where the overall average of the 
tax effort in selected oil-producing countries was 1.039 during the same 
period. 
Third, the panel data analysis also showed that taxable capacity was 
positively correlated with the following variables: the index of economic 
freedom, and the shadow economy index. However, it was negatively 
correlated with the corruption perceptions index. This is consistent with the 
results reported by LeTuan Minh, Moreno-Dodson, Blanca, 
Rojchaichaninthorn and Jeep (2008). However, these variables were not 
statistically significant in determining the taxable capacity. 
Fourth, according to the panel data analysis, foreign trade and the rate of 
inflation were negatively and significantly correlated with taxable capacity 
in Libya and oil-producing countries under study for the period 2001-2007. 
This is consistent with the results reported by Davoodi and Grigorian (2007) 
and Agbeyegbe, Stotsky, and WoldeMariam (2004), who found that there is 
an inverse relationship between the rate of consumer price inflation (as an 
independent variable) and taxable capacity (as a dependent variable). This 
negative relationship between foreign trade and taxable capacity was due to 
the high percentage of oil exports, this means that an increase in oil revenues 
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leads to reduce the need to high tax revenues; the other reason for this is that 
most non-oil exports are exempt from taxes. And most imports are necessary 
goods and exempted from tax or subject to low customs taxes. 
 7.3 Implications and recommendations of the study. 
Based on the above analyses and results, the author makes following 
recommendations:  
To promote tax equity 
Libya’s tax system should be adjusted to suit local and external conditions. 
The tax burden should be distributed in an equitable manner. Specifically, 
the marginal propensity to tax should be reduced by lowering the tax rates. 
The imposition of progressive rates of tax should be consistent and in 
harmony with the nature of the tax base on the one hand, and with the ease 
of collecting income on the other. 
To consider tax convenience  
The varieties of taxable income should be expanded in proportion to the 
financial ability of the taxpayer. However, double taxation should be 
avoided. Moreover, given the income elasticity of taxation, both direct and 
indirect tax should be increased in order to achieve other economic and 
social purposes of taxation more efficiently. 
 To restructure tax system 
There is an urgent need to restructure Libya’s tax system. Given Libya’s 
high tax burden, the authorities should reduce both direct and indirect taxes. 
On the one hand: there is a need to moderate the direct taxes and provide 
more exemptions from the collection of direct taxes, taking into account the 
financial ability of the taxpayer; the types of necessary goods subject to tax 
exemption or reduction should be accurately identified, so that this 
identification takes into account the social, economic and cultural 
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developments that have made many goods necessary. On the other hand, 
indirect taxes should also be reduced due to their wide coverage and direct 
link with increasing costs of living. It is necessary to perform large cuts to 
tax rates on imports, especially on essential goods and products with a low 
elasticity of demand. The types of necessary goods subject to tax exemption 
or reduction should be accurately identified, so that this identification takes 
into account the social, economic and cultural developments that have made 
many goods necessary over time. 
To expand the tax base  
The Libyan authority may consider expanding its tax base and tax capacity 
by adopting rates appropriate to the financial ability of the taxpayer. These 
can be achieved by increasing the growth rates of the existing economic 
sectors, establishing new and productive investment projects, encouraging 
private saving and investment, and improving the performance of the public 
sector.  
The following measures may be introduced to expand the tax base and tax 
capacity. 
1. Increase commodity exports by establishing a production base for export-
oriented industry, according to Libya’s economic conditions, and providing 
all the facilities for these industries in the early stages, so that the tax base 
can be relied upon in the long run. 
2. The size of the black market and street vendors should be monitored or 
even limited.  
3. Foreign workers’ income should be included in the tax base in accordance 
with taxable employment contracts. 
4. Unified and more clarified tax legislation should be promulgated, 
combining all the legal provisions relating to all taxes (direct and indirect), 
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so that they can be implemented easily. The phenomena of tax evasion and 
avoidance should be addressed and tax assessment and collection procedures 
should be simplified.  
5. The tax administration should be improved and strengthened. This can be 
achieved by improving the taxpayer service, introducing incentive systems 
for employees in the tax administration, not imposing financial obligations 
except by law, developing accurate legal and economic standards for tax 
assessment and collection, and not relying on presumptive assessment. 
6. A tax database should be constructed, developing a coordinated and 
integrated system for these data with information technology. 
7. Specialised centres of tax research may be established to study and 
analyse the changes in economic activities and the performance of different 
sectors, developing appropriate standards to measure taxable capacity. 
 
7.4. Contribution of this study. 
The motivation for this study derived from a recognition that Libya was an 
economy highly dependent on the revenues of its oil reserves, and that tax 
policy might be constraining the economy’s capacity to diversify. From this 
working theory it was conjectured that a change in tax policy might allow 
for faster diversification and growth in the Libyan economy, and that 
therefore an investigation of the taxable capacity and tax burden of Libya 
must be undertaken, including an analysis of these factors in comparison 
with other oil producing countries that may be facing problems of revenue 
dependency similar to Libya’s.  
 
There are several contributions made by  this study. First, according to the 
knowledge of the author, this is the first of its kind to provided 
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comprehensive analyses for Libya’s tax system, structure and performance 
for the time period of 1970 and 2005.  Based on the time series analysis, it 
has found that Libya’s tax burden was high in relation to people’s income, 
while the tax base was narrow and weak inside the Libyan economy. Based 
the cross-section and panel data analyses, this research has found that 
Libya’s taxable capacity was relatively low in comparison with other 
selected oil-producing countries. Second, there are some new additions new 
variables to the existing theoretical framework built by a large body of 
literature on taxable capacity and tax effort in developing countries (e.g., 
Williamson, 1961; Plasschaert, 1962; Hinrichs, 1965; Lotz & Morss,1967, 
1970; Shin,1969; Bahl, 1971; Chelliah,1971; Chelliah, Bass & Kelly, 1975; 
Tait & Eichengreen, 1978; Truong & Gash, 1979; Askari, Cumming & 
Glover ,1982; Musgrave & Musgrave ,1989; Leuthold ,1991;  Abu 
Hammour, 1997;  Al Mutawkel, 2000; Eltony, 2002;  among others)  to 
study the impact of tax effort on developing countries.  Although numerous 
variables were used in the previous studies, to examine the determinants of 
tax effort, some other important variables were overlooked. In the current 
study, several new variables including oil revenues, non-oil exports, tax 
penalties, currency in circulation, and narrow money supply (M1) are added 
to the framework. These are pioneering and have helped to fill in a gap in 
the literature. Due to the additions of new variables, the research has 
generated some fresh results. 
 For example, this study found a positive relationship between the taxable 
capacity and the tax penalties and narrow money supply.  
The reasons for increasing the tax penalties leading to an increase in tax 
capacity is attributed to the fact that these penalties encouraged taxpayers to 
comply with tax payment on time. Tax penalty was also a tool to combat tax 
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evasion. The reason why money supply (in the narrow sense) was positively 
related to taxable capacity was because the increase in the money supply led 
to an increase in the volume of transactions and trade exchanges that were 
subject to taxes. 
 
This study also found some negative relationships between the taxable 
capacity and  non-oil exports and oil revenue.  
The inverse relationship is the result of several causes. An increase in the 
non-oil exports means a decrease in taxable capacity for several reasons, 
including: exports were exempt from taxes, and the size of non-oil exports 
was low. The factors explaining the inverse relationship between oil revenue 
and  taxable capacity was mainly due to a reduced reliance on tax revenues 
in the years when there was a rise in oil revenues. In other words, when oil 
revenues increased, there was no urgent need for tax revenues. As one of the 
measures of fiscal policy, the government also reduced taxes and increased 
public spending when oil revenues increased. 
The aforementioned new variables were employed in statistical tests to 
analyse the taxable capacity, tax burden and tax base, in line with previous 
literature (see Toye, 1978). However, these variables have not been included 
in previous studies into the tax systems of developing countries, and the 
emphasis on oil revenues and non-oil exports is vital to establishing a picture 
of the future taxable capacity of a nation and its potential to grow in non-oil 
areas of its economy. Whereas previous researchers such as Amin (2008) 
and McGee (2008) regarded tax effort as a representative of the 
government’s willingness to exploit available taxable capacity, this study 
widens the perspective of taxable capacity to include the ability of private 
individuals to pay, and the logic of employing oil revenues to fund salaries 
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in the public  sector that are then taxed, leading to the circulation of money 
at considerable administrative expense but with little positive effect on tax 
effort.  
 
Finally, this research makes recommendations of a practical nature that, if 
adopted, would increase the people’s ability to pay and the state’s ability to 
collect taxes.  Specifically, it has demonstrated how the Libya government 
may diversify the Libyan economy and encourage growth in the non-oil 
private sector and private sectors through an appropriate taxation 
mechanism.   
The study’s findings suggest that as a country moving  from a command 
economy towards a liberalised capitalist economy, Libya needs to be 
sensitive to fluctuations in tax burden and willing to change the thrust of 
their tax policy to encourage growth in the private sector, even at the 
expense of short term reductions in tax revenue: the tax base needs time to 
expand, and will not do so if it is subjected to levels of tax burden found by 
this study.  
Overall, this study contributes to the literature on tax policy, particularly in 
terms of concerning how to improve the tax effort through linking between 
oil policy, trade policy, monetary policy, as well as tax policy. The findings 
and recommendations of this study provide important suggestions for 
decision makers and others concerned with Libyan economy and tax system 
in Libya 
 
7.5. Limitation of this study and a proposal for future studies: 
The author of this study acknowledges that there is a limitation of this study: 
The study was constrained by the availability of the data used. For example, 
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there is a lack of the required data for representative tax system RTS and 
Kalman filter methods such as comprehensive tax revenue coverage 
classified by each economic sector, especially taxes in the oil sector and 
administrative region, and the classified tax revenues into separated sources 
which reflect distinctive characteristics of the tax base. If this were not the 
case, a more detailed comparative study between Libya’s tax effort and tax 
capacity and those of selected oil-producing countries could have been 
conducted. 
 
This study suggests some areas of research and studies related to the subject 
matter which can be carried out by scholars and specialist researchers in 
future 
This includes the following aspects and themes: 
Firstly, to study the tax effort, one may take into consideration the price 
changes and the circumstances of the labour market. This study also 
suggests a future link between inflation and unemployment with tax effort 
and tax capacity, as the former may have adverse impacts on the latter.  
Secondly, in order to reduce the tax effort, the possibilities of increasing the 
quality of public goods such as electricity and water services, postal services 
and telecommunications may be studied. Studies may be undertaken to 
explore how to actively expand public goods and, in pursuit of obtaining the 
benefits of economies of scale, which are cost-cutting rather than raising 
prices, should be established for these services, which constitutes an 
additional burden together with the tax burden for the taxpayer. 
Thirdly, this research also suggests that further study the tax effort in Libya 
is necessary, taking into consideration the possible roles taxes may play in 
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the oil sector, using representative tax system RTS and Kalman filter 
methods. 
Finally, to establish the link between tax and public expenditure, more 
specific studies on developing standards for efficient public expenditure 
should be encouraged. These may include studies on spending the proceeds 
of tax on services of public interest, control of return of expenditure, so as to 
contribute to raising the level of taxable capacity, to act as an incentive for 
tax compliance by the taxpayers. 
 
7.6. Policy implications. 
However, notwithstanding the above recommendations, it must be 
acknowledged that Libya finds itself at the time of writing in a state of 
transition, not only from a managed economy to a more liberal one, but from 
a closed political system to a more democratic one. Given these 
circumstances the researcher makes the following further recommendations 
for Libya’s policy makers: 
1) The tax system should be streamlined and some of the additional taxes 
imposed on individuals in Libya should be abolished. Specifically the 
Al-jihad tax, the tax for the blind, and the tax for the Palestinian 
national fund should be removed from the list of taxes imposed, for 
the reasons that the cost of collecting these taxes is at least as much as 
the revenue raised; and that they produce little utility to Libyan 
economy as a whole. 
2) Most of the tax burden imposed by the Libyan state falls on the public 
sector. This is illogical, because in effect the state is simply taxing its 
own revenues, most of which are derived from the profits of oil 
extraction activities. Increasingly the state should be seeking to reduce 
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the tax burden on the public sector and to concentrate its efforts in 
taxation on the public sector, which is benefiting from the 
considerable outlay on infrastructure development the state has made 
in recent years.  
3) In order to achieve the aims of point two, the state needs to take 
measures to increase the tax base.  In almost all its previous 
adjustments to taxation in Libya the state has concerned itself with the 
tax rate and has done little to expand the tax base. This must now be a 
priority; the public sector must be increasingly protected from 
taxation, while any activities of the public sector that have the 
potential to be profitable and/or benefit from competition and better 
management practices should be privatised and become potentially 
revenue producing entities that expand the tax base. 
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STATISTICAL  APPENDIX 
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Table( 1 ):The Gross Domestic Product at current factors cost - by economic Sectors  ( LYD  million)
GDPBAyears
∑ AA3A2A1
1288.3812.6475.7420.122.533.11970
1586.5922.7663.8605.725.1331971
1753920.6832.4752.236.643.61972
2182.31131.81050.5939.750.8601973
3795.723901405.712855664.71974
3674.31961.11713.21564.865.582.91975
4768.127502018.11827.890.699.71976
5612.73275.92336.82122.1124.7901977
5496.12808.72687.42416.6148.7122.11978
76034545.33057.72731.5185.8140.41979
10553.86525.74028.13581.3210.4236.41980
8798.84403.34395.53869.5252.4273.61981
8932.44235.84696.64145.1265.8285.71982
8511.73823.64688.14056329.13031983
7804.73209.84594.93910.7361.23231984
7852.13500.44351.73587.8421.7342.21985
6767.52406.24361.33620.6356.1384.61986
5933.21711.64221.63390.5423.6407.51987
6170.61527.24643.43795.5448.4399.51988
7094.71915.55179.24283.4474.6421.21989
7741.62740.85000.84062.6547.1391.11990
8426.22783.256434620.5562460.51991
8774.42480.462945121686.8486.21992
9287.52519.567685452775.5540.51993
9913.52559.573545887865.5601.51994
10592.526757917.56257980680.51995
11782.528228960.570711107782.51996
128883204.59683.57584.2848.91250.41997
12610.627869824.67452.8977.51394.31998
14075.23995.910079.375431086.41449.91999
17620.2666110959.28233.11286.41439.72000
21868.57045.51482312373.51129.71319.82001
30549.414384.116165.313391.21479.41294.72002
3760420217.917386.114061.21991.913332003
48793.429227.41956615788.72448.71328.62004
67048.343946.723101.618522.43131.71447.52005
12382.15689.66692.45453.5673.7565.2Average
12.0%12.1%11.7%11.4%15.1%11.4%CAGR
where  :
A:Non‐oi l  economic activi ties   ,   A1:Agricul ture  & forestry and fi shing sector  ,   A2:The  manufacturing sector 
A3:Other non‐oi l  economic sectors    ,  ∑A:Tota l  non‐oi l  activi ties    , B:The  activi ty of oi l  and natura l  gas
GDP:Gross  Domestic Product at current factors  cost.   ,  LYD :Libyan Dinar ., CAGR :  Compound Annual  Growth Rate,
Sources :
  ‐General People's Committee for Planning, the economic and social achievements during the nine years of the  Libyan 
revolution ,January 1989,table 9 , p.13.
 ‐Council of arab economic unity , sectoral study for Libya during 1970‐78 , November 1978.
‐Libyan national Accounts for period of 1971‐75 , table  (1‐1).
  ‐General people's committee for planning ,focus on  economic and social development in Libya during 1970‐78 ,
November 1978.
‐General people's committee for planning,statistical   Collection , 1976 , table 5 , p.316.
  ‐General people's committee for planning, the national accounts for 1975‐80 ,January 1982 , table 2 , p.11.
 ‐General people's committee for planning and economic and  trade , national accounts for the period of 1980‐92 ,  
 july 1997, table 2 , p.29.
  ‐The national authority for information and documentation ,statistical handbook, 1998 , No.5,table.43 ,p.44.
‐Central bank of libya,the economic bulletin,1997 ,vo.37,  No.4‐6.
  ‐General people's committee for planning,the social and  economic indicators for 1962‐96,December 1997,tables 
 (1);(4) , p.40;43.
  ‐General people's committee for planning, national  accounts for the period of 1986‐97 , December 1999 ,
   table 2 , pp.24‐25
-Economic research centre, Total Economic , financial and demographic data in Libya during 1962-2006, Benghazi, Libya , July 2009.
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table ( 2 ) The structure of GDP at current factors cost -Economic Sectors  ( %)
∑ AA3A2A1
10063.136.932.61.72.61970
10058.241.838.21.62.11971
10052.547.542.92.12.51972
10051.948.143.12.32.71973
100633733.91.51.71974
10053.446.642.61.82.31975
10057.742.338.31.92.11976
10058.441.637.82.21.61977
10051.148.9442.72.21978
10059.840.235.92.41.81979
10061.838.233.922.21980
1005050442.93.11981
10047.452.646.433.21982
10044.955.147.73.93.61983
10041.158.950.14.64.11984
10044.655.445.75.44.41985
10035.664.453.55.35.71986
10028.871.257.17.16.91987
10024.775.361.57.36.51988
100277360.46.75.91989
10035.464.652.57.15.11990
100336754.86.75.51991
10028.371.758.47.85.51992
10027.172.958.78.35.81993
10025.874.259.48.76.11994
10025.374.759.19.36.41995
1002476609.46.61996
10024.975.158.86.69.71997
10022.177.959.17.811.11998
10028.471.653.67.710.31999
10037.862.246.77.38.22000
10032.267.856.65.262001
10047.152.943.84.84.22002
10053.846.237.45.33.52003
10059.940.132.452.72004
10065.534.527.64.72.22005
10042.957.147.554.6Average
Where:
A:Non-oil economic activities  ,   A1:Agriculture & forestry and fishing sector  ,   A2:The manufacturing sector
A3:Other non-oil economic sectors   ,  ∑A:Total non-oil activities   , B:The activity of oil and natural gas
GDP:Gross  Domestic Product at current factors  cost.   
source  :  the  ratios  were  ca lculated based on table  1 .
GDPBA1years
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Table ( 3 ) Exports and Imports of Goods and Services in Libya*  ( LYD/million )
sourcevaluesourcevalue
1042.9(1),(6)198(1)844.91970
1225.5(1),(6)250.4(2),(3)975.11971
1341(1),(6)343.2(2),(3)997.81972
1780.2(6),(12)539.9(2),(3)1240.31973
3307.7(6),(13),(14)817.8(2),(3)2489.91974
3101.9(6)1048.7(4)2053.21975
3832.2(6)950.8(4)2881.41976
4547.9(6),(7),(13),(15)1117.1(4)3430.81977
4340.7(6),(7),(13),(15)1362.6(4)2978.11978
6373.8(6),(7),(16),(17)1572.4(4)4801.41979
8492.6(6),(7),(16),(17)2006.2(5),(6)6486.41980
7091.2(6),(7),(16)2481.4(5),(6)4609.81981
6033.1(6),(7),(16)2124.3(5),(6),(7)3908.81982
5401.4(6),(8)1784.8(6),(8)3616.61983
5142.1(6),(8)1841.7(6),(8)3300.41984
4860(6),(8)1214.4(6),(8)3645.61985
3747.2(8)1315.7(8)2431.51986
3650.4(8)1278.1(8)2372.31987
3584(8)1677.3(8)1906.71988
3882.4(9)1475(9)2407.41989
5255.8(10)1510.9(10)3744.91990
4659.1(10)1505.4(10)3153.71991
4460.9(10)1422.1(10)3038.81992
4188.9(10)1711.3(10)2477.61993
4605.1(10)1487.9(10)3117.21994
4950.6(10)1728.5(10)3222.11995
5493.5(10)1914.8(10)3578.71996
6434.26(11)2995.1(11)3439.161997
5128.3(18)2660.7(18)2467.61998
5807.2(18)2432.9(18)3374.31999
8875.9(18)2690.3(18)6185.62000
10314.3(18)4751.2(18)5563.12001
25521.7(18)11087.5(18)14434.22002
29309.6(18)10877.8(18)18431.82003
37815.1(18)12917.8(18)24897.32004
56763.1(18)16807.9(18)39955.22005
302.36103.9198.46**Total
8398.93‐2886.16‐5512.77Average
12.1%‐13.5%‐11.6%CAGR
( * ) in current prices  .,  Exports  includes  the  re‐exports .( ** ) in LYD/Mi l l iard .
Sources  :
Libyan Arab republ ic , Minis try of planning, foreign trade  s tatis tics ,1‐
1972,table  1 .
Planning secretariat, nationa l  income  accounts (1971‐75),account No.1,p.5.2‐
Libyan Arab republ ic , Minis try of planning and scienti fi c research, nationa l  3‐
accounts  ( 1971‐74)
The  planning secretariat, the  nationa l  accounts (1975‐80), account No.1,p.4.4‐
The  planning secretariat, foreign trade  s tatis tics , 1985,table  1 ,p.1.5‐
The  Secretariat of information(1989),'' Libya 's  revolution in twenty years  1969‐89'',6‐
table(3‐15),p.525.
Centra l  Bank of Libya  , The  Economic bul letin Oct/Dec 1988, Vol .28,No.10‐12,table  29.7‐
The  planning secretariat, The  foreign trade  trends  1983‐88,table  1 , p.12.8‐
The  national  Authori ty for information and documentation, foreign trade  s tatis tics , 9‐
1995, table  1,p.1.
( turn over )
Total
ImportsExports
years
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The  national  Authori ty for information and documentation,the  fi fth s tatis tica l  10‐
handbook 1990‐96,table  31,p.32.
The  uni fied Arab economic report, sep/1998 p.287. ( the  values  were  converted 11‐
to i ts  equiva lent in loca l  currency $ 1=0.3704 Dirham)
The  Libyan Arab republ ic ,planning minis try, the  foreign trade  s tatis tics , 1973.12‐
The  planning secretariat , the  foreign trade  stati s tics  , 1979, table  1 , p.1.13‐
Centra l  Bank of Libya  , The  Economic bul letin Jan/Mar 1978, No.1‐3, table  30.14‐
The  planning secretariat , the  foreign trade  stati s tics  , 1978.15‐
The  planning secretariat , the  foreign trade  stati s tics  ( 1980‐85 ), table  1 , p.8. 16‐
The  planning secretariat , summary of the  foreign trade  stati s tics , 1980.17‐
Economic research centre, Tota l  Economic , financia l  and demographic data  in Libya  18‐
during 1962‐2006, Benghazi , Libya  , July 2009.  
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Table ( 4 ) Rate of change in GDP in Libya
∆0∆ 1∆0∆ 1
ــــ1288.3ــــ1288.31970
26.226.21625.523.123.11586.51971
37.28.71767.136.110.517531972
52.511.21964.369.424.52182.31973
153.1663260.9194.673.93795.71974
122.1-12.22861.6185.2-3.23674.31975
167.220.33442.7270.129.84768.11976
204.7143925335.717.75612.71977
120.2-27.72837.4326.6-2.15496.11978
252.3604539.1490.238.376031979
334.623.35598.8719.238.810553.81980
226-254199.9583-16.68798.81981
200.8-7.73875.2593.31.58932.41982
159.1-13.93337.9560.7-4.78511.71983
111.2-18.52721.3505.8-8.37804.71984
94.7-7.82508.7509.50.67852.11985
62.5-16.62093.3425.3-13.86767.51986
36.5-161758.5360.5-12.35933.21987
37.70.91773.737946170.61988
56.313.52013.3450.7157094.71989
570.52022.4500.99.17741.61990
53-2.61970.6554.18.88426.21991
41.9-7.21828.4581.14.18774.41992
39.3-1.81794.7620.95.89287.51993
37.9-11776.3669.56.79913.51994
36.6-0.91759.6722.26.810592.51995
40.93.11814.6814.611.211782.51996
42.91.41840.4900.49.4128881997
29.6-9.31669.8878.9-2.212610.61998
34.23.51728.5992.511.614075.21999
55.716.12006.21267.725.217620.22000
79.215.12308.51597.524.121868.52001
132.129.52990.32271.339.730549.42002
164.914.13412.72818.923.1376042003
218.720.34105.83687.429.848793.42004
306.127.45231.25104.437.467048.32005
109.35.92657885.713.412382.1Average
ــــ4.1%ــــ12.0%CAGR
where    ∆ 1 : compared to the  previous  year , ∆0: compared to the  base  year 1970 .
CAGR : compound annual  growth rate  .
source  : table  7.
years LYD/million
rate of annual  change %
GDP at constant prices  1970=100GDP at current prices
rate of annual  change %
LYD/million
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Table ( 5 ) The evolution of per capita nominal/real income  in Libya 
yp ( U.S $ )yp ( LYD )NG.D.P
( 9 )( 8 )( 7 )( 6 )( 5 )( 4 )( 3 )( 2 )( 1 )
2003=1001984=1001975=1001970=1001964=100U.S $LYDNo. millionLYD million
4244.41836.4822.7640.9417.81794.7640.92.011288.31970
5139.52222.1994.1774.1504.72245.8755.52.11586.51971
5347.72302.91032.1803.2523.92416.7796.82.217531972
5560.52399.51073.5835.85453136.1928.62.352182.31973
8641.13724.61669.11299.1847.25107.11512.22.513795.71974
7103.63060.313711067.8695.94630.213712.683674.31975
8033347615561212.2790.156701678.92.844768.11976
8879.53825.91715.31335870.56447.51909.12.945612.71977
6253.127011210942.6614.46166.51825.93.015496.11978
9271.44159.41862.81450.2945.58203.62429.13.1376031979
11275.34942.62212.11722.71123.210966.93247.33.2510553.81980
7955.43443.71541.31200782.484902513.93.58798.81981
6901.22978.51334.11038.9677.28087.52394.73.738932.41982
56692448.71096.7853.7556.67351.92176.93.918511.71983
4963.22144.1960.2747.6487.47241.12144.13.647804.71984
4605.31988.2890.1693451.87325.62169.13.627852.11985
3786.41636.2732.6570.4371.8585418443.676767.51986
2869.71239.6554.9432.1281.74906.81457.84.075933.21987
27841202.6538.5419.3273.35102.51458.84.236170.61988
3070.21324593461.73015519.71627.24.367094.71989
2973.41282.9574.5447.4291.76051.91712.74.527741.61990
2725.91177.4527.2410.5267.66161.81755.54.88426.21991
2550.91070.4479.2373.1243.359991790.74.98774.41992
2313.6989.5443.2345.122555401786.15.29287.51993
2159.7972.2435.333922152321891.95.249913.51994
2054.4950.4425.5331.42165641.41994.85.3110592.51995
2050.7978.3438.1341.1222.460982214.85.3211782.51996
21901077.1482.3375.6244.971012630.24.9128881997
2008.1961.4430.6335.3218.61146.32532.24.9812610.61998
2177.5981.4439.6342.3223.11287.52787.25.0514075.21999
2763.21121.4502.2391.1254.91871.13434.75.1317620.22000
3721.71273.2570.2443.9289.42715.54205.55.221868.52001
5608.21608.6720.5561365.76956.25731.65.3330549.42002
6963.71812.5811.66324129088.56963.75.4376042003
8799.72144.7960.4747.9487.511087.68887.75.4948793.42004
11574.42692.91206939.2612.216274.812037.45.5767048.32005
Average :
6847.42970.81330.71036.1675.54581.81384.82.6377670-1979
53882334.81045.4813.9530.67084.62103.43.8784280-1989
3914.71318.4590.4459.7299.76140.83897.35.120598.590-2005
5138.62059.7922.4718.2468.25969.92701.14.112382.170-2005
 compound Annual Growth rate(CAGR)
9.1%9.5%9.5%9 . 5%9.5%18.4%16.0%5.0%21.8%70-1979
-13.5%-13.6%-13.6%-13.6%-13.6%-7.3%-7.4%3.3%-4.3%80-1989
9.5%5.1%5.1%5.1%5.1%6.8%13.9%1.4%15.5%90-2005
2.9%1.1%1.1%1.1%1.1%6.5%8.7%3.0%12.0%70-2005
where  ,  G.D.P: Gross  domestic product at current factors  cost‐Economic sectors  . , N : Number of tota l
population , yp  ( LYD ) : per capita  nomina l  income   at current price  by Libyan dinar .,yp ( U.S $ ): per capi ta
nomina l  income  at current price  by U.S dol lar., yp * ( LYD ) : per capita  real  income  .
Column ( 1 ) : source  , Table  .1 .; Column ( 2 ) : source, Table.2.; column ( 4 ) : converted va lues  us ing the
exchange  rates  in table  .3 . ; columns  ( 5‐8) : converted values  us ing the  General  cost of l iving indeces  in
table  4 .
years
yp * ( LYD )  
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Table ( 6 ) Average monthly/annual income of employees in the libyan public sector       (LYD/million)
No. of 
employees
compensation 
 of employees
( 8 )( 7 )( 6 )( 5 )( 4 )( 3 )( 2 )( 1 )
ــــ55.5ــــ6660.4335288.71970
36%19.975.436%239.2905.20.459415.51971
17%13.188.517%156.71061.90.488518.21972
9%8.496.910%101.31163.20.5381625.91973
29%27.9124.829%334.814980.6072909.61974
5%6.7131.55%79.81577.80.67711068.31975
6%7.4138.96%89.216670.73271221.41976
12%17.115612%204.51871.50.7651431.71977
14%22.5178.514%270.22141.70.77271654.91978
14%25.3203.814%303.72445.40.7891929.41979
17%34.7238.517%416.22861.60.81282325.91980
-8%-19.6218.9-8%-2352626.60.94642485.81981
-3%-6.2212.7-3%-74.12552.51.08372766.11982
-8%-16.9195.8-8%-203.523491.17952770.71983
28%54249.828%64829970.92712778.51984
-10%-25.3224.5-10%-303.32693.70.89422408.71985
-8%-18.1206.4-8%-216.52477.20.90472241.11986
-12% .-23.8182.6-12%-285.92191.30.93682052.81987
15%27.7210.315%332.22523.50.96362431.61988
13%27.4237.713%329.22852.70.99542839.61989
-9%-21.2216.5-9%-254.32598.41.01862646.71990
21%46.3262.821%555.43153.81.01253193.21991
8%20.6283.48%247.43401.21.0443550.91992
-5%-14269.4-5%-167.93233.31.11373600.91993
-2%-5264.4-2%-60.73172.61.1493645.31994
-1%-2.8261.6-1%-33.23139.41.186237241995
13%34295.613%407.43546.81.2244341.31996
14%42.1337.714%505.54052.31.25515086.11997
-3%-11.3326.4-3%-1363916.31.323751841998
-3%-9.9316.5-3%-118.53797.81.38385255.41999
5%16.8333.35%201.43999.21.4455778.82000
25%82.3415.625%9884987.21.44877224.92001
8%31.8447.48%381.45368.61.49268013.22002
8%34.64828%415.65784.21.53498878.12003
8%38.5520.58%461.56245.71.58899923.82004
13%69.2589.713%830.27075.91.6651117822005
10%15.3251.410%183.13016.51.0223527.6average
ــ3.7%7.0%ــ3.7%7.0%3.9%11.2%CAGR
source  : tables  8,9
( * ) LYD/year .; ( ** ) LYD/month
years
average  monthly income  per employee
rate  of 
monthly  
change
average  annual  income  per employee
LYD/mi l l ion
va lue  of monthly 
change**
mil l ion 
employees
annual  va lue*
rate  of 
annual  
change
monthly 
va lue**
value  of annual  
chage*
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Follows Table ( 7 ) The public Revenues in Libya                                                                                              LYD/million ( unless stated otherwise )
ACESACESACESACESACESACES
(17),(18),(31),(32)5843.64645.122032203.53640.62441.62651.21449.1598440391.4552.52000
(17),(18),(31),(32)7068.16134.236033603.53465.12530.72235.31390.6791.7567.6438.1572.52001
(17),(18),(31),(32)9653.29038.865516550.93102.22487.91662.11701.9866.4636573.71502002
(17),(18),(31),(32)81899132.93929616042602972.92404.52037.91172.8660682.72752003
(17),(18),(31),(32)24977.25257.7199562105.35021.23152.43143.72240.91197602680.5309.52004
(17),(18),(31),(32)38943.318003.13437815154.44565.32848.72739.51762.51207660618.8426.22005
** in millard Libyan dinars191.83103.01135.3459.5456.4843.4726.4620.5218.4813.9711.548.98total**
5328.52861.53759.51701.315691207.5826.9570.1513.4388320.5249.4Average
13.0%10.5%13.2%10.4%12.1%10.8%15.8%12.9%9.5%8.3%11.0%10.6%CAGR
where, TD: direct taxes  include ( tax on Business incomes, tax on individual incomes,Agricultural tax , real estate tax); TI: indirect taxes include( stamp tax,tax of the entertainments,customs 
taxes,production tax); TJ: other revenues  ,such as the services charges and the like.; NOR:  non‐oil revenues .; OR: oil revenues.; TR: total public revenues.; ES: Budget estimates ; AC: Actual .
2‐ Ajam,Maithem,(1992),"public finance ‐ Applied study on the libyan economy", central Bank of Libya, Economic bulletin , the second quarter, 1998,vol.38,table 28.Sources : 1‐
publications of the national Authority for scientific research , 1st Edition , tables 7‐9 ,the libyan Ministry of treasury , details of the Administrative budget,1977,vol1, table ( B )3‐
 pp.115,120‐122.Central Bank of Libya, the annual report, No.16, fiscal year 1971/72,p.99.4‐
Central Bank of Libya, the annual report, No.18, fiscal year 1973/74.5‐
Central Bank of Libya, the annual report,fiscal year 1975, p.101.6‐
Central Bank of Libya, the annual report,No.23, fiscal year 1978, p.70.7‐
Central Bank of Libya, the annual report,No.26, fiscal year 1981, p.63.8‐
Details  of revenues of the Administrative budget for 1986.9‐
The treasury secretariat ,details of public budget for fiscal year of 90‐1991.10‐
Central Bank of Libya, the annual report,No.38, fiscal year 1994, tables 42‐43.11‐
The General people`s committee for treasury , estimations of the public budget for 1992/93.12‐
Report of the investment climate in Arab countries , 1992.13‐
The General people`s committeeof planning and finance, details of the public budget, 1994 , p.37.14‐
The General peopl's committee , Note & draft of the law of public budget , was presented to the basic people's congresses,1996.15‐
The General peopl's committee , Note & draft of the law of public budget , was presented to the basic people's conferences,1997.16‐
Records of the libyan tax Authority , Tripoli.17‐
Records of the libyan customs  Authority , Tripoli.18‐
The planning secretariat, the national accounts for 1971‐79 , Libya.19‐
Central Bank of Libya  , Economic bulletin , vol 37, No.4‐6, April/June 1997.20‐
Shokir,Mohamed(1985)," study on the transmission of the labour force between the arab countries ", publications of the Arab monetary fund .( the values were converted to its equivalent 21‐
in million libyan dinars, using the exchange rates which listed in the economic bulletin, central bank of libya  ,1988,vol.28,No.10‐12.
Arab Monetary fund , Economic indicators for 1980‐90,No.8,1990.( the values were converted to its equivalent in millions  libyan dinars, according to the prevailing exchange22‐
 rates at that time LYD 1 = $ 0.2961 )
The unified Arab economic report for 1997 .( the values were converted to its equivalent in million libyan dinars , using the exchange rates which listed in the Economic indicators for23‐
 1986‐96,Arab monetary fund , 1997, vol.14,table 54,p.64.
The General people`s committee for treasury , details of the Administrative budget, 1979, vol.1, pp.7‐20.24‐
Central Bank of Libya  , Economic bulletin ,Jan/Mar 1986,  vol 26, No.1‐3, tables 31,34.25‐
Central Bank of Libya, the annual report,No.37,  table 47,p.176..26‐
The Ministry of treasury , Libyan Arab Republc, details of Administrative budget, 1973.27‐
The Libyan official Gazette , 1987, No.13, PP.334‐35.28‐
The Libyan official Gazette , 1988, No.18, P.642.29‐
The Libyan official Gazette , 1989, No.12, PP.362‐63.30‐
The Libyan official Gazette , for years of (1999‐2007 ).31‐
Economic research centre, Total Economic , financial and demographic data in Libya  during 1962‐2006, Benghazi, Libya  , July 2009.32‐
sources
 publ ic Revenues   oi l  RevenuesNon‐oi l   Revenues
years TRORNORTJTITD
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Table ( 8 ) Structure of the public revenues in Libya                                                             percentages %
ACECACECACECACECACECACEC
100%100%85%86%15%14%3%5%9%7%3%2%1970
100%100%79%89%21%11%13%3%7%6%2%2%1971
100%100%75%91%25%9%13%3%9%5%3%2%1972
100%100%71%77%29%23%15%4%12%13%3%6%1973
100%100%79%45%21%55%9%9%9%31%3%15%1974
100%100%74%28%26%72%9%33%12%31%5%8%1975
100%100%77%23%23%77%10%25%9%42%4%10%1976
100%100%78%21%22%79%10%28%8%41%4%10%1977
100%100%73%17%27%83%11%29%10%42%6%12%1978
100%100%78%28%22%72%9%23%8%38%4%11%1979
100%100%89%17%11%83%1%34%7%37%4%11%1980
100%100%79%0%21%100%0%46%13%41%8%13%1981
100%100%82%6%18%94%0%43%11%37%7%14%1982
100%100%73%19%27%81%2%25%14%41%11%15%1983
100%100%66%20%34%80%0%24%20%39%14%17%1984
100%100%66%13%34%87%7%23%15%45%13%19%1985
100%100%54%21%46%79%9%23%20%35%17%20%1986
100%100%52%14%48%86%14%35%18%28%16%22%1987
100%100%44%13%56%87%10%32%30%29%15%27%1988
100%100%50%8%50%92%16%36%21%29%13%27%1989
100%100%56%54%44%46%22%15%12%16%11%15%1990
100%100%63%54%37%46%17%16%12%17%8%13%1991
100%100%47%57%53%43%24%12%16%15%13%16%1992
100%100%62%48%38%52%21%17%11%19%6%16%1993
100%100%38%39%62%61%0%21%29%23%33%16%1994
100%100%74%55%26%45%0%18%16%14%10%12%1995
100%100%70%63%30%37%8%17%13%10%9%10%1996
100%100%54%64%46%36%28%17%11%9%6%9%1997
100%100%46%57%54%43%34%15%13%16%8%12%1998
100%100%56%68%44%32%25%11%13%11%6%10%1999
100%100%38%47%62%53%45%31%10%9%7%12%2000
100%100%51%59%49%41%32%23%11%9%6%9%2001
100%100%68%72%32%28%17%19%9%7%6%2%2002
100%100%48%67%52%33%29%22%14%7%8%3%2003
100%100%80%40%20%60%13%43%5%11%3%6%2004
100%100%88%84%12%16%7%10%3%4%2%2%2005
100%100%66%44%34%56%13%22%13%23%8%12%Average
Where   ,  TD: Direct taxes   , TI: Indi rect taxes  , TJ: Other non‐oi l  revenues  , NOR : Tota l  of non‐oi l  revenues  , ES: Budget Estimates  , AC: Actu
Source  : Table  25
Public RevenuesOil revenuesNon-oil revenues years NORTJTITD
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Table ( 9 ) The nominal and real world prices for crude oil
US Dollar/barrel
9.1232.11970
10.4252.61971
10.4272.81972
9.4333.11973
264010.41974
23.14510.41975
24.94511.21976
25.74912.61977
23.55512.91978
46.36329.21979
5072361980
49.66934.21981
486631.71982
46.36530.11983
44.66328.11984
44.46227.51985
18.172131986
22.18017.71987
16.58614.21988
20.18617.31989
249322.31990
209318.61991
19.49518.41992
18.19016.31993
16.79315.51994
16.910016.91995
20.99720.31996
20.39218.71997
The  index Number represents  a  unit of exports  of industria l  countries  expressed in 
US dol lars  , as  publ i shed by the  international  monetary fund .
Source  : The  organization of Arab petroleum exporting countries  , the  annual  report 
The real price  
1995=100
years Nominal price
Index 
Number** 
1995=100
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Table ( 10 )  Non- Oil Revenues                                                                           percentage  %
ACESACESACESACES
100%100%19%33%61%51%20%16%1970
100%100%59%27%31%53%10%19%1971
100%100%53%27%36%50%11%23%1972
100%100%50%19%40%56%10%25%1973
100%100%42%16%43%57%15%27%1974
100%100%34%46%48%43%19%11%1975
100%100%42%32%40%54%18%14%1976
100%100%47%35%35%52%18%13%1977
100%100%41%34%37%51%21%15%1978
100%100%42%32%38%53%19%15%1979
100%100%8%42%60%45%32%14%1980
100%100%0%46%63%41%37%13%1981
100%100%0%45%60%40%40%15%1982
100%100%7%30%53%51%40%19%1983
100%100%0%30%59%49%41%21%1984
100%100%19%26%43%52%37%22%1985
100%100%21%29%44%45%36%26%1986
100%100%29%41%37%33%33%26%1987
100%100%19%37%55%33%27%30%1988
100%100%33%39%42%31%25%30%1989
100%100%49%33%27%34%24%33%1990
100%100%45%34%34%38%21%28%1991
100%100%46%29%30%35%24%37%1992
100%100%55%33%29%37%16%31%1993
100%100%0%35%47%38%53%27%1994
100%100%0%41%61%32%38%27%1995
100%100%26%45%45%27%30%27%1996
100%100%62%48%24%26%14%26%1997
100%100%62%35%24%37%14%29%1998
100%100%56%34%29%34%14%31%1999
100%100%73%59%16%18%11%23%2000
100%100%65%55%23%22%13%23%2001
100%100%54%68%28%26%18%6%2002
100%100%56%69%28%22%16%9%2003
100%100%63%71%24%19%14%10%2004
100%100%60%62%26%23%14%15%2005
100%100%37%39%39%39%23%22%Average
Where   ,  TD: Direct txes   , TI: Indi rect taxes  , TJ: Other non‐oi l  revenues  , NOR: Tota l  of non‐oi l  
revenues  , ES: Budget Estimates  , AC: Actual  .
Source  : Table  25
NORyears TD TI TJ
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Table ( 11 ) Proportion of the actual public revenues to the GDP in Libya ( the  values  in LYD/mi l l ion )
42%35%6%1%4%1%1288.3535.845382.816.150.516.21970
52%41%11%7%3%1%1586.5828.453652.318176.135103.83554.817.51971
47%36%12%6%4%1%1753831.265624.575206.69110.4973.422.81972
39%28%11%6%5%1%2182.3852.696604.108248.588125.28899.3241973
49%39%10%4%4%2%3795.71861.2791474.279387163.4165.158.51974
49%36%13%4%6%2%3674.31784.7441323.995460.749155.34922085.41975
56%44%13%5%5%2%4768.12689.482077.336612.144257.044243112.11976
60%47%13%6%5%2%5612.73376.6012625.846750.755349.955264136.81977
55%40%15%6%6%3%5496.13007.2212183.483823.738339.738307.4176.61978
62%48%13%6%5%3%76034704.1533682.1761021.977430.777393.4197.81979
71%63%8%1%5%3%10553.87541.16691.9849.268.8509.5270.91980
49%39%10%0%7%4%8798.84340.33420920.30575.9344.41981
57%46%10%0%6%4%8932.45068.84145.4923.40552.2371.21982
41%30%11%1%6%4%8511.73448.12520928.167.3488372.81983
40%27%13%0%8%6%7804.73240.521251115.50654.3461.21984
36%24%12%2%5%5%7852.12798.61846952.6184.4413.9354.31985
29%16%14%3%6%5%6767.51994.11074920.1189.1401.9329.11986
33%17%16%5%6%5%5933.21964.51029.7934.8274348.5312.31987
33%15%18%3%10%5%6170.62029.88981131.8210.1617.73041988
34%17%17%6%7%4%7094.72382.91181.51201.4391.2506.8303.41989
37%21%16%8%4%4%7741.6286016001260619334.6306.41990
42%26%15%7%5%3%8426.2352222301292584434.5273.51991
31%14%16%7%5%4%8774.4268612671419646.4425.2347.41992
36%26%10%2%5%3%9287.53937.7522451.8521485.9821.3427.1237.51993
20%8%13%0%6%7%9913.52014761125305896641994
38%28%10%0%6%4%10592.53981.42940.410413.2640397.81995
42%30%13%3%6%4%11782.54980.334941486.3379.4665.5441.41996
39%27%12%4%5%3%128886154.133512803.11739677.5386.61997
44%20%24%15%6%3%12610.65594.125513043.11878.5727.8436.81998
44%24%19%11%6%3%14075.26141.73444.42697.31518.4787.93911999
33%13%21%15%3%2%17620.25843.622033640.62651.2598391.42000
32%16%16%10%4%2%21868.57068.136033465.12235.3791.7438.12001
32%21%10%5%3%2%30549.49653.265513102.21662.1866.4573.72002
22%10%11%6%3%2%376048189392942602404.51172.8682.72003
51%41%10%6%2%1%48793.424977.2199565021.23143.71197680.52004
58%51%7%4%2%1%67048.338943.3343784565.32739.51207618.82005
43%30%13%5%5%3%12382.15328.53759.51569735.1513.4320.5average
1.0%1.1%0.2%3.4%‐2.2%‐0.9%12.0%13.0%13.2%12.1%15.8%9.5%11.0%CAGR
where  : TD: Direct taxes  , TI: Indi rect taxes  , TJ: other non‐oi l  revenues  , NOR: Tota l  non‐oi l  revenues  , OR: Oi l  Revenues  , 
PR: Tota l  publ ic revenues  , GDP: Gross  domestic product , CAGR: Compound annual  growth rate  .
The  results  of this  table  were  derived from tables  1, 25.
TD/GDPyears PR/GDPOR/GDPNOR/GDPTJ/GDPTI/GDPTD TI GDPPRORNORTJ
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Table ( 12 ) The actual and estimated public expenditures in Libya .            LYD/million ( unless stated otherwise )
ACESACESACES
434.5407.5146224.5288.51831970
478.2509.7248302230.2207.71971
661.2683.9397.3442.9263.92411972
648.3688413.8545234.51431973
1298.91168.6866916.2432.9252.41974
1496.41561.7923.21124.7573.24371975
1751.21906.91187.21406.95645001976
1964.12103.11294.81520.1669.35831977
20752480138017856956951978
2638.823431868.815737707701979
3501.63477.42551.62527.49509501980
3922.840052872.82955105010501981
3650.938552365.92600128512551982
3663.93890.32096.323701567.61520.31983
34803550.21834.721101645.31440.21984
2705.429001523.317001182.112001985
24143064.81081.117001332.91364.81986
206826949931450107512441987
1970.32599845.31355112512441988
1930.92368760.9900117014681989
2598264011001170149814701990
219032666821875150813911991
20742420540820153416001992
2005.5*1561.3405.5484.51600*1076.81993
2669.32530.59009001769.31630.51994
30293428318.97002710.127281995
4422.13978660.98003761.231781996
4448.44808.39394313033505.43505.3931997
3649*3453.2485.21073.13163.8*2380.11998
37614768794.111332966.936351999
4694.24206.6154117653153.22441.62000
5409.65637.7181319003596.63737.72001
79129038.93701.743564210.34682.92002
6487.76201.9291026643577.73537.92003
1343810225.46718523767204988.42004
1855517368.8102731110582826263.82005
130.097131.78959.43666.79370.66164.995**Total
3613.83660.816511855.41962.81805.4Average
11.3%11.3%12.9%11.8%10.1%10.6%CAGR
The  Libyan Arab republ ic , the  minis try of petroleum , " Libya`s  oi l  1954‐71", Table  40, P.132.1‐
The  Libyan Arab republ ic , the  minis try of treasury , "development of the  Adminis trative  budget during 2‐
1968‐76" , November 1976.
The  planning secretariat, the  s tati s i ti ca l  col lection , 1976, table  11 , p.304.3‐
The  Libyan Arab republ ic , the  minis try of treasury , deta i l s  of the  Adminis trative  budget , 1977,vol .1.4‐
Centra l  Bank of l ibya  , the  annual  report , No.23, 1978.5‐
Centra l  Bank of l ibya  , the  annual  report , No.24, 1979,p.66..6‐
The  Genera l  people's  committee  for treasury , detai l s  of the  Adminis trative  budget, 1979, vol .1.7‐
Centra l  Bank of Libya  , The  annual  report, 1981, No.26, pp.59,62.8‐
( turn over )The  treasury secretariat, The  deta i l s  of adminis trative  budget, 1986.9‐
Approximate (*) ,( 38 ),(22)'
(33),(26),(25),(16),(15),(14),(11)
( 38 ),(31),(26),(25),(21), (10)
( 38 ),(35),(34),(30),(29),(28),(24), (22),(20), (2)
( 38 ),(35),(34), (30),(29),(28),(24),(22),(20), (2)
( 38 ),(35),(34),(30),(24),(22),(20), (2)
( 38 ),(35),(34),(30),(24 ),(22),(21), (8),(6)
( 38 ),(35),(34),(30),(24),(22),(21),(6),(5), (7)
( 38 ),(35),(34)0(30),(27),(24)0(22),(20), (6),(5)
( 38 ),(31),(26),(25), (22),(21) ,(10)
(33),(26),(25),(22),(21), (14),(13)
( 38 ),(30),(24),(22),(21), (8)
( 38 ),(30),(24),(22),(21), (8)
( 38 ),(26),(25),(22),(21), (32)
( 38 ),(26),(25),(24),(22),(21), (32)
( 38 ),(35),(34),(30),(24),(22),(20), (2)
Public expenditures
years 
( 38 ),(35),(34), (30),(29),(28),(24),(23) ,(22),(20), (1)
sources
Administrative expenditures Development expenditures 
( 38 ),(35),(34),(30),(24),(22),(20), (3)
( 38 ),(35),(34),(30),(24),(22),(20), (3)
( 39 ),( 36 )
( 39 ),( 36 )
( 39 ),( 36 )
( 38 ),(35),(34),(30),(24),(22),(20), (4)
(33),(19)
(33),(22),(18)
(33),(22),(18)
( 38 ),(26),(25),(24)0(22),(21 ),(32)
( 38 ),(26),(25),(22),(21), (9)
( 38 ),(33),(26),(25),(22),(21),( 12),( 11),(10)
in milliard Libyan dinars
( 39 ),(33),(26),(25)0(17)
( 38 ),(31),(26),(25),(22),(21), (10)
Approximate (*),( 39 ),( 38 )
( 39 ),( 38 ),( 36 )
( 39 ),( 38 ),( 36 )
( 39 ),( 36 )
( 39 ),( 36 )
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The  Genera l  people's  committee  of people's  control l ing authori ty , the  General  annual  report which 10‐
presented to the  bas ic people's  congresses  , 1996, p.9.
The  centra l  Bank of Libya  , the  annual  report, 1992/93, No.37,table.46.11‐
The  treasury secretariat,  detai ls  of the  publ ic budget,1990/91, p.14.12‐
The  Arab investment Guaranttee  corporation , report of the  investment cl imate  in Arab countries , 13‐
1991, p.424.
Centra l  Bank of Libya  , the  annual  report, 1991/92, No.36.14‐
The  report of investment cl imate  in Arab countries , 1992, p.407.15‐
The  Genera l  people's  committee  of treasury , estimations  of the  publ ic budget, 1992/93.16‐
The  Genera l  people's  committee  of planning and finnance  , deta i ls  of the  publ ic budget , 1994.17‐
The  Genera l  people's  committee  , note  & draft of law of the  publ ic budget , which presented to the  bas ic 18‐
people's  congresses ,1996,  p.50.
The  Genera l  people's  committee  , note  & draft of law of the  publ ic budget , which presented to the  bas ic 19‐
people's  congresses ,1997.
The  planning secretariat,spotl ights  on the  economic & socia l  development in Libya  during 1970‐78,20‐
November 1978, tables  2, 3 .
Journa l  of economic research , 1996, vol .7, No,1‐2, tables  3‐4, p.5.21‐
The  Genra l  people's  committee  of planning , The  Economic & socia l  indicators  during 1962‐96, Dec 1997,22‐
pp.22‐23 , 26,28.
The  Genera l  Bank of Libya  , The  Economic bul letin , October/december 1997, vol .17, No. 10‐11‐12 ,23‐
 tables . 33‐34.
Journa l  of economic research , 1997, vol .8, No,1‐2, table  1, p.68.24‐
The  centra l  Bank of l ibya  , the  Economic bul letin , 1996, No.7‐9, tables  29‐31.25‐
Centra l  Bank of Libya  , the  Economic bul letin, Apr/Jun 1997, Vol .37, No.4‐6, tables . 28‐31.26‐
The  planning secretariat , achievements  of the  revolution within ten years  1970‐79 , table  . 7 , p.15.27‐
Centra l  Bank of Libya  , the  economic bul letin, Jan /Mar 1978, No.1‐3, table  32.28‐
Centra l  Bank of Libya  , the  economic bul letin, Mar/Apr 1977, vol .17, No.3‐4, table  34.29‐
The  Genera l  people's  committee  of planning , main features  of the  economic & socia l  evolution in Libya30‐
during 1970‐82 , tables  4‐5.
Centra l  Bank of Libya  , the  annual  report, 1988, No.33, pp.67,69.31‐
Ajam,Maithem,(1992),"publ ic finance  ‐ Appl ied s tudy on the  l ibyan economy", publ ications  of the  32‐
nationa l  Authori ty for scienti fi c research , 1st Edition , tables  7‐9 , pp.115,120‐122.
The  centra l  bank of l ibya  , the  economic bul letin , 1998, the  second quarter, tables : 26‐28 33‐
( the  addi tiona l  expenditures  i s  not included ) 
The  planning secretariat, achievements  of the  economic & socia l  trans formation during 1970‐80, 34‐
tables  6‐7
The  planning secretariat, the  economic & socia l  indicators  for 1970‐80, tables  1‐3, p.12.  35‐
The  l Libyan officia l  Gazette  , for years  of (1999‐2007 ).36‐
Nationa l  counci l  for planning , publ ic budget proposa l  for 2009.37‐
The  Genera l  planning counci l  , The  Economic&Socia l  indicators  during 1962‐2000 , December 2001.38‐
Economic research centre, Tota l  Economic , financia l  and demographic data  in Libya  during 1962‐2006, Benghazi , 39‐
Libya  , July 2009.
360 
 
 
  
Table ( 13 ) The relative importance of public expenditures  in Libya                             percent ( % )
ACESACESACESACESACESACES
34%32%11%17%22%14%100%100%34%55%66%45%1970
30%32%16%19%15%13%100%100%52%59%48%41%1971
38%39%23%25%15%14%100%100%60%65%40%35%1972
30%32%19%25%11%7%100%100%64%79%36%21%1973
34%31%23%24%11%7%100%100%67%78%33%22%1974
41%43%25%31%16%12%100%100%62%72%38%28%1975
37%40%25%30%12%10%100%100%68%74%32%26%1976
35%37%23%27%12%10%100%100%66%72%34%28%1977
38%45%25%32%13%13%100%100%67%72%33%28%1978
35%31%25%21%10%10%100%100%71%67%29%33%1979
33%33%24%24%9%9%100%100%73%73%27%27%1980
45%46%33%34%12%12%100%100%73%74%27%26%1981
41%43%26%29%14%14%100%100%65%67%35%33%1982
43%46%25%28%18%18%100%100%57%61%43%39%1983
45%45%24%27%21%18%100%100%53%59%47%41%1984
34%37%19%22%15%15%100%100%56%59%44%41%1985
36%45%16%25%20%20%100%100%45%55%55%45%1986
35%45%17%24%18%21%100%100%48%54%52%46%1987
32%42%14%22%18%20%100%100%43%52%57%48%1988
27%33%11%13%16%21%100%100%39%38%61%62%1989
34%34%14%15%19%19%100%100%42%44%58%56%1990
26%39%8%22%18%17%100%100%31%57%69%43%1991
24%28%6%9%17%18%100%100%26%34%74%66%1992
22%17%4%5%17%12%100%100%20%31%80%69%1993
27%26%9%9%18%16%100%100%34%36%66%64%1994
29%32%3%7%26%26%100%100%11%20%89%80%1995
38%34%6%7%32%27%100%100%15%20%85%80%1996
35%37%7%10%27%27%100%100%21%27%79%73%1997
29%27%4%9%25%19%100%100%13%31%87%69%1998
27%34%6%8%21%26%100%100%21%24%79%76%1999
27%24%9%10%18%14%100%100%33%42%67%58%2000
25%26%8%9%16%17%100%100%34%34%66%66%2001
26%30%12%14%14%15%100%100%47%48%53%52%2002
17%16%8%7%10%9%100%100%45%43%55%57%2003
28%21%14%11%14%10%100%100%50%51%50%49%2004
28%26%15%17%12%9%100%100%55%64%45%36%2005
32%34%15%19%17%16%100%100%46%53%54%47%Average
‐0.6%‐0.6%0.9%‐0.1%‐1.7%‐1.2%0.0%0.0%1.4%0.4%‐1.1%‐0.6%CAGR
where   GS : Adminis trative  expendi ture.; Gi : Development expenditures .; ES: Budget Estimates  , AC: Actual  .
the  resul ts  were  derived from tables  : 1 , 12 .
Proportion of the public expenditures  to GDP 
public expenditureGiGSpublic expenditureGiGSyears
The relative importance of public expenditures
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Table ( 14 ) Compararison between the public expenditures and the public revenues in Libya 
***%%%%( 6 )( 5 )( 4 )( 3 )( 2 )( 1 )
101.3307‐205.7123%81%32%348%535.845382.8434.5146288.51970
350.253404.318‐54.065173%58%38%131%828.453652.318176.135478.2248230.21971
170.065227.275‐57.21126%80%64%128%831.265624.575206.69661.2397.3263.91972
204.396190.30814.088132%76%68%94%852.696604.108248.588648.3413.8234.51973
562.379608.279‐45.9143%70%59%112%1861.2791474.2793871298.9866432.91974
288.344400.795‐112.451119%84%70%124%1784.7441323.995460.7491496.4923.2573.21975
938.28890.13648.144154%65%57%92%2689.482077.336612.1441751.21187.25641976
1412.5011331.04681.455172%58%49%89%3376.6012625.846750.7551964.11294.8669.31977
932.221803.483128.738145%69%63%84%3007.2212183.483823.738207513806951978
2065.3531813.376251.977178%56%51%75%4704.1533682.1761021.9772638.81868.87701979
4039.54140.3‐100.8215%46%38%112%7541.16691.9849.23501.62551.69501980
417.5547.2‐129.7111%90%84%114%4340.33420920.33922.82872.810501981
1417.91779.5‐361.6139%72%57%139%5068.84145.4923.43650.92365.912851982
‐215.8423.7‐639.594%106%83%169%3448.12520928.13663.92096.31567.61983
‐239.5290.3‐529.893%107%86%147%3240.521251115.534801834.71645.31984
93.2322.7‐229.5103%97%83%124%2798.61846952.62705.41523.31182.11985
‐419.9‐7.1‐412.883%121%101%145%1994.11074920.124141081.11332.91986
‐103.536.7‐140.295%105%96%115%1964.51029.7934.8206899310751987
59.552.76.8103%97%94%99%2029.88981131.81970.3845.311251988
452420.631.4123%81%64%97%2382.91181.51201.41930.9760.911701989
262500‐238110%91%69%119%2860160012602598110014981990
13321548‐216161%62%31%117%352222301292219068215081991
612727‐115130%77%43%108%268612671419207454015341992
1932.2522046.352‐114.1196%51%17%108%3937.7522451.8521485.92005.5405.516001993
‐655.3‐139‐516.375%133%118%141%201476112532669.39001769.31994
952.42621.5‐1669.1131%76%11%260%3981.42940.410413029318.92710.11995
558.22833.1‐2274.9113%89%19%253%4980.334941486.34422.1660.93761.21996
1705.72408‐702.3138%72%28%125%6154.133512803.14448.49433505.41997
1945.12065.8‐120.7153%65%19%104%5594.125513043.13649485.23163.81998
2380.72650.3‐269.6163%61%23%110%6141.73444.42697.33761794.12966.91999
1149.4662487.4124%80%70%87%5843.622033640.64694.215413153.22000
1658.51790‐131.5131%77%50%104%7068.136033465.15409.618133596.62001
1741.22849.3‐1108.1122%82%57%136%9653.265513102.279123701.74210.32002
1701.31019682.3126%79%74%84%8189392942606487.729103577.72003
11539.213238‐1698.8186%54%34%134%24977.2199565021.213438671867202004
20388.324105‐3716.7210%48%30%181%38943.3343784565.3185551027382822005
61.775.9‐14.2‐‐‐‐191.8135.356.5130.159.470.7**Total
1714.72108.5‐393.81.40.80.61.35328.53759.515693613.816511962.8*Average
16.4%13.3%‐1.5%‐1.5%‐0.2%‐1.8%13.0%13.2%12.1%11.3%12.9%10.1%CAGR
where   ( * ) in LYD/mi l l ion .; ( ** ) in LYD/Mi l l iard.;  GS : Adminis trative  expenditure.; Gi: Development expenditures .;NOR: non‐oi l  
revenues .;OR: Oi l  revenues. 
Sources  : Tables   25 , 32 .
public revenue  *
NOR OR Total
(6)‐(3)(1):(4) (2):(5) (3):(6) (6):(3) (4)‐(1) (5)‐(2)
years GS Gi Total
public expenditure *
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Table ( 15 ) The public expenditures in Libya  ( Annual increasing rate   % )
ACESACESACES
-‐‐‐‐‐1970
10%25%70%35%‐20%13%1971
38%34%60%47%15%16%1972
‐2%1%4%23%‐11%‐41%1973
100%70%109%68%85%77%1974
15%34%7%23%32%73%1975
17%22%29%25%‐2%14%1976
12%10%9%8%19%17%1977
6%18%7%17%4%19%1978
27%‐6%35%‐12%11%11%1979
33%48%37%61%23%23%1980
12%15%13%17%11%11%1981
‐7%‐4%‐18%‐12%22%20%1982
0%1%‐11%‐9%22%21%1983
‐5%‐9%‐12%‐11%5%‐5%1984
‐22%‐18%‐17%‐19%‐28%‐17%1985
‐11%6%‐29%0%13%14%1986
‐14%‐12%‐8%‐15%‐19%‐9%1987
‐5%‐4%‐15%‐7%5%0%1988
‐2%‐9%‐10%‐34%4%18%1989
35%11%45%30%28%0%1990
‐16%24%‐38%60%1%‐5%1991
‐5%‐26%‐21%‐56%2%15%1992
‐3%‐35%‐25%‐41%4%‐33%1993
33%62%122%86%11%51%1994
13%35%‐65%‐22%53%67%1995
46%16%107%14%39%16%1996
1%21%43%63%‐7%10%1997
‐18%‐28%‐49%‐18%‐10%‐32%1998
3%38%64%6%‐6%53%1999
25%‐12%94%56%6%‐33%2000
15%34%18%8%14%53%2001
46%60%104%129%17%25%2002
‐18%‐31%‐21%‐39%‐15%‐24%2003
107%65%131%97%88%41%2004
38%70%53%112%23%26%2005
14%15%23%20%12%14%Average
ACESACESACES
16.9517.3311.2812.375.674.9670‐1980
28.431.5715.4718.3112.9313.2681‐1990
84.7482.8932.6936.1252.0646.7891‐2005
130.1131.7959.4466.7970.666570‐2005
ACESACESACES
13%13%19%19%8%8%70‐1980
22%24%26%27%18%20%81‐1990
65%63%55%54%74%72%91‐2005
100%100%100%100%100%100%70‐2005
where   ES: Budget Estimates  , AC: Actual  .the  values  and  percentages  were  derived from table  32
TotalDevelopmentAdministrative 
TotalDevelopmentAdministrative 
DevelopmentAdministrative 
The public expenditures  in l ibya     ( % )
years
The public expenditures  in l ibya     ( LYD/Mill iard )
Totalyears
years
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Table ( 16 ) Allocations of the Administartive budget in Libya during different years 
100%34%18%48%183.162.732.4881970
100%35%14%52%207.772.528.21071971
100%37%12%51%240.789.229122.51972
100%46%21%33%14365.430.746.91973
100%68%7%25%252.9171.418.363.21974
100%36%11%53%433156.147.5229.41975
100%51%17%32%500255.985.7158.41976
100%1%52%47%7704.4401.1364.51979
100%0%29%71%1364.80.83899751986
100%0%26%74%1243.60.8327.3915.51987
100%0%26%74%16000411.81188.21992
100%28%21%51%1630.5450348.4832.11994
100%17%34%49%272845693713351995
100%14%36%50%3178456114515771996
100%13%32%55%3505.44631126.61915.81997
100%25%24%51%1198.7180.28357.2661.23average
ــ‐3.50%2.20%0.50%11.60%7.70%14.00%12.10%CAGR
source  : The  treasury secretariat deta i l s  of the  publ ic pudget for different years  .
The  ratios  were  prepared by the  researcher.
Administrative Expenditures    %
total
other 
expenses
miscellaneous  
expenses
the wages  
and salaries  
miscellaneous  
expenses
the wages  
and 
salaries  
years
Administrative Expenditures   LYD/ million
total
other 
expenses
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
364 
 
  
  
  
Table ( 17 ) Evolution of the public expenditures  ,  revenues & deficit / surplus  in the public budget 
and income elasticity / marginal  propensity to the public expenditures  .
(4) ∆%(3)  ∆value*(2) ∆%(1)  ∆value*
--101.3101.3--535.8--434.51970
0.180.15451.6350.354.6292.653828.45310.143.7478.21971
127.6765.08621.7170.10.32.812831.26538.3183661.21972
‐0.77‐0.6826.1204.42.621.431852.696‐2‐12.9648.31973
0.850.651388.5562.4118.31008.5831861.279100.4650.61298.91974
‐3.71‐2.581676.8288.3‐4.1‐76.5351784.74415.2197.51496.41975
0.340.282615.1938.350.7904.7362689.4817254.81751.21976
0.480.314027.61412.525.5687.1213376.60112.2212.91964.11977
‐0.51‐0.34959.8932.2‐10.9‐369.383007.2215.6110.920751978
0.480.337025.22065.456.41696.9324704.15327.2563.82638.81979
0.540.311064.74039.560.32836.9477541.132.7862.83501.61980
‐0.28‐0.1311482.2417.5‐42.4‐3200.84340.312421.23922.81981
‐0.41‐0.3712900.11417.916.8728.55068.8‐6.9‐271.93650.91982
‐0.01‐0.0112684.3‐215.8‐32‐1620.73448.10.4133663.91983
0.830.8912444.8‐239.5‐6‐207.63240.5‐5‐183.934801984
1.641.751253893.2‐13.6‐441.92798.6‐22.3‐774.62705.41985
0.380.3612118.1‐419.9‐28.7‐804.51994.1‐10.8‐291.424141986
9.5311.6912014.6‐103.5‐1.5‐29.61964.5‐14.3‐34620681987
‐1.42‐1.512074.159.53.365.32029.8‐4.7‐97.71970.31988
‐0.11‐0.1112526.145217.4353.12382.9‐2‐39.41930.91989
1.731.412788.126220477.1286034.5667.125981990
‐0.68‐0.6214120.1133223.16623522‐15.7‐40821901991
0.220.1414732.1612‐23.7‐8362686‐5.3‐11620741992
‐0.07‐0.0516664.41932.346.61251.7523937.752‐3.3‐68.52005.51993
‐0.68‐0.3516009.1‐655.3‐48.9‐1923.752201433.1663.82669.31994
0.140.1816961.5952.497.71967.43981.413.5359.730291995
1.831.3917519.7558.225.1998.94980.3461393.14422.11996
0.030.0219225.41705.723.61173.86154.10.626.34448.41997
1.981.4321170.51945.1‐9.1‐5605594.1‐18‐799.436491998
0.320.223551.22380.79.8547.66141.73.111237611999
‐5.06‐3.1324700.61149.4‐4.9‐298.15843.624.8933.24694.22000
0.720.5826359.11658.5211224.57068.115.2715.45409.62001
1.270.9728100.31741.236.62585.19653.246.32502.479122002
1.180.9729801.61701.3‐15.2‐1464.28189‐18‐1424.36487.72003
0.520.4141340.811539.220516788.224977.2107.16950.3134382004
0.680.3761729.120388.355.913966.138943.338.15117185552005
12.566.363159.851005.8835.37700.532546.6225.67306.71
1.191.412357.04172.34‐6.67‐468.113012.76‐1.91‐90.36
0.160.1724799.033262.7329.512405.558912.3817.831063.8
42.2914730.951714.720.851097.365328.514.43517.73
where  , ( * ) in LYD/mi l l ion.;  ∆ : amount of the  annual  change  in LYD/mi l l ion ; ∆% : the  relative  change  
Sources : tables  25 , 32.
average 70‐2005
average 91‐2005
average 81‐1990
average 70‐1980
years
public expenditures public revenues annual  
deficit         
/surplus*
accumulated 
deficit         
/surplus*
 marginal  
propensity    
  1:3  (% )
income 
elasticity 
2:4   %
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Table ( 18 )Evolution of the investment expenditures ; oil revenues and  deficit/surplus in the development budget 
& the marginal propensity and income elasticity of the investment expenditures  in Libya .
‐‐307307‐‐453‐‐1461970
1.590.51711.318404.31844199.318652.31869.861022481971
‐14.16‐5.38938.593227.275‐4.25‐27.743624.57560.2149.3397.31972
‐1.27‐0.811128.901190.308‐3.28‐20.467604.1084.1516.5413.81973
0.760.521737.18608.279144.04870.1711474.279109.28452.28661974
‐0.65‐0.382137.975400.795‐10.19‐150.2841323.9956.6157.2923.21975
0.50.353028.111890.13656.9753.3412077.33628.62641187.21976
0.340.24359.1571331.04626.4548.512625.8469.06107.61294.81977
‐0.39‐0.195162.64803.483‐16.85‐442.3632183.4836.5885.213801978
0.520.336976.0161813.37668.641498.6933682.17635.42488.81868.81979
0.450.2311116.3164140.381.743009.7246691.936.54682.82551.61980
‐0.26‐0.111663.516547.2‐48.89‐3271.9342012.59321.22872.81981
‐0.83‐0.713443.0161779.521.21725.44145.4‐17.64‐506.92365.91982
0.290.1713866.716423.7‐39.21‐1625.42520‐11.4‐269.62096.31983
0.80.6614157.016290.3‐15.67‐3952125‐12.48‐261.61834.71984
1.291.1214479.716322.7‐13.13‐2791846‐16.97‐311.41523.31985
0.690.5714472.616‐7.1‐41.82‐7721074‐29.03‐442.21081.11986
1.981.9914509.31636.7‐4.12‐44.31029.7‐8.15‐88.19931987
1.161.1214562.01652.7‐12.79‐131.7898‐14.87‐147.7845.31988
‐0.32‐0.314982.616420.631.57283.51181.5‐9.98‐84.4760.91989
1.260.8115482.61650035.42418.5160044.57339.111001990
‐0.96‐0.6617030.616154839.386302230‐38‐4186821991
0.480.1517757.616727‐43.18‐9631267‐20.82‐1425401992
‐0.27‐0.1119803.9682046.35293.521184.8522451.852‐24.91‐134.5405.51993
‐1.77‐0.2919664.968‐139‐68.96‐1690.852761121.95494.59001994
‐0.23‐0.2722286.4682621.5286.392179.42940.4‐64.57‐581.1318.91995
5.70.6225119.5682833.118.83553.63494107.24342660.91996
‐10.44‐1.9727527.5682408‐4.09‐143335142.68282.19431997
2.030.5729593.3682065.8‐23.87‐8002551‐48.55‐457.8485.21998
1.820.3532243.6682650.335.02893.43444.463.66308.9794.11999
‐2.61‐0.632905.668662‐36.04‐1241.4220394.06746.915412000
0.280.1934695.668179063.551400360317.6527218132001
1.270.6437544.9682849.381.8229486551104.181888.73701.72002
0.530.338563.9681019‐40.02‐26223929‐21.39‐791.729102003
0.320.2451801.96813238407.921602719956130.86380867182004
0.730.2575906.9682410572.27144223437852.923555102732005
‐1.23‐0.463418.471010.5738.72623.892035.7336.63240.561970/80Average
0.610.5314161.92436.63‐8.74‐509.191983.96‐6.34‐145.161981/90Average
‐0.21‐0.0432163.134028.2958.842185.26207.3834.46611.531991/05Average
‐0.270.00418379.712108.5333.78969.293759.5423.43289.341970/05 Average
* in  LYD/mi l l ion  .  The  indicators  were  ca lculated by the  researcher .
sources  : tables  25 , 32 .
income  
elastici ty    
2 : 4     (%)
margina l  
propens i ty     
  1 : 3   (%)
accumulated 
surplus         
/defi ci t*   
annual  
surplus      
/defici t*      
years 
investment expenditures
(4) relative  
change  %
(3)amount of 
the  annual  
change*
value*(2) relative  
change  %
(1)amount of 
the  annual  
change*
value*
oil revenues
366 
 
  
Table ( 19 ) Evolution of the current(administrative) expenditures  ; non‐oil  revenues  and  deficit/surplus  in the 
administrative budget & the marginal  propensity and income elasticity of the administrative  expenditures   in Libya .
‐‐‐205.7‐205.7‐‐82.8‐‐288.51970
‐0.18‐0.62‐259.765‐54.065112.793.335176.135‐20.2‐58.3230.21971
0.841.1‐316.975‐57.2117.330.555206.6914.633.7263.91972
‐0.55‐0.7‐302.88714.08820.341.898248.588‐11.1‐29.4234.51973
1.521.43‐348.787‐45.955.7138.41238784.6198.4432.91974
1.71.9‐461.238‐112.45119.173.749460.74932.4140.3573.21975
‐0.05‐0.06‐413.09448.14432.9151.395612.144‐1.6‐9.25641976
0.830.76‐331.63981.45522.6138.611750.75518.7105.3669.31977
0.390.35‐202.901128.7389.772.983823.7383.825.76951978
0.450.3849.076251.97724.1198.2391021.97710.8757701979
‐1.38‐1.04‐51.724‐100.8‐16.9‐172.777849.223.41809501980
1.251.41‐181.424‐129.78.471.1920.310.510010501981
74.6775.81‐543.024‐361.60.33.1923.422.423512851982
4460.13‐1182.524‐639.50.54.7928.122282.61567.61983
0.250.41‐1712.324‐529.820.2187.41115.5577.71645.31984
1.932.84‐1941.824‐229.5‐14.6‐162.9952.6‐28.2‐463.21182.11985
‐3.76‐4.64‐2354.624‐412.8‐3.4‐32.5920.112.8150.81332.91986
‐12.06‐17.54‐2494.824‐140.21.614.7934.8‐19.3‐257.910751987
0.220.25‐2488.0246.821.11971131.84.75011251988
0.660.65‐2456.62431.46.169.61201.444511701989
5.715.6‐2694.624‐2384.958.612602832814981990
0.280.31‐2910.624‐2162.53212920.71015081991
0.170.2‐3025.624‐1159.812714191.72615341992
0.910.99‐3139.724‐114.14.766.91485.94.36616001993
‐0.68‐0.73‐3656.024‐516.3‐15.7‐232.9125310.6169.31769.31994
‐3.15‐4.44‐5325.124‐1669.1‐16.9‐212104153.2940.82710.11995
0.912.36‐7600.024‐2274.942.8445.31486.338.81051.13761.21996
‐0.08‐0.19‐8302.324‐702.388.61316.82803.1‐6.8‐255.83505.41997
‐1.13‐1.42‐8423.024‐120.78.62403043.1‐9.7‐341.63163.81998
0.540.57‐8692.624‐269.6‐11.4‐345.82697.3‐6.2‐196.92966.91999
0.180.2‐8205.224487.435943.33640.66.3186.33153.22000
‐2.94‐2.53‐8336.724‐131.5‐4.8‐175.53465.114.1443.43596.62001
‐1.63‐1.69‐9444.824‐1108.1‐10.5‐362.93102.217.1613.74210.32002
‐0.4‐0.55‐8762.524682.337.31157.84260‐15‐632.63577.72003
4.914.13‐10461.324‐1698.817.9761.25021.287.83142.367202004
‐2.55‐3.43‐14178.024‐3716.7‐9.1‐455.94565.323.2156282822005
0.360.35‐258.69‐4.729.7576.64510.8915.5466.151970/80Average
11.2912.49‐1804.98‐264.294.5141.081028.86.1954.81981/90Average
‐0.31‐0.41‐7364.25‐765.5611.92220.352705.0114.67452.271991/05Average
3.193.49‐3648.87‐393.8314.9128.071568.9712.5228.391970/05 Average
* in  LYD/million  .  The indicators were calculated by the researcher .
sources : tables 25 , 32 .
income  
elasti ci ty       
     2 : 4           
   %
marginal  
propens i ty    
  1 : 3           
%
accumulated 
surplus         
/defici t*   
annual  
surplus        
 /defici t*   
years (2) relative  
change  %
(1)amount of 
the  annual  
change*
administrative expenditures
value*
Non-oil revenues
(4) relative  
change% 
(3)amount of 
the  annual  
change*
value*
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Table ( 20  ) Proportion of the public revenues , surplus/deficit to the GDP  in Libya 
PR/GDPNOR/GDPOR/GDPD/GDPGDPD
%%%%**
42%6%35%8%1288.3101.3535.845382.8434.5146288.51970
52%11%41%22%1586.5350.3828.453652.318176.135478.2248230.21971
47%12%36%10%1753170.1831.265624.575206.69661.2397.3263.91972
39%11%28%9%2182.3204.4852.696604.108248.588648.3413.8234.51973
49%10%39%15%3795.7562.41861.2791474.2793871298.9866432.91974
49%13%36%8%3674.3288.31784.7441323.995460.7491496.4923.2573.21975
56%13%44%20%4768.1938.32689.482077.336612.1441751.21187.25641976
60%13%47%25%5612.71412.53376.6012625.846750.7551964.11294.8669.31977
55%15%40%17%5496.1932.23007.2212183.483823.738207513806951978
62%13%48%27%76032065.44704.1533682.1761021.9772638.81868.87701979
71%8%63%38%10553.84039.57541.16691.9849.23501.62551.69501980
49%10%39%5%8798.8417.54340.33420920.33922.82872.810501981
57%10%46%16%8932.41417.95068.84145.4923.43650.92365.912851982
41%11%30%‐3%8511.7‐215.83448.12520928.13663.92096.31567.61983
42%14%27%‐3%7804.7‐239.53240.521251115.534801834.71645.31984
36%12%24%1%7852.193.22798.61846952.62705.41523.31182.11985
29%14%16%‐6%6767.5‐419.91994.11074920.124141081.11332.91986
33%16%17%‐2%5933.2‐103.51964.51029.7934.8206899310751987
33%18%15%1%6170.659.52029.88981131.81970.3845.311251988
34%17%17%6%7094.74522382.91181.51201.41930.9760.911701989
37%16%21%3%7741.62622860160012602598110014981990
42%15%26%16%8426.21332352222301292219068215081991
31%16%14%7%8774.4612268612671419207454015341992
42%16%26%21%9287.51932.33937.7522451.8521485.92005.5405.516001993
20%13%8%‐7%9913.5‐655.3201476112532669.39001769.31994
38%10%28%9%10592.5952.43981.42940.410413029318.92710.11995
42%13%30%5%11782.5558.24980.334941486.34422.1660.93761.21996
48%22%26%13%128881705.76154.133512803.14448.49433505.41997
44%24%20%15%12610.61945.15594.125513043.13649485.23163.81998
44%19%24%17%14075.22380.76141.73444.42697.33761794.12966.91999
33%21%13%7%17620.21149.45843.622033640.64694.215413153.22000
32%16%16%8%21868.51658.57068.136033465.15409.618133596.62001
32%10%21%6%30549.41741.29653.265513102.279123701.74210.32002
22%11%10%5%376041701.38189392942606487.729103577.72003
51%10%41%24%48793.411539.224977.2199565021.213438671867202004
58%7%51%30%67048.320388.338943.3343784565.3185551027382822005
‐‐‐‐445.7661.73191.83135.3456.48130.159.4470.66**total
43%14%30%11%12382.091714.75328.53759.541568.973613.811651.011962.8*Average
1.0%0.2%1.1%3.9%12.0%16.4%13.0%13.2%12.1%11.3%12.9%10.1%CAGR
where  ,  * in LYD/mi l l ion ; ** in LYD/mi l l iard .; GS: Adminis trative  expenditures  ; Gi  :  development expenditures  ; NOR: Non‐oi l  revenues  ;
 OR: oi l  revenues  ; PR: publ ic revenues ; D : defici t/surplus  in the  publ i c budget ; GDP: Gross  domestic product .
sources  :  columns  1‐6  from tables  25,31.; column 9 from table  1 .;  The  other remaining indicators  were  ca lculated 
by the  researcher .
years
Actual  public revenues  *Actual  public expenditures  *
PRORNORtotalGiGS
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Table ( 21 ) Assets & Liabilities of Central Bank of Libya                                           LYD/Million ( unless stated otherwise )
(3)477.678.8278.8477.640.2‐‐‐1970
(3)786134.148078633.9‐* 0.567‐1971
(3)953.2132.5520.8953.2175.1‐*4‐1972
(5),(4),(3)892.6178.5325.7892.6371.3‐*54144.31973
(5),(4),(3)1609.4332.3376.31609.4450‐*132641974
(5),(4),(3 )1583.2263.8308.31583.2873.2‐* 255.5298.71975
(5),(4),(3)1764.9331.2321.61764.9829.7‐* 22.3489.21976
(5),(4),(3)2050.5407.6312.12050.5683.4‐* 22.6296.81977
(5),(4),(3)2686.8423.5423.42686.81446‐*23.510091978
(5),(4),(3)2606.5672.64902606.51521.9‐* 20.810141979
(5),(4),(3)5601.41009.7847.35601.41214.6‐* 18.3301.61980
(5),(4),(3)5735.11020.7716.95735.12395.9‐* 14.11155.91981
(5),(4)5489.4950.3681.15489.43156.2‐* 5471256.71982
(5),(4)5073.8606.5653.75073.83244.3‐* 544366.31983
(5),(4)4884.2595.3648.44884.23588.3‐* 570.7506.41984
(5),(4)5200.7692.5641.65200.73806.6‐* 567.6262.21985
(5)5246.2471.26395246.23858.3‐* 566120.41986
(2),(1)5714.7450.2662.25714.74617.13052694.81987
(2),(1)5420.4420.6665.65420.44488.6305812544.11988
(2),(1)6047.2551.5681.26047.24884.347989.42679.41989
(2),(1)6997.2974.7696.16997.25499.4180.5‐3928.11990
(2),(1)7190.31173.5697.17190.35686.5176.2‐3928.11991
(2),(1)7408.4593.3697.97408.45594.8166‐4181.41992
(2),(1)7730.7626.9676.67730.75444.1158.729.93439.31993
(2),(1)9060.7869678.29060.76954.8237.2646.23784.41994
(2),(1)10136.41006.2708.310136.48001.8486.8696.24484.11995
(2),(1)10771.3829.5741.210771.38264.7529.6696.243281996
(6)9525.7929684.29525.78461590782.64374.31997
(7)2787.7757.9792.72787.79495.4606.11307.84519.41998
(7)2744.1840.81613.42744.19387.1603.5696.24373.91999
(7)2826.7819.73891.82826.712424.3647.7696.24624.62000
(7)2690.71087.84418.12690.714611499.51600.14581.12001
(7)2751.8988.64860.92751.823503.1344.21600.14581.72002
(7)2883.3901.66324.12883.332366.6330.81600.145842003
(7)2794.71036.513627.52794.733422317.5002004
(7)3482.11757.728866.13482.154934.8776.7002005
**in LYD/Milliard161.6124.9280.65161.61285.736.7615.6972.52**Total
4489.04692.112240.234489.047936.95187.72435.892014.34Average  
5.8%9.3%14.2%5.8%22.9%19.8% (c)28.2% (b)12.2%  (a)CAGR
 * includes   laons  of the  publ ic treasury and publ ic enterprises  .,(a ) for1973‐2003.,(b) for 1971‐2003., ( c ) for 1987‐2005.
where  , CBL : centra l  Bank of Libya   ; CAGR : compound annual  growth rate  .
Sources  :  Centra l  Bank of Libya  , the  Economic bul letin , the  fol lowing No.s :‐ ( 1 ) jul /sep 1997 , vol .37,No.7‐9, table  1.; 
( 2 ) Apr/Jun 1997,vol .37,No.4‐6,table  1.;( 3 ) Apr/Jun 1982 ,vol .22, No. 4‐6, table  2.; ( 4 ) Oct/Dec 1986 ,vol  26 , No.10‐12, 1986 
table  2.; ( 5) Apr/Jun ,vol  27, No.4‐6, table  2.;( 6 ) the  second quarter 1998, vol  38, table  5 .;( 7 )second quarter 2008,vol .48,table  6.
sources  
Total
public 
Enterprises 
accounts at CBL
Treasury account 
at the CBL
Total
Loans&Advance
s to public 
Enterprises
public Treasury 
Loans& 
Advances
public 
Treasury bills& 
securities
years
LiabilitiesAssets
total of Banking 
operations in 
CBL
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Table ( 22 ) Money Supply and its facors affecting   ( LYD/million )
(2) , (1)240.56128.28112.281970
(2) , (1)364.47243.79120.681971
(2) , (1)392.74245.37147.371972
(5), (4), (2) , (1)490.97288.37202.61973
(5), (4), (2) , (1)753.84491.63262.211974
(5), (4), (2) , (1)844.45498.46345.991975
(5), (4), (2) , (1)1139.37703.41435.961976
(5), (4), (3) , (1)1443.76858.79584.971977
(5), (4), (3) , (1)1687.81819.29868.521978
(5), (4), (3), (1)2223.611169.881053.731979
(5), (4), (3) , (1)2856.832174.56682.271980
(5) , (4) , (3)3512.12721791.11981
(5) , (3)11261.92362.988991982
(5) , (3)2894.42056.2838.21983
(5) , (3)2711.31943.8767.51984
(5), (3)3492.22507.29851985
(5), (3)3041.42017.71023.71986
(7) , (6)3438.62370.41068.21987
(7) , (6)3032.72133.1899.61988
(7), (6)3521.52389.91131.61989
(7) , (6)4452.32991.21461.11990
(7) , (6)4292.826721620.81991
(7) , (6)4987.230051982.21992
(7) , (6)4948.12731.22216.91993
(7) , (6)5132.63142.81989.81994
(7) , (6)5237.23201.82035.41995
(7) , (6)6382.43963.424191996
(8)8007.75473.52534.21997
(10)7034.94336.32698.61998
(10)7385.44750.52634.91999
(9),(10)7278.94579.72699.22000
(9),(10)8270.85711.22559.62001
(9),(10)8705.86091.92613.92002
(9),(10)9029.26265.72763.52003
(9),(10)10536.67923.92612.72004
(9),(10)14028.110719.43308.72005
4584.852935.651649.19Average
12.3%13.5%10.1%CAGR
sources  : Centra l  Bank Of Libya  , The   Economic bul letin :(1)Apr/Jun 1982, vol .22,
No.4‐6,table  14.;(2)Jan/Mar 1978, No.1‐2‐3 , table  14.;(3)Jan/Mar 1988 , vol .28,No.1‐3.
(4)Oct/Dec 1986, vol .26,No.10‐12,table  14.;(5)Apr/Jun 1987, vol .27,No.4‐6,table  14.
(6)Apr/Jun 1997,vol .37,No.4‐6, table  12.(7)Jul/Sep 1997, vol .37,No.7‐9,table  12.
(8)The  second quarter, 1998 , vol .38, table.3.; (9) Second quarter 2008, Vol .48.
(10) Genera l  Authori ty for information, Statis tics  book, 2007, p.219.
years
Narrow Money supply
sources
Total
Demand 
deposits
currency in 
circulation
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Table ( 24 ) Tax on the real estate incomes & Tax on Business incomes    ( LYD/million )
Tax on the  
corporate  incomes
Tax on income  of 
trade,industry and 
crafts
5.1450.3734.7710.411970
4.1540.4623.6920.7381971
8.2708.270.831972
5.5483.5941.9540.6311973
15.95113.5912.360.8961974
20.83217.8562.9750.9461975
30.28925.6274.6621.1961976
34.54229.8224.7190.9781977
54.93851.4523.4860.5831978
64.40561.6842.7220.2771979
119.035114.5844.45101980
166.691155.5911.10101981
183.34177.4585.88201982
190.083185.6214.46101983
153.09148.4994.59101984
164.751160.5574.19501985
154.555145.1119.44401986
141.651137.8693.78101987
132.097127.7674.3301988
145.153141.1484.00501989
92.65485.0247.6301990
95.27886.3538.92501991
143.046126.90616.1401992
94.44984.869.5901993
421.812403.34818.46401994
200.57182.5418.0310.021995
239.44212.97726.4630.0251996
189.79159.41230.3780.0021997
220.732187.66433.0680.0181998
225.333197.51727.8160.0121999
177.547152.94624.6010.0332000
184.434162.79221.6420.0152001
267.12245.93621.1840.0162002
291.489267.73823.7519.4712003
327.304302.95224.3527.6622004
347.687323.2824.40716.2432005
5313.2054880.91432.29441.002TOTAL
147.589135.58112.0081.139Average 
12.8%21.3%4.8%11.1%CAGR
source  : Libyan tax authori ty , Tripol i  .
Tax on Bus iness  incomes
Total  of tax on 
Bus iness  incomes
tax on real  estate  
income
years
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Table ( 25 ) Tax on individuals incomes                                                                                                      ( LYD/ million )
tota l  of tax on the  
individuals  incomes
tax on external  
incomes
tax on the  banks  
depos i t benefi ts  and 
saving accounts
Genera l  tax on the  
income
* tax on the  free  
profess ions  
incomes
tax on sa laries  
& wages  
years
7.257000.1420.0017.1141970
6.747000.2260.0056.5161971
5.42400005.4241972
8.663001.2140.0147.4351973
21.05400.0153.2350.07317.7311974
34.55900.0274.1450.08230.3051975
41.5800.0415.4320.09636.0111976
54.92400.076.7060.19547.9531977
61.22700.0355.1440.22555.8231978
68.94200.0115.1350.16563.6311979
82.7800.0136.6280.47175.6681980
120.91800.0212.3290.329108.241981
131.9100.12113.3920.103118.2941982
126.73800.04110.5110.149116.0371983
251.81500.061122.9870.133128.6341984
138.58100.06411.7210.099126.6971985
128.49300.07211.3980.125116.8981986
126.50500.0811.8810.205114.3391987
129.49600.06311.7810.068117.5841988
115.2990.0010.02913.4650.202101.6021989
157.6290.0010.22521.1190.203136.0811990
137.95100.13819.2280.366118.2191991
138.13300.17714.5150.499122.9421992
113.15700.26810.1480.255102.4861993
186.2030.0040.12723.760.846161.4661994
153.2930.0060.11623.4970.769128.9051995
149.4410.0050.10923.3020.994125.0311996
145.720.0110.10416.2751.681127.6491997
155.7270.0180.05817.7721.987135.8921998
112.2920.0070.0110.322.46199.4941999
159.0270.0740.03620.8395.04133.0382000
196.2650.0440.03621.8965.279169.012001
238.7030.0760.09826.3493.559208.6212002
304.6520.0280.03662.7573.322238.5092003
262.4510.070.09674.4737.509180.3032004
160.9610.0540.08410.5599.12141.1442005
4434.5170.3992.481654.28146.633730.726TOTAL
123.20.0110.06918.21.3103.6Average 
9.3%28.3%5.7%13.1%29.8%8.9%CAGR
( * ) Includes : tax on the partner's income .
Source : The General peolple`s committee of finance , Libyan tax Authority , Tripoli .
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Table ( 26 ) total of incomes tax                                                                             ( LYD/ million )
total  of the income 
tax other items
tax on the 
l ivestocks
tax on the 
agricultural  
incomes
tax on the 
individuals  
incomes
tax on the 
Business  incomes
tax on the real  
estate incomesyears
12.8160.004007.2575.1450.411970
11.6390006.7474.1540.7381971
14.5240005.4248.270.831972
14.8420008.6635.5480.6311973
37.90100021.05415.9510.8961974
56.33700034.55920.8320.9461975
73.06500041.5830.2891.1961976
90.44400054.92434.5420.9781977
116.74800061.22754.9380.5831978
133.62400068.94264.4050.2771979
201.81500082.78119.03501980
287.609000120.918166.69101981
315.25000131.91183.3401982
316.835000.014126.738190.08301983
404.94000.035251.815153.0901984
303.701000.369138.581164.75101985
283.554000.506128.493154.55501986
268.809000.653126.505141.65101987
262.056000.463129.496132.09701988
260.769000.317115.299145.15301989
250.574000.291157.62992.65401990
233.362000.133137.95195.27801991
281.303000.124138.133143.04601992
207.656000.05113.15794.44901993
608.16400.0010.148186.203421.81201994
353.97500.0110.101153.293200.5701995
389.01100.0010.129149.441239.4401996
335.66100.0030.148145.72189.7901997
376.62100.0010.143155.727220.7320.0181998
337.77200.0010.134112.292225.3330.0121999
336.71700.0010.109159.027177.5470.0332000
380.858000.144196.265184.4340.0152001
506.04600.010.197238.703267.120.0162002
605.657000.045304.652291.4899.4712003
597.473000.056262.451327.3047.6622004
524.902000.011160.961347.68716.2432005
9793.030.0040.0294.324434.5175313.20540.955TOTAL
272.02900.0010.12123.181147.5891.138Average 
11.2%---1.1%9.3%12.8%11.1%CAGR
Source : the libyan tax authority , triopli .
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Table ( 27 ) The total deposits collected by tax authority for benefit of other parties .   ( LYD/Million )     
tota l  depos i tsother** i tems
Dinar 
discount
Defense  
fees*
nationa l  
companies  
supporting
cadastre  fees
tax of the  
bl ind
tax of the  
palestinian 
nationa l  fund
tax of Al ‐jihadyears
2.3270000000.0722.2551970
3.990000000.1673.8231971
5.962000000.0930.2215.6481972
6.2840.01800000.0880.2575.9211973
13.0270.01700000.1230.36712.521974
19.22700000.5550.1290.59817.9451975
24.87300001.4510.1280.60822.6861976
30.98400001.6050.1290.86828.3821977
33.40100001.2390.1270.64131.3941978
34.8300000.6190.120.86733.2241979
68.73500001.7030.08330.30536.6441980
56.30300003.2530.0610.9552.0391981
55.45700001.1840.0440.74953.481982
55.400000.930.0380.68553.7471983
54.4700000.8480.0390.652.9831984
43.81100000.3680.0470.53442.8621985
39.611000.03600.4170.0410.49338.6241986
38.314000.4721.7010.8060.1443.12632.0651987
37.668000.2342.4720.9350.0390.51833.471988
36.793000.1112.741.2020.030.47232.2381989
49.33400.0060.0884.585.7040.0770.51438.3651990
36.44900.0220.013.7071.6280.0290.41330.641991
62.92700.040.0013.59424.4140.0360.39834.4441992
28.32800.0350.0012.4761.0010.0290.25324.5331993
54.23700.0760.0015.1831.4810.0380.35447.1041994
42.98700.0760.0024.8190.6750.0620.26637.0871995
51.52200.0980.0016.97600.0340.1744.2431996
50.48700.0960.0016.1080.0150.0270.16644.0741997
59.9640.390.09207.6610.0180.0220.54151.241998
52.8730.0730.14705.9980.0260.0170.13746.4751999
54.5240.1660.3430.0015.5520.0050.0090.13448.3142000
57.0850.3020.3220.0084.76800.0050.1351.552001
67.3752.8280.2940.0084.61400.0030.14859.482002
76.7893.2240.3080.0014.39300.0020.12568.7362003
82.5243.9920.36504.84400.0010.11873.2042004
93.5153.8650.4920.0015.806000.19883.1532005
1582.38714.8752.8120.97787.99252.0821.89447.1631374.592TOTAL
43.9550.4130.0780.0272.4441.4470.0531.3138.183Average
11.10%38.80%34.10%-17.20%7.10%-17.20%-13.20%2.90%10.90%CAGR
( * ) called : gun installment     ,  ( ** )Includes:military service fees;petition&contest fees;social solidarity fund ; 
and other deposits .
source : the libyan tax authority , Tripoli .
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( LYD /million )Table (28 ) total of fine & seizure and miscellaneous ( part 6 )
tota l  of part 6
tota l  of the  miscel laneous
fines& seizuresyears 
0.2930.0620.2311970
0.2250.040.1851971
0.33600.3361972
0.4210.0120.4091973
0.8920.0120.881974
0.940.0090.9311975
2.1540.0132.1411976
1.0280.0111.0171977
1.6610.011.6511978
1.4980.0021.4961979
3.120.2372.8831980
3.4280.2813.1471981
3.870.3043.5661982
4.6720.2394.4331983
4.9250.2134.7121984
4.8080.2814.5271985
4.0840.1963.8881986
2.4890.22.2891987
3.6820.3273.3551988
2.7430.3792.3641989
3.3010.8132.4881990
2.980.3682.6121991
2.6730.2112.4621992
1.8810.0751.8061993
4.0430.0913.9521994
7.4170.1247.2931995
11.4860.40311.0831996
11.7520.37611.3761997
9.6040.2869.3181998
9.3240.3368.9881999
8.2420.1588.0842000
6.4980.1786.322001
6.840.2976.5432002
0.2660.26602003
0.4550.45502004
0.3550.35502005
134.3867.62126.766TOTAL
3.7330.2123.521Average
0.50%5.10%11.00%C.A.G.R
The miscellaneous , include : license fees , the rights of income & buildings tax 
collection; collection and implementation ( enforcement ) rights ( Execution rights fees );
 judiciary fees revenues of prior years  ; other various revenues .
Source : the libyan tax authority, tripoli .  
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Table ( 29 ) Indirect taxes revenues in Libya                                                                         ( LYD/million )
***tota l  indirect 
taxes (C+D+E+F+G)
other indirect 
taxes(G)
**tax of the  
bl ind (F)
tax of the  
enterta inme
nts(E)
stamp tax(D)
customs  & 
production 
tax(C=A+B)
*other customs  
tax(B)
import tax(A)years
50.5000.0963.7746.63411.13435.51970
54.8000.1086.20448.4885.44343.0451971
73.39300.0930.1188.5864.6027.18157.4211972
99.28800.0880.08512.67986.4368.76177.6751973
165.12300.1230.14131.007133.85210.073123.7791974
220.02900.1290.17235.351184.37711.677172.71975
243.02800.1280.18443.178199.53818.107181.4311976
264.32900.1290.20154.847209.15220.121189.0311977
307.42700.127059.654247.64621.863225.7831978
393.4200.12061.317331.98353.164278.8191979
509.48300.0830.27689.952419.172127.41291.7621980
575.86100.0610.209129.809445.78295.7823501981
552.24400.0440.18856.651495.361105.3613901982
488.038181.5370.0380.1963.181243.09226.282216.811983
654.338303.8440.0380.24859.157291.50839.766251.2851984
413.946139.3810.0460.28546.618232.6632.992194.6241985
401.941154.0210.0410.21144.344208.50815.845187.4791986
348.544114.7790.1440.25341.148196.57525.857166.3631987
617.739258.5940.0390.23860.602301.46631.192267.0741988
506.83239.8880.030.20654.934215.8619.696192.0761989
334.57769.6910.0770.32278.597188.91542.28143.611990
434.52985.4640.0290.29552.625298.477100.156195.961991
425.23619.0160.0360.35959.653348.417156.412189.761992
427.13700.0290.23551.013376.935161.328214.5321993
588.95700.0380.41378.04511.209263.416247.051994
640.0900.0620.30782.232557.696240.584316.9051995
665.49500.0340.2785.675579.533278.524300.9921996
677.52700.0270.28852.11625.117301.201323.9011997
727.800.0220.227105.12622.431234.028388.4031998
787.87700.0170.2138649.66286.816362.8441999
598.02600.0090.124132.782465.111165.28299.8312000
791.73200.0050.064140.13651.533249.456402.0772001
866.44600.0030.046261.588604.809251.729353.082002
1172.78600.0020.032223.143949.609326.594623.0152003
1197.03500.0010.021259.486937.527384.1553.4272004
1206.952000.005332.539874.408524.016350.3922005
18482.5031566.2151.8926.6173095.71613844.0794653.6279158.436Total
513.4156.620.050.1885.99384.56129.27254.4Average 
9.50%ــــ-8.10%13.70%8.70%11.60%6.80%CAGR
( * ) includes  : Oi l  products ;Carbonated water;Other products ;Consumption tax; Medicine  consumption fees . 
( ** ) tax for the  benefi t of the  bl ind. ;  ( *** ) customs  fines  & recaptures  not included .
Records  of the  l ibyan customs  authori ty , tripol i .sources  : ‐
Records  of the  Libyan tax authori ty , Tripol i .‐
Alhasea , Miloud ( 1988 ) , " income  accounts  and nationa l  accounts  " , Higher ‐
ins ti tute  of Adminis trative  & financia l  sciences  , Benghazi , Libya , 1st Edition , p.96.
The  Minis try of planning, Libyan Arab Republ ic, National  accounts  for 1962‐71.‐
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Table ( 30 ) Total stamp tax                                      ( LYD / million )
totalST4ST3ST2ST1year
3.77-0.5362.7170.5171970
6.204-0.5935.2590.3521971
8.581-0.7047.5890.2881972
12.679-0.76711.3940.5181973
31.007-1.3728.2761.3611974
35.35-1.41932.2261.7051975
43.178-1.40939.6522.1171976
54.847-1.56750.1273.1531977
59.654-1.54155.3562.7571978
61.318-1.66557.2632.391979
89.952-1.55985.932.4631980
129.809-1.539124.6923.5781981
56.651-1.38952.512.7521982
63.181-1.20358.6873.2911983
59.156-1.30355.0192.8341984
46.618-1.12142.9512.5461985
44.344-1.0140.7082.6261986
41.148-0.76838.2482.1321987
60.601-1.07757.5042.021988
54.934-1.17551.9061.8531989
78.596-1.50975.042.0471990
52.626-1.36949.3971.861991
59.653-1.45956.4831.7111992
51.013-1.04748.3841.5821993
78.04-1.41471.9424.6841994
82.233-1.34779.0021.8841995
85.676-1.68781.7692.221996
52.11-1.82348.3121.9751997
105.121.311.91999.2222.6691998
1382.7673.855127.2414.1371999
132.7822.4075.29119.945.1452000
140.133.2575.744125.7415.3882001
261.5883.2036.817244.9086.662002
223.1434.5585.66205.6377.2882003
259.4864.685.021242.1387.6472004
332.5394.6277.51312.3748.0282005
3095.71726.80977.1862885.544106.178TOTAL
85.993.352.1480.152.95Average 
13.7%19.8%7.8%14.5%8.2%CAGR
source  : the  l ibyan tax authori ty , and the  Libyan Customs  Authori ty ; Tripol i  .
where  :
s tamp tax on the  officia l  edited documentsST1:
s tamp tax on the  actions  & disposes  ( transactions  and facts  )ST2:
sa le  of stamped papers  & officia l  documents .ST3:
s tamp tax col lected by the  customs  Authori ty .ST4:  
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Table( 31 )   the evolution of tax  revenue  in Libya during the period  of 1970-2005    ,  ( Values in current prices )
TTTITDTTTITDTTTITD
100%76%24%---66.69950.516.1991970
100%76%24%8.4%8.5%8.1%72.3154.817.511971
100%76%24%33.0%33.9%30.2%96.19873.39322.8051972
100%81%19%28.1%35.3%5.2%123.27699.28823.9881973
100%74%26%81.4%66.3%144.1%223.669165.12358.5461974
100%72%28%36.6%33.3%45.9%305.443220.02985.4141975
100%68%32%16.3%10.5%31.2%355.118243.028112.091976
100%66%34%13.0%8.8%22.1%401.139264.329136.811977
100%64%36%20.7%16.3%29.1%483.987307.427176.561978
100%67%33%22.2%28.0%12.0%591.25393.42197.831979
100%65%35%32.0%29.5%36.9%780.353509.483270.871980
100%63%37%17.9%13.0%27.1%920.251575.861344.391981
100%60%40%0.3%-4.1%7.8%923.424552.244371.181982
100%57%43%-6.8%-11.6%0.4%860.838488.038372.81983
100%59%41%29.6%34.1%23.7%1115.558654.338461.221984
100%54%46%-31.1%-36.7%-23.2%768.246413.946354.31985
100%55%45%-4.8%-2.9%-7.1%731.061401.941329.121986
100%53%47%-9.6%-13.3%-5.1%660.884348.544312.341987
100%67%33%39.5%77.2%-2.7%921.719617.739303.981988
100%63%37%-12.1%-18.0%-0.2%810.22506.83303.391989
100%52%48%-20.9%-34.0%1.0%640.957334.577306.381990
100%61%39%10.5%29.9%-10.7%708.059434.529273.531991
100%55%45%9.1%-2.1%27.0%772.626425.236347.391992
100%64%36%-14.0%0.4%-31.6%664.667427.137237.531993
100%47%53%88.5%37.9%179.5%1252.967588.957664.011994
100%62%38%-17.2%8.7%-40.1%1037.89640.09397.81995
100%60%40%6.6%4.0%11.0%1106.905665.495441.411996
100%64%36%-3.9%1.8%-12.4%1064.147677.527386.621997
100%62%38%9.4%7.4%13.0%1164.649727.8436.8491998
100%67%33%1.2%8.3%-10.5%1178.841787.877390.9641999
100%60%40%-16.1%-24.1%0.1%989.416598.026391.392000
100%64%36%24.3%32.4%11.9%1229.848791.732438.1162001
100%60%40%17.1%9.4%31.0%1440.161866.446573.7152002
100%63%37%28.8%35.4%19.0%1855.4961172.786682.712003
100%64%36%1.2%2.1%-0.3%1877.4861197.035680.4512004
100%66%34%-2.8%0.8%-9.1%1825.7241206.952618.7722005
ــــــــــــ30021.48218482.50311538.979Total
100.0%60.0%40.0%10.0%10.0%20.0%833.9513.4320.5Average
ــــــــــــ2640.0%2290.0%3720.0%T.I.R
ــــــــــــ9.9%9.5%11.0%CAGR
Where , TD :direct taxes  ,  TI : indirect taxes  , TT : total  taxes . , T.I.R: total inreaseing ratio .
Sources : 
•         Direct Taxes : 
Records of the general administration of taxes authority , Tripoli , Libya. (Data does not include tax fines and confiscations).
•         Indirect Taxes : 
- Records of the general administration of customs  authority , Tripoli , Libya.
- Planning Secretariat, The national accounts  for periods of (1971-75),(1971-79),(1980-92).
 -Dr Miloud Alhasea , " Income accounts and national accounts ", Publications of the Higher Institute of Administrative & Financial  
Sciences, Benghazi ,Libya , 1st Edition , 1988, p.96.                                ( The ratios prepared by the researcher )
years Tax revenue    ( LYD  mil l ion ) The  rate  of increase
 relative distribution (tax structure)
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 Table ( 32 )   Population in Libya                                                     ( millions )
%No.%No.%No.
100%2.014%0.0996%1.921970
100%2.15%0.1195%1.991971
100%2.26%0.1394%2.071972
100%2.359%0.291%2.151973
100%2.5111%0.2889%2.231974
100%2.6813%0.3687%2.321975
100%2.8415%0.4385%2.411976
100%2.9415%0.4485%2.51977
100%3.0114%0.4186%2.61978
100%3.1314%0.4386%2.71979
100%3.2514%0.4586%2.81980
100%3.517%0.5883%2.921981
100%3.7319%0.781%3.031982
100%3.9119%0.7681%3.151983
100%3.6411%0.489%3.241984
100%3.628%0.2992%3.331985
100%3.677%0.2593%3.421986
100%4.0714%0.5586%3.521987
100%4.2314%0.6186%3.621988
100%4.3615%0.6485%3.721989
100%4.5215%0.785%3.821990
100%4.818%0.8782%3.931991
100%4.918%0.8682%4.041992
100%5.220%1.0580%4.151993
100%5.2419%0.9781%4.271994
100%5.3117%0.983%4.411995
100%5.3215%0.885%4.521996
100%4.98%0.492%4.51997
100%4.988%0.492%4.581998
100%5.058%0.3992%4.661999
100%5.138%0.3992%4.742000
100%5.27%0.3893%4.822001
100%5.337%0.3893%4.952002
100%5.47%0.3793%5.032003
100%5.497%0.3793%5.122004
100%5.576%0.3694%5.212005
100.0%4.0612.0%0.4988.0%3.57Average
-3.0%-4.0%-2.9%CAGR
Sources  :
   (1)Planning Secretariat, The  achievements  of the  revolution in Libya  during ten years , 1979 , table  23 , p.42.
    (2)Planning Secretariat, The  national  accounts  , January , 1982, p.39.;(3) National  Authori ty for Scienti fic 
Research ,  Journa l  of Economic Research, vol .7 , No. 1 & 2 , 1996 , table  1 , p.43.;(4) Research and discuss ions  
of the  sympos ium for the  consumption in the  Libyan economy , publ ications  of the  economic science  research
 center , Benghazi  ,1990, table  3 , p. 184.;(5)The  national  authori ty for information and documentation, stati s tica l  
handbook, 1998 , No.5,table.9 ,p. 10.;(6)Arab monetary fund, Economic indicators , 1997, No.14, table  .56, p.66.;
(7)Arab monetary fund, National  accounts , 1997, table  12, p.12 .
-Economic research centre, Total Economic , financial and demographic data in Libya during 1962-2006, Benghazi, Libya ,
July 2009.
TotalNon-LibyanLibyanyears
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( Thousands employees )Table ( 33 ) : Evolution of employees Numbers in Libyan Economy 
%No.%No.%No.
100%433.512%5088%383.51970
100%45914%6486%3951971
100%48817%8183%4071972
100%538.122%118.478%419.71973
100%607.228%169.872%437.41974
100%677.133%22367%454.11975
100%732.736%262.664%470.11976
100%76535%266.265%498.81977
100%772.733%252.367%520.41978
100%78933%259.467%529.61979
100%812.834%28066%532.81980
100%946.441%386.459%5601981
100%1083.746%495.354%588.41982
100%1179.548%562.152%617.41983
100%927.128%263.172%6641984
100%894.222%194.278%7001985
100%904.718%16682%738.71986
100%936.815%144.385%792.51987
100%963.615%142.885%820.81988
100%995.416%154.784%840.71989
100%1018.614%139.286%879.41990
100%1012.58%85.392%927.21991
100%10447%76.193%967.91992
100%1113.714%151.686%962.11993
100%114914%156.186%992.91994
100%1186.214%16186%1025.21995
100%122414%166.586%1057.51996
100%1255.113%169.487%1085.71997
100%1323.713%172.187%1151.61998
100%1383.813%179.987%1203.91999
100%144513%187.987%1257.12000
100%1448.712%176.888%1271.92001
100%1492.612%174.388%1318.32002
100%1534.911%170.289%1364.72003
100%1588.911%169.189%1419.82004
100%1665.111%18689%1479.12005
100%102220%19680%826Average
-3.90%-3.80%-3.90%C.A.G.R 
C.A.G.R  : Compound Annual  Growth Rate  . ,         Sources  :
Libyan Revolution in twenty years  ( 1969‐89 ) , the  pol i ti ca l  , economic and socia l  changes  , 
Genera l  people`s  committee  of information and culture  , september, 1989 , table  (1‐20) p.677.
Genera l  people`s  committee  of economy`s  planning , Economic & socia l  growth in l ibya  ,1991,february, table  22, p.81.
Genera l  people`s  committee  of planning, Summary of the  economic & socia l  trans i tion plan 1981‐85, table  19 , p.70.
Kaa iba ,Mohamed," Labour productivi ty in the  l ibyan manufactoring sector ‐ comparative  s tudy " , 
Economic research center,the  conference  of rea l i ty and prospects  of l ibyan industries  , Benghazi , 
during 4‐6 october 1994,
Centra l  Bank of Libya  , The  annual  report , No.33, 1988, p.47.
Genera l  people`s  committee  of planning , the  main features  of economic&socia l  evolution  in l ibya  
1970‐82, table  24 , p.61.
Genral  people`s  committee  of planning & trade  and finance  , the  achivements  of the  nationa l  economy 
1970‐92, table  19, p.64.
Planning secretariat, the  achievements  of the  l ibyan revolution during ten years  1970‐79,table  25,p.45.
The  genera l  people`s  committee  of planning , the  nationa l  acounts  1975‐80, january 1982, table  9,p.20.
Planning secretariat, the  nationa l  accounts  1971‐75,p.87.
Genera l  people`s  committee  of planning, the  economic and socia l  indicators  during the  period of
1962‐96, december , 1997, tables  1,4 ; pp.12,15.
Economic research centre, Total  Economic , financia l  and demographic data  in Libya  during 1962‐2006, 
Benghazi , Libya  , July 2009.
Non-libyans
(12).
(12).
(12).
(12).
(4),(11)
(4),(11)
(4),(11)
(4),(5),(11)
(4),(10),(11)
(4),(11)
(4),(11)
years
(2),(4),(7),(11)
(2),(4),(7),(11 )
(4),(11)
(4),(10),(11)
Total
sources
(1),(2),(3),(4),(7),(11 )
(4),(9),(11)
(4),(9),(11)
(4),(8),(9),(11)
(4),(10),(11)
(4),(10),(11 )
(4),(9),(11 )
Libyans
(12).
(12).
(1),(4),(11)
(1 ),(2),(4),(7),(9),(10),(11)
(11).
(11).
(11).
(12).
(1),(2),(4),(6),(7),(8),(11)
(12).
(12).
(11).
(4),(5),(11 )
(1),(4),(5),(11)
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Table ( 34 )  , The average daily exchange rate announced by the Central bank of Libya
$  Vs.  LYD   " dirhams"LYD  Vs.  $   "dollars"
( 1 )0.35712.80031970
( 2 )0.33642.97271971
( 2 )0.32973.03311972
( 2 )0.29613.37721973
( 2 )0.29613.37721974
( 2 )0.29613.37721975
( 2 )0.29613.37721976
( 2 )0.29613.37721977
( 2 )0.29613.37721978
( 3 )0.29613.37721979
( 3 )0.29613.37721980
( 3 )0.29613.37721981
( 3 )0.29613.37721982
( 3 )0.29613.37721983
( 3 )0.29613.37721984
( 3 )0.29613.37721985
( 3 )0.3153.17461986
( 3 )0.29713.36591987
( 3 )0.28593.49771988
( 4 )0.29483.39211989
( 4 )0.2833.53361990
( 4 )0.28493.511991
( 4 )0.29853.35011992
( 5 )0.32243.10171993
( 5 )0.36162.76551994
( 5 )0.35362.82811995
( 5 )0.36322.75331996
( 6 )0.37042.69981997
( 7 )2.20910.452671998
( 7 )2.16490.4619251999
( 7 )1.83570.5447652000
( 7 ),( 8 )1.54870.6457052001
( 7 ),( 8 )0.8241.213662002
( 7 ),( 8 )0.76621.305132003
( 7 ),( 8 )0.80161.247522004
( 7 ),( 8 )0.73961.352022005
0.5442.72average
2.10%-2.10%CAGR
Where  :
LYD : Libyan dinar  ( 1 LYD = 1000 dirhams   )   ,              $ : U.S. dol lar.
Sources  :
1‐ Statis tica l  indicators  of the  Arab world, the  league  of Arab States  and the  economic commiss ion 
for western as ia ,1981,Table:VIII‐I  , p.161.
2‐  Centra l  bank of l ibya, the  economic bul letin,1978 ,vol .18 ,  No.1‐2‐3 and 10‐11‐12.
3‐ Centra l  bank of l ibya, the  economic bul letin,1988 ,vol .28 ,  No.10‐12.
4‐ Centra l  bank of l ibya, the  thi rty‐seventh annual  report , 1992‐93.
5‐ Arab monetary fund, Economic indicators  during 1986‐96, 1997, No.14, table  .54, p.64.
6‐Report of the  investment cl imate  in Arab countries ,1997
7‐ Centra l  bank of l ibya, the  economic bul letin,2008 ,vol .48.
8‐ Centra l  bank of l ibya, the  annual  reports  ,for 2004,2006 and 2007.
Average  exchange  rateyears Sources  
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Table (35 ) The developing of General cost of living index in Tripoli City
***2003=100**1984=100**1980=100**1975=100**1974=100**1970=100*1964=100year
15.134.953.177.985.9100153.41970
14.73451.87683.997.6149.71971
14.934.652.677.285.299.2152.11972
16.738.758.986.595.5111.1170.41973
17.540.661.790.6100116.4178.51974
19.344.868.1100110.4128.41971975
20.948.373.5107.9119138.5212.51976
21.549.975.9111.3122.9143219.31977
29.267.6102.8150.9166.5193.7297.21978
26.258.488.9130.4143.9167.5256.91979
28.865.7100146.8162188.5289.11980
31.673111.1163.1180209.5321.31981
34.780.4122.3179.5198.1230.5353.61982
38.488.9135.3198.5219.1255391.11983
43.2100152.2223.3246.4286.8439.91984
47.1109.1166.1243.7269313480.11985
48.7112.7171.5251.7277.8323.3495.91986
50.8117.6179262.7289.9337.4517.51987
52.4121.3184.6270.9299347.9533.71988
53122.9187274.4302.9352.4540.61989
57.6133.5203.1298.1329382.8587.21990
64.4149.1226.9333367.5427.66561991
70.2167.3254.6373.7412.4479.9736.11992
77.2180.5274.6403444.8517.5793.91993
87.6194.6296.2434.6479.7558.1856.21994
97.1209.9319.4468.8517.4602923.51995
108226.4344.5505.6558649.39961996
120.1244.2371.6545.3601.8700.31074.21997
126.1263.4400.7588.1649755.21158.51998
128284432.1634.1699.8814.31249.21999
124.3306.3466683.9754.8878.31347.32000
113330.3502.6737.6814.1947.31453.12001
102.2356.3542.1795.58781021.61567.22002
100384.2584.7858946.91101.91690.32003
101414.4630.6925.41021.31188.418232004
104447680.1998.11101.51281.71966.22005
61.3159.3242.4355.7392.6456.8700.8Average
5.70%7.60%7.60%7.60%7.60%7.60%7.60%CAGR
*Centra l  Bank of l ibya  , the  economic bul letins :sources : 
(Jan/Mar 1978, No.1‐3, table.22),(Apr/Jun 1982,No.4‐6, vol .22)
(Jan/Mar 1986,No.1‐3,vol .26),(Apr/Jun 1997,No.4‐6,vol .37).
*During 1980‐1981 : estimated indexes  , because  of trade  national ization . 
see  to the  research papers  of sympos ium of consumption in the  l ibyan economy , Economic
 Research center , Benghazi ,Libya  , 1990, p.98.
* During 1998‐2006 : estimation , us ing the  fol lowing exponentia l  function : 
Y = 129.35 e 0.0756 t     R2=%98 , where  : t =time  , e=2.718
**The  Genera l  cost of l iving index of ( 1970=100, 1974=100, 1975=100,1980=100, 1984=100)were  converted
 indexes from 1964=100 index.
*** Economic research centre, Tota l  Economic , financia l  and demographic data  in Libya  during 1962‐2006,
 Benghazi, Libya , July 2009.  
383 
 
  
  
Table ( 36 ) Annual growth rate of individual money/real income in Libya 
Increasing NumberIncreasing NumberAnnual growth change valueIncreasing NumberIncreasing NumberAnnual growth change value
compared to 1974compared to 1970rate  %LYD/yearcompared to 1974compared to 1970rate  %LYD/year
0.5---0.4---1970
0.61.220.8133.20.51.217.9114.61971
0.61.33.829.10.51.25.541.31972
0.61.34.132.60.61.416.5131.81973
1255.4463.312.462.8583.61974
0.81.7-17.8-231.30.92.1-9.3-141.21975
0.91.913.5144.41.12.622.5307.91976
12.110.1122.81.3313.7230.21977
0.71.5-29.4-392.41.22.8-4.4-83.21978
1.12.353.9507.61.63.833603.21979
1.32.718.8272.52.15.133.7818.21980
0.91.9-30.3-522.71.73.9-22.6-733.41981
0.81.6-13.4-161.11.63.7-4.7-119.21982
0.71.3-17.8-185.21.43.4-9.1-217.81983
0.61.2-12.4-106.11.43.3-1.5-32.81984
0.51.1-7.3-54.61.43.41.2251985
0.40.9-17.7-122.61.22.9-15-325.11986
0.30.7-24.2-138.312.3-20.9-386.21987
0.30.7-3-12.812.30.111988
0.40.710.142.41.12.511.5168.41989
0.30.7-3.1-14.31.12.75.385.51990
0.30.6-8.2-36.91.22.72.542.81991
0.30.6-9.1-37.41.22.8235.21992
0.30.5-7.5-281.22.8-0.3-4.61993
0.30.5-1.8-6.11.335.9105.81994
0.30.5-2.2-7.61.33.15.4102.91995
0.30.52.99.71.53.5112201996
0.30.610.134.51.74.118.8415.41997
0.30.5-10.7-40.31.74-3.7-981998
0.30.52.171.84.310.12551999
0.30.614.348.82.35.423.2647.52000
0.30.713.552.82.86.622.4770.82001
0.40.926.4117.13.88.936.31526.12002
0.5112.7714.610.921.51232.12003
0.61.218.3115.95.913.927.619242004
0.71.525.6191.3818.835.43149.72005
Average :
ــــ12.789.9ــــ17.6198.770‐79
ــــ-9.7-98.9ــــ-2.7-80.280‐89
ــــ5.229.8ــــ14650.690‐05
ــــ2.98.5ــــ10.1325.671‐05
The  results  of thi s  table  were  derived from table  No.5
years
per capita  money income per capita  rea l  income  1970=100
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Table ( 37 ) Compensation of employees in the public sector in Libya           ( LYD million )
compensationcompensationcompensationcompensation
of employeesyearsof employeesyearsof employeesyearsof employeesyears
5778.820002646.719902325.91980288.71970
7224.920013193.219912485.81981415.51971
8013.220023550.919922766.11982518.21972
8878.120033600.919932770.71983625.91973
9923.820043645.319942778.51984909.61974
117822005372419952408.719851068.31975
3527.6Average4341.319962241.119861221.41976
5086.119972052.819871431.71977
11.2%CAGR518419982431.619881654.91978
5255.419992839.619891929.41979
Sources  :
Planning secretariat , nationa l  accounts  of 1971‐75‐
General  people`s  committee  of palnning , the  economic and socia l  achievements  during the  ‐
nineteen years  of the  l ibyan revolution , January 1989 , Table  9 , p.13.
Counci l  of Arab Economic  uni ty , General  secretaria t , Sectora l  s tudy for Libya  , Part ( I  ) ,‐
amman , p.74.
General  people`s  committee  of palnning ,focus  on economic and socia l  development in l ibya  ‐
during 1970‐78 , November 1978.
Planning secretariat , Stati s tica l  col lection , 1976, Table  5 , p.316.‐
Planning secretariat , nationa l  accounts  of 1975‐80 , p.4.‐
Planning secretariat , Stati s tica l  col lection , 1976, Table  6 , p.317.‐
General  people`s  committee  of palnning , economy and trade  , National  accounts  of 1980‐92 ‐
from table  1‐2 to 10‐2 , pp.31‐40.
Centra l  Bank of Libya  , Economic bul letin , vol .37,No.4‐6,1997.‐
The  nationa l  authori ty for information and documentation , statis ti ca l  handbook,No.5,1998,‐
Table  43, p.44.
General  people`s  committee  of palnning , national  accounts  of 1986 , December 1999, tables  ‐
from 1‐2 to 12‐2 , pp.26‐37.
Economic research centre, Tota l  Economic , financia l  and demographic data  in Libya  during 1962‐2006, ‐
Benghazi , Libya  , July 2009.
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Table ( 38 ) GDP at current and constant prices in Libya    ( LYD / million )
at current
2003=1001984=1001980=1001975=1001974=1001970=1001964=100prices
8531.83691.42426.21653.81499.81288.3839.81288.31970
10792.54666.23062.72087.51890.91625.51059.81586.51971
11765.15066.53332.72270.72057.51767.11152.517531972
13067.756393705.12522.92285.11964.31280.72182.31973
21689.793496151.94189.53795.73260.92126.43795.71974
19037.88201.65395.43674.33328.22861.61865.13674.31975
22813.99871.86487.244194006.83442.72243.84768.11976
26105.611247.97394.95042.94566.939252559.45612.71977
18822.38130.35346.43642.233012837.41849.35496.11978
29019.113018.88552.35830.55283.54539.12959.576031979
36645.116063.610553.87189.26514.75598.83650.610553.81980
27844.312053.27919.75394.74888.24199.92738.58798.81981
25741.8111107303.74976.345093875.22526.18932.41982
22165.99574.5629142883884.83337.92176.38511.71983
18066.47804.75127.93495.23167.52721.31774.27804.71984
16671.17197.24727.3322229192508.71635.57852.11985
13896.36004.93946.12688.72436.12093.31364.76767.51986
11679.55045.23314.62258.52046.61758.51146.55933.21987
117765087.13342.72277.82063.71773.71156.26170.61988
13386.25772.737942585.52342.32013.31312.47094.71989
13440.357993811.725972353.12022.41318.47741.61990
13084.25651.43713.62530.42292.81970.61284.58426.21991
12499.15244.73446.323482127.61828.411928774.41992
12030.45145.43382.22304.620881794.71169.99287.51993
11316.85094.33346.92281.12066.61776.31157.89913.51994
10908.95046.53316.42259.52047.31759.6114710592.51995
10909.75204.33420.22330.42111.61814.6118311782.51996
10731.15277.63468.22363.52141.61840.41199.8128881997
10000.54787.63147.12144.31943.11669.81088.512610.61998
10996.34956.13257.42219.72011.31728.51126.714075.21999
14175.55752.63781.22576.42334.42006.21307.817620.22000
19352.76620.84351.12964.82686.22308.5150521868.52001
29891.88574.15635.43840.33479.42990.31949.330549.42002
376049787.66431.34382.83971.33412.72224.7376042003
48310.311774.57737.65272.74777.64105.82676.548793.42004
64469.514999.69858.66717.660875231.2341067048.32005
19701.17619.85007.83412.33091.826571732.212382.1Average
5.90%4.10%4.10%4.10%4.10%4.10%4.10%12.00%CAGR
Column 1 : source  , table  1. The  remaining columns  : the  values  were  converted us ing the  
price  index in table  4 .
at constant prices 
Gross domestic product  at factors cost of production 
years
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Table ( 39 ) Tax on Agricultural income, ownership of livestocks and other items ( LYD/million )
*other i tems
tota l  of agricul tura l  , 
l i vestocks  tax
tax on the  ownership of 
l i vestocks
tax on agricul tura l  
income
years
0.0040001970
00001971
00001972
00001973
00001974
00001975
00001976
00001977
00001978
00001979
00001980
00001981
00001982
00.01400.0141983
00.03500.0351984
00.36900.3691985
00.50600.5061986
00.65300.6531987
00.46300.4631988
00.31700.3171989
00.29100.2911990
00.13300.1331991
00.12400.1241992
00.0500.051993
00.1490.0010.1481994
00.1120.0110.1011995
00.130.0010.1291996
00.1510.0030.1481997
00.1440.0010.1431998
00.1350.0010.1341999
00.110.0010.1092000
00.14400.1442001
00.2070.010.1972002
00.04500.0452003
00.05600.0562004
00.01100.0112005
0.0044.3490.0294.32TOTAL
-0.1210.0010.12Average 
-‐1.1%-‐1.1%CAGR
*other items ( miscellaneous) include : military service fees and other deposits
source  : the  l ibyan tax authori ty , tripol i  .
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Table ( 40 ) Total of tax payments to the municipalities  ( LYD/million )
tax payments to the 
municipalitiesyears
0.9021970
1.7381971
2.3411972
2.9041973
7.6431974
9.8761975
14.1041976
15.3451977
26.3771978
28.6411979
109.871Total
10.99Average
46.8%CAGR
Tota l  of tax payments  to the  municipal i ties  include  :
 payments  from income  tax , rea l  estate  tax , Enterta inment
 tax , corporate  tax , tax on free  profess ions , Tax on trade
 & industry and crafts  , tax on vacant land.  
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Table ( 41 ) Direct taxes revenues in Libya                                                                                             ( LYD/ million )
Total*T9T8T7T6T5T4T3T2T1year
16.1062.3270.9020.06112.8160.00407.2575.1450.411970
17.4073.991.7380.0411.639006.7474.1540.7381971
22.7345.8692.341014.524005.4248.270.831972
23.9546.1962.9040.01214.842008.6635.5480.6311973
58.4612.9047.6430.01237.9010021.05415.9510.8961974
85.3219.0989.8760.00956.3370034.55920.8320.9461975
111.92724.74514.1040.01373.0650041.5830.2891.1961976
136.65530.85515.3450.01190.4440054.92434.5420.9781977
176.40933.27426.3770.01116.7480061.22754.9380.5831978
196.97734.7128.6410.002133.6240068.94264.4050.2771979
270.70468.65200.237201.8150082.78119.03501980
344.13356.24200.282287.60900120.918166.69101981
370.96755.41300.304315.2500131.91183.3401982
372.43655.36200.239316.83500.014126.738190.08301983
459.58354.43100.212404.9400.035251.815153.0901984
347.74643.76400.281303.70100.369138.581164.75101985
323.3239.5700.196283.55400.506128.493154.55501986
307.17938.1700.2268.80900.653126.505141.65101987
300.01337.62900.327262.05700.464129.496132.09701988
297.9136.76300.378260.76900.317115.299145.15301989
300.64449.25700.813250.57400.291157.62992.65401990
270.1536.4200.368233.36200.133137.95195.27801991
344.40562.89100.211281.30300.124138.133143.04601992
236.0328.29900.075207.65600.05113.15794.44901993
662.45354.19900.091608.16300.148186.203421.81201994
397.02442.92500.124353.97500.112153.293200.5701995
440.90251.48800.403389.01100.13149.441239.4401996
386.49750.4600.376335.66100.151145.72189.7901997
436.84959.94200.286376.62100.144155.727220.7320.0181998
390.96452.85600.336337.77200.135112.292225.3330.0121999
391.3954.51500.158336.71700.11159.027177.5470.0332000
438.11657.0800.178380.85800.144196.265184.4340.0152001
573.71567.37200.297506.04600.207238.703267.120.0162002
682.7176.78700.266605.65700.045304.652291.4899.4712003
680.45182.52300.455597.47300.056262.451327.3047.6622004
618.77293.51500.355524.90200.011160.961347.68716.2432005
11491.0121580.493109.8717.6189793.030.0044.3494434.5175313.20540.955total
319.1943.93.050.21272.0300.12123.18147.591.14Average 
11.0%11.1%46.8%5.2%11.2%--1.1%9.3%12.8%11.1%CAGR
; T6=T1+T2+T3+T4+T5 ;     * Total= T6+T7+T8+T9source  : The  l ibyan tax Authori ty , tripol i  .
tota l  income  tax ( part 1 )T6:Tax on rea l  estate  incomes  .T1 :
 Miscel laneous   ( part 6 )T7:tax on Bus iness  incomes .T2:
Total  tax payments  to the  municipa l i tiesT8:tax on individua ls  incomes  ( Includes  : tax on the  partner's  income).T3:
tax on the  agricul tura l  incomes  and the  ownership of l i vestock.T4:
The  total  depos i ts  col lected by tax authori ty for benefi t of other parties  . T9:other i tems.T5:
Medicine  consumption fees  and Tax of the  bl ind are  not included due  to i t was  included in indi rect taxes  . 
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Table ( 42 ) The difference between the actual and estimated public revenues
 in Libya        ( LYD/million )
PRORNORTJTITD
10.715.7‐59.2‐10.5‐3.71970
‐196.1‐92.3‐103.7‐84.1‐16.2‐3.41971
‐40.391.4‐131.7‐90.4‐35.8‐5.51972
‐483.7‐318.5‐165.2‐109.7‐52.3‐2.91973
‐1551.4‐1333.5‐217.9‐136.8‐68.6‐12.51974
‐1347.4‐1200.8‐146.6‐9.6‐85.2‐51.81975
‐2189.5‐1962.3‐227.1‐132.2‐34.8‐60.11976
‐2793.6‐2503.8‐289.8‐187.7‐25.4‐76.71977
‐2312.3‐2063.5‐248.8‐141.4‐15.2‐92.11978
‐3934.2‐3468.2‐466‐251.6‐99.9‐114.51979
‐6591.1‐6526.9‐64.2258.9‐158.2‐164.91980
‐3290.3‐3420129.7482.2‐148.1‐204.41981
‐3813.8‐4071.2257.4535.7‐82.1‐196.21982
‐1927.7‐2228.8301.1306.8137.1‐142.81983
‐1800.3‐183534.7349.9‐94‐221.21984
‐1598.6‐169192.490.3126.4‐124.31985
‐611.8‐777165.2125.988.4‐49.11986
‐721‐851.9130.9163.50.2‐32.91987
‐786.3‐741.3‐45187.5‐258.4261988
‐1172.9‐1084.8‐88.146.9‐161.526.61989
‐532‐346‐186‐265.42851.41990
‐867‐795‐72‐16523.569.51991
‐43517‐452‐368.4‐89.25.61992
‐2451.3‐1733.9‐717.4‐570.9‐146.501993
194.410985.4473.3‐83.3‐304.61994
‐1699.3‐1676.4‐22.9413.7‐314.2‐122.41995
‐342.3‐572229.7398.1‐193.825.41996
‐772.7104‐876.7‐812.6‐177.5113.41997
‐1461.8‐188.3‐1273.5‐1262.5‐81.670.61998
‐830.7188.6‐1019.3‐940.4‐216137.11999
‐1198.50.5‐1199‐1202.1‐158161.12000
‐933.90.5‐934.4‐844.7‐224.1134.42001
‐614.4‐0.1‐614.339.8‐230.4‐423.72002
943.92231‐1287.1‐366.6‐512.8‐407.72003
‐19719.5‐17850.7‐1868.8‐902.8‐595‐3712004
‐20940.2‐19223.6‐1716.6‐977‐547‐192.62005
‐88811.9‐75799.1‐13012.6‐5940.2‐4512‐2559.9Total
‐2467‐2105.5‐361.5‐165‐125.3‐71.1Average
where  : TD: Direct taxes  , TI: Indirect taxes  , TJ: other non‐oi l  revenues  , 
NOR: Tota l  non‐oi l  revenues; OR : Oi l  revenues ; PR: publ ic revenues.
The  resul ts  of this  table  were  derived from table  25.
years (The difference=estimated values - actual values)    
 for :
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Table ( 43 ) The proportion of actual public revenues to the estimated 
public revenues in Libya.
PRORNORTJTITD
98%97%106%64%126%130%1970
131%116%243%527%142%124%1971
105%87%276%550%195%132%1972
231%212%298%803%211%114%1973
601%1047%229%614%171%127%1974
408%1075%147%107%163%254%1975
538%1806%159%206%117%216%1976
579%2152%163%216%111%228%1977
433%1820%143%171%105%209%1978
611%1721%184%240%134%237%1979
794%4056%108%21%145%256%1980
413%0%88%0%135%246%1981
404%5587%78%0%117%212%1982
227%865%76%18%78%162%1983
225%733%97%0%117%192%1984
233%1191%91%67%77%154%1985
144%362%85%60%82%118%1986
158%579%88%63%100%112%1987
163%573%104%53%172%92%1988
197%1222%108%89%147%92%1989
123%128%117%175%92%86%1990
133%155%106%139%95%80%1991
119%99%147%233%127%98%1992
265%341%193%328%152%100%1993
91%87%94%0%116%185%1994
174%233%102%1%196%144%1995
107%120%87%49%141%95%1996
114%97%146%188%136%77%1997
135%108%172%305%113%86%1998
116%95%161%263%138%74%1999
126%100%149%183%136%71%2000
115%100%137%161%139%77%2001
107%100%125%98%136%382%2002
90%64%143%118%178%248%2003
475%948%159%140%199%220%2004
216%227%160%155%183%145%2005
256%786%141%178%137%155%Average
2.3%2.5%1.2%2.6%1.1%0.3%CAGR
where  : TD: Direct taxes  , TI: Indirect taxes  , TJ: other non‐oi l  revenues  , 
NOR: Tota l  non‐oi l  revenues , OR : oi l  revenues  , PR: publ ic revenues . 
The  resul ts  of thi s  table  were  derived from table  25.
years (The proportion=actual values ÷ estimated values )     for:
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Table ( 44 ) The difference between the estimated and actual expenditures in Libya 
%LYD%LYD%LYD
107%1.0765%0.65158%1.58‐2778.5‐105.51970
94%0.9482%0.82111%1.1131.554‐22.51971
97%0.9790%0.9110%1.122.745.6‐22.91972
94%0.9476%0.76164%1.6439.7131.2‐91.51973
111%1.1195%0.95172%1.72‐130.350.2‐180.51974
96%0.9682%0.82131%1.3165.3201.5‐136.21975
92%0.9284%0.84113%1.13155.7219.7‐641976
93%0.9385%0.85115%1.15139225.3‐86.31977
84%0.8477%0.77100%140540501978
113%1.13119%1.19100%1‐295.8‐295.801979
101%1.01101%1.01100%1‐24.2‐24.201980
98%0.9897%0.97100%182.282.201981
95%0.9591%0.91102%1.02204.1234.1‐301982
94%0.9488%0.88103%1.03226.4273.7‐47.31983
98%0.9887%0.87114%1.1470.2275.3‐205.11984
93%0.9390%0.999%0.99194.6176.717.91985
79%0.7964%0.6498%0.98650.8618.931.91986
77%0.7768%0.6886%0.866264571691987
76%0.7662%0.6290%0.9628.7509.71191988
82%0.8285%0.8580%0.8437.1139.12981989
98%0.9894%0.94102%1.024270‐281990
67%0.6736%0.36108%1.0810761193‐1171991
86%0.8666%0.6696%0.96346280661992
128%1.2884%0.84149%1.49‐444.279‐523.21993
105%1.05100%1109%1.09‐138.80‐138.81994
88%0.8846%0.4699%0.99399381.117.91995
111%1.1183%0.83118%1.18‐444.1139.1‐583.21996
93%0.9372%0.72100%1359.993360‐0.0071997
106%1.0645%0.45133%1.33‐195.8587.9‐783.71998
79%0.7970%0.782%0.821007338.9668.11999
112%1.1287%0.87129%1.29‐487.6224‐711.62000
96%0.9695%0.9596%0.96228.187141.12001
88%0.8885%0.8590%0.91126.9654.3472.62002
105%1.05109%1.09101%1.01‐285.8‐246‐39.82003
131%1.31128%1.28135%1.35‐3212.6‐1481‐1731.62004
107%1.0793%0.93132%1.32‐1186.2832‐2018.22005
‐‐‐‐‐‐1.697.36‐5.67**Total
97%0.9783%0.83112%1.1246.99204.36‐157.4Average
0.00%0.00%1.00%1.00%‐0.50%‐0.50%‐7.00%‐CAGR
* in LYD/ Mil l ion .; ** in LYD/Mi l l iard  , ES: estimated expenditures  , Ac : Actua l  expendi tures  
, GS : Adminis trative  Expenditures  , Gi : Development Expenditures  .The  resul ts  were  derived from table  32 .
Budget execution rate = AC ÷ ES*Difference= ES ‐ AC
totalGiGStotalGiGS
years
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Table ( 45 ) the ratio between the public expenitures and the public
revenues in Libya .       ( % )
DCBAyears 
123%81%32%348%1970
173%58%38%131%1971
126%80%64%128%1972
132%76%68%94%1973
143%70%59%112%1974
119%84%70%124%1975
154%65%57%92%1976
172%58%49%89%1977
145%69%63%84%1978
178%56%51%75%1979
215%46%38%112%1980
111%90%84%114%1981
139%72%57%139%1982
94%106%83%169%1983
93%107%86%147%1984
103%97%83%124%1985
83%121%101%145%1986
95%105%96%115%1987
103%97%94%99%1988
123%81%64%97%1989
110%91%69%119%1990
161%62%31%117%1991
130%77%43%108%1992
196%51%17%108%1993
75%133%118%141%1994
131%76%11%260%1995
113%89%19%253%1996
138%72%28%125%1997
153%65%19%104%1998
163%61%23%110%1999
124%80%70%87%2000
131%77%50%104%2001
122%82%57%136%2002
126%79%74%84%2003
186%54%34%134%2004
210%48%30%181%2005
136%78%56%131%Average
1.5%‐1.5%‐0.2%‐1.8%CAGR
where  :
A : proportion of current ( adminis trative  ) expenditures  to the  non‐oi l  revenues  ( % )
B : proportion of inves tment ( development ) expenditures  to the  oi l  revenues        ( % )
C : proportion of publ ic expenditures  to the  publ ic revenues  .  ( % )
D : proportion of publ ic revenues  to the  publ ic expenditures  .  ( % )
Source  : table  34 .;  
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Table ( 46 ) The Libyan Non-oil Exports     
NOX : F   %NOX : X    %NOX   ( * )years
0.28770.355131970
0.13870.17431.71971
0.29080.39093.91972
0.29770.42735.31973
0.06650.08842.21974
0.08380.12662.61975
0.07830.104131976
0.07480.09913.41977
0.06680.09742.91978
0.04080.05422.61979
0.0330.04322.81980
0.01830.02821.31981
0.03480.05372.11982
0.02760.04151.51983
0.04860.07572.51984
0.05140.06862.51985
0.00530.00820.21986
0.00550.00840.21987
0.01120.0210.41988
0.01030.01660.41989
0.33680.472617.71990
0.36490.539171991
1.24411.826455.51992
1.05281.779944.11993
0.74481.100334.31994
0.53930.828726.71995
0.13110.20127.21996
17.877733.44711150.31997
13.953928.9998715.61998
10.259717.657595.81999
26.405237.88962343.72000
15.425228.599215912001
27.202748.09836942.62002
23.526837.41146895.62003
20.859131.68177887.92004
16.988124.134596432005
--38012.5Total
4.968.251055.9Average
12.4%12.8%26.0%CAGR
Where  , ( * ) in LYD/mi l l ion .;  NOX= Non‐oi l  exports  , X = total  exports .
;F= tota l  of the  foreign trade  (Exports+Imports ).;NOX : X = the  ratio of non‐oi l  exports  to
 tota l  exports .;NOX : F = the  ratio of non‐oi l  exports  to tota l  of the  foreign trade  .
Sources  :(1)G40The  Secretariat of information(1989),'' Libya 's  revolution in twenty 
years  1969‐89'', table  8‐15, p.545.;(2)Central  Bank of Libya  , the  econonic bul letin, 
vol  .26 , No. 10‐12 ,1986. and vol .27, No.4‐6, 1987.; (3)The  planning secretariat , 1997, 
the  economic & socia l  indicators  for 1962‐96, table  1 , p.64. ;(4)Journal  of Economic 
research (1991) , the  national  Authori ty of scienti fic research, vol .3,No.2.
(5) Economic research centre, Tota l  Economic , financia l  and demographic data  in Libya  
during 1962‐2006, Benghazi , Libya  , July 2009.
The  columns  2 , 3 were  derived from table  45.
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 Table 47 , Gross fixed capital formation in Libyan Economy 
at current prices ( Million LYD )
years public sector private sector total
value % value %
1970 122.6 51% 120.1 49% 242.7
1971 208.5 72% 79.4 28% 287.9
1972 338 77% 98.6 23% 436.6
1973 499.8 79% 136.4 21% 636.2
1974 780.4 80% 199 20% 979.4
1975 834.2 79% 220.5 21% 1054.7
1976 1029.6 84% 196.3 16% 1225.9
1977 1171.5 86% 196.8 14% 1368.3
1978 1284.4 84% 247.6 16% 1532
1979 1672.6 90% 182.7 10% 1855.3
1980 2556.3 93% 200.5 7% 2756.8
1981 2872.6 99% 27.7 1% 2900.3
1982 2365.9 85% 405.6 15% 2771.5
1983 2096.3 83% 428 17% 2524.3
1984 1834.7 86% 293 14% 2127.7
1985 1523.3 98% 34.8 2% 1558.1
1986 1117.1 81% 258.8 19% 1375.9
1987 788.4 83% 161.5 17% 949.9
1988 722.4 69% 327.4 31% 1049.8
1989 823.4 71% 333.4 29% 1156.8
1990 702 62% 433.3 38% 1135.3
1991 723.3 70% 311 30% 1034.3
1992 608.5 60% 399.3 40% 1007.8
1993 1317.8 88% 185.9 12% 1503.7
1994 1417.8 87% 204.6 13% 1622.4
1995 1023.9 82% 220.7 18% 1244.6
1996 1389.8 85% 249.9 15% 1639.7
1997 1443.2 86% 241.3 14% 1684.5
1998 1137.5 81% 259.1 19% 1396.6
1999 1254.9 82% 281.1 18% 1536
2000 1912 84% 369.2 16% 2281.2
2001 5702.9 85% 985.6 15% 6688.5
2002 7970 82% 1737.6 18% 9707.6
2003 8158.7 82% 1815.2 18% 9973.9
2004 8749.1 82% 1933.6 18% 10682.7
2005 11145 84% 2186.3 16% 13331.3
Total 79298.4 - 15961.8 - 95260.2
Average 2202.7 81% 443.4 19% 2646.1
CAGR 13.8% - 8.6% - 12.1%
Source  : Economic research centre, Tota l  Economic , financia l  and demographic 
data  in Libya  ,during 1962‐2006, Benghazi , Libya  , July 2009.  
  
 
395 
 
Table  48 . Individual tax burden in Libya  during 1970-2005 US$ / year* 
years 
Direct  taxes 
per capita*
Indirect  
taxes per 
capita* 
Total taxes per 
capita* 
Per capita 
income * 
Total taxes per 
capita as percentage 
of percapita income 
1970 22.57 70.36 92.92 1794.7 0.052 
1971 24.79 77.57 102.36 2245.8 0.046 
1972 31.44 101.19 132.63 2416.7 0.055 
1973 34.47 142.69 177.16 3136.1 0.056 
1974 78.77 222.17 300.95 5107.1 0.059 
1975 107.63 277.27 384.9 4630.2 0.083 
1976 133.29 289 422.29 5670 0.074 
1977 157.15 303.64 460.79 6447.5 0.071 
1978 198.1 344.93 543.03 6166.5 0.088 
1979 213.45 424.49 637.95 8203.6 0.078 
1980 281.47 529.42 810.89 10966.9 0.074 
1981 332.31 555.66 887.96 8490 0.105 
1982 336.07 500.01 836.08 8087.5 0.103 
1983 322 421.54 743.54 7351.9 0.101 
1984 427.92 607.1 1035.02 7241.1 0.143 
1985 330.54 386.18 716.72 7325.6 0.098 
1986 284.69 347.68 632.38 5854 0.108 
1987 258.31 288.25 546.55 4906.8 0.111 
1988 251.35 510.8 762.15 5102.5 0.149 
1989 236.04 394.32 630.35 5519.7 0.114 
1990 239.52 261.56 501.08 6051.9 0.083 
1991 200.02 317.75 517.77 6161.8 0.084 
1992 237.51 290.73 528.24 5999 0.088 
1993 141.68 254.78 396.46 5540 0.072 
1994 350.44 310.83 661.27 5232 0.126 
1995 211.87 340.91 552.78 5641.4 0.098 
1996 228.45 344.42 572.87 6098 0.094 
1997 213.02 373.3 586.32 7101 0.083 
1998 39.71 66.16 105.86 1146.3 0.092 
1999 35.76 72.07 107.83 1287.5 0.084 
2000 41.56 63.51 105.07 1871.1 0.056 
2001 54.4 98.31 152.72 2715.5 0.056 
2002 130.64 197.29 327.93 6956.2 0.047 
2003 165 283.45 448.46 9088.5 0.049 
2004 154.62 272.01 426.63 11087.6 0.038 
2005 150.2 292.97 443.16 16274.8 0.027 
total 6656.76 10634. 17291.07 214916.8 2.945 
Average 184.91 295.39 480.308 5969.911 0.082 
CAGR 5.6 4.2 4.6 6.5 -1.9 
Source : calculated from Tables 5 , 9  in the statistical Appendix . 
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Table 49 Country wise actual tax burden (%) for the period 2001 to 2007 
Row Labels 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Algeria 0.031792 12.012341 27.51929 26.902067 31.192759 32.670685 38.466114 
Argentina 12.471706 16.91567 20.349873 22.897041 5.656288 5.436857 5.364426 
Bahrain 7.212345 4.064861 3.775706 4.958383 4.425468 3.796001 2.252773 
Bangladesh 7.596558 7.697519 8.071459 8.111346 8.220671 8.171811 8.102354 
Bolivia 13.576129 16.853674 16.512665 18.88806 21.843895 24.726036 22.464401 
Botswana 27.270147 24.742983 26.789635 26.40085 25.852863 27.137985 27.303905 
Brazil 17.651958 18.012115 16.766218 16.783895 17.072186 17.235186 17.236263 
Cameroon 13.686727 13.843985 12.599596 11.858821 13.547916 15.601912 15.068361 
Chad 4.484373 5.145996 5.880974 7.771594 7.628527 15.043023 18.614681 
Chile 18.13415 18.23601 17.41717 16.963388 20.021324 21.968588 21.383015 
Colombia 13.282012 11.932579 13.775321 13.760815 15.275862 14.149672 18.56997 
Congo.Rep 9.215447 8.361443 8.834661 8.639672 6.540304 44.372444 28.625027 
Côte d'Ivoire 15.188678 15.729316 14.905635 15.179 14.512988 14.862528 9.622907 
E.Guinea 25.484858 25.924707 25.714972 28.708267 34.137302 45.74077 9.41993 
Ecuador 13.3 14.1 12.9 12.8 13 13.9 14.3 
Egypt 14.317814 13.651623 13.34994 13.835978 14.068709 15.829529 15.635353 
Emirates 2.119354 2.484143 3.082288 3.355062 2.400442 2.918935 2.890572 
Ethiopia 8.436068 10.261254 9.79143 10.340407 9.512795 6.549066 5.36502 
Ghana 0.001719 0.001749 0.001848 0.002175 0.002132 0.002023 22.969055 
Guatemala 9.684139 10.630288 10.282289 10.135207 9.634597 10.157176 12.298756 
Guyana 29.6 30.2 29.1 31 29.9 0 0 
Indonesia 11.94906 11.826986 12.385516 12.330768 12.454429 12.258208 12.406836 
Iran 7.654975 6.818464 7.396452 7.499545 9.169517 9.096462 8.611256 
Kenya 17.55149 17.23379 15.678802 16.81273 18.28613 17.16629 16.420586 
Kuwait 0.949351 2.227018 1.922267 1.637467 1.394777 1.186642 1.32076 
Lesotho 36.73359 35.565372 36.720936 43.28481 44.43954 58.345688 56.943752 
Libya 5.623833 4.714204 4.934305 3.847828 2.722998 2.198543 2.119238 
Mauritania 17.711586 27.98593 28.407797 26.933998 22.330877 11.496599 12.133113 
Nigeria 37.624767 31.661621 33.277954 0.280921 0.199369 0.148576 0.195455 
Oman 7.388527 4.994882 2.554919 2.532577 2.842443 2.598632 3.410263 
Peru 13.567223 12.258781 13.082763 13.386102 13.795555 15.276153 15.612721 
Saudi 6.446744 6.633035 7.705233 6.635377 5.053573 5.182168 5.604231 
T.Tobago 22.1213 20.4555 21.4333 27.406734 32.469467 35.21437 26.364662 
Tunisia 21.634733 21.484762 20.59125 20.70501 20.622547 21.003298 21.255226 
Venezuela 11.796312 10.950465 11.534121 0.01293 0.015596 0.006708 8.12177 
Yemen 7.126002 10.022563 9.634499 9.368595 8.868667 7.094203 7.319877 
Zambia 18.6214 17.516445 16.835152 17.516232 16.952333 16.295166 17.720976 
Zimbabwe 24.6 25.1 26 21.18 16.36 9.56 3.809 
The table was calculated by the researcher. 
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Table 50 : Country wise estimated Taxable Capacity for the period 2001 - 2007
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Algeria 26.4634 28.3938 24.7588 24.2492 19.2068 19.7675 20.0946 
Argentina 24.9838 27.599 20.5908 18.0695 14.2738 14.8823 15.115 
Bahrain 4.8197 4.2673 6.4096 6.185 1.6801 2.6656 6.3624 
Bangladesh 32.2497 28.795 25.9704 25.4729 22.11 24.9411 19.4516 
Bolivia 50.3412 46.8612 45.6973 46.0203 38.0687 35.8285 31.9741 
Botswana 14.0732 11.5755 16.9035 16.2319 16.2759 17.4047 17.6001 
Brazil 23.131 22.9632 25.0408 23.3366 23.8786 24.889 19.2624 
Cameroon 24.6197 23.0509 24.8269 22.8552 22.8994 23.6934 24.0236 
Chad 26.8853 29.0045 30.7799 29.6541 28.1033 24.9849 26.342 
Chile 9.3676 11.6981 10.5554 11.182 12.3751 12.444 13.6222 
Colombia 27.9348 27.7567 26.8457 23.4366 20.6459 21.4293 20.8657 
Congo.Rep 20.3149 21.1886 23.766 21.443 21.0472 18.9189 20.4804 
Côte d'Ivoire 28.7171 29.8503 32.587 33.9655 33.5073 32.3503 31.3612 
E.Guinea 20.1302 18.1005 23.6722 23.1098 23.4313 20.9196 23.1895 
Ecuador 19.8201 18.6158 19.4398 17.8703 15.3182 17.2429 18.5536 
Egypt 14.9666 18.482 19.9896 20.3379 19.3587 17.336 19.9199 
Emirates 20.8735 17.7476 19.004 8.3103 5.7405 2.843 5.0435 
Ethiopia 18.9255 17.4666 21.8001 27.1676 24.471 22.757 24.6374 
Ghana 26.0528 22.7377 26.5741 25.727 23.4224 22.8185 16.7016 
Guatemala 36.81 36.3233 36.6166 35.1976 33.4506 32.0582 31.6946 
Guyana 23.7462 24.7917 20.9694 23.0743 26.071 25.9906 22.8817 
Indonesia 18.9469 20.8823 21.6496 17.8118 17.3507 15.353 16.9073 
Iran 2.686 1.9035 4.7364 4.75 11.376 7.5349 8.3849 
Kenya 29.3163 30.559 30.8109 28.6107 28.3382 28.7075 28.1838 
Kuwait 8.6003 7.2701 7.6944 8.1334 7.7512 9.0285 11.1263 
Lesotho 11.8709 10.7355 12.9303 11.3511 14.4848 15.9245 13.833 
Libya 2.4594 3.4753 3.6042 1.8909 1.2113 2.6463 0.2747 
Mauritania 3.7961 9.6371 17.8339 22.398 22.512 20.2968 21.2201 
Nigeria 37.8411 35.8209 34.8411 32.6905 29.8899 28.2717 33.788 
Oman 2.4047 4.6148 1.0155 1.543 0.091 2.1815 6.855 
Peru 37.5214 33.4677 34.5611 35.258 31.9098 31.527 31.4896 
Saudi 10.8564 15.7225 12.4053 15.1681 17.0222 17.3785 14.6572 
T.Tobago 22.1269 22.8213 22.8897 26.8424 28.7873 30.5453 29.5654 
Tunisia 10.2624 12.0857 9.7286 8.7651 6.6932 9.7032 13.648 
Venezuela 21.2518 23.6411 24.8105 17.5684 15.7295 14.6144 16.5053 
Yemen 11.7957 15.1086 16.4385 17.5111 18.6183 18.091 19.8936 
Zambia 33.1871 33.1922 29.8048 28.6972 28.539 29.5147 28.5937 
Zimbabwe 18.8822 18.4702 20.8215 18.3829 17.5206 16.702 3.0895 
The table was calculated by the researcher. 
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Table 51 : Country wise estimated Tax effort for the period 2001 - 2007 
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average 
Algeria 0.0012 0.42306 1.1115 1.1094 1.62405 1.65275 1.91425 1.119458571 
Argentina 0.49919 0.61291 0.9883 1.26717 0.39627 0.36532 0.35491 0.640581429 
Bahrain 1.49643 0.95256 0.58907 0.80168 2.63405 1.42407 0.35408 1.178848571 
Bangladesh 0.23555 0.26732 0.31079 0.31843 0.37181 0.32764 0.41654 0.321154286 
Bolivia 0.26968 0.35965 0.36135 0.41043 0.5738 0.69012 0.70258 0.481087143 
Botswana 1.93774 2.13753 1.58486 1.62648 1.58841 1.55923 1.55135 1.712228571 
Brazil 0.76313 0.78439 0.66956 0.71921 0.71496 0.69248 0.89481 0.748362857 
Cameroon 0.55593 0.60058 0.5075 0.51887 0.59163 0.65849 0.62723 0.580032857 
Chad 0.1668 0.17742 0.19107 0.26207 0.27145 0.60208 0.70665 0.339648571 
Chile 1.93584 1.55889 1.65007 1.51703 1.61787 1.7654 1.56972 1.65926 
Colombia 0.47546 0.4299 0.51313 0.58715 0.7399 0.6603 0.88998 0.613688571 
Congo.Rep 0.45363 0.39462 0.37174 0.40291 0.31074 2.3454 1.39768 0.81096 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.52891 0.52694 0.45741 0.44689 0.43313 0.45942 0.30684 0.451362857 
E.Guinea 1.266 1.43226 1.08629 1.24226 1.45691 2.1865 0.40622 1.296634286 
Ecuador 0.67104 0.75742 0.66359 0.71627 0.84866 0.80613 0.77074 0.747692857 
Egypt 0.95665 0.73864 0.66784 0.68031 0.72674 0.9131 0.78491 0.78117 
Emirates 0.10153 0.13997 0.16219 0.40372 0.41816 1.02671 0.57313 0.40363 
Ethiopia 0.44575 0.58748 0.44915 0.38062 0.38874 0.28778 0.21776 0.393897143 
Ghana 0.00007 0.00008 0.00007 0.00008 0.00009 0.00009 1.37526 0.196534286 
Guatemala 0.26308 0.29266 0.28081 0.28795 0.28802 0.31684 0.38804 0.302485714 
Guyana 1.24652 1.21815 1.38774 1.34349 1.14687 0 0 0.90611 
Indonesia 0.63066 0.56636 0.57209 0.69228 0.71781 0.79842 0.73382 0.673062857 
Iran 2.84995 3.58207 1.56162 1.57885 0.80604 1.20724 1.027 1.801824286 
Kenya 0.59869 0.56395 0.50887 0.58764 0.64528 0.59797 0.58262 0.583574286 
Kuwait 0.11039 0.30633 0.24983 0.20133 0.17994 0.13143 0.11871 0.185422857 
Lesotho 3.09442 3.31288 2.83991 3.81327 3.06801 3.66389 4.11652 3.415557143 
Libya 2.28667 1.35649 1.36904 2.03492 2.248 0.8308 7.71474 2.548665714 
Mauritania 4.66573 2.90398 1.59291 1.20252 0.99195 0.56642 0.57177 1.78504 
Nigeria 0.99428 0.88389 0.95513 0.00859 0.00667 0.00526 0.00578 0.408514286 
Oman 3.07254 1.08236 2.51592 1.64133 31.23564 1.19121 0.49749 5.890927143 
Peru 0.36159 0.36629 0.37854 0.37966 0.43233 0.48454 0.49581 0.414108571 
Saudi 0.59382 0.42188 0.62112 0.43746 0.29688 0.29819 0.38235 0.435957143 
T.Tobago 0.99975 0.89633 0.93637 1.02102 1.12791 1.15286 0.89174 1.003711429 
Tunisia 2.10816 1.7777 2.11657 2.36221 3.08112 2.16457 1.55739 2.166817143 
Venezuela 0.55507 0.4632 0.46489 0.00074 0.00099 0.00046 0.49207 0.282488571 
Yemen 0.60412 0.66337 0.58609 0.53501 0.47634 0.39214 0.36795 0.51786 
Zambia 0.5611 0.52773 0.56485 0.61038 0.59401 0.5521 0.61975 0.575702857 
Zimbabwe 1.30281 1.35895 1.24871 1.15216 0.93376 0.57239 1.23289 1.114524286 
Overall Average               1.039173346 
The table was calculated by the researcher. 
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Table 52 Country wise comparison with the overall average actual tax burden (%) for the period 2001 to 
2007  
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 mean Category 
Algeria 0.031792 12.012341 27.51929 26.902067 31.192759 32.670685 38.466114 24.11358 High 
Argentina 12.471706 16.91567 20.349873 22.897041 5.656288 5.436857 5.364426 12.72741 low 
Bahrain 7.212345 4.064861 3.775706 4.958383 4.425468 3.796001 2.252773 4.35508 low 
Bangladesh 7.596558 7.697519 8.071459 8.111346 8.220671 8.171811 8.102354 7.99596 low 
Bolivia 13.576129 16.853674 16.512665 18.88806 21.843895 24.726036 22.464401 19.26641 High 
Botswana 27.270147 24.742983 26.789635 26.40085 25.852863 27.137985 27.303905 26.49977 High 
Brazil 17.651958 18.012115 16.766218 16.783895 17.072186 17.235186 17.236263 17.25112 High 
Cameroon 13.686727 13.843985 12.599596 11.858821 13.547916 15.601912 15.068361 13.7439 low 
Chad 4.484373 5.145996 5.880974 7.771594 7.628527 15.043023 18.614681 9.22417 low 
Chile 18.13415 18.23601 17.41717 16.963388 20.021324 21.968588 21.383015 19.16052 High 
Colombia 13.282012 11.932579 13.775321 13.760815 15.275862 14.149672 18.56997 14.39232 High 
Congo.Rep 9.215447 8.361443 8.834661 8.639672 6.540304 44.372444 28.625027 16.36986 High 
Côte d'Ivoire 15.188678 15.729316 14.905635 15.179 14.512988 14.862528 9.622907 14.28586 low 
E.Guinea 25.484858 25.924707 25.714972 28.708267 34.137302 45.74077 9.41993 27.87583 High 
Ecuador 13.3 14.1 12.9 12.8 13 13.9 14.3 13.47143 low 
Egypt 14.317814 13.651623 13.34994 13.835978 14.068709 15.829529 15.635353 14.38414 High 
Emirates 2.119354 2.484143 3.082288 3.355062 2.400442 2.918935 2.890572 2.75011 low 
Ethiopia 8.436068 10.261254 9.79143 10.340407 9.512795 6.549066 5.36502 8.60801 low 
Ghana 0.001719 0.001749 0.001848 0.002175 0.002132 0.002023 22.969055 3.28296 low 
Guatemala 9.684139 10.630288 10.282289 10.135207 9.634597 10.157176 12.298756 10.40321 low 
Guyana 29.6 30.2 29.1 31 29.9 0 0 21.4 High 
Indonesia 11.94906 11.826986 12.385516 12.330768 12.454429 12.258208 12.406836 12.23026 low 
Iran 7.654975 6.818464 7.396452 7.499545 9.169517 9.096462 8.611256 8.03524 low 
Kenya 17.55149 17.23379 15.678802 16.81273 18.28613 17.16629 16.420586 17.0214 High 
Kuwait 0.949351 2.227018 1.922267 1.637467 1.394777 1.186642 1.32076 1.51975 low 
Lesotho 36.73359 35.565372 36.720936 43.28481 44.43954 58.345688 56.943752 44.57624 High 
Libya 5.623833 4.714204 4.934305 3.847828 2.722998 2.198543 2.119238 3.73728 low 
Mauritania 17.711586 27.98593 28.407797 26.933998 22.330877 11.496599 12.133113 20.99999 High 
Nigeria 37.624767 31.661621 33.277954 0.280921 0.199369 0.148576 0.195455 14.76981 High 
Oman 7.388527 4.994882 2.554919 2.532577 2.842443 2.598632 3.410263 3.76032 low 
Peru 13.567223 12.258781 13.082763 13.386102 13.795555 15.276153 15.612721 13.85419 low 
Saudi 6.446744 6.633035 7.705233 6.635377 5.053573 5.182168 5.604231 6.18005 low 
T.Tobago 22.1213 20.4555 21.4333 27.406734 32.469467 35.21437 26.364662 26.49505 High 
Tunisia 21.634733 21.484762 20.59125 20.70501 20.622547 21.003298 21.255226 21.0424 High 
Venezuela 11.796312 10.950465 11.534121 0.01293 0.015596 0.006708 8.12177 6.06256 low 
Yemen 7.126002 10.022563 9.634499 9.368595 8.868667 7.094203 7.319877 8.49063 low 
Zambia 18.6214 17.516445 16.835152 17.516232 16.952333 16.295166 17.720976 17.3511 High 
Zimbabwe 24.6 25.1 26 21.18 16.36 9.56 3.809 18.087 High 
Overall average 13.99597 14.42769 14.93464 14.22799 14.01118 14.85258 14.08744 14.3625 
The table was calculated by the researcher. 
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Table 53 Country wise comparison with the overall average estimated taxable capacity (%) for the  
period 2001 to 2007 
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean Category 
Algeria 26.4634 28.3938 24.7588 24.2492 19.2068 19.7675 20.0946 23.2763 High 
Argentina 24.9838 27.599 20.5908 18.0695 14.2738 14.8823 15.115 19.35917 low 
Bahrain 4.8197 4.2673 6.4096 6.185 1.6801 2.6656 6.3624 4.6271 low 
Bangladesh 32.2497 28.795 25.9704 25.4729 22.11 24.9411 19.4516 25.5701 High 
Bolivia 50.3412 46.8612 45.6973 46.0203 38.0687 35.8285 31.9741 42.11304 High 
Botswana 14.0732 11.5755 16.9035 16.2319 16.2759 17.4047 17.6001 15.72354 low 
Brazil 23.131 22.9632 25.0408 23.3366 23.8786 24.889 19.2624 23.21451 High 
Cameroon 24.6197 23.0509 24.8269 22.8552 22.8994 23.6934 24.0236 23.70987 High 
Chad 26.8853 29.0045 30.7799 29.6541 28.1033 24.9849 26.342 27.96486 High 
Chile 9.3676 11.6981 10.5554 11.182 12.3751 12.444 13.6222 11.60634 low 
Colombia 27.9348 27.7567 26.8457 23.4366 20.6459 21.4293 20.8657 24.13067 High 
Congo.Rep 20.3149 21.1886 23.766 21.443 21.0472 18.9189 20.4804 21.02271 High 
Côte d'Ivoire 28.7171 29.8503 32.587 33.9655 33.5073 32.3503 31.3612 31.76267 High 
E.Guinea 20.1302 18.1005 23.6722 23.1098 23.4313 20.9196 23.1895 21.7933 High 
Ecuador 19.8201 18.6158 19.4398 17.8703 15.3182 17.2429 18.5536 18.12296 low 
Egypt 14.9666 18.482 19.9896 20.3379 19.3587 17.336 19.9199 18.62724 low 
Emirates 20.8735 17.7476 19.004 8.3103 5.7405 2.843 5.0435 11.36606 low 
Ethiopia 18.9255 17.4666 21.8001 27.1676 24.471 22.757 24.6374 22.46074 High 
Ghana 26.0528 22.7377 26.5741 25.727 23.4224 22.8185 16.7016 23.43344 High 
Guatemala 36.81 36.3233 36.6166 35.1976 33.4506 32.0582 31.6946 34.59299 High 
Guyana 23.7462 24.7917 20.9694 23.0743 26.071 25.9906 22.8817 23.93213 High 
Indonesia 18.9469 20.8823 21.6496 17.8118 17.3507 15.353 16.9073 18.41451 low 
Iran 2.686 1.9035 4.7364 4.75 11.376 7.5349 8.3849 5.91024 low 
Kenya 29.3163 30.559 30.8109 28.6107 28.3382 28.7075 28.1838 29.21806 High 
Kuwait 8.6003 7.2701 7.6944 8.1334 7.7512 9.0285 11.1263 8.51489 low 
Lesotho 11.8709 10.7355 12.9303 11.3511 14.4848 15.9245 13.833 13.01859 low 
Libya 2.4594 3.4753 3.6042 1.8909 1.2113 2.6463 0.2747 2.22316 low 
Mauritania 3.7961 9.6371 17.8339 22.398 22.512 20.2968 21.2201 16.81343 low 
Nigeria 37.8411 35.8209 34.8411 32.6905 29.8899 28.2717 33.788 33.30617 High 
Oman 2.4047 4.6148 1.0155 1.543 0.091 2.1815 6.855 2.67221 low 
Peru 37.5214 33.4677 34.5611 35.258 31.9098 31.527 31.4896 33.67637 High 
Saudi 10.8564 15.7225 12.4053 15.1681 17.0222 17.3785 14.6572 14.74431 low 
T.Tobago 22.1269 22.8213 22.8897 26.8424 28.7873 30.5453 29.5654 26.22547 High 
Tunisia 10.2624 12.0857 9.7286 8.7651 6.6932 9.7032 13.648 10.1266 low 
Venezuela 21.2518 23.6411 24.8105 17.5684 15.7295 14.6144 16.5053 19.16014 low 
Yemen 11.7957 15.1086 16.4385 17.5111 18.6183 18.091 19.8936 16.77954 low 
Zambia 33.1871 33.1922 29.8048 28.6972 28.539 29.5147 28.5937 30.21839 High 
Zimbabwe 18.8822 18.4702 20.8215 18.3829 17.5206 16.702 3.0895 16.26699 low 
Overall average 20.50084 20.70203 21.29932 20.5334 19.55686 19.32069 19.13664   20.14997 
The table was calculated by the researcher. 
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Table 54  The variables used in OLS , ORR , URR analysis during 1970-2000 in Libya .    
( in Million Libyan Dinars )
years Non-oil exports  
Tax 
penalties 
 
Oil revenue 
 
Money supply 
 
Total tax 
revenue 
 
Gross 
domestic 
product 
 
( nox ) ( vp ) ( OilR )  ( Msp ) ( T ) ( Y ) 
1970 3 0.231 453  240.56 66.699 1288.3 
1971 1.7 0.185 652.318  364.47 72.31 1586.5 
1972 3.9 0.336 624.575  392.74 96.198 1753 
1973 5.3 0.409 604.108  490.97 123.276 2182.3 
1974 2.2 0.88 1474.279  753.84 223.669 3795.7 
1975 2.6 0.931 1323.995  844.45 305.443 3674.3 
1976 3 2.141 2077.336  1139.37 355.118 4768.1 
1977 3.4 1.017 2625.846  1443.76 401.139 5612.7 
1978 2.9 1.651 2183.483  1687.81 483.987 5496.1 
1979 2.6 1.496 3682.176  2223.61 591.25 7603 
1980 2.8 2.883 6691.9  2856.83 780.353 10553.8 
1981 1.3 3.147 3420  3512.1 920.251 8798.8 
1982 2.1 3.566 4145.4  11261.9 923.424 8932.4 
1983 1.5 4.433 2520  2894.4 860.838 8511.7 
1984 2.5 4.712 2125  2711.3 1115.558 7804.7 
1985 2.5 4.527 1846  3492.2 768.246 7852.1 
1986 0.2 3.888 1074  3041.4 731.061 6767.5 
1987 0.2 2.289 1029.7  3438.6 660.884 5933.2 
1988 0.4 3.355 898  3032.7 921.719 6170.6 
1989 0.4 2.364 1181.5  3521.5 810.22 7094.7 
1990 17.7 2.488 1600  4452.3 640.957 7741.6 
1991 17 5.023 2230  4292.8 708.059 8426.2 
1992 55.5 5.101 1267  4987.2 772.626 8774.4 
1993 44.1 1.806 2451.852  4948.1 664.667 9287.5 
1994 34.3 11.953 761  5132.6 1252.967 9913.5 
1995 26.7 19.671 2940.4  5237.2 1037.89 10592.5 
1996 7.2 23.911 3494  6382.4 1106.905 11782.5 
1997 1150.3 23.773 3351  8007.7 1064.147 12888 
1998 715.6 22.432 2551  7034.9 1164.649 12610.6 
1999 595.8 19.785 3444.4  7385.4 1178.841 14075.2 
2000 2343.7 17.615 2203  7278.9 989.416 17620.2 
Tax penalties include income tax fines and customs tax fines. 
Sources: Tables 1;7;22;28;31 and 46 , and The Libyan customs authority, Tripoli,2006. 
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Figures Appendix  
  
  
Figure ( 2.1 ) Lorenz curve  
 
.  
 
Figure 2.2 Effects of selective tax and Lump-sum Tax on consumer behavior 
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Figure 2.3 The analysis of excess burden 
 
  
 
Figure 2.4  Total Efficiency Loss of Economy 
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Figure 2.5 Tax effects in product market and the role of price elasticity in burden distribution 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Effects of tax rates on total revenue and excess burden 
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Figure 2.7 Growth direction of tax revenue and excess burden 
 
 
Figure 2.8 Rent seeking cost 
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Figure 2.9 Laffer curve 
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Appendix to Chapter Five 
 
Durbin Watson Test  
When the error term in one time period is positively correlated with the error 
term in the previous time period, we face the problem of (positive first-order) 
autocorrelation. This is common in time-series analysis and leads to downward-
biased standard errors (and, thus, to incorrect statistical tests and confidence 
intervals). 
 
The presence of first-order autocorrelation is tested by utilizing the table of the 
Durbin-Watson statistic at the 5 or 1% levels of significance for n observations 
and k' explanatory variables.  
݀ ൌ  
∑ ሺ݁௧ െ ݁௧ିଵሻଶ
 ௡
௧ୀଶ
∑ ݁௧ଶ௡௧ୀଵ
 
Where ‘e’ is OLS residuals. 
If the calculated value of d from above equation is smaller than the tabular value 
of dL (lower limit), the hypothesis of positive first-order autocorrelation is 
accepted. The hypothesis is rejected if d > dU (upper limit), and the test is 
inconclusive if dL < d < dU (Salvatore & Reagle, 2002).  
The null hypothesis of Durbin-Watson test is : 
ܪ଴: ߩ ൌ 0 
Or    ܪ଴ :  the (error terms) e's are not autocorrelated with a first-order scheme. 
This hypothesis is tested against the alternative hypothesis: 
ܪଵ:  ߩ ് 0 
Or    ܪଵ :  the (error terms) e's are autocorrelated with a first-order scheme. 
It can be shown that the value of d lies between 0 and 4, and that when d=2 then 
ߩ ൌ 0, which  is equivalent to testing  ܪ଴ ׷ ݀ ൌ 2 . 
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If there is no autocorrelation ߩො = 0 and d=2. Thus, if from the sample data we 
find ݀כ ൎ 2 , we accept that there is no autocorrelation in the function 
(Koutsoyiannis, 1992 ). 
 
The autocorrelation solution  
One method to correct positive first-order autocorrelation (the usual type) 
involves first regressing Y on its value lagged one period, the explanatory 
variable of the model, and the explanatory variable lagged one period (Salvatore 
& Reagle, 2002) : 
 
௧ܻ ൌ  ܾ଴ ሺ 1 െ ߩ ሻ ൅  ߩ ௧ܻିଵ ൅  ܾଵܺ௧ െ  ܾଵߩܺ௧ିଵ ൅  … … … ൅ ݒ௧  
Where ߩ is the autocorrelation coefficient. 
The second step involves using the value of ߩ found in the above equation to 
transform all the variables of the original OLS model.  
To avoid losing the first observation in the differencing process, Kadiyala has 
suggested the following transformation of the first observation of Y and X, 
respectively (cited in Koutsoyiannis,1992). 
ଵܻ
כ ൌ  ଵܻඥ1 െ ߩଶ
  
௝ܺଵ
כ ൌ  ௝ܺଵ ൌ  ௝ܺଵඥ1 െ ߩଶ       ሺ ݆ ൌ 1,2,3, … … . , ݇ ሻ 
For the other observations, Aitken's Generalised least square can be used: 
௧ܻ
כ ൌ  ௧ܻ െ  ߩො ௧ܻିଵ 
  
୨ܺ୲
כ ൌ  ௝ܺ௧ െ  ߩ ෝ ୨ܺሺ୲ିଵሻ          ሺ j ൌ 1,2, … … . , k ሻ 
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Appendix to Chapter Six 
 
- Fiscal freedom Index (Fsf) is a measure of freedom from the burden of 
government from the revenue side. Technically, Fsf includes freedom from both 
the tax burden in terms of the top income tax rate (on corporations and 
individuals, taken separately) and the overall amount of tax revenue as a 
percentage of a nation's GDP (Cebula, 2011). 
The fiscal freedom component is composed of three quantitative factors :  top 
tax rate on individual income  ( f1 );  top tax rate on corporate income ( f2); 
total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP ( f3 ) (Heritage Foundation , 2009) . 
In general,   ܨ݅ݏ݈ܿܽ ܨݎ݁݁݀݋݉ ௜௝ ൌ 100 െ ן ൫ ݂ܽܿݐ݋ݎ௜௝ ൯
ଶ
 
So that this indicator can be calculated as the following  :- 
ܨݏ݂ ൌ
ሺ ଵ݂ ൅ ଶ݂ ൅ ଷ݂ ሻ
3
 
 
- Business freedom index (Bf), reflects the individual's right and ability to 
freely conduct entrepreneurial activities, e.g. starting and operating a business 
firm without government interference (Cebula, 2011). 
Business freedom is a quantitative measure of the ability to start, operate, and 
close a business that represents the overall burden of regulation, as well as the 
efficiency of government in the regulatory process. The business freedom score 
for each country is a number between 0 and 100, with 100 equaling the freest 
business environment. The score is based on 10 factors, all weighted equally : 
Starting a business-procedures (number);Starting a business-time (days); 
Starting a business-cost (% of income per capita); Starting a business-minimum 
capital (% of income per capita); Obtaining a license-procedures (number); 
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Obtaining a license-time (days); Obtaining a license-cost (% of income per 
capita); Closing a business-time (years); Closing a business-cost (% of estate); 
and Closing a business-recovery rate (cents on the dollar). 
Each of these raw factors is converted to a scale of 0 to 100, after which the 
average of the converted values is computed. The result represents the country’s 
business freedom score.  Each factor is converted to a 0 to 100 scale using the 
following equation:  
 
Factor Scorei = 50 × factoraverage /factori 
 
which is based on the ratio of the country data for each factor relative to the 
world average, multiplied by 50 ( Heritage Foundation , 2009). 
 
- Narrow money supply =   currency in circulation + demand deposits  
(Zoryan, 2005 ) . 
Then :  Currency in circulation = narrow money supply - demand deposits   
- Trade freedom (TF). Trade freedom reflects the openness of an economy 
to imports of goods and services from other nations and the ability of the 
citizens of that economy to freely interact as sellers and/or purchasers of goods 
and services in the international marketplace (Cebula, 2011). 
Trade freedom is a composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers that affect imports and exports of goods and services. The trade 
freedom score is based on two inputs: The trade-weighted average tariff rate; 
and Non-tariff barriers (NTBs). 
Different imports entering a country can, and often do, face different tariffs. The 
weighted average tariff uses weights for each tariff based on the share of 
imports for each good. Weighted average tariffs are a purely quantitative 
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measure and account for the basic calculation of the score using the following 
equation: 
Trade Freedomi = (((Tariffmax–Tariffi)/(Tariffmax–Tariffmin)) * 100) – NTBi 
where Trade Freedomi represents the trade freedom in a country i, Tariffmax and 
Tariffmin represent the upper and lower bounds for tariff rates (%), and Tariffi 
represents the weighted average tariff rate (%) in country i. The minimum tariff 
is naturally zero percent, and the upper bound was set as 50 percent (Heritage 
Foundation , 2009) . 
____________________ 
Sources: 
Cebula, Richard J., 2011, Economic Growth, Ten Forms of Economic Freedom, and Political 
Stability., Journal of Private Enterprise. Association of Private Enterprise 
Education.Volume: 26. Issue: 2. 
Zoryan , Hakob ., 2005 , The Measurement of Co-circulation of Currencies and Dollarization 
in the Republic of Armenia. Università Carlo Cattaneo ., The European Journal of 
Comparative Economics. Volume: 2. Issue: 1. 
Heritage Foundation, 2009, Methodology for the 10 Economic Freedoms, Index of Economic 
Freedom.  
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ORR method for period 1970-2000. Program: NCSS 2007 
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Dependent LnTy 
 
Descriptive Statistics Section 
   Standard 
Variable Count Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Lnnox 31 1.936736 2.410845 -1.609438 7.759486 
LnvP 31 1.101341 1.347665 -1.6874 3.174339 
LnOilR 31 7.484972 0.6575881 6.115892 8.808653 
LnMsp 31 7.854831 1.000366 5.48297 9.329181 
LnTy 31 -2.470264 0.2899662 -3.079114 -1.903809 
 
 
Correlation Matrix Section 
 
 Lnnox LnvP LnOilR LnMsp LnTy 
Lnnox 1.000000 0.566703 0.291712 0.433032 -0.235235 
LnvP 0.566703 1.000000 0.573246 0.888370 0.543761 
LnOilR 0.291712 0.573246 1.000000 0.636981 0.224461 
LnMsp 0.433032 0.888370 0.636981 1.000000 0.604152 
LnTy -0.235235 0.543761 0.224461 0.604152 1.000000 
 
Least Squares Multicollinearity Section 
Independent Variance R-Squared  
Variable Inflation Vs Other X's Tolerance 
Lnnox 1.5263 0.3448 0.6552 
LnvP 5.8823 0.8300 0.1700 
LnOilR 1.6839 0.4061 0.5939 
LnMsp 5.5423 0.8196 0.1804 
Since all VIF's are less than 10, multicollinearity is not a problem. 
 
 
Eigenvalues of Correlations 
 
  Incremental Cumulative Condition 
No. Eigenvalue Percent Percent Number 
1 2.738141 68.45 68.45 1.00 
2 0.736788 18.42 86.87 3.72 
3 0.430644 10.77 97.64 6.36 
4 0.094427 2.36 100.00 29.00 
All Condition Numbers less than 100. Multicollinearity is NOT a problem. 
 
 
Eigenvector of Correlations 
 
No. Eigenvalue Lnnox LnvP LnOilR LnMsp 
1 2.738141 -0.400081 -0.565995 -0.457844 -0.556744 
2 0.736788 -0.822085 -0.039416 0.534957 0.190901 
3 0.430644 -0.378959 0.414124 -0.705960 0.431871 
4 0.094427 -0.143183 0.711757 0.076294 -0.683433 
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Ridge Trace Section 
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Standardized Ridge Regression Coefficients Section 
 
k Lnnox LnvP LnOilR LnMsp 
0.000000 -0.7637 0.7019 -0.2582 0.4758 
0.001000 -0.7619 0.6990 -0.2572 0.4765 
0.002000 -0.7601 0.6961 -0.2563 0.4772 
0.003000 -0.7583 0.6933 -0.2554 0.4779 
0.004000 -0.7565 0.6905 -0.2545 0.4785 
0.005000 -0.7547 0.6877 -0.2535 0.4791 
0.006000 -0.7530 0.6850 -0.2526 0.4797 
0.007000 -0.7512 0.6824 -0.2517 0.4802 
0.008000 -0.7495 0.6797 -0.2508 0.4807 
0.009000 -0.7477 0.6772 -0.2499 0.4812 
0.010000 -0.7460 0.6746 -0.2490 0.4817 
0.020000 -0.7295 0.6508 -0.2400 0.4850 
0.030000 -0.7140 0.6299 -0.2313 0.4865 
0.040000 -0.6993 0.6111 -0.2229 0.4866 
0.050000 -0.6853 0.5941 -0.2148 0.4857 
0.060000 -0.6720 0.5786 -0.2071 0.4840 
0.070000 -0.6593 0.5644 -0.1996 0.4817 
0.080000 -0.6471 0.5512 -0.1924 0.4790 
0.090000 -0.6354 0.5390 -0.1856 0.4759 
0.100000 -0.6242 0.5275 -0.1790 0.4725 
0.200000 -0.5312 0.4426 -0.1258 0.4342 
0.300000 -0.4623 0.3874 -0.0893 0.3978 
0.352658 -0.4325 0.3648 -0.0747 0.3806 
0.400000 -0.4087 0.3473 -0.0634 0.3664 
0.500000 -0.3658 0.3164 -0.0445 0.3399 
0.600000 -0.3307 0.2917 -0.0302 0.3172 
0.700000 -0.3013 0.2713 -0.0192 0.2976 
0.800000 -0.2764 0.2541 -0.0107 0.2805 
0.900000 -0.2551 0.2393 -0.0039 0.2655 
1.000000 -0.2366 0.2265 0.0015 0.2522 
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Variance Inflation Factor Section 
 
k Lnnox LnvP LnOilR LnMsp 
0.000000 1.5263 5.8823 1.6839 5.5423 
0.001000 1.5177 5.7685 1.6762 5.4369 
0.002000 1.5093 5.6582 1.6685 5.3348 
0.003000 1.5010 5.5513 1.6609 5.2357 
0.004000 1.4929 5.4475 1.6534 5.1396 
0.005000 1.4849 5.3468 1.6459 5.0463 
0.006000 1.4770 5.2490 1.6386 4.9557 
0.007000 1.4693 5.1541 1.6313 4.8678 
0.008000 1.4617 5.0619 1.6241 4.7824 
0.009000 1.4543 4.9723 1.6169 4.6994 
0.010000 1.4469 4.8852 1.6098 4.6187 
0.020000 1.3794 4.1344 1.5424 3.9224 
0.030000 1.3206 3.5543 1.4805 3.3837 
0.040000 1.2683 3.0962 1.4232 2.9578 
0.050000 1.2213 2.7277 1.3698 2.6147 
0.060000 1.1784 2.4265 1.3200 2.3338 
0.070000 1.1389 2.1770 1.2733 2.1007 
0.080000 1.1024 1.9677 1.2295 1.9048 
0.090000 1.0683 1.7902 1.1881 1.7384 
0.100000 1.0364 1.6383 1.1491 1.5957 
0.200000 0.7960 0.8404 0.8527 0.8397 
0.300000 0.6390 0.5419 0.6639 0.5509 
0.352658 0.5759 0.4525 0.5903 0.4630 
0.400000 0.5274 0.3927 0.5348 0.4038 
0.500000 0.4442 0.3051 0.4419 0.3161 
0.600000 0.3802 0.2481 0.3727 0.2583 
0.700000 0.3297 0.2083 0.3195 0.2175 
0.800000 0.2891 0.1791 0.2775 0.1873 
0.900000 0.2559 0.1568 0.2438 0.1641 
1.000000 0.2283 0.1392 0.2163 0.1457 
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K Analysis Section 
 
k R2 Sigma B'B Ave VIF Max VIF 
0.000000 0.7908 0.1425 1.3689 3.6587 5.8823 
0.001000 0.7894 0.1429 1.3623 3.5998 5.7685 
0.002000 0.7881 0.1434 1.3557 3.5427 5.6582 
0.003000 0.7867 0.1438 1.3492 3.4872 5.5513 
0.004000 0.7854 0.1443 1.3427 3.4333 5.4475 
0.005000 0.7840 0.1447 1.3364 3.3810 5.3468 
0.006000 0.7827 0.1452 1.3301 3.3301 5.2490 
0.007000 0.7814 0.1456 1.3239 3.2806 5.1541 
0.008000 0.7801 0.1461 1.3177 3.2325 5.0619 
0.009000 0.7787 0.1465 1.3116 3.1857 4.9723 
0.010000 0.7774 0.1469 1.3056 3.1402 4.8852 
0.020000 0.7647 0.1511 1.2486 2.7447 4.1344 
0.030000 0.7524 0.1550 1.1966 2.4348 3.5543 
0.040000 0.7407 0.1586 1.1488 2.1864 3.0962 
0.050000 0.7295 0.1620 1.1046 1.9834 2.7277 
0.060000 0.7186 0.1652 1.0635 1.8147 2.4265 
0.070000 0.7082 0.1683 1.0250 1.6725 2.1770 
0.080000 0.6981 0.1711 0.9890 1.5511 1.9677 
0.090000 0.6884 0.1739 0.9551 1.4463 1.7902 
0.100000 0.6790 0.1765 0.9232 1.3549 1.6383 
0.200000 0.5997 0.1971 0.6824 0.8322 0.8527 
0.300000 0.5396 0.2113 0.5299 0.5989 0.6639 
0.352658 0.5133 0.2173 0.4706 0.5204 0.5903 
0.400000 0.4921 0.2220 0.4260 0.4647 0.5348 
0.500000 0.4535 0.2303 0.3514 0.3768 0.4442 
0.600000 0.4212 0.2370 0.2959 0.3148 0.3802 
0.700000 0.3939 0.2425 0.2533 0.2688 0.3297 
0.800000 0.3703 0.2472 0.2198 0.2333 0.2891 
0.900000 0.3497 0.2512 0.1929 0.2051 0.2559 
1.000000 0.3315 0.2547 0.1709 0.1824 0.2283 
 
Ridge vs. Least Squares Comparison Section for k = 0.352658 
 
Regular Regular Stand'zed Stand'zed Ridge L.S. 
Independent Ridge L.S. Ridge L.S. Standard Standard 
Variable Coeff's Coeff's Coeff's Coeff's Error Error 
Intercept -3.076228 -2.689835 
Lnnox -5.20E-02 -9.19E-02 -0.4325 -0.7637 1.25E-02 1.33E-02 
LnvP 7.85E-02 0.1510201 0.3648 0.7019 1.98E-02 4.68E-02 
LnOilR -3.29E-02 -0.1138411 -0.0747 -0.2582 4.63E-02 5.13E-02 
LnMsp 0.1103327 0.137908 0.3806 0.4758 2.70E-02 
 
 
OLS :  R-Squared = 0.7908, sigma = 0.1425 , F-ratio = 24.571 , dw = 2.0256  , MSE = 0.02029537 
Ridge : R-Squared = 0.5133 , sigma = 0.2173 , F-ratio = 6.86 , dw = 1.51  , MSE = 0.04721358  
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Ridge Regression Coefficient Section for k = 0.352658 
   Stand'zed 
Independent Regression Standard Regression 
Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient VIF 
Intercept -3.076228    
Lnnox -5.202131E-02 1.248744E-02 -0.4325 0.5759 
LnvP 7.850109E-02 1.980104E-02 0.3648 0.4525 
LnOilR -3.291741E-02 4.634993E-02 -0.0747 0.5903 
LnMsp 0.1103327 2.698462E-02 0.3806 0.4630 
 
 
Analysis of Variance Section for k = 0.352658 
  Sum of Mean  Prob 
Source DF Squares Square F-Ratio Level 
Intercept 1 189.1683 189.1683 
Model 4 1.294859 0.3237148 6.8564 0.000659 
Error 26 1.227553 4.721358E-02 
Total(Adjusted) 30 2.522412 8.408041E-02 
 
Mean of Dependent -2.470264 
Root Mean Square Error 0.2172869 
R-Squared 0.5133 
Coefficient of Variation -8.796099E-02 
 
Residual Plots Section 
 
  
 
 
Independent variables   Period 1970-2000 
LnMspLnOilR LnvPLnnoxIntercept
0.110333-0.03292 0.078501-0.05202 -3.07623 Regular Ridge Coeff's 
0.137908-0.11384 0.15102 -0.09186 -2.68984 Regular OLS Coeff's 
0.3806 -0.0747 0.3648 -0.4325   Standardized Ridge Coeff's 
0.4758 -0.2582 0.7019 -0.7637   Standardized OLS Coeff's 
0.0269850.04635 0.0198010.012487  Ridge standard Error 
0.06121 0.051327 0.0468090.013329  OLS standard Error 
2.253 -2.218 3.226 -6.892   t-test OLS 
4.088725-0.71019 3.964493-4.16589   t-test Ridge 
5.5423 1.6839 5.8823 1.5263   OLS VIF  
0.463 0.5903 0.4525 0.5759   Ridge VIF 
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Descriptive Statistics Section 
   Standard 
Variable Count Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Lnnox 36 2.867836 3.251167 -1.609438 9.173987 
LnvP 36 1.262129 1.357912 -1.6874 3.469199 
LnOilR 36 7.712045 0.9029535 6.115892 10.44517 
LnMsp 36 8.041989 1.042292 5.48297 9.548818 
LnTy 36 -2.567117 0.3757098 -3.611918 -1.903809 
 
 
Correlation Matrix Section 
 
 Lnnox LnvP LnOilR LnMsp LnTy 
Lnnox 1.000000 0.569830 0.612920 0.595401 -0.599775 
LnvP 0.569830 1.000000 0.541436 0.854263 0.179786 
LnOilR 0.612920 0.541436 1.000000 0.693832 -0.397826 
LnMsp 0.595401 0.854263 0.693832 1.000000 0.070835 
LnTy -0.599775 0.179786 -0.397826 0.070835 1.000000 
 
Least Squares Multicollinearity Section 
Independent Variance R-Squared  
Variable Inflation Vs Other X's Tolerance 
Lnnox 1.8389 0.4562 0.5438 
LnvP 3.9427 0.7464 0.2536 
LnOilR 2.2826 0.5619 0.4381 
LnMsp 5.1442 0.8056 0.1944 
Since all VIF's are less than 10, multicollinearity is not a problem. 
 
 
Eigenvalues of Correlations 
 
  Incremental Cumulative Condition 
No. Eigenvalue Percent Percent Number 
1 2.941459 73.54 73.54 1.00 
2 0.539496 13.49 87.02 5.45 
3 0.401752 10.04 97.07 7.32 
4 0.117292 2.93 100.00 25.08 
All Condition Numbers less than 100. Multicollinearity is NOT a problem. 
 
 
Eigenvector of Correlations 
 
No. Eigenvalue Lnnox LnvP LnOilR LnMsp 
1 2.941459 -0.466887 -0.508757 -0.482013 -0.539302 
2 0.539496 -0.578478 0.574631 -0.451552 0.362302 
3 0.401752 -0.665018 -0.207992 0.702702 0.143879 
4 0.117292 -0.071635 0.606386 0.264526 -0.746452 
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Ridge Trace Section 
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Standardized Ridge Regression Coefficients Section 
 
k Lnnox LnvP LnOilR LnMsp 
0.000000 -0.9060 0.5597 -0.4575 0.4495 
0.001000 -0.9043 0.5589 -0.4567 0.4483 
0.002000 -0.9026 0.5580 -0.4560 0.4471 
0.003000 -0.9010 0.5571 -0.4552 0.4459 
0.004000 -0.8993 0.5562 -0.4545 0.4447 
0.005000 -0.8977 0.5553 -0.4538 0.4436 
0.006000 -0.8961 0.5544 -0.4530 0.4424 
0.007000 -0.8944 0.5535 -0.4523 0.4412 
0.008000 -0.8928 0.5526 -0.4516 0.4401 
0.009000 -0.8912 0.5518 -0.4509 0.4390 
0.010000 -0.8896 0.5509 -0.4501 0.4378 
0.020000 -0.8738 0.5421 -0.4431 0.4269 
0.030000 -0.8586 0.5333 -0.4364 0.4167 
0.040000 -0.8439 0.5247 -0.4299 0.4070 
0.050000 -0.8297 0.5162 -0.4237 0.3979 
0.060000 -0.8160 0.5079 -0.4177 0.3892 
0.070000 -0.8027 0.4998 -0.4119 0.3809 
0.080000 -0.7899 0.4919 -0.4063 0.3730 
0.090000 -0.7776 0.4841 -0.4009 0.3655 
0.100000 -0.7656 0.4766 -0.3956 0.3582 
0.200000 -0.6641 0.4105 -0.3503 0.2989 
0.207709 -0.6574 0.4060 -0.3473 0.2951 
0.300000 -0.5872 0.3588 -0.3151 0.2558 
0.400000 -0.5270 0.3178 -0.2868 0.2230 
0.500000 -0.4785 0.2846 -0.2635 0.1970 
0.600000 -0.4384 0.2571 -0.2440 0.1759 
0.700000 -0.4049 0.2342 -0.2273 0.1586 
0.800000 -0.3763 0.2147 -0.2130 0.1440 
0.900000 -0.3517 0.1980 -0.2004 0.1316 
1.000000 -0.3302 0.1835 -0.1894 0.1210 
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Variance Inflation Factor Section 
 
k Lnnox LnvP LnOilR LnMsp 
0.000000 1.8389 3.9427 2.2826 5.1442 
0.001000 1.8304 3.8870 2.2650 5.0630 
0.002000 1.8219 3.8327 2.2477 4.9838 
0.003000 1.8135 3.7797 2.2307 4.9065 
0.004000 1.8052 3.7280 2.2140 4.8311 
0.005000 1.7969 3.6774 2.1976 4.7576 
0.006000 1.7887 3.6281 2.1815 4.6858 
0.007000 1.7806 3.5798 2.1656 4.6157 
0.008000 1.7726 3.5327 2.1499 4.5473 
0.009000 1.7646 3.4867 2.1345 4.4805 
0.010000 1.7566 3.4416 2.1194 4.4152 
0.020000 1.6806 3.0417 1.9800 3.8377 
0.030000 1.6101 2.7167 1.8591 3.3723 
0.040000 1.5445 2.4484 1.7528 2.9913 
0.050000 1.4833 2.2239 1.6583 2.6753 
0.060000 1.4260 2.0338 1.5735 2.4102 
0.070000 1.3722 1.8711 1.4968 2.1854 
0.080000 1.3217 1.7305 1.4271 1.9931 
0.090000 1.2741 1.6080 1.3633 1.8271 
0.100000 1.2293 1.5004 1.3047 1.6828 
0.200000 0.8918 0.8793 0.8998 0.8883 
0.207709 0.8720 0.8509 0.8777 0.8542 
0.300000 0.6814 0.6082 0.6711 0.5741 
0.400000 0.5406 0.4582 0.5251 0.4140 
0.500000 0.4413 0.3637 0.4250 0.3195 
0.600000 0.3684 0.2990 0.3528 0.2581 
0.700000 0.3131 0.2523 0.2989 0.2153 
0.800000 0.2702 0.2170 0.2572 0.1840 
0.900000 0.2360 0.1895 0.2244 0.1602 
1.000000 0.2084 0.1676 0.1979 0.1415 
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K Analysis Section 
 
k R2 Sigma B'B Ave VIF Max VIF 
0.000000 0.8578 0.1505 1.5454 3.3021 5.1442 
0.001000 0.8563 0.1513 1.5396 3.2613 5.0630 
0.002000 0.8548 0.1521 1.5339 3.2215 4.9838 
0.003000 0.8532 0.1529 1.5282 3.1826 4.9065 
0.004000 0.8517 0.1537 1.5225 3.1446 4.8311 
0.005000 0.8502 0.1545 1.5169 3.1074 4.7576 
0.006000 0.8487 0.1553 1.5113 3.0710 4.6858 
0.007000 0.8472 0.1561 1.5057 3.0354 4.6157 
0.008000 0.8457 0.1568 1.5001 3.0006 4.5473 
0.009000 0.8442 0.1576 1.4946 2.9666 4.4805 
0.010000 0.8427 0.1583 1.4891 2.9332 4.4152 
0.020000 0.8281 0.1655 1.4359 2.6350 3.8377 
0.030000 0.8139 0.1722 1.3856 2.3896 3.3723 
0.040000 0.8003 0.1784 1.3379 2.1843 2.9913 
0.050000 0.7872 0.1842 1.2927 2.0102 2.6753 
0.060000 0.7745 0.1896 1.2498 1.8609 2.4102 
0.070000 0.7622 0.1947 1.2090 1.7314 2.1854 
0.080000 0.7503 0.1995 1.1702 1.6181 1.9931 
0.090000 0.7388 0.2040 1.1332 1.5181 1.8271 
0.100000 0.7276 0.2084 1.0980 1.4293 1.6828 
0.200000 0.6326 0.2420 0.8216 0.8898 0.8998 
0.207709 0.6264 0.2440 0.8048 0.8637 0.8777 
0.300000 0.5602 0.2647 0.6384 0.6337 0.6814 
0.400000 0.5031 0.2814 0.5107 0.4845 0.5406 
0.500000 0.4569 0.2942 0.4181 0.3874 0.4413 
0.600000 0.4187 0.3044 0.3488 0.3196 0.3684 
0.700000 0.3866 0.3127 0.2956 0.2699 0.3131 
0.800000 0.3592 0.3196 0.2538 0.2321 0.2702 
0.900000 0.3356 0.3254 0.2204 0.2025 0.2360 
1.000000 0.3149 0.3304 0.1932 0.1788 0.2084 
 
Ridge vs. Least Squares Comparison Section for k = 0.207709 
 
Regular Regular Stand'zed Stand'zed Ridge L.S. 
Independent Ridge L.S. Ridge L.S. Standard Standard 
Variable Coeff's Coeff's Coeff's Coeff's Error Error 
Intercept -2.231929 -2.297353 
Lnnox -7.60E-02 -0.1046944 -0.6574 -0.906 1.18E-02 1.06E-02 
LnvP 0.1123406 0.1548695 0.406 0.5597 2.80E-02 3.72E-02 
LnOilR -0.1445199 -0.190353 -0.3473 -0.4575 0.042796 4.26E-02 
LnMsp 0.1063716 0.162028 0.2951 0.4495 3.66E-02 5.54E-02 
 
OLS     : R-Squared  0.8578 ,Sigma  0.1505 ,F-ratio  46.768 ,dw = 1.765   , MSE  0.02265554  
Ridge   : R-Squared  0.6264 ,Sigma  0.2440 ,F-ratio 12.9927 ,dw = 1.103   , MSE  0.05954538  
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Ridge Regression Coefficient Section for k = 0.207709 
   Stand'zed 
Independent Regression Standard Regression 
Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient VIF 
Intercept -2.231929    
Lnnox -7.597106E-02 1.184732E-02 -0.6574 0.8720 
LnvP 0.1123406 2.802013E-02 0.4060 0.8509 
LnOilR -0.1445199 0.042796 -0.3473 0.8777 
LnMsp 0.1063716 3.657521E-02 0.2951 0.8542 
 
Analysis of Variance Section for k = 0.207709 
  Sum of Mean  Prob 
Source DF Squares Square F-Ratio Level 
Intercept 1 237.2432 237.2432 
Model 4 3.094619 0.7736546 12.9927 0.000003 
Error 31 1.845907 5.954538E-02 
Total(Adjusted) 35 4.940525 0.1411579 
 
Mean of Dependent -2.567117 
Root Mean Square Error 0.2440192 
R-Squared 0.6264 
Coefficient of Variation -9.505574E-02 
 
Residual Plots Section 
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Independent variables  Period 70-2005 
LnMsp LnOilR LnvP Lnnox Intercept 
0.106372-0.14452 0.112341 -0.07597 -2.23193 Regular Ridge Coeff's 
0.162028-0.19035 0.15487 -0.10469 -2.29735 Regular OLS Coeff's 
0.2951 -0.3473 0.406 -0.6574   Standardized Ridge Coeff's 
0.4495 -0.4575 0.5597 -0.906   Standardized OLS Coeff's 
0.0365750.042796 0.02802 0.011847  Ridge standard Error 
0.0553630.04257 0.037203 0.010612  OLS standard Error 
2.926639-4.47154 4.162832 -9.86567   t-test OLS 
2.908298-3.37695 4.009282 -6.41251   t-test Ridge 
5.1442 2.2826 3.9427 1.8389   OLS VIF  
0.8542 0.8777 0.8509 0.872   Ridge VIF 
 
URR method for 1970‐2005  
 Period 1970-2005 Independent variables  
  Intercept Lnnox LnvP LnOilR LnMsp 
Regular Ridge 
Coeff's 2.23193 0.07597 0.112341 0.14452 0.106372 
Regular OLS Coeff's 2.29735 0.10469 0.15487 0.19035 0.162028 
 
k 0.207709 
kJ 0.120857 
0.120857 
0.120857 
0.120857 
0.120857 
 
 
36 4.00E-09
-2.00E-
09
-3.00E-
09
-2.00E-
09 
4.00E-09 35 19.94405 21.45221 20.83902 
x'x -2.00E-09 19.94405 35 18.95025 29.89921 
-3.00E-09 21.45221 18.95025 35 24.28412 
-2.00E-09 20.83902 29.89921 24.28412 35 
36.207709 4E-09 -2E-09 -3E-09 -2E-09 
4E-09 35.20771 19.94405 21.45221 20.83902 
x'x+kIP -2E-09 19.94405 35.20771 18.95025 29.89921 
-3E-09 21.45221 18.95025 35.20771 24.28412 
-2E-09 20.83902 29.89921 24.28412 35.20771 
0.027618 
-8.50E-
12 3.82E-12 6.03E-12
-8.05E-
13 
-8.50E-12 0.051826 -0.01549 -0.02128 -0.00285 
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(x'x+kIp)-1 3.82E-12 -0.01549 0.108094 0.015734 -0.09348 
6.03E-12 -0.02128 0.015734 0.063763 -0.04475 
-8.05E-13 -0.00285 -0.09348 -0.04475 0.140337 
 
x'y 2E-09 
-20.9921 
6.292506 
-13.9239 
2.479239 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x'y+kI 0.207709 
-20.7844 
6.500215 
-13.7162 
2.686948 
 
var 0.004780728 -1.5E-12 6.62E-13 1.04E-12 -1.4E-13 
-1.47154E-12 0.008971 -0.00268 -0.00368 -0.00049 
6.61562E-13 -0.00268 0.018711 0.002723 -0.01618 
1.04401E-12 -0.00368 0.002723 0.011037 -0.00775 
-1.39346E-13 -0.00049 -0.01618 -0.00775 0.024292 
 
Betas 
0.005736596 var(b0) 0.004781
nox -0.893628839 var(b1) 0.008971
vp 0.557565332 var(b2) 0.018711
oilR -0.450279029 var(b3) 0.011037
Msp 0.442322617 var(b4) 0.024292
 
s(b0) 0.069143 t(b0) 0.082967
s(b1) 0.094715 t(b1) -9.43488
s(b2) 0.136788 t(b2) 4.076124
s(b3) 0.105059 t(b3) -4.28597
s(b4) 0.155859 t(b4) 2.83796
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standardized 
year Lnnox LnvP LnOilR LnMsp LnTy 
1970 -0.54418 -2.00857 -1.7677 -2.455186658 -1.03642 
1971 -0.71888 -2.17211 -1.36387 -2.056570035 -1.36275 
1972 -0.46348 -1.73264 -1.412 -1.984897596 -0.88713 
1973 -0.36914 -1.58786 -1.4489 -1.770720259 -0.83918 
1974 -0.63958 -1.0236 -0.46084 -1.359321786 -0.70028 
1975 -0.5882 -0.98211 -0.57991 -1.250421937 0.208146 
1976 -0.54418 -0.36884 -0.08107 -0.963030897 -0.09734 
1977 -0.50568 -0.91705 0.17843 -0.735862824 -0.2075 
1978 -0.55461 -0.56023 -0.02588 -0.586018934 0.363841 
1979 -0.5882 -0.63283 0.552869 -0.321505427 0.042774 
1980 -0.5654 -0.14971 1.214469 -0.081092237 -0.09734 
1981 -0.8014 -0.08519 0.471067 0.117030397 0.833947 
1982 -0.65389 0.00686 0.6841 1.234962601 0.78276 
1983 -0.75738 0.16713 0.132864 -0.068557147 0.73057 
1984 -0.60026 0.212078 -0.05595 -0.131255167 1.656082 
1985 -0.60026 0.182582 -0.21183 0.111578717 0.650314 
1986 -1.37713 0.070524 -0.81167 -0.02102716 0.908928 
1987 -1.37713 -0.31962 -0.85832 0.09673882 0.981853 
1988 -1.16393 -0.03806 -1.00988 -0.02377555 1.76548 
1989 -1.16393 -0.29588 -0.70602 0.119594829 1.052834 
1990 0.001762 -0.25823 -0.37021 0.344612292 0.208146 
1991 -0.01065 0.259147 -0.00253 0.309610935 0.240022 
1992 0.353272 0.270495 -0.62865 0.453462663 0.363841 
1993 0.282552 -0.49415 0.102502 0.445911066 -0.17027 
1994 0.205252 0.897594 -1.19321 0.48103434 1.319219 
1995 0.128209 1.264454 0.303733 0.500390395 0.650314 
1996 -0.2749 1.408199 0.494774 0.690123501 0.539396 
1997 1.285675 1.403936 0.448494 0.907777952 0.208146 
1998 1.139679 1.361178 0.146404 0.783513188 0.482155 
1999 1.083325 1.268709 0.47894 0.830161946 0.240022 
2000 1.504583 1.183156 -0.01602 0.816225992 -1.39208 
2001 1.385436 0.946975 0.528795 0.938793902 -0.83918 
2002 1.8386 1.625341 1.190901 0.987972306 -1.3055 
2003 1.836511 -0.22921 0.624723 1.022966644 -1.19459 
2004 1.877864 1.185411 2.424533 1.171093291 -1.87126 
2005 1.939658 0.142124 3.026875 1.445687835 -2.78087 
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y^ E E2 DE DE2 
TAX 
EFFORT 
-0.9179 -0.11852 0.014047 1.129119 
-0.85848 -0.50426 0.254279 -0.385741326 0.148796 1.587384 
-0.78831 -0.09882 0.009766 0.405438294 0.16438 1.125359 
-0.68054 -0.15863 0.025164 -0.059809386 0.003577 1.233095 
-0.38719 -0.31308 0.098021 -0.154451891 0.023855 1.808598 
-0.30819 0.51634 0.266607 0.829423092 0.687943 -0.67537 
-0.10309 0.005743 3.3E-05 -0.510596355 0.260709 0.944287 
-0.45952 0.252021 0.063515 0.246277694 0.060653 0.451553 
-0.05857 0.422413 0.178433 0.170392337 0.029034 -6.21181 
-0.21264 0.255409 0.065234 -0.167004037 0.02789 -0.20116 
-0.1552 0.057853 0.003347 -0.197555952 0.039028 0.627228 
0.514042 0.319905 0.102339 0.262051511 0.068671 1.622332 
0.832111 -0.04935 0.002435 -0.369255352 0.13635 0.940692 
0.68559 0.04498 0.002023 0.094330896 0.008898 1.065608 
0.627528 1.028554 1.057924 0.983573765 0.967417 2.639056 
0.788682 -0.13837 0.019146 -1.166922251 1.361708 0.824558 
1.631877 -0.72295 0.522656 -0.584581234 0.341735 0.556983 
1.487443 -0.50559 0.25562 0.217360216 0.047245 0.660095 
1.468849 0.29663 0.08799 0.802219615 0.643556 1.201948 
1.251693 -0.19886 0.039545 -0.495488802 0.245509 0.841128 
0.179313 0.028833 0.000831 0.227691417 0.051843 1.160798 
0.297833 -0.05781 0.003342 -0.086644253 0.007507 0.805894 
0.324503 0.039338 0.001547 0.097148905 0.009438 1.121225 
-0.3712 0.20093 0.040373 0.16159218 0.026112 0.458702 
1.072833 0.246386 0.060706 0.04545619 0.002066 1.229659 
0.680751 -0.03044 0.000926 -0.27682316 0.076631 0.955289 
1.119031 -0.57963 0.335977 -0.549197824 0.301618 0.482021 
-0.16081 0.368956 0.136128 0.948590554 0.899824 -1.29436 
0.026875 0.45528 0.20728 0.086323976 0.007452 17.94048 
-0.10342 0.343444 0.117954 -0.111835224 0.012507 -2.32079 
-0.31086 -0.52831 0.279112 -0.871755409 0.759957 2.699488 
-0.52718 -0.31199 0.097339 0.216319024 0.046794 1.591809 
-0.83029 -0.47521 0.225827 -0.163220753 0.026641 1.572345 
-1.59204 0.397452 0.157968 0.872665115 0.761544 0.75035 
-1.58515 -0.28611 0.081862 -0.683567292 0.467264 1.180497 
-2.37183 -0.40904 0.167314 -0.12292573 0.015111 1.172458 
4.968563 8.739266
DW 1.758912195
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URR method for 1970‐2000 
 
 Period 1970-2000 Independent variables  
  Intercept Lnnox LnvP LnOilR LnMsp 
Regular Ridge 
Coeff's 3.076228 0.052021 0.078501 0.03292 0.110333 
Regular OLS Coeff's 2.689835 0.091856 0.1510201 0.1138411 0.137908 
k 0.352658 
kJ 0.224605 
0.224605 
0.224605 
0.224605 
0.224605 
x'x 31 -8.87807 -3.6706437 -7.79583 -5.56651 
-8.87807 19.03869 13.5629536 6.958652 10.83991 
-3.67064 13.56295 29.98357 13.3528 26.04518 
-7.79583 6.958652 13.3528042 17.87152 14.75677 
-5.56651 10.83991 26.0451789 14.75677 28.63464 
x'x+Kip 31.35266 -8.87807 -3.6706437 -7.79583 -5.56651 
-8.87807 19.39135 13.5629536 6.958652 10.83991 
-3.67064 13.56295 30.336228 13.3528 26.04518 
-7.79583 6.958652 13.3528042 18.22417 14.75677 
-5.56651 10.83991 26.0451789 14.75677 28.9873 
(x'x+kIp)-1 0.041527 0.021908
-
0.02027133 0.016468 0.009612 
0.021908 0.088187
-
0.05280848 -0.00125 0.019312 
-0.02027 -0.05281 0.17726296 -0.00384 -0.14146 
0.016468 -0.00125
-
0.00384195 0.101185 -0.04443 
0.009612 0.019312 -0.1414603 -0.04443 0.178843 
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x'y 7.991403 
-6.32742 
11.54871 
1.775159 
11.99057 
x'y+kI 8.344061 
-5.97476 
11.90137 
2.127817 
12.34323 
Betas 0.128039 
-0.73687 
0.501792 
-0.23397 
0.394204 
var 0.006608 0.003486 -0.0032258 0.002621 0.00153 
0.003486 0.014033
-
0.00840347 -0.0002 0.003073 
-0.00323 -0.0084 0.02820806 -0.00061 -0.02251 
0.002621 -0.0002
-
0.00061137 0.016102 -0.00707 
0.00153 0.003073
-
0.02251074 -0.00707 0.028459 
 
  
Betas 0.128039 var(b0) 0.006608
nox -0.73687 var(b1) 0.014033
vp 0.501792 var(b2) 0.028208
oilR -0.23397 var(b3) 0.016102
Msp 0.394204 var(b4) 0.028459
  
  
s(b0) 0.081291 t(b0) 1.575067
s(b1) 0.118462 t(b1) -6.22024
s(b2) 0.167953 t(b2) 2.987702
s(b3) 0.126892 t(b3) -1.84386
s(b4) 0.168699 t(b4) 2.336728
  
  
  
431 
 
standardized 
year Lnnox LnvP LnOilR LnMsp LnTy 
1970 -0.54418 -2.00857 -1.7677 -2.45519 -1.036423614 
1971 -0.71888 -2.17211 -1.36387 -2.05657 -1.362745466 
1972 -0.46348 -1.73264 -1.412 -1.9849 -0.887134283 
1973 -0.36914 -1.58786 -1.4489 -1.77072 -0.839175713 
1974 -0.63958 -1.0236 -0.46084 -1.35932 -0.700276618 
1975 -0.5882 -0.98211 -0.57991 -1.25042 0.208145658 
1976 -0.54418 -0.36884 -0.08107 -0.96303 -0.097344139 
1977 -0.50568 -0.91705 0.17843 -0.73586 -0.207496215 
1978 -0.55461 -0.56023 -0.02588 -0.58602 0.363840837 
1979 -0.5882 -0.63283 0.552869 -0.32151 0.04277393 
1980 -0.5654 -0.14971 1.214469 -0.08109 -0.097344139 
1981 -0.8014 -0.08519 0.471067 0.11703 0.833947098 
1982 -0.65389 0.00686 0.6841 1.234963 0.782760354 
1983 -0.75738 0.16713 0.132864 -0.06856 0.730569885 
1984 -0.60026 0.212078 -0.05595 -0.13126 1.656082344 
1985 -0.60026 0.182582 -0.21183 0.111579 0.650313695 
1986 -1.37713 0.070524 -0.81167 -0.02103 0.908927511 
1987 -1.37713 -0.31962 -0.85832 0.096739 0.981853405 
1988 -1.16393 -0.03806 -1.00988 -0.02378 1.765479741 
1989 -1.16393 -0.29588 -0.70602 0.119595 1.052834375 
1990 0.001762 -0.25823 -0.37021 0.344612 0.208145658 
1991 -0.01065 0.259147 -0.00253 0.309611 0.240021831 
1992 0.353272 0.270495 -0.62865 0.453463 0.363840837 
1993 0.282552 -0.49415 0.102502 0.445911 -0.170270033 
1994 0.205252 0.897594 -1.19321 0.481034 1.319219375 
1995 0.128209 1.264454 0.303733 0.50039 0.650313695 
1996 -0.2749 1.408199 0.494774 0.690124 0.539396453 
1997 1.285675 1.403936 0.448494 0.907778 0.208145658 
1998 1.139679 1.361178 0.146404 0.783513 0.482154921 
1999 1.083325 1.268709 0.47894 0.830162 0.240021831 
2000 1.504583 1.183156 -0.01602 0.816226 -1.39208 
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Y^ e e2 de de2 tax effort 
-1.03311 -0.00331 1.0962E-05 1.003205
-0.92379 -0.43896 0.19268308 -0.43565 0.189787 1.47517
-0.85195 -0.03519 0.00123802 0.403771 0.163031 1.0413
-0.75575 -0.08342 0.00695926 -0.04824 0.002327 1.110383
-0.34234 -0.35794 0.12811907 -0.27452 0.075359 2.045563
-0.2886 0.496741 0.24675145 0.854678 0.730475 -0.72124
-0.01672 -0.08063 0.00650059 -0.57737 0.333353 5.822744
-0.29134 0.08384 0.00702919 0.164466 0.027049 0.712222
0.030634 0.333207 0.11102688 0.249367 0.062184 11.87707
-0.01219 0.054959 0.00302054 -0.27825 0.077422 -3.51023
0.153421 -0.25077 0.06288324 -0.30572 0.093468 -0.63449
0.61173 0.222217 0.04938036 0.472982 0.223712 1.36326
0.940076 -0.15732 0.02474828 -0.37953 0.144045 0.832656
0.711879 0.018691 0.00034935 0.176007 0.030978 1.026256
0.638117 1.017965 1.03625252 0.999274 0.998549 2.595263
0.755514 -0.1052 0.01106705 -1.12316 1.261499 0.860757
1.359804 -0.45088 0.20328959 -0.34568 0.119492 0.668425
1.221372 -0.23952 0.05736905 0.211358 0.044672 0.803894
1.193512 0.571968 0.32714718 0.811486 0.65851 1.479231
1.049563 0.003271 1.0702E-05 -0.5687 0.323416 1.003117
0.219631 -0.01149 0.00013192 -0.01476 0.000218 0.947706
0.388566 -0.14854 0.02206551 -0.13706 0.018785 0.617711
0.329299 0.034542 0.00119316 0.183087 0.033521 1.104896
-0.17633 0.006058 3.6698E-05 -0.02848 0.000811 0.965644
0.896004 0.423216 0.17911164 0.417158 0.174021 1.472337
0.794251 -0.14394 0.02071782 -0.56715 0.321662 0.818777
1.193515 -0.65412 0.42787091 -0.51018 0.260285 0.451939
0.138069 0.070077 0.00491072 0.724195 0.524458 1.507547
0.245887 0.236268 0.05582235 0.166191 0.027619 1.960877
0.181598 0.058424 0.00341336 -0.17784 0.031628 1.321722
-0.61433 -0.77775 0.60489046 -0.83617 0.699182 1.366
3.79598995 7.651519
2.015685
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Glossary  
 
Rentier economy: an economy that relies heavily on external sources 
of income (Ryan, 2002). Rentier states differ from non-rentier states 
whose income depends on domestic taxation (O'Leary, Lustick, & 
Callaghy, 2001). Over-dependence on oil has also helped to create a 
group of “rentier states,” which, in a number of cases, have failed to 
translate the benefits of oil to generate a level of industrialization 
compatible with other parts of the developing world (Kohli; Chung-In 
Moon; Sørensen, 2003). 
 
Tax effort: is defined as the is the exertion a country puts into collecting 
its tax revenue, given the tax handles available to the country ( Leuthold, 
2002). This means that the tax effort is the extent to which a country 
utilises its taxable capacity (Gillis, 1989). 
 
Tax effort index: An indicator can be measured by dividing the tax 
burden by the taxable capacity (Le Minh et al., 2008). 
  
Tax burden:  is the burden to which an entire society is subjected in 
terms of tax cost(Black, 1997).   
  
Taxable capacity: is the maximum limit up to which people can 
normally pay taxes, (Deepashree, 2006, p.28). In other words, it is the 
optimal size of tax revenues. According to Howard (2001, p. 162) 
“taxable capacity can be interpreted as the amount of tax which could 
be justly or fairly imposed on a country ". 
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Excess burden: (Also called Deadweight-loss) is an allocative 
inefficiency, which can be described as the sum of all losses in 
productivity caused by excessive taxation in a society (Auerbach, 1985). 
More clearly, excess burden it refers to the loss in revenue brought about 
by a distortionary tax relative to a lump-sum tax for the same reduction in 
utility." (Pestieau, 2006, p. 159).  
Tax basis: (Also called tax base or tax handle) .That which is taxed, e.g. 
income, wealth, property, expenditure or consumption. A government can 
raise its total tax revenue by using several tax bases. Originally little was 
taxed because of problems of valuation and collection; gradually, there 
has been a movement from indirect taxes on imports and various types of 
consumption to income tax and property tax (Rutherford, 1995). 
Tax basis size: The quantity or amount (value) of the tax basis. 
Vertical tax equity:  Fairness in the tax system is defined by 
economists in terms of horizontal and vertical equity. Vertical equity 
refers to the relative amounts of taxes paid by people with different 
incomes. The rate structure of our income tax reflects the adoption of a 
principle of vertical equity called progressivity, which means that as 
one's income rises the proportion of income that one pays as a tax rises. 
(Pollack, 1996). This means that vertical tax equity concerns the way 
taxes are distributed among taxpayers with different abilities to pay. 
Horizontal equity:  this principle holds that people similarly situated 
should be taxed alike, which is translated under an income tax into the 
principle that people with the same income (properly defined) should pay 
the same tax (Pollack, 1996) . This means that horizontal tax equity 
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concerns the way taxes are distributed among taxpayers with the same 
ability to pay. 
Tax avoidance: A taxpayer's careful arrangement of his/her activities and 
business affairs to minimize liability to taxation (Rutherford, 1995). 
Tax evasion: Reduction of one's tax burden by inaccurate statements of 
income and other circumstances relevant to tax liability. The amount of 
evasion depends on the probability of being detected in such conduct and 
the penalties for such offences (Rutherford, 1995).  
Tax reform: A change in a tax system which attempts to improve 
allocation, efficiency and equity. Tax reform usually takes the form of 
reducing the number of separate rates of tax and abolishing many tax 
allowances (Rutherford, 1995). 
The compensating variation, CV, is the amount of money that must be 
given to a loser, or taken from a gainer, in order to keep the individual on 
the initial indifference curve (Creedy, 2006). 
The equivalent variation, EV, (also called extortionary variation), is the 
amount that the individual would be prepared to pay, in the new situation, 
to avoid the price change (Creedy, 2006). 
The statutory taxpayer: the identity of the person upon whom the law 
officially imposes the tax (Economic Report of the President, 2004). In 
other words, it is the statutory taxpayer who physically pays the tax. 
The economic taxpayer: the identity of the person who bears the final 
burden of the tax because of the shifting of tax burden (Economic Report 
of the President , 2004). 
Jihad tax: Is a symbolic tax, meant to the purposes of defense, and it was 
payable under Law 44 of 1970 and levied on personal incomes and 
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corporation profits (The Business Environment, 2009). In other words, 
jihad tax is withheld monthly from earned income. It is imposed on gross 
income less the Social Unity Fund contribution and the employee’s social 
security contribution at the following rates: 1% if monthly income does 
not exceed LD 50.; 2% if monthly income does not exceed LD 100.;  3% 
if monthly income exceeds LD 100 (Gidirin, 2011). 
  
 
 
